

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THE FATHERS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

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THE FATHERS

OF

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

BY

R. D. HAMPDEN, D.D.

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The substance of the following work has been already presented to the public in several Articles by the Author, which have appeared successively under the titles of Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates, in a recent edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

As these Articles all related to one definite period in the History of Ancient Philosophy, and are intimately connected with one another; it was suggested to the Author, that they might advantageously be combined as a whole in a separate Volume.

For this purpose, accordingly, a revision of them has been undertaken, and considerable additions have been made under each head of the Inquiry; so as to convey, it is hoped, a more accurate and full information concerning the state of Philosophy during the period in question.

In contemplating this period as a whole, there can be no doubt that the philosophy of Aristotle occupies the foreground; whether we regard it, as giving a systematic form, and definite expression, to what had been before, either indiscriminately taught, or only sketched in outline and shadow, under the general name of Philosophy, by his immediate predecessors; or refer to its established empire in the world, and its effects subsisting even in our own times; especially as these are manifested in

the high authority still attributed to those masterly works, the Treatises of Logic, Rhetoric, and Ethics, the glory of his philosophic genius.

The attention of the reader has therefore been naturally directed to Aristotle in the first instance. Next, on the same principle, would follow the inquiry into the Philosophy of Plato; as, in like manner, the development of the teaching of Socrates, so far as it was a consequence of that teaching. Looking, thus, at the results of the lines of thought and tendencies existing in their antecedents, we shall be better enabled to trace out the respective contributions of each Philosopher to the common result. By thus prosecuting the order of study, we shall be acting in the spirit of that direction of the greatest of modern philosophers; where he bids us, if we would rightly estimate any particular science, not "stand on the level with it, but climb up, as it were, into the watch-tower of some higher science," and so, taking the prospect of it from above, explore the more remote, as well as the more interior, parts of it, then made apparent to the view.*

* Bacon, *De Aug. Scient.* Works, 8vo, ed. 1857, vol. i. p. 460.

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ARISTOTLE.

THE power of philosophy in fixing an impression of itself on the world, appears, when attentively viewed, no less than that evidenced in successful exertions of civil or military talents. But there is a striking difference in the comparative interest excited by the philosopher himself, and by the distinguished statesman or general. The personal fortunes of the philosopher are not connected with the effects of his philosophy. He has passed away from the eyes of men, when his powerful agency begins to be perceived; whereas the statesman and the commander of armies are at once set before us in the very effects which they produce on the world; and the history which tells of their policy or their conquests assumes almost the character of their biographies.

This contrast is strongly displayed in the instance of the particular philosopher whose life we would now retrace. At this day, after the lapse of more than twenty-one centuries from the time when he flourished, we are experiencing the power of Aristotle's philosophy, in its effects on language, and literature, and science, and even on theology; and yet little satisfactory information can be obtained from Antiquity respecting the philosopher himself. No account of him appears to have been given until his celebrity had attracted envy as well as admiration; so that we are compelled to receive with suspicion everything beyond the simple detail of a few facts.

Stagirus,[1] a Grecian city in the peninsula of Chalcidice,

[1] It is also written Stagira. We have the authority of Herodotus and Thucydides for Stagirus.

colonized originally from the island of Andros, and afterwards from Chalcis in Eubœa, was the birthplace of Aristotle. His father was Nicomachus, the physician and friend of Amyntas II., king of Macedonia; his mother, Phæstis: both of Chalcidian descent. The origin of his family is referred to Machaon, son of Æsculapius. Such a tradition of descent, however, is but an ennobling of the fact that the art of healing was the hereditary profession of the family.[1] The date assigned to his birth is B.C. 384.

Being left an orphan in early youth, Aristotle appears to have quitted his home, and gone to the house of Proxenus, a citizen of Atarneus, in Mysia, to whose guardianship he had been committed; and with him to have continued until his seventeenth year when he repaired to the great University of the world at that time—the school of Plato at Athens. Different accounts are given of the commencement of his application to philosophy. By one it is ascribed to a direction of the Pythian oracle.[2] Others state that philosophy was his last resource, when other schemes of life had failed; that, having exhausted a large patrimony, he became a military adventurer, and after that a seller of drugs; until at length, on accidentally entering the school of Plato, he there received a sudden impulse to the studies of his future life. These last statements, however, are not reconcilable with the period of youth at which his discipleship to Plato began. Nor are they consistent with the alleged fact, that his mind had been from the first trained to philosophy by his father Nicomachus.[3]

We can readily suppose that the extraordinary talent for science, and laborious devotion to it, which his mature age developed, would give some indications of themselves in his earlier years. Hence the expressions attributed to Plato, complimenting him as "the intellect of the school," and "the reader,"

[1] Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*; Dionys. Halicar. *De Demosth. et Aristot.*; Ammon. in *Aristot.*

[2] Ammon. in *Aristot.*

[3] His father Nicomachus has the reputation of being the author of some philosophical works.

and comparing his ardour and forwardness to the spirit of a restive colt.[1]

He remained at Athens, a hearer of Plato, twenty years; leaving it only at the death of that philosopher, B.C. 348, and then returning to Atarneus. Disappointment at not succeeding to the chair of Plato in the Academy, has been assigned as the reason of his departure. All that appears, however, is, that he left Athens in compliance with an invitation from Hermias, who, having been his fellow-disciple in the school of Plato, had established himself at that time in independence against the King of Persia, as Tyrant, or Sovereign Prince, of Atarneus and its neighbourhood. It appears to have formed part of the state of Princes in those times, to receive the philosophers, and poets, and other literary men, at their courts, and thus to have formed circles of civilization around them. We hear of Solon at the court of Crœsus; Simonides and Pindar at that of Hiero; Anacreon with Polycrates, Tyrant of Samos; Euripides with Archilaus; Plato with Dionysius. Literary men then, as indeed would be especially necessary, when books were few and scarcely to be obtained, sought information by travelling; and such may have been in great measure the object of this visit of Aristotle to Atarneus.[2] Here he spent the following three years of his life; when the unhappy end of his friend Hermias, who fell a sacrifice to his ambition, and was executed as a rebel against Persia, compelled him to seek a refuge for himself by flight to Mitylene. Nor did he in this extremity forget the ties of friendship which had connected him with the unfortunate Tyrant of Atarneus. To support the fallen family, he married Pythias, the adopted daughter, but variously described both as the sister and as the niece of Hermias.

[1] Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*; Ammon. *in Aristot.*; Ælian. *Var. Hist.* iv. 9.

[2] Herodotus (III. 139) alludes to persons following the expedition of Cambyses into Egypt for the purpose of viewing the country:—Καμβύσεω τοῦ Κύρου στρατευομένου ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον, ἄλλοι τε συχνοὶ εἰς τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀπίκοντο Ἑλλήνων, οἱ μὲν, ὡς εἰκὸς, κατ' ἐμπορίην, οἱ δὲ, στρατευόμενοι· οἱ δέ τινες καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρης θεηταί. Aristotle himself, in Ethic. viii., shews by the remark, that "one may see also in travels, how domestic every man is to man, and friendly," that this use of travelling was nothing strange to him.

From Mitylene he proceeded into Macedonia to the court of Philip, and entered on a new scene of exertion, as the preceptor of the future sovereign of the mightiest kingdom of the ancient world—Alexander the Great, at that time a youth of fourteen years of age. The call to such an office argues the high reputation already attained by Aristotle for philosophy; though, doubtless, his introduction to the Macedonian court must have been through the interest and favour enjoyed there by his father Nicomachus. At what time, indeed, his care of the youthful prince commenced, it is not possible exactly to determine. A letter is extant, addressed by Philip to Aristotle, which would imply that the charge of the prince's education had been committed to the philosopher from the birth of Alexander. This is also far more probable than that the charge should have been postponed until the prince had reached his fourteenth year, the period at which the actual residence of Aristotle at Pella is dated. Philip states in that letter that "a son is born to him; that he is grateful to the gods, but not so much for the birth of the boy, as that he was born in the time of Aristotle; trusting that, being nurtured and trained up by the philosopher, he would be a worthy successor to his father's glory and the conduct of affairs."[1] It is certainly very possible that a plan of education proposed by Aristotle may have been carried on by others, until the more especial care of the intellectual powers demanded his personal instructions. The reception of the philosopher by the royal family was most friendly and honourable to him. The high estimation in which he was held was shewn in the influence he possessed at the Macedonian court. Philip, it is said, gave him liberal supplies of money, to enable him to pursue scientific inquiries.[2] He was most happy in the admiration and affection of his pupil. Alexander valued his instructions as those of a

[1] Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* ix. 3. The genuineness of the letter has been doubted, but without sufficient reason, if the only ground of objection is, that it could not have been received by Aristotle at Mitylene.

[2] Ælian. *Var. Hist.* iv. 19. The statement of Hermippus (Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*), that Aristotle served in the capacity of Ambassador from the Athenians to Philip, seems inconsistent with other established facts of his life.

second parent; observing, that "he was no less indebted to Aristotle than to his father; since it was through his father indeed that he lived, but through Aristotle that he lived well."[1]

It would be interesting to know what particular method was pursued by Aristotle in the education of Alexander; but we have no exact information on this point. It appears certain, however, that he made the cultivation of a taste for literature the great principle of his instructions: and this would be in conformity with the plan of education proposed in his treatise of Politics. He is known, indeed, to have made a new collection of the Iliad, expressly for the use of Alexander, and to have composed for him a treatise *On the Office of a King*, not extant among his works. How deeply the youthful king had imbibed the Homeric spirit in the discipline of his early years, was evidenced in his after-life, by the heroism with which his actions were conceived, and the poetry which mingled with the realities of his eventful history. The circumstances alone, that a copy of the Iliad was constantly at the pillow of Alexander during his expeditions, and was treasured by him with extraordinary care in the precious casket of the spoils of Darius, are characteristic of the tone of mind which his preceptor's instructions had, if not formed, at least strengthened and improved. Nor is it inconsistent with this ultimate effect, that Aristotle should have communicated to his royal pupil even the abstruse doctrines of his philosophy For, that he did so, we have evidence in Alexander's complaint, in a letter to Aristotle, of the publication of the secret wisdom in which he had himself been disciplined; and in the reply from Aristotle, "that the books alluded to were as if they had not been published, since without his oral instruction they would be unintelligible."[2] Plutarch, indeed, attributes to Aristotle's instruc-

[1] Plutarch in *Alex.* Diog. Laertius in *Aristot.* attributes to Aristotle himself a general expression to the same effect.

[2] Plutarch in *Alex.* c. 7, Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* xx. 5. This literary jealousy on the part of Alexander appears also from a passage of Aristotle, where, writing to Alexander (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 1) (if the treatise here referred to be really his), he says, "you have charged me in your letter that no other person should receive this book."

tions the fondness for medical study and practice remarkable in Alexander.[1]

A life of such premature exertion as that of Alexander left comparatively little time for the mere business of philosophical instruction. Succeeding to the throne of his father at the age of 20 years, he was from that time immersed in affairs of policy and war; and even previously, he had been forwardly engaged in the services of the field, as also for a short interval in the conduct of the government. Still the society of Aristotle appears to have been cherished by him, so that the philosopher continued a resident at the court for two years after the accession of Alexander; leaving Macedonia only on the occasion of Alexander's setting out on his Asiatic campaigns, B.C. 334.[2] It is probable that Aristotle was indisposed to the hurry and restlessness of military expeditions, and longed for a repose more congenial to his taste in the philosophic bowers of the suburbs of Athens. Circumstances also had prepared the way for the separation. For though Alexander, it seems, never entirely lost his respect for his preceptor, the cordiality of their intercourse had in some measure abated. A commencement of alienation in the feelings of Alexander had been evidenced.[3] Aristotle, accordingly, embraced the opportunity then offered of returning to Athens; and Callisthenes of Olynthus, his relative and pupil, supplied his place among the party of philosophers by whom the king was accompanied in the Asiatic expedition.

It was fortunate for science that the intercourse between the king and the philosopher was not broken off by their separation. The conquests of Alexander presented singular opportunities for a collection of observations on Natural history. Under the superintendence, accordingly, of Aristotle, some thousands of

[1] Plutarch in *Alex.*

[2] Ammonius, in his *Life of Aristotle,* asserts that Aristotle accompanied Alexander into Asia, and conferred with the Brahmans, where he composed "the two hundred and fifty Polities." How much credit may be attached to this author, appears from his making Aristotle a disciple of Socrates for three years, whereas Socrates had been dead sixteen years before the birth of Aristotle.

[3] Plutarch in *Alex.*

persons, it is said, were employed in making inquiries on the subject throughout Asia and in Greece. And we have still valuable fruits of these inquiries, in a *History of Animals*, in ten books, extant among the works of Aristotle ; though this history must be but a small part of the fifty volumes to which Pliny says it extended.[1]

In the absence, however, of Aristotle, an event occurred which had the effect of exciting most unjust surmises against him, and involving him in unmerited disgrace with Alexander. A conspiracy was formed against the life of the king by some noble youths who attended on his person. The conspirators were detected and punished. But the chief blame of the whole affair rested on Callisthenes; to whom the education of the youths had been especially committed, and under whose sanction, accordingly, they were conceived to have acted in their traitorous designs. The imputation was the more credible, as Callisthenes had distinguished himself by his opposition to the adulation of the courtiers, and the rude freedom with which, in spite of the admonitions of Aristotle,[2] he asserted his democratic principles. How far he was really guilty may admit a doubt. A pretext at least was afforded for the removal of an obnoxious individual. Callisthenes was imprisoned, and died a violent death. His connection with Aristotle gave a plea for extending the charge to Aristotle himself; who, it is represented, became so fearful of the result to himself, after the death of Callisthenes, as to have been actually instrumental to the murder of the king. He is stated to have sent a very subtle poison, called Stygian water, in a mule's hoof, the only material impregnable to it, to Antipater, and thus to have occasioned the death of the king.[3] The account,

[1] Plin. viii. 16.

[2] Aristotle is said expressly to have cautioned Callisthenes in the words of Thetis to Achilles (*Iliad*, xviii. 95):

Ὠκύμορος δή μοι, τέκος, ἔσσεαι, οἷ' ἀγορεύεις.

"Swift is the fate, my child, such words as thine bespeak."

And generally to have admonished him to converse, either very seldom, or else most courteously, with the king. Valer. Maxim. vii. 2. Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*

[3] Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* vii. 27.; Plin. xxx. 16; Xiphilin. in *Caracalla;* Qu. Curtius, viii. 6; Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Philos.* in *Aristot.*

improbable in itself, is sufficiently refuted by the real state of the case, which shews that Alexander fell a sacrifice to his intense exertions in an unhealthy climate. It was probably invented and propagated by the rival sophists who surrounded the person of Alexander. To the same source may be ascribed the first estrangement of the king, and his increased aversion to the philosopher in consequence of the affair of Callisthenes. Alexander pointedly shewed his increased dislike, by sending a present of money to Xenocrates; thus placing that philosopher, as well as Anaximenes, whom he also now more particularly noticed, in triumphant contrast with Aristotle, as the objects of his patronage.[1]

In the meantime Aristotle was pursuing his proper path of exertion at Athens as a lecturer in philosophy, in his own school of the Lyceum. There is no good reason for supposing that he was actuated in forming a separate school, as some have asserted, by contemptuous opposition to Xenocrates, or jealousy of the rhetorical fame of Isocrates.[2] His own fame already stood sufficiently high. Numbers resorted to him for instruction. In the morning and evening of each day he was thronged with hearers; the morning class consisting of his more intimate and peculiar disciples, the evening class of hearers of a more general description. The distinction of these two classes corresponds with the difference between his "acroamatic" or "esoteric" and his "exoteric" philosophy. The application of these terms to the writings of Aristotle has been much controverted. The most simple account of them appears to be, that the acroamatic or esoteric were more of text-books, notices of various points of philosophy to be filled up by the previous knowledge of the learner and the explanations of the teacher, as lectures addressed to his own proper class; the exoteric were more elaborate and popular disquisitions, more expanded in the reasonings, more diffuse in the matter.[3] His disciples obtained the appellation

[1] Diog. Laert. in *Arist.*; Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Philos.* in *Xenocrat.*

[2] Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*; Cicero, *Tusc. Qu.* i. 4: *Orator.* iii. 35; Quinctil, *Inst. Orat.* iii. 1.

[3] Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* xx. 5; Plutarch in *Alex.*

of Peripatetics; but the reason of this is also controverted. Perhaps, like some other party-names, or names of sects, it was originally given in contempt.[1]

The reputation of Aristotle at length rose to a dangerous popularity. The intolerant spirit of paganism viewed with suspicion the spread of philosophical teaching, as tending to unsettle the existing government through their effect on the vulgar superstition. This had been strikingly shewn at Athens not long before the birth of Aristotle, in the fate of Socrates.[2] In the case of Aristotle there were enemies watching to apply the policy of the state to the cruel purposes which their envy had suggested. For twelve years, it seems, no opportunity of attack presented itself; since he continued his labours at Athens for that time. Probably the name of Alexander had been itself a shelter to him against their malice. But the alienation of the royal favour gave an opening to their designs; and, on the death of Alexander, B.C. 323, he became the marked object of persecution. Through the agency of the hierophant Eurymedon, with whom was associated a powerful citizen, by name Demophilus, a direct accusation of impiety was brought against him before the court of Areopagus. He was charged with introducing doctrines adverse to the religion of Greece.[3] It was alleged that he had paid divine honours both to Hermias and Pythias; to the former by a hymn in praise of his virtue, to the latter by celebrating her memory (for she was then dead) with the Eleusinian rites,[4] and to both by statues of them erected at Delphi. He saw that he had no chance of a favourable hearing against so formidable a conspiracy, and that his death was fully determined by his

[1] The practice of teaching in walking was not peculiar to Aristotle (Ælian. *Var. Hist.* i. 19; Diog. Laert. iii. 11; Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Philosoph.* vol. i. p. 788). Indeed the term περίπατος was applied to "discussion" before the time of Aristotle. Aristophanes uses it humorously in *Ran.* 940, 951, in this sense. The custom appears to have been for the hearers to sit at the lectures of the philosophers. Cleon, in *Thuc.* iii. 38, compares the Athenian Assembly to "persons sitting spectators of sophists."

[2] B.C. 400.

[3] See Origen. *con. Cels.* i. p. 52, ii. p. 68.

[4] The profanation of the mysteries was not an unknown occurrence at Athens. See *Thuc.* vi. 28, 61.

enemies; knowing too well the malignant sycophancy[1] which domineered at Athens. Instead, therefore, of confronting the charge, he made his escape to Chalcis, alleging to his friends, in allusion to the death of Socrates, "that he was unwilling to involve the Athenians in a second crime against philosophy."[2]

Some public honours at Delphi, probably a statue of himself with an inscription commemorating his former services to the Delphians, had been conferred on him by a public vote of the citizens. These honours were now recalled. The indignity made a deep impression on his feelings: yet he bore it with a becoming magnanimity. For in writing to his friend Antipater concerning it, he thus expresses himself—"Concerning what was decreed to me at Delphi, of which I am now deprived, I so feel, as neither to be excessively concerned, nor yet to be without concern about it." These were not the words, as Ælian, who reports them, says, of vain ambition, but the just sentiments of one who, though he may not have cared for the honour itself, felt the insult of the deprivation.[3] He did not long survive his retreat to Chalcis—little more, probably, than a year. He was then advanced in life, and broken with bodily infirmities as well as with dejection of spirit. On the approach of death, he declared his wish, it is said, with regard to his successor at the Lyceum. Theophrastus of Lesbos and Menedemus of Rhodes were the most conspicuous candidates for that honour. But the dying philosopher, avoiding a pointed rejection of either, delicately intimated his preference of Theophrastus, by calling for cups of Lesbian and Rhodian wine, and, when he had tasted them, simply observing, ἡδίων ὁ Λέσβιος, "*The sweeter is the Lesbian.*"[4] The expression was the more appropriate, as sweetness was the characteristic of the style of Theophrastus.

The mode of his death is variously related. One account is,

[1] Well described by him with allusion to the origin of the term "sycophant," in a quotation from Homer, Od. vii., 120, 121:—

Ὄγχνη ἐπ' ὄγχνῃ γηράσκει . . .
. . . σῦκον δ' ἐπὶ σύκῳ.

[2] Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*; Ammon. in *Aristot.*; Origen. *con. Cels.* i. p. 51, edit. Cantab.; Ælian. *Var. Hist.* iii. 36; Athenæus, xv. 16.

[3] Ælian. *Var. Hist.* xiv. 1.

[4] Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* xiii. 5.

that he died from vexation at not being able to explain the current of the Euripus.[1] Another story, less incredible than this, asserts that he drank aconite, in anticipation of the adverse judgment of the Areopagus.[2] The only probable account is; that he died from a natural decay of the powers of the stomach; his constitution being worn out by excessive watching and study. How exhaustless his application of mind was, may be judged from the anecdote related of him, that in resting himself on his couch, he would hold a brass ball in his hand in such a way, that the noise of its falling into a basin underneath might disturb his slumbers.[3] Another anecdote, shewing the like restless spirit of inquiry, is, that on some occasion of sickness, he observed to his physician; "Treat me not as you would a driver of oxen or a digger, but tell me the cause, and you will find me obedient."[4]

His fellow-citizens shewed great respect to his memory. They conveyed his body to *Stagirus*, and erected a shrine and altar over his tomb. In gratitude also for the restoration of their city, effected through his interest with the Macedonian court, and the new code of laws which he had been permitted to frame for them, they instituted a festival called Aristotelea, and gave the name of Stagirite to the month in which the festival was held. Plutarch says that even in his time they shewed the stone seats and shaded walks of the philosopher.[5] The grant of a gymnasium had been among the advantages which he had obtained for his native city.

Aristotle was twice married. After the death of Pythias, by whom he had a daughter of the same name, he married Herpyllis, a fellow-citizen. By Herpyllis he had a son, Nicomachus, who became a disciple of Theophrastus, but died in battle at an early age.[6] He adopted also as a son, Nicanor, the son of

[1] Justin Martyr, *Coll. ad. Græc.;* Greg. Nazianz. *Orat.* iii. p. 79; Bayle *Dict.* art. *Aristot.* note z.

[2] Hesych. in *Aristot.;* Suidas, *Fabric. Bibl. Gr.* vol. ii. p. 109; Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*

[3] Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*

[4] Ælian. *Var. Hist.* ix. 23.

[5] Plutarch in *Alex.*

[6] Aristocles apud Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* xv. 2.

Proxenus, the friend of his youth, and by the directions of his will gave his daughter Pythias to him in marriage. Pythias, by her third husband Metrodorus, had a son named after the philosopher.

In his extant will we have a pleasing evidence of his amiable concern for his surviving family. It contains affectionate provisions, not only for his wife and children, but for his slaves also; expressly enjoining that no one of those who had served him should be sold, but that each should be freed on attaining manhood, according to his deserts.[1]

The fondness of the Greeks for apophthegm has handed down some reputed sayings of the philosopher, such as the following: —Being asked "in what the educated differ from the uneducated," he said, "as much as the living from the dead." Again, to the question, "What grows old soon?" he answered "Gratitude;" "What is hope?" "The dream of one awakened." To one boasting that he was from a great city, "Not this," he said, "should one look to, but who was worthy of a great country." "Some men," he observed, "lived so parsimoniously as if they were to live for ever, whilst others spent, as if they were to die immediately." Being blamed for giving alms to a person of no worth: "It was not to the man," he said, "I gave, but to mankind."[2]

In body, Aristotle, if we may believe the accounts of his person, was deficient in the requisite symmetry. He is described as having slender legs and little eyes. To these defects were added a feeble voice and hesitating utterance.[3] Unlike philosophers in general of that age, he attended to the ornament of his person. His hair was shorn; he wore several rings; and was elegant throughout in his dress.[4] His health was infirm; but he

[1] Diog. Laert in *Aristot.*

[2] Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.* The same author mentions an instance of Aristotle's foiling the cynic Diogenes in some premeditated witticism, and gives some expressions by which Aristotle characterized certain philosophers, such as calling Socrates "a shortlived tyranny." The point of these passages, at any rate, escapes the modern reader.

[3] Diog. Laert. τραυλὸς τὴν φωνήν.

[4] Diog. Laert.; Ælian. *Var. Hist.* iii. 19.

sustained it by habits of temperance, and by that medical skill which he possessed in an eminent degree, so as to protract his life to the 63d year, B.C. 322.

Of his moral qualities, the zeal of philosophical rivalry has transmitted the most discordant accounts.[1] Some have been as extravagant in their praises as others have been in their censures. By some, his patriotism, his affection for his friends, and reverence for his preceptor Plato[2]—his moderation, and modesty, and love of truth—have been held up to admiration. By others, again, no crime has been thought too bad to be imputed to him. He has been stigmatised as a parasite, as gluttonous, effeminate, sordid,[3] ungrateful, impious. Among his faults, too, have been mentioned a sneering cast of countenance, and an impertinent loquacity. In particular, he has been accused of assailing Plato with captious questions, and thus forcing the old man, when in his eightieth year, to retire to the privacy of his garden.[4] Whilst, however, the circumstances in which he lived, exalted as he was by the favour of kings, and by eminence in philosophy, afford a strong presumption that the dark side of the picture has at least been overcharged,[5] we have a more decisive evidence to the truth of the favourable representations of his character in the temper and spirit of his extant writings. Throughout these, there is a candour, and manliness, and love of truth, strikingly discernible; not professedly set forth, but interwoven with the texture of his discussions, and rather betrayed unconsciously than obtruding itself on our notice, and demanding to be recognized. His ethical writings, especially, breathe a pure morality, such as we find in no antecedent philosopher; a morality also avowedly practical, and by which he would have stood self-condemned had his own conduct been at variance with it.

[1] Cicero remarks the malignity of the Greeks in their censures of each other —Sit ista in Græcorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos a quibus de veritate dissentiunt. De Fin. ii. 25.

[2] Ammonius says he dedicated an altar to Plato, inscribing it to him as "a man whom for the bad even to praise would be profane."

[3] Hence the story of his selling the oil which he had used medicinally about his person. (Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.*)

[4] Ælian. *Var. Hist.* iii. 19.

[5] See Aristocles apud Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* xv. 2.

ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY.

Account of the Writings of Aristotle and reception of his Philosophy.

The preservation of the original copies of the writings of Aristotle is a curious fact in literary history. Whilst the philosopher distributed his other property to his surviving family, he left the more precious bequest of his writings to Theophrastus, his favourite disciple and successor in the Lyceum. By Theophrastus they were bequeathed to Neleus, his scholar, by whom they were conveyed from Greece into Asia Minor, to the city of Scepsis, where he resided. The heirs of Neleus, to whom they next descended, were private individuals, not philosophers by profession, who were only anxious for the safe custody of their literary treasure. The magnificence of kings had then begun to display itself in the collection of libraries; and the works of genius were sought out with an eager and lavish curiosity. It was a taste happy for the cause of literature; to which, perhaps, the example of Alexander's noble fondness for everything connected with intellectual energy had principally led. Aristotle himself, indeed, is said to have been the first to form a library.[1] He was the first, probably, to form one on an extensive scale. The Scepsians, into whose hands his works had now fallen, fearful of the literary rapacity of the kings of Pergamos, resorted to the selfish expedient of secreting the writings under ground. The volumes remained in this concealment until at length their very existence seems to have been forgotten; and they would thus have been lost to the world, but for the accidental discovery of them after the lapse of 130 years. His philosophy had been traditionally propagated; for we hear of Peripatetics at this time. Portions, indeed, of his works must, doubtless, have continued in circulation among the disciples of the Lyceum, serving in some measure as a record of the principles

[1] Strabo, xiii.

of the sect. Much may have been preserved from memory: for we have little notion now of the impression made by *viva voce* instruction, when it was the only channel of knowledge to the generality. A Peripatetic philosopher, accordingly, Apellicon of Teos, whom Strabo, however, characterizes as a lover of books rather than a lover of science—φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος[1]—purchased the recovered volumes, and effectually retrieved them for the world. He employed several copyists in transcribing them, himself superintending the task. Unfortunately, much was irreparably lost, the writings being mouldered with the dampness of the place in which they had so long been deposited. In addition to these damages of time, they were now further impaired by misdirected endeavours to restore the effaced text of the author.

This account, which rests ultimately on the authority of Strabo, has been much canvassed by modern critics. But while the testimony of Strabo may be received as to the facts which he relates, and which Plutarch derives from him, the inferential part of his account is not borne out by the real state of the case, with regard to the extent of the knowledge of Aristotle's works. What Strabo says may be true of certain copies, perhaps autographs of Aristotle's works; but cannot be true generally of copies of them. For Athenæus mentions Ptolemy Philadelphus having purchased from Neleus, Aristotle's works, with those of other philosophers. And it further appears from the writings of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle, that those of an earlier age, whose writings are not extant, but are cited, or referred to, by the later, had several, if not the chief part, of the treatises of Aristotle before them.

The works of Aristotle, or rather the copies of them thus obtained, were conveyed by Apellicon to Athens, their proper home, though no longer perfect in the text, or such exactly as the author had left them. Here this collection of them remained until the spoliation of the city by Sylla. The library of Apellicon

[1] Strabo, xiii. p. 609. Aristocles in Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* xv. 2, speaks of Apellicon as the author of some writings on Aristotle.

was a tempting object of plunder to the Romans, who were now awakened to the value of literature; and Aristotle's works accordingly were carried away to Rome amidst the other rich spoils. At Rome they experienced a better fortune. Tyrannio, a learned Greek, who had been a prisoner of war to Lucullus, and was then enjoying the freedom granted to him as a resident at Rome, was the principal instrument in their future publication. Obtaining access to the library of Sylla, he made additional copies of the writings. His labours were followed by Andronicus the Rhodian, who at length edited the collected works of Aristotle, at a distance of nearly 300 years from the time when they were composed.[1]

Meanwhile other sects in philosophy had sprung up, and engaged the attention of the world. The Stoics, and the Epicureans, among others, had formed their respective parties. Platonism had obtained permanent establishment at Alexandria. The disciples of Aristotle, on the contrary, had to struggle against the disadvantage of the loss, except, it seems, in some detached portions, of the authoritative records of their master's philosophy. When, however, these records were fully published, they were studied with extraordinary eagerness. A multitude of commentators arose, who exercised their acuteness and ingenuity in explaining the sense of the philosopher. As Aristotle himself by his personal teaching had transcended the fame of his contemporaries, so his philosophy rose up from its long sleep to triumph over every other that had previously engaged the public

[1] Plutarch in *Sylla;* Bayle's *Dict.* art. Tyrannio, note D; Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Philos.* vol. i. p. 799. Andronicus flourished about B.C. 60. The rise of philosophy at Rome was contemporary with him. Cicero in *Tusc. Qu.* i. 1, says, "Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem." He mentions, too, in *Fin.* iii. 3, of finding "commentarios quosdam Aristotelios," in the villa of Lucullus. In the Topica ad Trebatium, c. 1, Cicero further speaks of the prevailing ignorance of Aristotle's works among the philosophers of his time. He does not wonder, he says, "at the ignorance of Aristotle's Topics in an eminent rhetorician of that age; as Aristotle was unknown to the philosophers themselves, except to very few;" qui ab ipsis philosophis, præter admodum paucos, ignorarctur. Athenæus, i. p. 3, says the books of Aristotle were purchased of Neleus by Ptolemy Philadelphus, for the library of Alexandria. This may also be true of detached portions of Aristotle's works, or copies of such portions.

mind. Platonism, indeed, modified as it was by Ammonius and his successors, continued to be fostered in the early ages of the Christian church, in consequence of the theological cast which it had assumed, and its facility of accommodation to Christian truth. But in the progress of the Church, when Christianity needed to be maintained, not so much by accession from the ranks of paganism, as by controversial ability within its own pale, a more exact method was required. Here, then, the philosophy of Aristotle asserted its value and its pre-eminence.

But it was only a partial Aristotelic philosophy that was at first established. His logical treatises had been studied during the ascendancy of Platonism, for their use in arming the disputant with subtle distinctions, and enabling him accurately to state his peculiar notions in Theology. The same occasion still existed for the acuteness of the expert logician, even after the decline of Platonism, in the state of theological controversies. It was still, therefore, chiefly as a logical philosopher, through the several treatises which pass under the name of the *Organon*, that Aristotle was known throughout Christendom. In the west of Europe, indeed, the cloud of ignorance which had covered the lands with thick darkness, limited the attainments even of the learned to a narrow field. The original language of Aristotle's Philosophy was gradually almost forgotten; and the generality were restricted to such of his writings as were translated by the few learned men, the luminaries of the long night of the middle ages. The peculiar exigencies of the times, and the taste of the learned themselves, led to the translation in particular of the logical treatises. That on the "Categories" appears to have been the one principally known among Christians. Nor were these translations always made from the original Greek; but, on the contrary, were in most instances versions of versions. For its knowledge of Greek literature, the west of Europe was indebted to Arabian civilization. The Arabians had, together with their conquests in Spain, imported their knowledge of the Greek philosophy, the seeds of which had been scattered in the East by the learning of the Nestorian Christians. Translations had

been made into Arabic, of the Greek authors, and among these, of Treatises of Aristotle. Jews at the same period were resident in great numbers in Andalusia, the principal seat of Arabic literature. These, by their commercial intercourse with Christians and Mahometans, served as a channel through which the Greek philosophy was carried on from the Spanish Arabians to the Christians of the West. For the purpose of communication, the Arabic versions of Aristotle were translated into Latin, the universal language of early European literature. And thus was the foundation laid of that Scholastic Philosophy, through which the dominion of Aristotle was afterwards extended over Europe.

But the occupation of Constantinople by the Latins, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, was the opening of a new era in the literary history of Europe. Greater facilities were afforded by this event for the knowledge of the Greek language. Aristotle began then to be no longer known chiefly as a logician. His physical, metaphysical, and moral treatises were more extensively explored and studied; though at first objection was made to the Physics by the Papal authority. He was thenceforth recognized under the title of *Princeps Philosophorum*. His logic, indeed, maintained its ascendancy in the Schools of Europe; but it was not applied exclusively, as at first, to Theology. It was carried into those new subjects of inquiry which the extended knowledge of his writings had introduced to the learned. The spirit of disputatious subtilty, which, in the beginnings of the Scholastic philosophy, had displayed itself in the quarrels between the Nominalists and Realists, afterwards found employment in the application of logical principles to speculations in Physics and Metaphysics. At the same time Theology became more and more corrupted by the refinements of systematic exposition; until at length the accumulated mass of error became too evident to be borne, and, among other causes, produced a re-action in the Reformation of the Church.[1]

The abuse of his philosophy, thus manifested, tended greatly

[1] Roger Bacon, *Opus Majus*, part i. p. 13, 19, ed. Jebb, Lond.; Lewis's *Life of Wickliffe;* Lewis's *Life of Bishop Pecock;* Mosheim's *Eccles.*

to shake the empire which it had held over the minds of men. Had Luther, accordingly, stood alone in the work of reform, Aristotle would perhaps have been altogether banished from the schools of the Reformed. But his roughness of hand was tempered, in this point as in others, by the milder spirit of Melanchthon.

Melanchthon, whilst he had too deep an acquaintance with classical literature not to feel the charm of the writings of Plato, justly vindicated the superiority of Aristotle's philosophy as a discipline of the mind. He therefore assisted in supporting the established dominion of Aristotle in the Schools; whilst he rejected the errors to which it had administered.[1] Afterwards the disputes among Protestants themselves served to perpetuate that dominion: and, from the same cause as before, the subtilties of the Logical and Metaphysical Treatises were studied rather than the more practical parts of the philosophy. Thus, even after the labours of Bacon in dispelling the mists which the too elaborate study of Aristotle's system and method by the doctors of the Middle ages had diffused, his works continued to be read and taught in Protestant Universities. His Philosophy, during an empire of centuries, had occupied so many posts in the field of science and literature, that no other, however great the improvement, could at once displace it. For thus we find even Bacon himself, in the process of counteracting it, and introducing his "Interpretation of Nature," compelled to use a phraseology founded on the dogmas of the Schools.

It is then of great importance to examine the system of Aristotle in its own authentic sources. Such an examination will convince us, that the philosopher is not to be censured for that depravation of philosophy to which he was made subservient; but rather that, had his teaching been rightly applied, and pursued in the spirit of its author, the Schoolmen could hardly have been led into those airy and unreal speculations

Hist. vol. ii. p. 216, 218, Lond. 1823; Pegge's *Life of Bishop Grosseteste; Recherches Critiques sur l'Age et l'Origine des Traduct. Lat. d'Aristotle*, par M. Jourdain, p. 16, 81, 94, Paris, 1819.

[1] Melanchthon in *Aristot. et Platon.* ii. p. 370, iii. p. 351; Bayle's *Dict.* art. Melanchthon, note K.; Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Phil.* iv. p. 282.

which constituted their science of Nature. We are compelled, indeed, to take our estimate of it from such imperfect and often confused relics, as time has spared to us out of a far greater mass of his original writings.[1] Fortunately, however, those relics include a great variety of treatises, affording a specimen at least of his mode of philosophizing in every department of science.

State of Philosophy before Aristotle. General Character of his Philosophy.

Aristotle was the first who really separated the different sciences, and constituted them into detached systems, each on its proper principles. Before his time philosophy had existed as a vast undigested scheme of speculative inquiry, fluctuating in its form and character according to the genius and the circumstances of its leading teachers.

Thus the two great fountains of Grecian science,—the Italic school, founded by Pythagoras—the Ionic, by Thales—were both in principle mathematical; though, when we look to their actual results, as they were moulded by their respective masters, the Italic is characterized as the Ethical school, the Ionic as the Physical. Both appear to have been drawn from the same parent-source of Egyptian civilization and knowledge. The mystic combination of mathematical, physical, and moral truth exhibited in the ancient theological philosophy of Egypt, found a kindred spirit in Pythagoras. Hence that solemn religious light shed over his speculations. Mathematical science was the basis of his system. He conceived Numbers to be the primary elements of all things; regarding all other objects of thought as "imitations," or "representations," of Numbers.[2] But the system, as a whole, was a mystic contemplation of the universe, addressed to the moral and devotional feelings of man. Thales was a

[1] Diog. Laert. in *Aristot.* *συνέγραψε δὲ πάμπλειστα βιβλία.*

[2] *Metaph.* i. 6, ii. p. 848, Du Val. *Metaph.* xii. 3, p. 974. So Æschylus, instinct with Pythagorean doctrine, makes Prometheus say, *Καὶ μὴν ἀριθμὸν ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων Ἐξεῦρον αὐτοῖς.*—*Prom. Vinct.* 45. Ed. Blomfield.

philosopher of a much more simple cast. Like Pythagoras, he was devoted to mathematical study. He is said to have instructed the Egyptians how to measure the height of their pyramids by means of the shadows; and several of the theorems of the Elements of Euclid are attributed to him. But he did not, like Pythagoras, fall into the error of confounding and blending the objects and facts of the external world with the truths of abstract science. According to him, it was sufficient to shew that water was the element of all things. He sought no deeper cause in any speculation concerning the mode in which this element subsisted. The successors of Pythagoras and Thales variously modified the theories of those great masters. The physical philosophy, however, of Thales, as the more simple and intelligible, and probably also from the greater intercourse of Greece with its Asiatic Colonies than with its Italian, especially prevailed in Greece. Thus we find Socrates, who had been the disciple of Archelaus of that School, complaining that the concerns of human life had been abandoned for the subtilties of Physics. In the hands of Socrates, Philosophy resumed its moral complexion. Had it devolved on Xenophon to take the lead as the successor and interpreter of Socrates, things would probably have continued in this course, and Ethical science might henceforth have triumphed in the Grecian Schools. But the genius of Plato succeeded to the rich patrimony of the Socratic philosophy. And Plato was not one, whose ambition could be content with less than the reputation of founding a school, or whose imagination could be tied down to the realities of human life.[1] The mystical theory of Numbers taught by Pythagoras possessed a powerful charm for such a mind as that of Plato. At the same time his power of eloquent discussion found its own field of exertion, in speculating on those moral truths with which the lessons of Socrates had inspired him.

[1] Aristotle (*Rhet.* ii. 23) mentions that Aristippus, alluding to Plato's ambitious manner of expression on some point of philosophy, remarked, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅγ' ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, "our friend, at any rate (meaning Socrates), said nothing of the kind."

He had also been a hearer of Cratylus,[1] and through him had been instructed in the theory of the "perpetual flux" of nature, the great doctrine of Heraclitus. Plato accordingly applied himself to the combination of these various systems. The theory of Pythagoras was to be retained consistently with the perpetual change of all existing things according to Heraclitus, and with the immutability of Nature implied in the Socratic definitions. Definitions could not apply to any perceptible objects, if it were allowed that all such objects were constantly changing. Nor could Numbers sufficiently account for that immense variety of objects which the universe presented. There must therefore, it was concluded, be some existences, independent of the perceptible universe, the fixed objects of definitions; and there must be also an infinity of various archetypes, corresponding to the various classes of external objects. Hence he devised his doctrine of εἴδη, or Ideas; a doctrine naturally suggested to an imaginative mind, by the fixedness and universality of the notions signified by language, as contrasted with the perpetual variations of the external world. To these abstract natures, or Ideas, he assigned a real being, as objects of intellectual apprehension; accounting for the existence of sensible things from their "participation" of them. Thus he raised a structure of philosophy on a basis of metaphysics and logic conjointly; or, in other words, Philosophy, in its passage through the school of Plato, had become a transcendental Logic or Dialectic. Dialectic, the science, according to Plato, which contemplates the Ideas themselves, was held forth to the student as the dominant Philosophy, the consummation and crown of all sciences.[2]

Such was the state of Philosophy when Aristotle began to teach, and in which he had himself been trained. But it was not a system in which his penetrating mind could rest satisfied.

[1] Cratylus found fault with his master Heraclitus for saying that "a man had never been twice on the same river; for no one," he said, "had ever been even once." (*Metaph.* iv. 5.) This was but a natural extension of the doctrine of Heraclitus.

[2] Ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θρίγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ Διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων; Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. (Plato, *Republ.* vii. p. 168, ed. Bekker, 1785).

He thought too accurately, not to discover that this cardinal doctrine[1] of Platonism, the doctrine of Ideas, specious as it was, was only a shadowy representation of the objects of philosophy;[2] and that, in order to rest the sciences on a sure basis, a more exact analysis of the principles of human knowledge was required. He accordingly addressed himself to the task of developing a *really intellectual* system of nature, in the stead of that imaginary world of thought and knowledge which the lofty enthusiasm of Plato had created.

He found the several sciences separated from their roots, and vegetating only as stunted branches on a stock unnatural to them. Even Dialectic itself, the master science, was neglected. Its proper nature was mystified and overlooked in that medley of logical and metaphysical truth which had usurped its name; and its relation to the other sciences was misapprehended. In overthrowing the doctrine of Ideas, therefore, he had to make an entire reform of Philosophy. And, in fact, he did appear no less as a reformer of the Ancient Philosophy, than Bacon was of the Scholasticism of his day. In each case, idols were enthroned in the niches and shrines of the temple of science; and the hand of a bold reformer was required to cast them down and break them in pieces. If indeed we impartially consider the case, we shall find that Aristotle was animated by the like spirit to that which dictated the method of the Inductive philosophy, and that his reform was directed to the like points. It was his object, as well as Bacon's, to recal men, from their unprofitable "flight to universals," to a study of the actual course of nature; and further to direct them into the right path of discovery.

He was the first, accordingly, except in the case of mathematics, to exhibit a particular science drawn out into its proper system. There was, for instance, a great deal of logical and of moral truth scattered through the writings of Plato; but there was no regular statement of the principles either of logical or

[1] Τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον καὶ τὸ κῦρος τῆς Πλάτωνος αἱρέσεως, ἡ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν διάταξις. (Atticus Platonic. apud Euseb. *Præp. Evan.* xv. c. 13.)

[2] Τὰ γὰρ εἴδη χαιρέτω· τερετίσματα γὰρ ἔστι. Aristot. *Anal. Post.* i. c. 22, p. 513, ed. Buhle.

moral science, no distinct collection of the proper facts of those sciences, until the Treatises of the Organon and the Rhetoric and Ethics of Aristotle appeared. We may easily conceive the arduousness and importance of this service in the cause of philosophy. For any one person to have fully carried into effect such a design, might well be thought impossible. And we shall not wonder, therefore, that in some instances he should have failed, or have merely indicated the proper method to be pursued.

It was not indeed to be expected, that one trained in the dialectical philosophy of Plato should have emerged at once from the prejudices of that system. Aristotle, though professedly opposed to the realism involved in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, yet betrays the power of language over his own speculations, by the importance which he attributes to abstract notions as the foundations of scientific truth. It is a delusion, which the simple attention to the phraseology of one language (and there is no evidence that Aristotle knew any language but his own) is apt to produce. In the analysis of words, we are apt to lose sight of the merely arbitrary connection between them and the objects designated by them, and to suppose that we have penetrated into the nature of the thing, when we have only explored the notions signified by the term. Thus Aristotle, whilst he rejected the Platonic theory of Ideas, still conceived that there were certain immovable principles, in the knowledge of which true science consisted. He differed at the same time from Plato in his estimate of their nature. Plato regarded the Ideas as archetypes and causes of all sensible and actual existences; whereas Aristotle contemplates them simply as causes or first principles from which all knowledge is derived. He did not allow that these abstractions had in themselves any objective reality or any active power; but he conceived that the speculation about them was an insight into the secrets of Nature.

Philosophy, accordingly, under his hands, stripped of its metaphysical mysticism, assumed a strictly logical aspect. The foundations of science were laid in definitions of those essential natures which constituted the first principles of his

system; and from these definitions the truths of the particular sciences were to be deduced.

From this view of the nature of Science, it followed that he should employ Induction, rather to determine notions, than to arrive at general principles, such as in modern philosophy are denominated Laws of Nature. In order to discover a first principle, on which a system of science might be raised, it was necessary to state exactly that conception of the mind which belonged exclusively to any particular class of objects. The stating such a conception was, in the phraseology of Aristotle, the assigning of the λόγος of the Οὐσία, or the giving a definition of the object as to its essence. A definition of this kind required an accurate analysis of thought. Every notion common to other objects was to be rejected; and after such rejection, that which remained exclusively appropriate to the object under consideration, was to be assumed as the principle by which its real nature was expressed. The process was not dissimilar to that by which the truths of modern science are elicited; except that the Induction of Aristotle terminates in universal notions; whereas the Induction of Bacon terminates in general facts;—such facts being the utmost that can be obtained from outward observation of objects. It is precisely indeed in this point that the great difference consists between the science of Aristotle and that of Bacon. Aristotle, for example, inquires into the nature of light, and endeavours to define it exactly as it differs from all other natures. This definition is an expression of that principle on which the whole nature of light is conceived to depend. A modern philosopher pursuing the method of Bacon, examines facts concerning it, and, distinguishing those which really belong to it from those which do not, concludes from the remainder some general affirmative respecting it. A modern philosopher often draws a conclusion as to the nature of a thing; as when he infers that light is material, or that the soul is immaterial. But then he does not hold such inferences as principles in the sense of Aristotle; nor does he employ them to interpret the facts of a science. He acquiesces in such conclusions as ultimate principles. He finds,

for example, the facts belonging to the falling of bodies on the earth's surface, and to the revolutions of the heavens, coincident in the same general law. He pronounces, therefore, that the principle signified by the term gravity, whatever its nature may be, is the same in both classes of facts. His conclusions at the same time in Natural Philosophy are independent of this assumption; as these would not be affected, though the principle of gravitation were proved to be different in the two cases. If you overthrow, on the other hand, a speculative doctrine of the ancient Physics, all the conclusions of the system fall to the ground.

We shall wonder the less at the peculiar complexion of Aristotle's philosophy, when we observe that even modern philosophers have been by no means exempt from the Realism which language tends to suggest, and which might almost be termed the original sin of the human understanding.

Such then, according to Aristotle, was the character of philosophy, so far as it was purely theoretic. It furnished the mind with the means of contemplating nature surely and steadily, amidst the variety of phenomena which external objects present, by fixing it on abstract universal principles, eternal and unchangeable.

But this was not the only view which he took of Philosophy. He did not limit its use to Contemplation; though Contemplation was its proper function. He regarded it further under two other distinct points of view—as it studied the principles either of Effects produced, or those of Human Actions. Thus, he distributes Philosophy in general into three branches:—I. Theoretic; II. Efficient; III. Practical. By Theoretic, he denotes, 1. Physics, 2. Mathematics, 3. Theology, or the Prime Philosophy, or the science known by the modern name of Metaphysics; by Efficient, what we understand by the term Art, as Dialectic or Logic, Rhetoric, Poetics; by Practical, Moral philosophy, as Ethics and Politics. Whilst, then, in order to a purely Theoretic philosophy, he endeavoured to present to the mind the primary elements of Thought, following the order and connections of human reason rather than looking to the phenomena of nature, he had a different aim in the two other branches of inquiry, and pursued a different

method. In these, his aim was to enable the student to realize some effect, or to attain some good; in Efficient Philosophy, to lay before the mind those principles which impart skill in the arts; in Practical, those by which the goods of life are attained, whether by individuals or by societies. Thus, in both these branches his object, though comparatively limited, was in fact the same as that of Bacon—to increase human power by increasing human knowledge. He has accordingly adopted, in pursuing them, the Inductive method. We find him in these strictly attending to Experience—deducing his speculative principles from facts, and pointing out their application to the purposes of the arts and the business of life. Under the term Τέχνη, indeed, which we translate Art, he comprized much more than is understood by Art. Chemistry, for instance, might justly be referred to this branch of philosophy, so far as its principles are applicable to the production of any effect. In fact, it corresponds more nearly with Science, in the acceptation of the word by Bacon, or to what is understood by the term "Applied Science." For Aristotle himself expressly asserts it to be the result of Experience—observing, that memory of particular events or facts is the foundation of Experience, and that from several experiences Art is produced.[1]

So also, in his Practical philosophy, he directs us not to seek a speculative certainty of principles, but to be satisfied with such as result from the general experience of human life. He further even gives express caution against treating this department in the *a priori* method of his Theoretic philosophy, in remarking that the abstract speculation concerning "universal good" was unprofitable in that kind of inquiry.[2] Had he viewed Natural Philosophy in its application to the arts, he would surely have introduced the Inductive method there also. Indeed he has done so, wherever particular departments of Nature are explored in his writings in order to particular arts. But his works professedly treating of Natural Philosophy belong to a higher speculation, according to his estimate, than those which concern human life. He conceived the things of the material world to be unoriginated

[1] *Metaph.* i. 1; *Analyt. Post.* ii. last chap. *Mag. Mor.* i. 1; *Eth. Nic.* i. 6.

and indestructible in their essential nature, and *therefore* the eternal objects of scientific truth,[1] whilst everything belonging to man was temporary and variable. The former, therefore, were not satisfactorily investigated until they were referred to their primary fixed principles; but of the latter it was sufficient to obtain such knowledge as the contingency of the objects admitted. He perceived, from his accurate and extensive knowledge of human nature, that there was no ground for that realism in Morals which the more uniform aspect of the physical world tended to inculcate. The immense variety of objects to which the appellation of "good" was applied, impressed on his acute mind the conviction, that there was no one fixed and invariable principle implied by that term; and that the truths of Moral Philosophy, accordingly, were to be sought simply in an observation of facts, without endeavouring to trace the general facts thus collected to some further abstract principles.

It will illustrate this arrangement of the sciences to look to the Theory of Causation, or the several classes into which ancient Philosophy distributed the principles of scientific investigation. Now, the classes of such principles assigned by Aristotle are, 1*st*, The Material, or that class which comprehends all those cases in which the inquiry is, *out of* what a given effect has originated. From the analogy which this principle has to the wood or stone, or any actual matter, out of which a work of nature or art is produced, the name "Material" is assigned to the class. But it is not commonly so termed by Aristotle, whose description of it is more precise and just.[2] Unfortunately the term "Material" introduces a misunderstanding on this head. It may be supposed to mean something physically existing, some sensible matter, as wood or stone; whereas, according to Aristotle, it denotes antecedents; that is, principles whose inherence and

[1] *Analyt. Post.* i. c. 8; *Ethic. Nic.* vi. 7.

[2] *Nat. Ausc.* ii. c. 3, τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, p. 330. *Analyt. Post.* ii. c. 11, τὸ τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι. Ed. Du Val. 1619.

"Neither Plato nor Aristotle, by matter ὕλη, understood corporeal substance, whatever the moderns may understand by that word. To them, certainly, it signified no positive actual being. Aristotle describes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity, nor quality, nor essence, etc." Bishop Berkeley, *Siris*, p. 397.

priority is implied in any existing thing.[1] The Material cause, then, is properly an intellectual principle—one of the elements into which the mind resolves its first rough conception of an object.

The second class of Causes is that to which all inquiries belong which respect the Characteristic nature of a thing. To this Aristotle gives the name of εἶδος, species, form or exemplar.[2] It corresponds with what are termed in Modern Philosophy "laws of nature." According to Aristotle, and the Ancient philosophy in general, it is the abstract essence or being of a thing,—that primary nature of it on which all its properties depend. Bacon, indeed, has retained the name "Form" in his *Organum*, and applied it to denote the generalizations of his philosophy[3];—a general fact, from its excluding all merely accidental circumstances, being in a manner the proper *form* of the particular facts from which it is inferred, under all the variety which they may exhibit.

The third class of Causes comprehends all inquiries into the Motive or Efficient principles of a thing. It differs from the Material cause—which it resembles, so far as it is an investigation of antecedents—in its reference to such antecedents only as are the Means in order to an Effect. We may contemplate a given effect *as such*, and not simply as a mere *event;* and in that case we inquire into the *power* by which it was produced, or the Motive cause. It is to this class that the term Cause[4] is popularly applied, by analogy from the works of human art, in which we discern the connection between means and results. Aristotle, however, did not suppose that we could discover such necessary connection in Nature; signifying by such a cause merely those principles under which all effects, *as such*, might be arranged.

The fourth class in the ancient theory of Causation is what has obtained the appellation of the Final Cause, or, to express it

[1] The premises of a syllogism accordingly are the material cause of the conclusion.

[2] Thus he terms it also παράδειγμα, *Nat. Ausc.* ii. 2, Du Val. i. p. 330, the pattern, as it were, of the thing, or its archetype, in the mind.

[3] Bacon, *Nov. Org.* ii. 2.

[4] The word *cause* is indeed, as has often been pointed out, only a verbal generalization of the different principles to which it is here applied. The Greek word αἴτιον, "account," or "reason why," is nearer the truth.

more after the mind of Aristotle, Tendency, or an account of anything from a consideration of its perfect nature or tendency. For example, when we appeal from virtue militant in the world to virtue triumphant in heaven, and explain the present state of moral disorder, by this ultimate view of virtue, or of the end to which it is tending, we argue from a Final Cause in the sense of Aristotle. So, again, when it is argued that the eye was formed for seeing, because its nature is *perfected* in the act of seeing ; or, in general, whenever it is inferred that such is the nature of a thing, because it is *best* that it should be so. According to modern views, Design is always implied in a Final cause. In Aristotle, it is an intrinsic Tendency in Nature, analogous to the effect of Design.

The division of Philosophy adopted by Aristotle corresponds with this classification of Causes. Physical science, as concerned about objects, of which one rises out of another, or is produced after another, is an investigation of Material Causes. The inquiry is into the law of continuation and succession observed in the natural world,—what the antecedents are in this course,—what the primary principles into which the succession of physical events may be resolved, or from which they may be traced.

The First Philosophy, including Theological, Metaphysical, and Mathematical science, belongs to the Formal Cause. It endeavours to draw forth that secret philosophy by which the mind administers the world of its own ideas ; and, by this process to arrive at those primary abstract forms which are the originals, and patterns, as it were, of the various actual forms of things throughout the Universe.

Dialectical science, and the Arts in general, are inquiries into Motive Causes, since it is by the Arts that human power is exerted in producing certain effects. The principles of Rhetoric, for instance, are the means by which persuasion is effected. In order to produce any effect, we must observe what acts, what moves, what influences—not simply what precedes or follows in the order of nature ; and a study of this kind constitutes what Aristotle calls Efficient philosophy.

The Final cause is the science of human actions, or Practical philosophy. Actions, being the exertions of the inward principles of our moral constitution towards some end, cannot be rightly estimated by viewing them merely as effects, but must be considered in their design or *tendency*. A compassionate action, for example, may, in its actual effect, be productive of evil; but we cannot conclude as to the *nature* of the action from this result. We must further inquire, whether the result was coincident or not with the effect intended, or what it would have been, had the action been perfect as the exertion of the principle; that is, we must inquire into its Final cause. The same principle applies to the arts also, so far as the skill in any art is exerted in action. We then judge of the art so exemplified by its tendency to produce the *proper* effect; of the wisdom, for instance, of the politician by the adaptation of his counsels to the welfare of his country—or of the military skill of the general by his plans—not simply by their result; which may accidentally be untoward.

But though this is the appropriate classification of the principles of the several sciences, it does not follow that any particular science is restricted to one particular mode of speculation. The several kinds of Causes are all employed as modes of analysis under the same head of philosophy. Thus an action may be analyzed into the affection exerted in it (the Material or Physical cause), the choice of the agent (the Motive cause), the end to which it tends (the Final cause), the definition of the virtue to which it belongs (the Formal cause); and yet the science of the action is fundamentally an inquiry into the Final cause. As all Philosophy, indeed, ultimately refers to the principles of the human mind, so far every science is a speculation of the Formal cause. In Aristotle's system of Physics, the speculation of the Final Cause occupies the *principal* place, instead of being employed, as in Modern Philosophy, in subordination to the inquiry into the Material and the other Causes.

[1] *Nat. Ausc.* ii. 7, ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι· καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς τὸ ἓν πολλάκις· κ. τ. λ.

THEORETIC PHILOSOPHY.

Physics, Mathematics, Metaphysics.

In proceeding to examine the several sciences included in this threefold division of Philosophy, and contained in the extant writings of Aristotle, those which he has classed under the head of Theoretic philosophy, as being the only *proper sciences* in his view, naturally come first to be considered. These, then, are Physics, Metaphysics (or Theology), and Mathematics.

There is the less occasion for considering these sciences distinctly, as Aristotle has not strictly maintained their separation, but has often blended their different principles in the same discussion. In this department of Philosophy he receded less from the dialectical system of Plato, and felt the influence of that system attracting him into its vortex. As Plato, by drawing off the attention of the philosophical inquirer from nature itself to the Ideas of his intellectual world, was led to confound all the sciences in one philosophical reverie; so Aristotle, in the Theoretic branch of his philosophy, looking to the primary principles of the sciences as they exist in the human mind, rather than to the phenomena of each, was tempted to overlook their real differences in his mode of treating those united under this head. The ground of this promiscuous discussion is to be found in that classification which he adopts of the objects of these three sciences.[1] They are all, in his view, conversant about Τὰ Ὄντα, or things that ARE; but differing in the mode in which they abstract the notion of BEING from existing things. The science which considers Being in union with matter, or as it is evidenced under those variations which the material world presents, is Physics. That which considers Being as it is conceived apart from the variations of the material world, though still not separate from matter, is Mathematics. Lastly, that to which the name of Metaphysics has been given by his commentators, but to which Aristotle himself assigns the name

[1] *Metaph.* vi. 1, and xiii. chap. 1, 3, 4. See also *Nat. Ausc.* ii. c. 2.

of Theology, or the First Philosophy, is the science which considers Being apart both from the variations of the material world, and from matter. It appears, therefore, that the object of his inquiry in each of these three sciences is ultimately the same. He is engaged in all, in investigating those universal principles under which existing things are arranged by the mind. For this is the meaning of the term Being in his Philosophy. It stands for any of those conceptions by which the various natures or properties of things as they exist, are represented in the mind. These sciences, accordingly, not differing fundamentally in his view, he was naturally led to combine them in one general speculation.

Hence the abortive and futile character of his Physical philosophy. Instead of looking to the phenomena of the material world, he was employed in arguing from metaphysical and mathematical data, from mere abstract notions, to the realities of external nature. Thus, instead of being an investigation of the laws of nature, his system was a vain fabric of speculative reasoning from assumed principles. Whilst he thought that he was discussing and stating truths of Physical science, he was only analysing certain notions of the mind, and accurately defining them. No other method, indeed, is open to the philosopher who would penetrate the veil of the actual phenomena, and establish a certainty of science, beyond what is conceded to man, but that of abstract Definitions. These being once laid down, the truths of science follow by necessary connection; for they are then the mere development of general assertions into the particulars implied in them, or connected with them. But, the certainty and necessity of such conclusions are nothing more than consistency with the original assumptions. It would be absurd to suppose them otherwise, because this would be to contradict what has been already asserted. Aristotle indeed expressly says, that truth of fact and truth of science are not mutually implied in each other. "Impossible and possible, and falsehood and truth," he observes, "are either hypothetical—as it is impossible for a triangle to have two right angles, if this is so, and the diameter of a square is commensurate with its side, if this is so—or

absolute. But absolute falsehood and absolute impossibility are not the same; since, for one not standing to say he is standing, is false, but not impossible; and for a harper not singing to say he is singing, is false but not impossible; but to stand and sit at once, or for the diameter to be commensurate, is not only false, but impossible."[1] Still he sought to unite both kinds of truth in his physical speculations; and in the vain attempt, lost sight of the absolute truth contained in the facts presented to his observation.

The first portion of his Physics, contained in a treatise in eight books, entitled *Natural Auscultations*, is devoted to inquiries into principles; with a view to ascertain those fundamental conceptions from which all conclusions concerning physical objects were, in the *a priori* spirit of the whole inquiry, to be deduced. Agreeably to this order, he sets out with discussing the question, whether these principles should be ultimately referred to one or more than one, and laying down his own doctrine of three principles, under the established denominations of, 1. Matter, 2. Form, 3. Privation. These are the principles which, as employed by his disciples of the middle ages, have occasioned much undue censure of the philosopher. His system, indeed, is sufficiently condemned in its hypothetical character, but is guiltless of the absurdity which modern refinements have cast upon it. These three principles rightly viewed are general conceptions of the mind, as it endeavours to class the various objects of the sensible universe, and to refer the succession of events without itself to some ultimate unchanging views within itself. It has been already stated what is meant by a material cause, the ἐξ οὗ or ὕλη of Aristotle. These principles, then, are only different modifications of this cause. They are antecedents, or notions at which the mind ultimately arrives, in an analysis of its complex notions of natural objects; and therefore antecedents, because they must be presupposed in every contemplation of the natural world. The terms by which they are denoted are merely analogical. Aristotle, proceeding on a principle of the Pythagorean school—

[1] *De Cœlo*, i. 12, p. 449, Du Val.

indeed the common doctrine of philosophers before him[1]—argues that, as contraries cannot generate contraries, there must be at least two opposite classes of principles. In the changes observed in the course of the world, one object is succeeded by another; something has passed away, something is produced. Two fundamental notions, therefore, are involved in every contemplation of nature. These accordingly are expressed by the terms *Form* and *Privation;* imperfectly characterizing these subtile abstractions, though justly, so far as the relation denoted corresponds with that between the present form of any material object and the previous forms superseded by it. For example, a statue is a form constituted in the stead of the rough block, and of that infinite multiplicity of figures of which the marble in its unmoulded state was susceptible. Of these it is, as it were, "deprived," in the act of producing the statue. The analogy, however, is apt to induce us to suppose that something positive is implied by the terms *Form* and *Privation* in the language of Aristotle. Hence the ridicule with which the statement of Privation as a physical principle has been received. But if rightly understood, it holds a just and important place in the physical philosophy of Aristotle. And to see the proper nature of it, it should be observed, that it applies no less to immaterial objects than to material.[2] For instance, if we look at man physically, we observe that he is capable of moral improvement. Supposing him, then, civilized and improved beyond his ordinary state, we perceive in such a case a transition from a state of barbarism to a state of culture. The state of culture, then, is the Form of which Aristotle speaks; the state of barbarism, which may be in infinite varieties of Form, the Privation. Or, a person becomes healthy from being diseased: health is the Form superinduced; the Privation is of every species of disease. But beside those principles which are excluded in the physical constitution of anything, and so referred to the head of Privation—and those again in which the peculiar constitution of the thing is found to consist, and which are there-

[1] *Nat. Ausc.* i. 6, p. 322, Du Val.

[2] *Metaph.* vii. 7 and 11; xiv. c. 8; ὅσα ἀριθμῷ πολλὰ, ὕλην ἔχει, p. 1003, Du Val.

fore referred to the head of Form—there are evidently other principles which remain the same in all variations of Form. The internal nature of physical objects subsists under all external changes. The notion, therefore, by which that nature is represented to the mind, must be respected, in accounting for the physical constitution of a thing; as being an antecedent out of which it proceeded. To this notion, or class of principles, by which the one common nature of all physical objects is denoted, Aristotle applies the name of ὕλη, or matter: this notion being analogous to the stuff or substance of which different works of human art are constructed, as marble or brass is the material of which different statues are made.[1]

Now, beyond *these* abstractions, it is impossible to proceed in the speculation on physical existence. They comprise, in fact, the whole of modern investigations in physics. Modern physical science has followed an order exactly the reverse of that of Aristotle. It has ended where he began. But it has had *these* several principles in view. The *abscissio infiniti*, prosecuted in the inductive method of philosophy, is analogous to the "privation" of the ancient system. It is a continued process of separating from any subject under examination, those natures or principles which do not constitute the proper nature of the subject, and thus gradually narrowing the inquiry more and more, until we have at last obtained some ultimate fact, expressing the proper nature of the thing. This ultimate fact, accordingly, Bacon terms the "form" of the thing, adopting the received language, whilst varying its sense to denote the law or principle by which it exists. It is the result which remains to be affirmed, after rejecting and excluding other principles; or, in other words, after the subject has been "deprived" of all those "forms" in which its proper nature does not consist. Again, Bacon directs that a collection be made of all those "*instantiæ*," instances to which the form in question seems to belong. These instances, so far as they agree

[1] *Nat. Ausc.* i. 8, Ἡ δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις, ἐπιστητὴ κατ' ἀναλογίαν· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς, ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν, ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει, πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν· οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει, καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, καὶ τὸ ὄν.

in this respect, correspond with the Material principle of Aristotle. They exhibit that common nature, in some one form of which the particular nature sought must be found.

It is not meant here that Aristotle conceived of these principles according to this view of them. The design of his inquiry is, by an analysis of Nature, to obtain those fundamental notions to which all the various notions involved in the speculation of Nature might be referred. For he explains things that have their being by Nature, to be such as have *in themselves* a principle of motion and rest, as contrasted with works of art, the principle of which is in the artist.[1] Aristotle's object, accordingly, is to examine this inherent principle of motion and rest, which is the nature of a thing, and to shew how it operates in producing the various forms observed in the world around us. His error was not unlike that of one who should profess to give an account of visible objects solely from what they *appear* to the eye, and who should accordingly describe such objects as flat surfaces, variously shaded and coloured. From this view of the object of Natural philosophy, he was led to account for the processes of generation and corruption, and the changes which occur in bodies by alteration, increase and decrease, local motion, mixture. Consequently, he states the great principles of Matter, Form, and Privation, as generalizations of those latent processes by which physical effects are produced, rather than as principles by which the investigation of nature must be guided. Hence the perverse application of his physical philosophy in the middle ages to work transmutations in nature. The labours of the alchemists were nothing else but a practical realism founded on the speculative principles of the philosopher.[2]

The discovery of the principle to which the denomination of Form is assigned, is, in Aristotle's system, as in Bacon's, the

[1] *Nat. Ausc.* ii. c. 1, *ὡς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως καθ' αὑτὸ, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—Metaph.* x. c. 1, *διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως τὴν τοῦ φυσικοῦ πᾶσαν εἶναι πραγματείαν.* Also *De Cœlo*, i. c. 2.

[2] The doctrine of transubstantiation is wholly built on, and maintained by, a logical philosophy of this kind. The remark will readily be extended to other refinements of scholastic theology.

ultimate point of physical inquiry. The investigation of the principles of Matter and Privation is in order to the discovery of the Form, which is thus the τέλος, the end, or completion of the process of nature. The principle of self motion, or instinctive tendency, which, according to Aristotle, is the proper object of Physics, is then traced to its effect on the thing produced, and we have obtained the οὐσία[1] or proper being of the thing.

From this view of the principle of Form, as the result of a self-working power in Nature, results the peculiar character of Aristotle's Physical philosophy. He thought it evident, from such facts as the provident care shewn by spiders, ants, and other animals, and the service of the leaves of plants in protecting the fruit, that Nature intrinsically possessed this power of working certain ends.[2] The form, then, of every physical object being the attainment of such an end, and the form also constituting the being or nature of the object, occasion was furnished for speculating *a priori* from the supposed perfection, or view of what was best, in anything, to the form or law in which its nature consisted. This mode of speculation was embodied in those maxims of ancient philosophy, that "nature does nothing in vain;" that "nature always works the best that the case admits;" that "nothing by nature is imperfect."[3] The consequence was, that the very point to be ultimately investigated was assumed at the outset of the inquiry, and the conclusions accordingly were only hypothetically and not absolutely true. And thus it is that Aristotle expressly admits the necessity which belongs to physical truths to be hypothetical—dependent, that is, on the assumption of the end pursued by Nature, in like manner as the conclusions in mathematics are dependent on the assumption of definitions.[4]

[1] Hence, he observes, the term *nature* is metaphorically applied to denote the being, οὐσία, of anything (*Metaph.* v. c. 4).

[2] *Nat. Ausc.* ii. c. 8, Μάλιστα δὲ φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων κ. τ. λ.—*De Anim.* iii. c. 12, Ἕνεκά του γὰρ ἅπαντα ὑπάρχει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἴσται τῶν ἕνεκά του.—*Polit.* i. 1, οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι, τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.

[3] *De Anim.* iii. cap. 10 and 12; *De Cœlo*, i. cap. 4; and ii. cap. 5, 8, 11; *De Gen. et Cor.* ii. c. 10; *Polit.* i. cap. 1, 5.

[4] *Nat. Ausc.* ii. cap. 9.

It is curious to observe the traces of such a doctrine in different systems of Philosophy, as they appear under different modifications. In some of the older theories, we find indications of it in the hypothesis of two opposing principles, as love and enmity, by which it was proposed to solve those appearances in Nature which were adverse to the notion of the tendency of Nature to the best. In the systems of Parmenides and Hesiod, love and desire—in that of Anaxagoras, intellect—were the expressions of this tendency. In the philosophy of Plato, it was evidenced in the rejection of the material world from the class of permanent and real existences; this doctrine being a ready transition from the notion which attributed the physical constitution of things to their dependence on some primary ideal principles. Modern deists have argued in the same way, when they have rejected a Revelation because the things contained in it did not correspond with what they had determined to be "best" in Nature.[1] In Aristotle, on the contrary, it was shewn in the theory of the Eternity of the Universe. For if Nature is an active principle, ever tending to realize in act the perfect form of everything, the existence of the Universe at all times is necessary as a condition in order to this end.

The great doctrine of the Ancient Physics, that "nothing could be produced out of nothing,"[2] required no distinct consideration according to the theory of Aristotle. Inquiring into nature simply as a principle of Motion, he was only called upon to shew how those changes which took place in the material world might be accounted for. It was no part of his philosophy to demonstrate that any particular element, or combination of elements, was employed in the laboratory of Nature for effecting the various productions and transmutations. All he assumes is, that some material or other is employed in every instance, to effect that perfect constitution of a thing in which its "form" consists. An object, indeed, is not a physical object, unless it is conceived

[1] See Bishop Butler's *Analogy*, Introd. p. 9; also *Origen. Con. Cels.* ii. p. 102, ed. Cantab.

[2] *Metaph.* x. cap. 6, Τὸ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι πᾶν δ' ἐξ ὄντος, σχεδὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως. Also *Nat. Ausc.* i. cap. 5.

in conjunction with "matter." If only it has "matter,"—that is, a nature capable of affecting the external senses,—what particular kind of matter it may have, is irrelevant to his inquiry.[1] For example, whether water or air must pre-exist in the production of the other of these two elements, is not the point with which he is concerned. It is enough that there is in every physical effect a principle of motion operating. It follows, from the existence of such a principle, that there must be also "matter;" otherwise the *material* effect—the effect cognizable by the senses—would not have been produced.

The analogous inquiry in his system is, what principles are *prior* in the order of transition, so that from their presence or absence the constitution of any particular body results? What are those, in any instance, which never pass into each other, and of which a physical object cannot be deprived without its destruction; and which may therefore be regarded as elementary principles.

Hence his detailed investigation of Motion, in the technical sense in which the term is employed in his philosophy. In his system, changes of place or quantity or quality, generation and corruption, the action and passion of bodies, their mixture, are all instances of Motion. Hence also his discussion in his Physics of questions which, in Modern philosophy, are more properly regarded as the province of the metaphysician; as the nature of infinity, of time, and place, etc.: all which subjects, however, belong to his inquiry, inasmuch as they are implied in the various processes of motion.

A speculative difficulty, however, occurred in the prosecution of this physical theory, like that which perplexed the material philosophers in respect to the pre-existence of matter. He had to account for the production by Motion of "a Form" not previously existing.[2] This he explained by the subtile distinction between potential and actual being. This, in fact, is his

[1] *De Gen. et Cor.* i. cap. 3, Τὸ δὴ ταῦτα, ἢ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ὑποτίθεσθαι, διαφέρει οὐδέν· τὸν γὰρ τρόπον ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

[2] *Nat. Ausc.* iii.; *De Gen. et Cor.* i. cap. 3.

analysis of Motion; Motion being the exertion in act of that intrinsic efficacy which is in a thing to produce a particular Form. He speaks of this power in Nature of working ends, as analogous to the skill of a person[1] working a cure of himself. Nature, which is thus in his view as a kind of life[2] to all existing things, realizes in itself those principles, which are inherent in its constitution, before latent but now developed, when an actual effect takes place. Nothing, accordingly, is produced in his system, which was not, though in another mode, before in existence. What already existed potentially is produced into actuality and manifested to our perception in some physical object.[3] To describe it in terms of modern philosophy, we should say it was a transition from metaphysical existence to physical; from the subjective to the objective; from an object of the mind only cognizable by the internal principles of our constitution, to an object of the external senses;—the mind perceiving the principle of motion *as a principle*,—the senses giving us the impression of the principle *moving* or operating on matter.

This doctrine of potential being, transmitted by the speculations of the schools, and perverted to realism, has given occasion to represent a coincidence on this point in the system of Aristotle with the Ideal theory of Plato, the very part of Plato's philosophy which Aristotle most directly opposed. But it should be observed, that the forms of which Aristotle speaks are not, like the ideas of Plato, separate existences, constituent of physical objects. They are the philosophy of nature considered as an instinctive principle of motion—general principles under which the mind classes the effects of physical power, analogously to its own operations when it proceeds to realize in some outward act any idea which it has conceived.

Leaving then the question as to the element or material itself, of which physical objects are composed, untouched, Aristotle examines what principles reject and exclude one another

[1] *Nat. Ausc.* ii. cap. 8, Μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις.

[2] *Ibid*, viii. cap. 1, Οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν.

[3] *Ib.* viii. c. 14. Du Val. vol. i. p. 414.

in the various changes of the material world. For these are the causes of the transitions of one nature into another, and of generation and corruption: the presence of one involving the privation of all those forms of matter dependent on the presence of the other. What these mutually excluding principles are, he decides by a reference to the sense of touch; that being the proper evidence to us of the existence of body. Sight, indeed, may give us the first notices of the *existence* of a material thing; but it does not inform us of the *material* nature of the thing. This we infer from the resistance to the sense of touch. Accordingly, Aristotle explains what is sensible to be what is tangible.[1] The contrarieties then ascertained by touch, and which account therefore for all the different forms of matter, are hot and cold, dry and moist; the first two as active principles, the last two as passive. The touch, indeed, informs us of other contrarieties, but they are all reducible to these four heads, with the exception of light and heavy. The last are excluded from the class of physical principles. For though, in common with other ancient philosophers, he held them to be positive and absolute natures, he found that they could not act on each other, and therefore could not effect any physical change. As hot and cold cannot co-exist, nor can moist and dry, these four principles admit only of four combinations: and the effect of each combination is a different element. The combination of hot and dry, is fire; of hot and moist, air; of cold and dry, earth; of cold and moist, water. Any one of these elements may pass into another[2] by the privation of one of the combined principles. In such an event, the contrary principle, which had been only excluded by the presence of its contrary, combines with the remaining one. For example, water is transformed into air, by the privation of cold, and the consequent combination of hot with the moist which remains. Or both principles combined may be superseded by the two opposites, as when fire and water may be changed into each other. Thus there is a subordination of principles wherever the principle of motion is exerted in act. First, there must be

[1] *De Gen. et Cor.* ii. c. 2. [2] *Ibid*, ii. c. 4.

matter, that is, a principle susceptible of the contrarieties ; then the contrarieties ; and last of all, the material elements themselves.[1] When the change effected involves an entire change of the material from which it proceeds, the process is that of generation and corruption. But when the change is simply in the affections of some existing body, as in the instance of a person from being unmusical becoming musical, or of the food of an animal being converted into its substance, the process is that of alteration.[2]

Thus does Aristotle account for all the changes which take place in the world immediately about us. Whether we observe things generated, or altered in their sensible qualities, or varied in bulk, or place (and to one or another of these every physical effect may be referred), the changes observed may be traced to the operation of a principle which is either one of these four already mentioned, or some modification of them. For all the intermediate principles between two contrarieties, or the degrees of them, are to be regarded as contrary, and capable therefore of effecting physical changes in the same manner as the extremes.

But the changes which occur immediately in the world around us, constituted, in the view of the ancient philosopher, a very inferior part of the objects of Physical science. The luminaries of the superior celestial world were regarded by Aristotle as more excellent than man, and the study of their laws as a higher employment of the intellect than the philosophy of human life.[3] Besides, however, the intrinsic excellence of this branch of physics, it demanded his attention from its necessary connection with the development of his theory of Motion. Now, all other physical changes imply local change. Local change may therefore be inferred to be prior to every other.[4] Further, to keep up the constant succession of generation and corruption which is carried on in the world, and the passing of one nature into another, there must be some principle ever in *actual* being. But,

[1] *De Gen. et Cor.* ii. c. i, ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν μὲν εἶναί τινα ὕλην τινα τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστὴν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἐναντιώσεως, κ. τ. λ. [2] *Ibid*, i. c. 4.
[3] *Eth. Nic.* vi. c. 7. [4] *Metaph.* iii. c. 2, p. 860 ; *Mag. Mor.* i. c. 33.

no other than the revolution of the heavenly bodies continuing incessantly, this alone exhibits a principle of local motion adequate to the effect. Aristotle, accordingly, was led to speculate on the motions of the heavens, in order to trace up the propagation of Motion in this lower world, through its successive impulses, to the First Mover. This being discovered, his philosophy of Nature is completed: since Nature is then fully explored according to his analysis, as the principle of motion and rest.

His whole astronomy is deduced from the notions of lightness and heaviness, as intrinsic and absolute properties of bodies. He considers lightness the same as positive tendency upwards, and heaviness as positive tendency downwards. But this view implied that there were certain fixed points, the extremes to which these qualities of bodies tended, and in which bodies naturally rested as they possessed either lightness or heaviness. Each of the material elements, accordingly, had its proper place in the universe, corresponding to the degree of lightness or heaviness which he conceived them to possess, both absolutely in themselves, and relatively to each other. Fire he placed in the extreme point upwards, earth in the lowest; air next to fire, and water next to earth. Each of these elements, therefore, he argued, as naturally tending either upwards or downwards, moved in a straight line, and could not consequently move *naturally* in a circle. Hence the earth must be at rest, and therefore be the centre of the universe. For if it revolved round the sun, as the Pythagoreans thought, it would be moving unnaturally, and therefore could not move eternally. Hence, also, no revolving body could consist of any of the four material elements. It must be some other material, some other element, to which circular motion was as natural as rectilineal motion is to earth or fire.

On the ground of such speculative notions Aristotle proceeding in constructing his system of the Universe; in opposition to the more enlightened conclusions of the Pythagorean, and the records of Egyptian and Babylonian[1] observations on the heavens.

[1] *Metaph.* i. 1. Herodot. *Euterp.* 109.

In some instances, indeed, his view was more correct. He admits the spherical[1] form of the earth, from the evidence of lunar eclipses, in which he had remarked that it always exhibits a curved outline; and infers its magnitude to be not very great,[2] from the variation of horizon consequent on a little variation of our position on its surface. But, in acknowledging these facts he was influenced by their accordance with his speculations *a priori*, as he rejected or misinterpreted other facts from their repugnance to these speculations. For the spherical form of the earth resulted from his theory of heaviness. It was the effect of the tendency of all the particles of the earth to the lowest point; this lowest point being a centre of the two opposite hemispheres of the heavens. For, that the whole heavens were spherical, he supposed a necessary consequence of the perfection belonging to them, a solid being the perfect mathematical dimension. The tendency, consequently, of all the particles of the earth to the lowest point, was a tendency towards a middle; or this lowest point would be a centre round which the earth would adjust itself in a spherical mass.

The reason assigned by Aristotle for the revolutions of the heavens, as appears, then, is precisely opposite to that of modern philosophy. He conceived revolution to be performed, not in consequence of a tendency to the centre, but of the absence of any such tendency in the revolving body. Revolution and gravity are, according to him, contradictory terms. The motions of the several heavenly bodies result from their being carried round by spheres, which consist of this revolving element. That they do not revolve in themselves he considers to be evident from the fact that the moon always presents the same side towards us. They are incapable indeed of motion in themselves, he argues, in being spherical, nature seeming purposely to have denied them all power of motion in giving them the form least apt for motion. They revolve, therefore, from being bound in

[1] He speaks of it in *Meteor.* ii. c. 5, p. 562, as shaped like a tympanum.

[2] Mathematicians, he says, had computed its circumference to be 400,000 stades, or about 40,000 miles.

revolving spheres, the first in order of which is that in which the fixed stars are placed, and then the several planets (five in number), the sun, and next to the earth the moon;[1] and to account for the apparent irregularities in the motions of the heavenly bodies, he supposes, following the theory of Eudoxus,[2] that there were as many additional spheres employed in the revolutions of each body as it appeared to have different motions.

The oblique motion of the sun, viewed in connection with the successive renewals and decays of nature, as he approaches or recedes from the earth, suggested the most ready link for connecting the phenomena of the earth with those of the heavens. It is, accordingly, to the revolution of the sphere of the sun, that Aristotle ascribes the continuation of generation and corruption in unbroken series, and the consequent perpetuity of being in the world around us. It might be supposed that generation and corruption would be carried on at equal intervals. But the unequal temperament of material things prevents such a uniformity; and occasions that variety of duration, which we observe in different things within the sphere of the moon, the sublunary world, or the limits of Nature properly so called.[3]

Still, however, it remained to be explained what it was that imparted to the sphere of the sun, as well as to the several other spheres, their principle of motion. To every thing that is itself moved there must be a mover: and the successive motions, therefore, as communicated from sphere to sphere, must be traced up to some first principle, itself unmoved, in which they originate.

Here, then, we discern the close connection of Aristotle's

[1] The Pythagoreans connected with this notion the beautiful fancy of the music of the spheres. Aristotle expresses his admiration of the thought, but denies its possibility. The stars move with the spheres, he says, like the parts of a ship with the ship, and therefore can make no sound. (*De Cœlo*, ii. 9.)

[2] *Metaph.* xiv. c. 8. Eudoxus assigned fifty-five spheres on the whole; or, deducting those added to the sun and moon, forty-seven. Aristotle only states this as what may reasonably be thought; leaving, he says, the assertion of its necessity to others more positive, ἰσχυροτέροις, than himself, p. 1003, Du Val. Eudoxus of Cnidus went into Egypt about 368 B.C. and introduced the regular astronomy from Egypt into Greece. Aristotle gives him the high praise of recommending his theory of Pleasure as the Chief Good, by the distinguished morality of his life. (*Eth. Nic.* x. 2.)

[3] *De Gen. et Cor.* ii. c. 10.

Physics with his Metaphysics; and at the same time the ground of his applying to the latter science the designation of Theology. The several spheres of the heavens, differing in element from the bodies of this lower world, and pursuing their unceasing and immortal revolutions, presented a distinct class of *οὐσίαι*, beings, or substances, to the speculation of the philosopher. To ascertain that in which they moved and had their being, was an inquiry, with regard to them, analogous to his investigation of the principle of Motion in the natural world. This principle of motion to these celestial substances would be Being itself, or the very vital Energy in which they had their being.[1] At the same time, in exploring this primary Being, he would be tracing those general principles by which the mind held together the various objects of physical contemplation to one primary law or master-principle, in which, as in a single theorem, all the truths of philosophy should be comprized.[2]

This intimate connection of Theology with Metaphysics, in the Ancient Philosophy, was a natural consequence of the separation which heathenism established between Theology and Religion. In the civilized states of antiquity, Religion was pursued only as a matter of public policy, and not as a rule of life to the individual. Whatever was the established creed of the state, it was the recognized duty of the good citizen to support as established. Not involving any question of truth or falsehood in the particular creed adopted, it readily admitted of any additions of superstition not repugnant to the laws and manners of the state; but imperiously rejected all questioning of the fundamental assumption of the importance of that which was established.[4] It may be said to have been the great principle of

[1] *Nat. Ausc.* viii. c. 4, 5, 6, 8; *Metaph.* xiv. c. 6 and 7.

[2] *Metaph.* iii. 2, *ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχικωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη, καὶ ἡ ὥσπερ δούλας οὐδ' ἀντειπεῖν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας δίκαιον, ἡ τοῦ τέλους καὶ τἀγαθοῦ τοιαύτη.*

[3] See Xenophon's *Memorab.* iv. c. 4. The great rule of piety inculcated by Socrates is, *Νόμῳ πόλεως*. See also Polyb. vi. 56.

[4] Even Aristotle says that there are some who are not to be argued with; and mentioning such as require punishment rather than argument, he instances in those who question "whether one ought to honour the gods, or love parents." *Top.* i. See also *Eudem.* i. c. 3.

their religion, that it should be made no question of truth and falsehood. The religious instincts of the human heart were under such a system at once gratified and diverted from their proper end. Their strength was spent in the vain amusement of festal ceremonies, and their purity corrupted by demoralizing orgies. In this state of things, the better and wiser part of men were driven into a metaphysical religion. They could not acquiesce in the views of the Deity presented by the popular superstitions. Yet the subject could not but recur to them in the reasonings of their hearts, as soliciting earnest inquiry. They searched for God, accordingly, not seeking what to *do*, but what to *know*. Whatever the truth concerning Him might be, it was not to be expressed in the uplifting of pure hearts and hands to Him. Though the whole world might be found his temple, He was not to be worshipped as the Holiness of their shrines. Though the heavens were telling of his glory, and the stars were singing together for joy at his presence, yet no praise was to ascend to Him, the Lord of heaven and earth, in the perfumes of their altars, or the poetry and music of their hymns. Thus devotion, being banished from the heart, sought a refuge for itself in the wilderness of a speculative theological philosophy. Hence Socrates and Plato, and Aristotle and Cicero, and other illuminated sages of heathenism, continued, without hypocrisy, professors of the established religion, whilst they aspired after a purer knowledge of God in the thoughtful abstractions of their own intellect, and the cultivation of their natural sense of the sacred Law of Conscience.

Looking, then, at the admirable order of the heavenly bodies, the philosopher saw, in their unvarying regularity, the immutable and eternal nature of the great Principle on which their motions depended. He did not, it seems, attribute to them a proper divinity in themselves; for he refers their perpetuity of motion to the ultimate principle or First Mover, the Deity of his system. But he speaks as if they possessed a divine nature.[1] He also

[1] *Metaph.* xiv. 8. p. 1003, ed. Du Val. "It has been handed down by the primitive and ancient men, left to those after them in the figure of myth, that these

says that we must think of them as partaking of life and action. He must be supposed, however, by such expressions, to be giving only an analogical description of the perfection in which they display the efficacy of the First Great Principle. Contrasted with the unstable things of the earth, they evidence the Principle of Motion perpetually operating without interruption; whereas the successions of generations and corruptions about the earth only approximate to the perpetuity of the heavenly motions. We ought indeed to interpret in the same manner his ascription of power to Nature as a Principle of Motion. It seems as if he was excluding the agency of Deity. But in truth he is only tracing the mode of the operation of the First Principle. For he thinks that all things attain the good of their nature, so far as they have something *divine* actuating them. It is this divinity in them which is the primary source of all perceptions of pleasure.[1] Further, it is the indistinct apprehension of the same that he supposes to be the motive of exertion in all things that are capable of action, though they may be unconscious of its being so.[2] Hence it has been maintained, that the doctrine of Aristotle differed but little from the pantheism of the modern infidel.[3] The operations of Nature, then, as well as the revolving spheres of the heavens, are divine, inasmuch as they illustrate more or less perfectly the animating principle of all Motion,—

are Gods, and that the Divinity also encompasses universal nature. But all else has been fabulously associated for influence with the multitude, and for its use in respect to the laws and expediency. For they say that these are of human form, and like some of the other living beings; and other things, they say, consequent on, and similar to those mentioned. From which accounts should one separate and take that only which was first; that they conceived the first Beings to be Gods; he might consider it to have been divinely said; and that, as probably each art and philosophy has been often discovered to the utmost and again lost, so also that these their opinions, like relics, have survived up to the present time. Now our traditionary opinion, and that derived from the first men, so far only, is manifest to us."

[1] *Eth. Nic.* vii. c. 13, *πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον, κ. τ. λ.*

[2] *Ibid.* x. 3, *ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις, κ. τ. λ.*; also, *Metaph.* xiv. 7, p. 1000, Du Val; *Polit.* vii. 3, *σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς, καὶ πῶς ὁ κόσμος, κ. τ. λ.*; also *De Cœlo*, i. 9. In *De Anim.* i. 3, he substitutes "the Deity," where, according to his usual mode of speaking, he would say "Nature," *καίτοι γ' ἐχρῆν τὸν θεόν, κ. τ. λ.* p. 625, Du Val.

[3] See Bayle's *Dict.*, article Aristotle.

the operation of Deity itself. At the same time, there is no notion of Deity inculcated under the idea of the Creator and Governor of the Universe. It is simply as the Life of the Universe—the Intellect—the Energy—as what gives excellence, and perfection, and joy to the whole system—that his philosophy sets forth the notion of Deity. It is, in short, pure Being, abstracted from all matter, and therefore only negatively defined as without parts or magnitude, impassible, invariable, eternal. But whilst his system included no providence,[1] it has the merit of excluding the operation of fortune and accident. These, he observes, are not capable of being causes of any thing; they are merely descriptions of what takes place contrary to some presupposed design, or some tendency in Nature.[2]

In his Metaphysics, properly so called, he considers this First Principle strictly in a metaphysical point of view. His professed object here is, to inquire into "Being so far forth as it is Being, and the general properties belonging to it as such."[3] Having traced the changes which occur about the earth to a fixed principle, he had presented one unchangeable point of view in which the human mind might contemplate the vast and restless variety of physical objects. It remained for him, then, to examine this principle in itself, in order to attain a sure and perfect science, the highest and first Philosophy, in the knowledge of the fixed and immutable, and necessary.

[1] There is a passage in his *Ethic. Nicom.* x. 8, in which he alludes to the supposition of a divine superintendence, ἐπιμέλεια; but he there evidently makes the appeal rhetorically, to recommend that cultivation of the intellect in which he places man's highest happiness. A further evidence of this is, his speaking of *gods* in the plural in that passage. At any rate, the superintendence here spoken of is distinct from what we mean by Providence, as he does not suppose it extended over the bad as well as the good. In his *Magna Moralia*, ii. c. 8 (Du Val, vol. ii. p. 185), he argues that the superintendence and benevolence of the Deity cannot be supposed the same as good fortune εὐτυχία, because it is not reasonable that the Deity should superintend, or take care of, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, the bad; and we observe the bad sometimes fortunate.

[2] This view of Fortune agrees with the remark in Thucydides, that "we are accustomed to charge Fortune with whatever happens παρὰ λόγον, out of, or beside, the course of reason," Book i. chap. 140. Aristotle has expressed the same in his *Rhetoric*, i. c. 5, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη.

[3] *Nat. Ausc.* ii. 6, 7, 8; *Metaph.* xiii. 8.

This employment of the term "Being" may give the appearance of the investigation being concerned with positive objective realities, independent of the human mind for their existence. But though his mode of expression, and perhaps his example in some parts of his Metaphysics, may have afforded occasion to the ontology of the schools, he cannot justly be charged with the realism and absurdity of that system. These may be traced chiefly to a circumstance already adverted to—the introduction of Aristotle's philosophy into the Western Church by the medium of Latin translation. The term οὐσία, by which he denotes existence in the abstract, as distinct from any object of which it is affirmed, having been rendered in Latin by *substantia*, it came to be supposed that the natures or principles represented by the the term had a real subsistence. Thus the doctrine of Aristotle respecting Being was understood in a sense precisely the reverse of that which the philosopher himself intended. The analogy on which the application of the term *substantia* to metaphysical subjects was founded, became obscured by the actual force of the term itself. Instead of its being regarded as denoting only a relation between our conceptions corresponding to that between a thing supported and what supports it, the idea was suggested of an external objective reality, or even of a material nature, as implied by the term.

Rightly, however, to understand Aristotle's notion of Being, as it is the object of his Metaphysics, we should distinguish between Being as it is in nature generally, and as it is conceived in the human mind. For it is in this last sense that it must be understood, when it is stated to be the *object* of the universal science; since there is no other sense in which Being which is not in anything can be affirmed, but as it is the pure object of intellect, or exists in the intellect solely. Looking, then, at Nature at large, we must apply Being, in its first and proper sense, to individual objects really existing in themselves; and, in a secondary sense, to the attributes of such: because, the first notion of Being in Nature is suggested by the actual existence of the object; and our next notions result from the operations

of our minds about the object already presupposed in existence. But the case is different when the objects whose being we are considering are pure objects of intellect. Here the abstract notions of things are the first in order:[1] these are, relatively to the mind, the realities about which it is engaged; whereas the actual objects in nature are, in this point of view, the secondary beings. The reason is, that an object of the mind, as such, exists in its proper nature when it is entirely abstracted from all matter, but loses that nature in proportion as it is viewed in any actual form of physical existence.

Hence, in the science of Metaphysics, the proper if not the only substance, or οὐσια, is the form or abstract nature of things.[2] This, as explained by Aristotle, is the exemplar or representation in the mind of a thing as it exists in Nature. As, then, the primary substances in Nature are the things themselves as they are found and observed in Nature, so the primary substances in the world of the mind are those abstract forms by which the truth and reality of things are there shadowed out. The science of Metaphysics, then, is strictly conversant about these abstract intellectual forms, just as Natural Philosophy is conversant about external objects of which the senses give us information.

The object, then, of Aristotle in his Metaphysics is, to explain the nature of those general notions by which the mind represents to itself, and translates, as it were, into its own language, the objects without it, and speculates about them. Hence, in technical terms, he speaks of this science as the science of First Causes—the First Philosophy—or by the general titles of Philosophy and Theology. A science such as this, corresponds with what modern writers have designated the Philosophy of the Human Mind. They, indeed, have directed their attention rather to the powers and operations of the mind; the study of which, in his view, belongs to Physics. He, however, has confined himself—in those books at least which, as a sequel to

[1] *Metaph.* xiii. c. 4, τὴν δὲ πρώτην εἰρήκαμεν ἐπιστημὴν τούτων εἶναι, καθ' ὅσον ὄντα τὰ ὑποκείμενά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἕτερόν τι.

[2] *Ibid.* vii. 5.

the Physical, have obtained, from that circumstance, the name of the Metaphysical—to the objects about which the mind is immediately conversant.[1]

In this inquiry, Aristotle had to encounter two extremes of opinion maintained by philosophers before him—the doctrine of Protagoras, Empedocles, and others, who held that there was no fixed standard of thought—no absolute reality,—but that everything was relative to human perception; and the imaginary theory of Plato, which, by the hypothesis of self-existent Ideas, introduced a subtile materialism into the philosophy of mind, whilst, no less than the former theory, it made the external world a land of shadows and unrealities.

He points out the practical absurdity of the former opinion, according to which contradictories were equally true, and every proposition was equally true and equally false—by asking,[2] "why a man walks to Megara, and does not remain still, thinking that he is walking; why he does not go down a well or a precipice, as it may happen, the first thing in the morning, but appears to use caution, as not equally thinking the falling in to be good, and not good?"[3] Again, that men do not regard all notions as equally true, is plain, he observes, from this, that "no one who may have supposed himself during the night at Athens, when in Libya, walks to the Odeum."[4] He refutes, however, this sceptical doctrine more expressly, by distinguishing between the reality of things as they exist absolutely or relatively to our perceptions. There may be no reality of Being, either in that which is perceived, or in the perception, these being affections of the percipient power. But it is impossible, that there should not really exist some objects externally, which produce the perception, and are independent of perception. Whereas those who make *Being* dependent on perception, by asserting that whatever appears is true, imply that nothing would exist if there were no living creatures.[5] Hence it appears that Aristotle virtually

[1] Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά.
[2] *Ibid.* iv. c. 4; Du Val, ii., p. 876.
[3] *Ibid.* iv. c. 5.
[4] *Ibid.* iv. 4, 5.
[5] *Ibid.* iv. 5, τὸ μὲν οὖν μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα, ἴσως ἀληθές· τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθανομένου πάθος τοῦτό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, ἀδύνατον.

admits the distinction made by modern metaphysicians between the primary and secondary qualities of matter. He affirms, that whilst we have ideas of things without us which are simply our own perceptions, or acts of the perceiving mind, there must also be some really existing natures without us on which these perceptions are founded.

The Ideal theory of Plato tended to the same scepticism as the doctrine of these elder philosophers, but on a different principle. Plato destroyed all the certainty of our knowledge, by fixing the objects of it entirely out of the range of human intellect, and teaching men to abandon the information of the senses and experience, in the pursuit of abstract Ideas, the imaginary archetypes or exemplars of the things of the sensible world. He established in his system other beings separate from Nature as the objects of Philosophy; whilst his predecessors denied that there were any proper objects founded in Nature. But both he and they equally removed all grounds of conviction from the mind of man. Aristotle, accordingly, strenuously combats the doctrine of Ideas as adverse to all sound speculation. He loses no opportunity, in the course of his discussions, of alluding to it and refuting it.[1] He speaks of it as overthrowing all science, by multiplying, instead of reducing to certain definite principles, the variety of the objects of contemplation. "It is like," he says, "any one wishing to reckon, but who, thinking himself unable when he had less, should make more, and then reckon."[2]

The Ideal theory was, as has been before remarked, a modification of the Pythagorean theory of Numbers, or a mixture of logical and mathematical truth. Hence the importance assigned by Plato to Mathematics, as introductory to the philosophy of the Ideas. The theory of Pythagoras was, it seems, purely mathematical. It appears to have been an application of the properties of numbers to the solution of the phenomena of the universe. Plato proceeded a step further, and endeavoured more

[1] *Gen. et Cor.* ii. 9; *Analyt. Post.* i. 8, 19; *Eth. Nic.* i. c. 4; *Metaph.* xii. 4, 5; Atticus apud Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* xv. c. 13; Plutarch *adv. Colot.*

[2] *Metaph.* i. c. 7, and xi. c. 4.

distinctly to account for the great variety of objects by the help of the abstractions of language. Still he retained so much of the mathematical conception as to make the knowledge of the Ideas dependent on the knowledge of mathematics; describing the objects of mathematics as intermediate to the Ideas and sensible objects.[1] Aristotle shews, then, in opposition both to the Pythagoreans and to Plato, that there are no such principles as Numbers or Ideas really existent in Nature as primary and constituent elements of things.

There is no point, in fact, on which Aristotle has spoken more plainly than in denying a separate existence to those secondary natures, which, in the language of the schools, were afterwards called Universals. It is to individuals alone that he allows a real existence.[2] He remarks, that when any principle is asserted of several things, it is by analogy; as in fact there are distinct principles in each distinct thing; "for the particular is the principle of the particulars in each thing."[3] Thus, "whilst the universal man is the principle of man, Peleus is the father of Achilles—your own father of yourself." In things generically distinct, as colours and sounds, the principles differ, but are the same by analogy. In things specifically the same, the principles differ, not in species, but as they are distinct in each individual; *e.g.*, the matter, the form, and the moving power, are distinct in this and that man; but in the general principle, τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ, they are the same." So clearly has he laid it down, that none but individuals have a positive absolute existence, and that all other beings are relative to these, and results of the operation of our minds about them.

In extending our survey to the several subjects included in the metaphysical books, we must remember, that the science of which he is treating had hitherto been blended with logic under the general name of Dialectic. It was hardly to be expected, therefore, that Aristotle, in making the separation, should alto-

[1] See Plato *De Repub.* vii.; Aristot. *Metaph.* xii.

[2] *Categ.* c. 5; *Metaph.* vii. c. 13; *Annal. Post.* i. 31.

[3] *Metaph.* xiv. 4 and 5, ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον.

gether forget the prejudice which had united them. Nor must we wonder, therefore, that much of the work should he employed in discussing the meaning of terms, and in observations addressed rather to the disputant in words, than to the inquirer into principles of Philosophy. But we should be too hasty in judgment, if we condemned such discussions as foreign to the purpose of the metaphysician. The accurate examination of the notions expressed by such terms as being, oneness, sameness, contrariety, power, is illustrative of the connections of our ideas; for these terms are not dependent on the peculiarities of any one language, but are uniform characters of human thought. It is a curious and important inquiry, accordingly, to ascertain that connection of ideas of which these terms are the expressions; to trace, for example, the various modes of thought to which the term contrariety applies, or which are characterized under the description of qualities.

The inquiry, then, into Mind, considered in itself as a principle of life, and thought, and action, forms no part of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In his philosophy such an inquiry belongs to Physics; since he regards Mind only as a principle connected with matter. This inquiry he has prosecuted in a Treatise *On the Soul, or Life*, and in several smaller treatises *On the Parts and Motions of Animals, on Perception, On the Duration of Life, Youth and Old Age, Life and Death, Respiration, Memory, Sleep and Waking*, and *On Dreaming*. To these should be added the book *On Physiognomy*, and his larger work the *Treatise on Animals;* which, though properly a work of Natural history, is also illustrative of the nature of Soul, or the living principle in all animated, material beings. In these several works, there is less of mere speculation, and a more distinct evidence of that power of real philosophy, the δύναμις ἀναλυτική, which he so eminently possessed. We find him stating and examining facts,[1] and drawing from them conclusions in the spirit of a modern inquirer, though at the same time with the severe accuracy of his own method.

[1] He speaks of this part of his philosophy as an inquiry; τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν. *De Anim.* i. 1.

The ingenuity of the Ancient philosophers was exhausted in attempting to assign the nature of the Soul or living principle. There was no one of the elements, except earth, which did not find its advocate in some theory of the Soul. It was represented also as a combination of all elements; or as blood; or intrinsic motion; or a harmony and conjunction of contraries. Aristotle, pursuing the method of his Physics, wisely avoids endeavouring to refer the soul to any particular class of material objects; explaining the nature of it, as it instances the union of the two principles, matter and form, in a common result. It is an instance of the principle of matter, so far as there must be an organized body susceptible of life in everything that lives. It is an instance of the principle of form, so far as that nature, in which the life of the creature consists, is perfectly developed in the animated body. His definition, accordingly, maintains the distinctness of body and soul[1] as two principles combined, without defining what the soul is in itself. He illustrates their union by the analogy of the eye and the sight.[2] There must be the eye in order to sight; but the eye, though perfect in its structure, is not an eye unless the principle of sight be superadded.

Thus, considering the principle of life as distinct from the organization with which it is connected, he proceeds to inquire into its laws, by examining the mode of its operation. He divides its mode of operation into five classes, according to the objects about which it is exercised. It is, 1*st*, a principle of nutrition, in which respect it is common to vegetables and animals; 2*dly*, of perception; 3*dly*, of appetites and affections; 4*thly*, of intellect; 5*thly*, of locomotion. Wherever there is perception, there are also, he states, appetites and affections;[3] and

[1] *De Anim.* ii. 2, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι, μήτε σῶμά τι ψύχη· σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, κ. τ. λ. p. 633, Du Val. Ἐντελέχειαν appellat novo nomine, quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem. (Cicero, *Tusc. Qu.* i. 10.)

[2] *De Anim.* ii. 1, εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν αὐτῷ ἦν ἡ ὄψις, κ. τ. λ. p. 631.

[3] *Ibid.* ii. 3, ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη, κ. τ. λ. p. 633. *De Animal. Motione*, c. 10, he compares the operation of the soul on the different parts of the body of animals, to a well-ordered state, in which the various offices are regularly administered without requiring the presence of the monarch on each occasion. (P. 709, Du Val.)

consequently all these modes of operation of the living principle are evidenced in brutes, with the exception of intellect, which belongs to man exclusively.

His observations on Perception are highly important, as tending to shew the existence of living powers in animals, distinct from the organs by which those powers are displayed. He affirms that there is always a medium interposed between the perceiving power and the object perceived,—appealing to the sense of sight. Sight, he observes, is not produced by placing the object on the eye, nor yet can be produced by the object itself at a distance. It must result then, from something intervening between the eye and the object, so as to make an impression from the object on the eye. He mistakes, indeed, the nature of this medium, conceiving light to be the active development of the nature of transparency in some body, as in air or water,[1] and not material or capable of motion.[2] But the conclusion itself is just. And it serves to shew that the eye[3] perceives only as an instrument of communication with external objects to an internal power of the soul. The senses which appear to militate with this conclusion are those of touch and taste. For these seem to be produced immediately, without any interposed medium. But there is no reason, he argues, to conclude the flesh to be the feeling power in itself[4] because it acts instantaneously. For an artificial membrane spread over the body would produce the like instantaneous effect; and supposing the air to grow all around us, we should in like manner have immediate perception of all objects of sense, and thus appear to have perceptions of sight, and hearing, and smelling, by one sense.

Perception, then, according to Aristotle, is the power of the soul to receive immaterial impressions from material objects; as the wax receives impressions of a seal without the brass or gold of which the seal is made. The impressions thus received, he regards, as the basis of all our knowledge; insomuch that a

[1] *De Anim.* ii. c. 7, ἡ δ' ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστί, p. 369. *De Sensu et Sensil.* c. 2.

[2] *De Anim.* ii. c. 7.

[3] The eye, he says afterwards, sees only, ᾗ διαφανές, so far forth as it is transparent, no otherwise than water or air. (*De Sens. et Sensil.* p. 664, Du Val.)

[4] *De Anim.* ii. c. 11, p. 644.

creature destitute of perception would be incapable of understanding and learning. Touch[1] is the sense indispensable to existence, and the only one so indispensable. All the other senses, he says, have been added for the good and perfection of the animal—τοῦ εἶ ἕνεκα. The sensations are distinct, however, from the ideas of the mind. The sensations in themselves are never delusive. The same thing is always sweet or always bitter. But the same sensations may be followed by different ideas in different minds. To a sick person, what is naturally sweet may seem bitter, or, from accidental position with respect to the spectator, an object may appear different from what it is; as, for example, the diameter of the sun. To the ideas thus formed immediately from Perception, Aristotle gives the name of phantasms; and the power of Perception thus modified, he calls Phantasia or Imagination.[2] The delusiveness sometimes attributed to the senses themselves originates in this faculty of imagination consequent on sensation. Together with memory, it constitutes the whole intellectual nature of brutes. In man it furnishes the first notices in order to the operation of his intellect. By the operation of the intellect on these notices the first simple ideas are formed, from which the mind proceeds to its complex and general notions.

In considering the nature of the intellect, Aristotle introduces an important distinction between the mere capacity or faculty of knowledge, and the actual knowledge possessed by the mind; or between the intellect and the principles of the intellect. He employs the well-known illustration of "a writing tablet in which nothing is actually written," to distinguish the thinking faculty in itself from the thoughts with which it is furnished. But he does not suppose, as this illustration might suggest, that ideas are objects distinct from the mind itself. Where the object of thought is itself immaterial, as when the mind is reflecting on itself, there, he observes, the thinking power and the object of

[1] He considers natural talent as connected with the delicacy of this sense. (*De Anim.* ii. c. 9, p. 642.)

[2] *Ibid.* iii. c. 3 and 4; *Metaph.* iv. c. 5. The term *imagination* must here be understood in the most general sense.

thought are the same.[1] He conceives, however, that the mind is capable of existing without thinking,[2] and consequently does not resolve the whole understanding of man into consciousness. Hence, according to him, whilst the passive intellect, or the mind, as it consists of principles with which the senses have furnished it, perishes, the active intellect, the power itself by which we think, exists in its proper nature when separate, and is immortal and eternal.[3]

It may be perceived, from this view of Aristotle's Theory of Soul, or Life, how far he acknowledged the Immortality of man. So far as the nature of man is purely intellectual, he conceived it capable of existing separately from matter, and in some sense divine. But so far as it consists of affections, which he describes as λόγοι ἔνυλοι, principles *in* matter, he regarded it as mortal and necessarily perishable with the body. He pronounces nothing on the nature of that immortality which he thus attributes to the intellect, speaking of it in a rhetorical manner rather than with the precision of philosophy. At any rate, as only asserting an immortality of such an abstract and undefined nature, he seems not unjustly to have been represented as opposed to Plato on the doctrine of the Immortality of the soul.[4]

As Aristotle included under Physics animate as well as inanimate nature, he has carried the historical part of his Natural philosophy into both these departments. His *History of Animals* has been already mentioned. It is the precious relic of an extensive work, for which the materials were furnished to him by the conquests and the magnificence of Alexander. This fact alone excites an interest in favour of the work. And this interest is fully sustained by the variety of curious information contained in it respecting the structure and the habits of animals, indicating a power of the most minute observation.[5] He is said also to

[1] *De Anim.* iii. c. 5, ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὑλῆς τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, p. 653.

[2] *Ibid.* τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον πισκεπτέον, p. 653.

[3] *Ibid.* iii. 6.

[4] Origen c. *Cels.* ii. p. 67, ed. Spenc.

[5] It was the authority followed by Pliny in his *Natural History*. Pliny, viii. 16, says in allusion to it, "vir, quem in iis magna secuturus ex parte præfandum reor."

have written a work on Comparative Anatomy. There are extant among his works further illustrations of the animal economy, in treatises on the motion, the walking, the parts, and the generation of animals. In inanimate nature he has explored the causes of meteors, comets, earthquakes, of the rainbow, and other phenomena of the atmosphere, in a work on Meteorology. He has also separately discussed the nature of Colours, and of the objects of Hearing.

To this catalogue must be added two works which do not strictly fall under either department of Nature, *The Problems*, containing queries chiefly on subjects belonging to Natural Philosophy, with brief answers,—a curious work, illustrative of his vast reach of observation, and his extraordinary sagacity in searching out the reasons of things; and a tract against the doctrines of Xenophanes, Zeno the Eleatic,[1] and Gorgias.[2]

In Mathematics he has left very little. The only treatises extant under this head are, *The Mechanical Questions*, and a book *On Indivisible Lines;* both very inconsiderable works. But he had been trained in the school of Plato, whose threshold was not to be passed by the uninitiated in geometry; and had attained a perfect skill in the method of mathematical investigation then known. We do not want, indeed, more proof of this than is to be gathered from passages in his Physics, in which we find him sometimes establishing conclusions by steps of mathematical demonstration.

[1] So called in contradistinction to Zeno the Cittian, founder of the Stoics, from Velia in Italy, his birthplace.

[2] The treatise on plants edited with his works is acknowledged by critics not to be the work of Aristotle, but of Theophrastus. The treatise *De Mundo* may also be regarded as now decidedly rejected from the number of his works, as also the *Collection of Wonderful Narrations*, and perhaps the *Fragment on the Winds;* the internal evidence of these tracts being against their imputed authorship. It is probable that the works of Theophrastus were mixed with those of Aristotle, from the fact of Theophrastus having had some volumes of Aristotle's bequeathed to him, and having used them in the composition of his own.

EFFICIENT PHILOSOPHY.

Dialectic, or Logic.

Aristotle, as was before remarked, was the first to separate the proper science of Dialectic or Logic from that confusion with Physics and Metaphysics in which it had been entangled and perverted. In doing this he laid the foundation of a sound and practical Logic. There was a basis of truth, he saw, in the doctrine of Plato, which referred our knowledge of all sensible objects to certain abstract universal ideas, the objects of pure intellect. But he saw also that Plato had entirely overthrown the right application of the doctrine, by imputing to these universals a positive and distinct being. Instead of treating them simply as principles of classification and grounds of knowledge, Plato's creative genius built the world out of them, resolving all other existences into these as the primary essences and causes of all things. Having stated, then, the proper nature of these universals to be that of conceptions of the mind, by which it represents to itself things, not in that variable character in which they appear, but as they really are, Aristotle further considers them, in the treatises of the *Organon*, as they are employed dialectically, or are subservient to discussion and the communication of knowledge between man and man. There was indeed another view of the application of abstract principles, and prior to that of their employment in discourse, remaining to be considered. This was their use in enabling the mind to connect the phenomena of Nature, or as they are the causes of a proper scientific knowledge. But the state of philosophy in his time did not lead him to such an inquiry. It was reserved for an age of more diffused civilization, and the adventurous spirit of Bacon, to display the principles of that analysis by which the mind arrives at sound general principles, and obtains a real science of Nature. The practice of colloquial discussion on questions of philosophy, recommended as it was by the instructiveness and interest of the conversations of Socrates, attracted the attention of Greek philosophers to the

mode of producing conviction by tracing out the connections and consequences of given statements. Aristotle accordingly, was diverted from the study of the method of Investigation, to explore the application of general principles to the business of Argument. In pursuing this inquiry, he has laid down the principles of a logical science, applicable to the inferences of the reasoner from probabilities, as well as the most rigid demonstrations of the mathematician.[1]

Dialectic, in its original sense (for the term Logic is only of modern use), is the method of deducing the probabilities on either side of a question, which is so framed as to involve one of two contradictory propositions in the answer, according as the affirmative or negative of it is taken.[2] The discussions to which the term Dialectic refers being carried on by a series of questions and answers, the design of the art was to furnish the means of sustaining these intellectual exercises, by supplying not only principles of correct reasoning, or rules of logic properly so called, but various modes of proof and helps to the invention of arguments.[3] To have a ready command of propositions on any given point, and the objections against it, so as to be completely armed for debate, was the perfect accomplishment of the dialectician. This most obvious application of the science produced unfortunately, in the haste to supply arms for the disputant, instead of a philosophy of Reasoning, a misnamed science, conversant chiefly about the intricacies of verbal quibbling. Zeno the Eleatic, Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes, took the lead in framing systems according to this view. Nor do the Dialogues of Plato, though rich in examples of reasoning, suggest any more just and exact method. Hence the Logic which prevailed at the time of Aristotle, and which, from the partial acquaintance with his writings, continued, even after his improvements in this branch of philosophy, to be the system of the Greek schools, was a mere collection of subtile points of argument, without any attempt to analyze the process itself of argument. His Dialectic

[1] *Anal. Prior.* i. c. 1 and 30. *Anal. Post.* i. c. 11. [2] *Top.* viii. cap. 2.
[3] *Top.* viii. cap. 5 *et ult.*; Cicero *De Fin.* ii. cap. 6, and *Top. ad Treb.* cap. 2.

is the reformation of that irregular and perplexed system. Whilst he adopts and explains the general notion of the science, as a method of defending or impugning an opinion, he takes a larger, more philosophical view of the subject; investigating the grounds, both in the nature of language and in the connections of thought, on which all argument must rest. Hence his just boast, that "with regard to the dialectical art, there was not something done and something remaining to be done,—there was absolutely nothing done; for those who professed the art of disputation resembled the rhetoricians of Gorgias's school: for as these composed orations, so the other framed arguments which might suit, as they imagined, most occasions. These their scholars soon learned. But they were in this manner only furnished with the materials produced by the art,—the art itself they did not learn." He goes on in the same passage to observe, that "upon Rhetoric much had been written of old; but on syllogizing or reasoning, absolutely nothing; the whole of what he had composed on that subject was from himself;"—that he had "derived no benefit from former labours:" expressing his hope, accordingly, that what he had "left undone would be forgiven, and that what had been discovered would meet with a favourable acceptance."[1]

It is a singular fact in the history of science, that his labours in this arduous work should have suffered an unjust depreciation in modern times, by being estimated in contrast with the analysis of Bacon. According to his own challenge, and as the reason of the case suggests, they admit only of comparison with the efforts of his predecessors, and of the Stoics, who, though following him, wrought upon the ancient model of the science, and elaborated that to its perfection. If we compare the method of Aristotle with what is known of the wrangling discipline of the Stoics, we shall then judge with more fairness of the philosophical character of his labours. His disciples were content to be ignorant of such a method as the Stoics taught,[2] though, from its untoward preval-

[1] *Soph. Elench.* ii. last chapter.

[2] Cicero introduces Cato in the character of a Stoic, speaking of the Peripatetics as deficient in acuteness, "on account of their ignorance of dialectic." (*De Fin.* iii. cap. 12.)

ence down to the time at least of Cicero, it has probably been confounded with that of Aristotle, and thus reflected its disrepute on his more scientific system. With the method, however, of Bacon, the Logic of Aristotle has no natural rivalry. In the period of literature preceding Bacon, it happened that ingenious men, with a natural devotedness to the studies by which their minds had been moulded, sought to resolve the mysteries of science by a profound Aristotelic philosophy. Thus were principles of Physics and Metaphysics mixed up with the theory of Argumentation; as, on the other hand, principles belonging to Argumentation had been previously applied to the analysis of Nature. The writings of Aristotle were regarded as a kind of Scriptural philosophy, beyond which there was no appeal in controversies of science.[1] And when an authority of this kind is once established, it is easy to see that a mere verbal philosophy will soon follow. Expounding and commenting on the text of the master supersedes the questioning of Nature; just as a mere textual theology supersedes an enlarged study of the facts, and truths, and scheme of Divine Revelation. But this perversion is not to be regarded as the tendency of Aristotle's philosophy. Practically, indeed, he does not keep clear of the seductions of realism. But in him realism is only a *practical* infirmity. Theoretically, he was perfectly aware, no less than Bacon, that "the subtilty of Nature far surpasses the subtilty of sense and intellect;"[2] and that, accordingly, to

[1] Where a disputant quoted a passage from this philosopher, he who maintained the Thesis durst not say *Transeat*, but had either to deny the passage or explain it in his own way. (Bayle, *Dict.*, art. *Aristot.*) He refers, in evidence of this, to the *Courses of Philosophy*, printed in the Sixteenth Century. Crackanthorp, in a volume of Logic (2d ed. 1641), declares that he purposes following Aristotle to the utmost; yet he cannot go as far as Brerewood in his admiration of the philosopher; "quamvis autem non mihi placeat illa viri doctissimi, mihique a puero dilectissimi, Brerewooddi vox, quam inter disputandum, me audiente, juvenis ille, in scholis nostris, non sine magno astantium applausu, publice edidit; 'prius *vitam quam Aristotelem deseram;*' tantum tamen ei in Logicis tribuendum, et sentio, et ingenue profiteor, ut ab illius tramite in his discedere, et indocti hominis, et valde levis ingenii, σκεμμήριον, judicem." Logicæ Libri Quinque; Auctore, R. Crackanthorpo, SS. Theol. D. Coll. Reg. Oxon. Soc. The like devotedness to Aristotle is evidenced throughout the ancient Oxford Statutes.

[2] Bacon, *Nov. Org.* i. aph. 10.

ascertain *what* things *are*, we must know them otherwise than dialectically. He would have dialectical skill employed for the purpose of stating and examining the questions and difficulties belonging to a subject—not to supersede an acquaintance with phenomena.[1] He observes, that when, in inquiries concerning what a thing is, men are ignorant of the circumstances connected with it, they pronounce only logically and emptily;[2] thus pointing out the futility of applying an instrument of discussion to the real business of philosophical investigation. So far, then, as dialectical art, by sifting a question thoroughly, clearing up apparent inconsistencies, and pointing out where the truth lies, may be regarded as an organ of philosophy, so far Aristotle authorizes the inquirer to employ it. It may serve as a precursor and companion of investigation, but not as the substitute. And thus he describes it as a method of "trying," πειραστική; whereas Philosophy is a method of "knowledge," γνωριστική.[3] It is quite opposite to his idea of dialectical art to suppose it capable of furnishing the principles of the several sciences. These, he expressly says, belong to the sciences themselves, by which they must be supplied to the dialectician according to the matter in hand.[4] To the philosophical *disputant* they are the *data* with which he sets out; or rather, so far as he is concerned with them, the hypotheses, which he proceeds to discuss in their various points of view, tracing their connection with, or opposition to, other principles.[5] Aristotle, therefore, evidently did not intend that the philosopher, as such, should rest in mere logical speculation. And though he has not provided in his writings an instrument of Investiga-

[1] He sometimes expressly adverts to the difference between conclusions drawn ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων and ἐκ τῶν λόγων, as *De Gen. et Cor.* ii. cap. 10; *Eudem.* i. cap. 6. He also distinguishes between λογικῶς and ἀναλυτικῶς in the mode of obtaining a proof. *Analyt. Post.* i. 22.

[2] *De Anim.* i. cap. 1, p. 617, Du Val.

[3] *Metaph.* iv. cap. 2.

[4] *Anal. Pr.*, i. cap. 30; *Anal. Post.* i. cap. 1, 3, 9.

[5] Bacon rightly describes the kind of discovery, which belongs to Logic, in saying, "Inventio enim dialecticæ non est principiorum et axiomatum præcipuorum, ex quibus artes constant, sed eorum tantum, quæ illis consentanea videntur." (*Nov. Org.* i. p. 82.) Aristotle says the same thing.

tion, giving only indirect hints of such a method, he supposes it resorted to in practice by the philosopher. His Logic, accordingly, instead of being put in contrast with the *Novum Organum*, is to be regarded as an auxiliary system, introductory to the latter, and tending to enforce its use.

The error of the Schoolmen in applying logical principles to the philosophy of Nature arose from their misconception of the nature of philosophical truth. They do not seem to have been aware that philosophical principles are but expedients which the mind adopts for connecting and arranging the various objects of Nature. Otherwise, they would have seen that a science conversant about the connections of our notions expressed in language, could not suffice for the investigation, properly so called, of other sciences. When the facts of this science were reduced to certain principles, the whole object of the science was accomplished. The result would be a scientific use of thought and language for the purposes of debate and speculation. To carry this philosophy into other matters, was an incongruity like that of combining principles of mathematics and ethics.[1] There was at the same time a ground for their error, in the universality of language, as the medium by which the truths of every science are expressed; and its comprehensiveness and extent, as it has the power of signifying by single terms an immense variety of objects. These imposing attributes of language gave at least a semblance of philosophizing to their *a priori* speculations. But could they have studied the writings of their master in a freer spirit, their acute minds would have seen the real use to which the universality and comprehensiveness of language might be applied, without trespassing on the legitimate province of Investigation.

A slight consideration of the nature of Language may suffice to shew the proper business of the dialectician. Language is the record of the observations of mankind on the course

[1] Aristippus complained of mathematical science, that it gave no account of goods and evils. (*Metaph.* iii. c. 2.) As unreasonable has been the complaint of the "barrenness of invention" of the ancient Logic.

of Nature. It is, as it were, a popular philosophy. Whatever may be its origin—whether words be merely conventional signs, as Aristotle teaches,[1] or have a foundation in the nature of the things denoted by them—still, their application to observed objects and facts in Nature, is the result of the operation of the human mind; and words, in this use of them, are the creations of the intellect. The intellect takes up and applies the existing signs furnished by language, however derived, to mark and preserve for its future direction the dictates of its past experience. Thus, the application of the term "burning" to the observed effect of fire on a combustible body, is an act of the mind recording its experience of that effect. Having recorded its experience by this term, it thenceforth uses the term as a substitute for the actual experience. Proceeding on that fundamental law of human belief and action, that all things will continue in their observed course, it trusts to the word thus obtained as a guide to future conduct. It is sufficient to say that anything "burns," to give us a representation of the effect of fire, and direct us in our actions with regard to that thing. Accordingly, by the use of terms, observations, in themselves individual facts, are generalized. The term, originally the record of a single experience, serving practically in the stead of a repeated experience, comes to stand for a number of individuals. From its practical application to a multitude of similar events, it obtains a speculative multiplication as the general expression of many particulars, or, in short, becomes a class-term.

It is thus that language may be regarded as a popular philosophy of Nature. Each term, denoting some observed object or event, is a general principle connecting the several objects or events to which it admits of being equally applied. Whilst it practically enables us to judge and act in a number of individual cases, it also speculatively presents the means of anticipating a number of particulars, as notions implied in it; or, in other words, is a *theory* of the particulars which it signifies.

[1] *De Interpret.* c. 2.

But when we have once obtained a variety of terms, thus representing in each of them a multitude of particulars, we can further generalize our observations by reflection on the notions themselves, and recording our observations on these, in like manner as on the real objects and events of Nature. We then notice whether the notions implied by one term are distinct from, or are included in, the notions implied by another, and accordingly we regard the terms respectively signifying them, as classes, totally distinct, on the one hand, or on the other, as more or less extensive, or more or less comprehensive. We observe, for instance, whether the terms "man," "animal," "vegetable,"—all being records of our observations on Nature,—give us information of the same particulars, or of others entirely different; and we find that "man" and "animal" are but different views of the same individual, as for instance of Socrates; whilst the term "vegetable" is no expression of any observation whatever on the same individual. We find, again, that "animal" represents to us more individual objects than "man," and that "man," whilst excluding many objects signified by "animal," represents, in its comprehensiveness, a vast variety of objects of thought besides that of "animal;" and so we regard these terms speculatively as classes, relatively including more or less in them, and both, further, as classes entirely distinct from the class "vegetable," because none of the observations referred to in either of the former are the same with those referred to in the latter.

These principles of language are the data on which the logical system of Aristotle is constructed. It is evident, from the mere statement of them, that there is such a thing as a scientific application of language, and the notions which it expresses, to the purpose of argumentative instruction. It is thus clearly seen to act as an instrument of knowledge by its very nature, independently of any art in the use of it; and it is for the philosopher, therefore, to inquire how it acts in producing this effect.

Now, in order to such a science, the first step appears to be to reduce our various observations on existing things into some

definite classes. We thus bring them out of that perplexing infinity which defies all grasp of the intellect, and obtain a few general notions under which the whole intellectual world may be surveyed. These classes will represent to us the different forms or modifications of Being, so far as Being is capable of expression in language. The next step is to examine the principle of Classification in itself, and notice the varieties of form which it takes, as the observations that are made on any individual give us more or less general, more or less invariable and scientific views of the individual. The first step leads us to the *Categories* or *Predicaments*, general designations under which all the various abstractions of the mind are conveniently arranged for the purpose of the logician. These constitute, as it were, the fixed landmarks by which he may know the limits of each notion with which he has to do in any discussion. They are the great sections in the geography of the intellectual world, which it is his office to explore and describe. The next step leads us to the Heads of Predicables, or various modes of classing the same object. Here we enter on that part of the science which is purely logical. In the arrangements called the "Categories," the inquiry is partly metaphysical, partly logical, but more metaphysical than logical. We are there philosophizing on the notions of the mind in connection with language. But here we examine the principle of classification evidenced in language, *in itself*, and endeavour to obtain exact views of all the varieties of form under which it appears: we are taking accordingly a more interior view of the nature and working of language itself, as it is a method of science; as it conveys information of what is, or is not, in the wide world of Human Thought: and this is properly the business of Logic, as it is a peculiar branch of metaphysical science.

Thus far the science of Dialectic was sketched out before the time of Aristotle. The Pythagorean philosopher, Archytas of Tarentum, has the merit of having instituted those arrangements of the objects of the intellect, which Aristotle adopted under the title of *The Categories*. The authority, however, of Simplicius

the commentator in the sixth century, on which such a work is ascribed to Archytas, is extremely questionable. The truth appears to be, that the arrangement itself was of ancient standing in Greek philosophy, but was unknown as to its origin. It may, however, have been derived through the Pythagoreans, whose mathematical studies gave a colour to all their speculations; as the tenfold division corresponding with the decimal notation of Arithmetic would indicate. Whilst the classification then was adopted by Aristotle, the discussion of it is evidently throughout his own, strikingly displaying that acuteness of discrimination which is a great characteristic of his mind.

The number of the Categories may be deduced from the following considerations. We may contemplate an object either as to what it is, or what it has,—as to its nature, or as to its attributes. 1. If we contemplate it as to its being or nature, it may be regarded, 1*st*, Either as a whole complex independent being in itself; or 2*dly*, Partially, under some abstract peculiar point of view, which still represents its nature, but only indistinctly and inadequately. Under both these aspects it is a being or substance that we contemplate. Being then evidently is of two kinds—Primary and Secondary. Individuals and units, existing alone, and independently, are Primary beings; those natures which are abstracted from them, and which by generalization become universals, not existing independently of the individuals in which they are observed, are Secondary beings. Being or Substance, then, under this twofold division constitutes the 1st Category. The remaining nine, which are the following:—2. Quantity; 3. Quality; 4. Relation; 5. Place; 6. Time; 7. Situation; 8. Habitude or Condition; 9. Action; 10. Passion or Suffering,—are all so many different affections or attributes of Being. Each head then is separately considered by Aristotle, and its limitation exactly drawn. The Treatise being further introductory to the whole method of disputation, a method, not simply of reasoning, but of producing conviction on any subject—he prefaces it with pointing out in what sense alone one notion, or rather the term

which represents it, can be logically predicated or said of another; and at the end, in that portion of the work which has been called the Post-predicaments, subjoins explanations of the notions "opposite," "contrary," "prior," "co-existent," "motion," "having;" as the terms denoting them were understood in the Greek language.

There is no distinct treatise of Aristotle on the Heads of Predicables. This classification, like that of the Categories, is, doubtless, of ancient date in the schools of Greece. He assumes it as familiarly known; and where accordingly he refers to it with explicitness, it is chiefly to shew its application to the purpose of disputation, as in the first book of his Topics. Here we have nothing to do with individuals *as such*.

The term Class is, evidently, one purely notional, not formed from the contemplation of objects existing in themselves, independently and unconnectedly, but as already grouped together by the mind; which, pursuing the process by which it originally combined them into classes, seeks further to obtain a general view of these classes, by grouping them also, and assigning to them their respective designations. Such are these five classes,—1. Genus; 2. Differentia; 3. Species; 4. Property; 5. Accident; technically called the Heads of Predicables, and also words of Second Intention, for this reason, that they do not express the primary affections or intentions of the mind in its contemplation of things, but its secondary affections or intentions, on its reflex contemplation of the primary ones; all having relation to some one given object of thought, differing only in regard to the fulness and distinctness of view in which they represent that object to the mind. A Predicable falls under the head of Genus, when it brings to our view some object of thought as existing, by identifying it with some other object already known to us by that name, which is then regarded as the general designation of the nature or being of the object which it is sought to make known. This is shewn by the fact, that when we wish to give a person some conception of a thing of which he may have heard the name, but has yet to learn what it is, we naturally tell him what it is like, by referring it to something else with which he

is already acquainted, or, in other words, saying what sort of thing it is. And this other object of thought becomes to him thus a genus, or class, under which he arranges it. Suppose, for example, we had to give a person, ignorant of the thing, some notion of a crusade, we should suggest to him the idea of a war; and if that were insufficient to bring the object before his mind, we should proceed to state it to be a war for a religious purpose; either of which designations would, in its measure, give him an information of the nature of the thing. Such, however, would be but vague and indistinct informations. Were a person to rest in them, he would confound the object sought with others to which it bore the general resemblance thus far intimated. It becomes necessary, therefore, to point out further and closer resemblances of the object, by suggesting other terms, which, whilst importing the same general resemblance as the first, are exclusive of some of the objects denoted by the first, and so tend to bring the object within a smaller range of view, and more distinctly therefore before the mind. The search for these leads us to the class of Predicables called Differentia, expressing under that one term, the several subordinate genera in the scale, by which the descent is made from the higher ground of the first abstract notion with which the information about the object commenced, to the level on which we ultimately view it. The process is like that of the painter working on his picture, in order to place the chief object of his study in the most prominent point of view. He first presents it grouped with others around it, from which it is scarcely distinguishable. He throws them into shadow as he proceeds, and concentrates his lights more and more upon it, and touches its outline more strongly, until at length it stands forth in bold relief on his canvas, borrowing indeed much of its character and interest from the surrounding landscape, but itself the chief object of attention and interest in the finished picture.

The result of the whole process constitutes the third class of Predicables, termed by the Latin logicians, more after Plato than after Aristotle, the Species, by Aristotle himself, "Ορος, or ὁρισμός, the Definition or Determination, inasmuch as it denotes

the process of subdivision terminated at that stage, and the object accordingly then distinctly marked out, characterized, and defined in words. Hence, the Species stands as the lowest classification of the object defined, and is conceived to consist only of individuals, or units admitting no further division, inasmuch as they are represented in their whole being by the terms expressing their species.

The two remaining classes of Predicables, termed by Aristotle Ἴδιον and Συμβεβηκὸς, and by modern usage, after the Latin logicians, Property and Accident, do not, like the first three, characterize an object of thought, as it exists—as it occupies a place in the intellectual world amidst other objects of contemplation—but as it manifests certain phenomena in itself, or is affected by certain conditions. Whatever may be the primary character of the object of thought as referred to its place in the Categories, not only when it may be itself a Being or Substance, but also when, as in Morals, it may be a Quality, or, in Mathematics, a Quantity, in assigning its Genus, Differentia, and Species or Definition, we assume its Being; we then consider it as it exists, though it is nothing more than a notional existence with which the mind invests it.

This five-fold distribution of Predicables into the several heads of 1. Genus, 2. Differentia, 3. Species, or Definition, 4. Property, 5. Accident, belongs properly to Logic in the wider, looser sense, in which it is viewed as the art of disputation, rather than as a science of the connexions of Thought evidenced in statements of facts and reasonings by the aid of Language. The earliest lessons in philosophy appear to have been carried on in question and answer; the teacher taking the office of questionist; and the discussion being so directed as to call forth the chief points of doubt and interest on the subject proposed.[1]

[1] Διαλέγεσθαι, sometimes explained as equivalent to τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι, Scheibleri Logica, p. 45. Some, he observes, from their ignorance of Greek, derive the word from δύο and λέξις, sermo vel ratio duorum, hoc est opponentis et respondentis. The practice of Disputations carried on by an opponent and respondent on a given question, maintained in the Schools of the Middle Ages, and still subsisting as an exercise in our own Universities, is only a modification of the original notion of Dialectic.

The original logic of the Greek schools took its complexion from the requirements for this purpose, and in that character was perpetuated by the Latin Churchmen and Logicians of the Middle Ages. It was necessary that the disputant should be furnished with an instrument of oral discussion, both in order to put his questions in due form, so as to draw forth the desired answers, and also to enable him, in performing the part of the answerer, to see to what point a questioner might be leading him, and to maintain any view of the subject which he had taken up, with consistency. There would be a demand, therefore, for instruction in the nature and use of words as they served to characterize and state the natures of things. Exact distinctions must be given of the notions implied in the terms of any question proposed for discussion; and the world of thought must therefore be surveyed and mapped out. The disputant must be prepared, by a study of the Categories, to say whether a given object belonged to the category of Substance or Quality, and so forth. He must also have gone beyond this preliminary study of words in their primary relation to things as their immediate objects of thought, and explored them also in their secondary relation, as classes of purely notional objects, such as the Heads of Predicables are, so as to be able to say in respect to any object, what its genus was, what its species or definition, what its properties, what its accidents. These matters of inquiry, then, whilst they are valuable and interesting to logical students of all times, would be of especial practical importance in the Ancient Schools; that so, the disputant might enter the lists fully equipped in his proper intellectual armoury, provided with weapons of attack and defence, ready to meet all challengers in the field. Accordingly, in the Treatise which follows the *Categories* in the arrangement of the several portions of the logical works by the commentators of the Middle Ages—that "*On Interpretation*,"[1]—in which Propositions come to be considered, it is shewn, what propositions having the same terms are opposed, or not, to each other, and

[1] Ἑρμηνεία is not adequately rendered by Interpretation. It means the Expression of Thought by Language.

what may or may not be true together. Still more does the same appear in a subsequent Treatise, entitled the *Topics*, in which the author is engaged throughout in suggesting to the disputant principles for maintaining, or impugning, the alternatives on any given question. In that Treatise the reference is immediate to Dialectic, as the method by which one might reason about any proposed problem from probabilities, and in sustaining an argument might avoid saying anything contrary to the purpose. And he describes that method, not only as useful for exercise in conversational discussions, but also as availing, in a measure, for the sciences belonging to philosophy; because, when we are able to raise objections on both sides, we shall more easily discover in everything both the truth and the falsehood; and further, because the first principles of any science are incapable of demonstration, and a way may be opened to the reception of them by adducing probable arguments concerning them.[1] Such, indeed, is the practical design of both Treatises of the *Analytics*, whilst in that entitled the *Prior Analytics*, the theory of the Syllogism is accurately and fully developed; and more obviously still of the Treatise "*On Sophistic Refutations*" or *Fallacies*.

But though the several Treatises of the *Organon* have this direct practical design, and are therefore dialectical rather than logical, yet it is evident, that a view of Logic as an art of Disputation did not satisfy the penetrating mind of Aristotle. He saw that there was a real science of the connexions of Thought, as expressed in Language, involved in the method of disputation, which, in pursuance of the track marked out by his predecessors, and for the introduction of a better system, he had been led to search out and unfold. And though we may have no occasion to apply his observations to the same purpose, and their essential instruction to us is in the theory of Argumentation, they are not without their use to us, even according to their original design, as aids in the study of the truths of a science, and in order to the methodical pursuit of any matter of literary inquiry.

[1] Topica, i. c. 1, 2.

In the Categories, then, we have the Metaphysical Being of things, so far as it is denoted by Language, drawn out into its various modes, and distinctly characterized. They are not arrangements of things existing in Nature or classification of objects. They are nothing more than a classification of objects as represented by words to the mind. As no one supposes that the parts of speech enumerated by the grammarian are a theory of the universe, whilst they give all the general heads under which the truths of the Universe fall when stated in sentences; so neither should it be supposed that the Categories are designed to be a system of the Universe. If they be taken apart from their place in a science of Logic, they may be objected to by some as incomplete, by others as prolix; and attempts, accordingly, have been made both to extend and to reduce their number. But the question with regard to them is, whether in their present form they answer the purpose of the logician; whether they suffice to reduce the objects of thought, innumerable in themselves, within the horizon of its survey, and enable us to deal with them and reason about them with clearness and accuracy.

In the Heads of Predicables, we have the Secondary or Logical Being, the various modes of existence created by Language through its power of representing multitudes under single terms or expressions. For there is no limit to that power. It is not with these as the case is with the Categories. They must have a reference to existing things, since they are classes of our notions about existing things; and they are limited therefore in number, But we may create, and give a logical existence, to innumerable, even fictitious and imaginary thoughts; as when, for instance, it may be said of anything that it is a chimera, that term may constitute either the subject, or the predicate, of a proposition, to be employed in reasoning, no less than if it expressed a reality. All that is meant, in fact, when in a proposition any object is said to be this or that—as when it is said, "that Socrates is wise,"—it means logically, the existence in our conception of Socrates, of something belonging to that class of notional beings

which is denoted by the term "wise," or that, on the other hand, "wise" is a quality comprehended in our conception of the individual Socrates.

The Treatise *on Interpretation* brings us more immediately into the presence of logical facts, by exhibiting the combination of words in propositions; whereas, hitherto, we have considered them rather as distinct expressions of thought in themselves alone. We now proceed to examine them in their bearings on each other when connected in an enunciation.

Here it becomes important to us accurately to distinguish between the respective functions of Grammar and Logic, inasmuch as both these sciences are conversant about words in their application to the communication of knowledge.

The rise of a science of Grammar has been admirably sketched by Adam Smith, in his observations on the Origin of Language. He points out how the ancient languages are more simple, and one in the expression, than the modern. What is one word, for instance, "venit" in the Latin, becomes in the English, "he is coming;" the modern, as he shews, dropping the various inflections, and becoming, at once, more simple in its elements, and more complex in structure, by the various combination of fewer elementary sounds. In its progress, accordingly, Language carries on the analytical process, with which it set out, when single words were broken up into a sentence consisting of several words; when the relations of thoughts which had been expressed by different terminations of words, had each their separate distinctive signs; just as writing, from being at first in pictures and symbols, became at length alphabetical. What is gradually effected in regard to the study of Grammar, by the natural progress of Language, that, Logic takes up as already accomplished to its hands, in every information submitted in words to its survey, or else reduces that information into a form which conveys it without any extrinsic addition—that is, as either an affirmative or negative proposition, declaring what the fact or truth, or thought, communicated, is. Now, if we desire to communicate anything in words to others, whether

it be matter of history or of our own observation, or an opinion, or a feeling, the communication, stripped of all its adjuncts of description or grammatical proprieties, or ornaments of style, will be found in all instances to be reducible to the form of the bare statement that this is, or is not, that. What was a whole, as perceived and apprehended by the mind of the person who desires to express it, becomes, in communicating it in words, divided into three several parts, constituting together an enunciation: 1. a subject; 2. a predicate; 3. the verb substantive,—"is," on the one hand, if it be an affirmative; on the other, if it be a negative, "is not,"—the same in all cases, uniting the subject and predicate, the two terms or extremes,[1] in the one expression, as existing, or not existing, together. And this formula is the same for all instances; whether the expression be of something real or unreal—a truth of history and experience—or a mere speculation and opinion—one relative to external nature or of our own consciousness—a principle, or an inference. For the inquiry of the logician is not into what is true or false, probable or improbable, in the statement before him,—which it belongs to the philosopher, and the observer, or the historian, or the man of judgment and information in the matter concerned, to determine,—but simply into what is affirmed or denied, in the enunciation, into which the alleged fact is now, as it were, translated. The logician, like the philosopher in general, has his peculiar class of facts presented to his survey, which he is to observe and study, and reduce to their general principles, as far as may be. And the facts in his case are, the instances in which one term is predicated of another, either affirmatively or negatively. He has to explain what the nature of that connexion is, and trace it out as a phenomenon to its cause and principle. In like manner, he proceeds also with those inferentially connected; as where something is alleged as resulting from another, or propositions are stated as conclusions from others. These also he reduces to their simplest form of

[1] Such is the original meaning of "term," now popularly applied as synonymous with "word" or "expression."

enunciations, in each of which there is presented for his consideration the relation of two terms, of which one is the subject, and the other the predicate of a proposition, connected by the substantive verb, "is," or "is not."[1]

Each of the terms, either the subject or predicate, may consist of several words, as must happen, when no single word adequately conveys the thought intended; for then it must be expressed by description and circumlocution. But this makes no difference in the estimate of the subject or predicate as terms of a proposition. The logician simply looks to the thought expressed as if it were denoted by a single word, and compares the subject and predicate of the proposition as universals so connected or disconnected.

An erroneous view of the formation of logical propositions has been given in the popular Compendium,[2] according to which they are represented as the results of a synthetic process, instead of being, as here stated, the results of an analysis effected by Language. The mind, it has been said, sits, as it were, in judgment on two objects, and, on comparing them, pronounces that they agree or disagree, and so forms affirmative or negative propositions concerning them. This is to build the science on a metaphorical assumption. The only agreement or disagreement between two objects is their being found in some one fact, whether real or supposed. Affirmative propositions, accordingly, are not judgments, the results of a previous comparison, and afterwards put together in words, but analytical statements of what is observed in the concrete; and likewise negative propositions on the other hand analytical statements of what, by the like observation, has been found or supposed not to be the fact.

It has been part of the same misconception of a proposition to regard the substantive verb as only the "copula" or tie of

[1] Hence it is said, that the noun and the verb are the only parts of speech which belong to Logic, and of verbs, only the verb substantive signifying existence; all other verbs resolving themselves into this and their participles, which are in fact nouns; as is the case with even the verb "is," when used in a proposition without any predicate expressed; for it then stands for, "is existing."

[2] Aldrich's Logic.

connexion between the two objects supposed to be compared, like the Conjunction in Grammar uniting two words or two sentences, or disuniting them. In reality, the substantive verb is the most important word in the analysis, expressing, as it does, the existence or non-existence of some fact, real or supposed; denoting the affirmation, or negation, without which there could be no proposition.

The logician, then, has to explore how words can thus become the subjects and predicates of propositions about existence. That A is B, or that A is not B,—these are the fundamental general facts of his science, which he has in the first place to investigate, and then to apply the results in explaining the process of Argumentation. For Argumentation is but a series of connected propositions.

The first thing which occurs to observation is the position of the two terms, one as the predicate of the other. This implies that the latter is a term of greater extent than the former, bearing the relation of a genus to a species; and that the former, the subject, is a term of greater comprehension than the other, inasmuch as it may have resemblances to many other objects besides those intimated by the predicate, and each of which resemblances may be the ground of as many different predicates. Each of the terms, then, of the proposition being universals, one in the sense of comprehension, and the other in that of extension, it becomes necessary to express further in the proposition whether the logical being denoted by the predicate extends, or not, over the whole conception of the subject; or in other words, whether not only the predicate itself is universal, but the *predication* universal. For in all instances the predicate as well as the subject are in themselves universals, no less if the proposition of which they are the terms, be particular, than if it be universal. If the fact or observation, accordingly, which the proposition is meant to express, be general,—or not restricted to particular instances, but unlimited in application,—the proposition which expresses it, must, in its logical form, correspond in its universality. If, for instance, the observation be that "Knowledge is Power;" in order to avail

ourselves of that proposition as a premiss in a logical argument, we must reduce it to a determinate form, since, as it stands in the general assertion, it may mean "all knowledge," or "some knowledge." And if the universality is the chief thing respected in the observation, it must be stated so as to imply that the predicate "Power" extends over the whole subject "Knowledge." In such case, the abstract form of the proposition becomes all A is B. So, also, if the observation be universally negative, the statement becomes "No A is B." But if the universality of the fact or the observation be unascertained, or it be accompanied with exceptions, the form will be some A is B, as well as some A is not B, to indicate that the predicate applies only to the subject as partially connected; that though the predicate be an universal itself, it is not predicated universally of the subject.

Hence all Propositions on any matter whatever are reduced to four kinds:—1. Universal Affirmative, in which one class or universal is affirmed of the whole of another; 2. Universal Negative, in which two classes or universals are mutually excluded from one another, because, if anything in the subject did belong to the universal denoted by the predicate, or any of the predicate to the universal denoted by the subject, the assertion that "No A is B" could not be made; 3. Particular Affirmative, in which one class or universal is affirmed of some of the particulars included in the other; 4. Particular Negative, in which one class or universal partly excludes the other. These are the only varieties of form under which any two classes of objects can be combined in Affirmations or Negations. Every Proposition, accordingly, in order to be brought fully and strictly under the survey of Logic, must be referred to one or the other of these Forms, as the case may be. Hence we may proceed to examine these ultimate forms to which propositions are reducible, independently of the things themselves about which the propositions are; and draw from them logical principles applicable to every particular case. Thus, the form of a Universal Affirmative, "All A is B," in which the letters A and B are put as the representatives of any objects whatever, is the proper datum, from which the

whole logical nature of any Universal Affirmative Proposition may be explored. So also with regard to the remaining abstract forms.

Aristotle, accordingly, has thus examined the nature of Propositions, and pointed out their force as principles, both in themselves and when connected in reasonings.

He does not separately consider the nature of Propositions under the view of their admitting the reciprocation or conversion of their terms, though in the book on Interpretation he has discussed the various forms of Opposition. The discussion of the nature of Opposition would be more particularly required of him from the metaphysical disputes of the day; some philosophers denying the absolute truth of any proposition, or the possibility of Contradiction. But the subject of Conversion is one of simple logical consideration, as to what inferences may be made from an interchange of position between the subject and predicate of a proposition; and, on this account probably, he has not treated it apart from the exposition of the syllogism. For it is in the course of his examination into the construction of syllogisms that he practically points out its principles; shewing, that Universal Affirmatives cannot be simply converted; but that when the predicate takes the place of the subject in the proposition, the predication must be limited; since, for the truth of the proposition "All A is B," it is enough that some B is A; but, at the same time, that it would not be true, that all A is B, unless some B were A. In like manner, he shews that no Particular Negative can be converted, because, when the subject of such a proposition becomes its predicate, it is then universally denied of the subject, but not the subject, of it; that is, if some A is not B, it may be true also, that "some A is B;" and that would not be true, if some B were not A.

In his *Prior Analytics* he passes on to the consideration of Syllogisms, or arguments logically viewed. Here it is that the logical theory is properly unfolded. Syllogisms are the perfect developments of the theory of language, as language consists of signs expressive of Being,—as it manifests of the general fact, that

a word denoting Being is the representative of a class of observations on some subject to which they refer as to their foundation and support. This theory is first intimated in the ordinary use of single words. It is next more disclosed in the connections of words, as terms, in propositions affirming or denying one term of another. It is lastly laid open in the Syllogism, in which the principle of classification is fully exemplified as the tie of connection between two terms affirmed or denied of each other.

Since, then, the evidence of the *connection* subsisting between the two terms brought together in any affirmation or negation is *the point* in every argument; it is evident that the reasoning on any subject whatever may be exhibited abstractedly from the particular matter about which it is. Terms can only be connected as they are classes more or less extensive, relatively to each other; and this relative extent is evidenced at once, as before shewn, by the abstract forms of the propositions in which they are connected. Three abstract propositions, accordingly, in which the terms whose connection is explored, are, first (*i.e.*, in the two premises), separately stated in their relation to some intermediate class or middle term,—and then in their relation to each other (*i.e.*, in the conclusion), as it is the result of their premised relations to the intermediate class,—will enable us, without reference to any other consideration, to judge of the conclusiveness of the argument. The Syllogism is nothing more than this abstract statement of an argument.

Accordingly, in entering on the discussion of Argument, Aristotle premises the Definition of Syllogism, as a "Sentence, in which certain things being stated, something different from what has been laid down, results, of necessity, on account of what has been laid down,"[1]—a definition, which being evidently drawn from observation of the particular instances, in which that connection between the three terms employed in an argu-

[1] Συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος, ἐν ᾧ, τεθέντων τινῶν, ἕτερον τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι· Λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν. Analytica Priora, i. c. 1; also Topica, i. 1.

ment, which constitutes its logical validity, is exemplified, in the development of his system serves as *the principle*, by which the conclusiveness of an argument from any given combination of two propositions as its premises, may be tested. As he proceeds, he appears to be distinguishing syllogisms into the two kinds of demonstrative and dialectical. But this is a difference, not in the form of the reasoning, but in the matter of the propositions, with which the dialectician has to do, as he differs from the philosopher. The dialectician is regarded as a controversialist on some proposed question, on which he has to take his side, and to support his own view, and impugn that of his adversary, who takes the contradictory of it, by every argument in his power. He reasons, accordingly, from the apparent and the probable: such principles suffice for his purpose: whereas the philosopher, having immutable truth for his end, according to the strict ancient notion of science, Ἐπιστημή, is restricted by the object of his pursuit to such principles as are both primary and true. In the proceedings of both, however, Syllogism is the one and the same Form into which their arguments, so far as they are valid, are capable of being resolved; so that there are not, in fact, two kinds of syllogistic reasoning, but one common method under the name of Syllogism, whether the conclusions drawn by the reasoner be necessary, or only apparent and probable truth. For the probable or apparent truth of the conclusion must *as necessarily follow* from the probable premises, as the necessary truth of the philosopher's conclusion from the necessary premises from which it is argued.

Such being the case—Syllogism being the universal Form of all arguments,—it has been attributed to Aristotle as an inconsistency, that he does not use that form in his own discussions, but adduces his arguments in the ordinary popular way. And this has been alleged as an objection against the usefulness of his exposition of the Syllogism. By the Schoolmen, indeed, of the Middle Ages, we find the method of arguing in formal syllogisms adopted, through a perverse application of what Aristotle himself intended to be an instruction in the nature and resources

of argument, and not as a pattern to be actually followed in the business of discussion: and this notable example has probably given occasion to a similar objection in modern times. Such a misapplication, indeed, was not unlike the absurdity of a sculptor or painter ostensibly displaying his knowledge of Anatomy, by executing the forms which he carves or paints, according to the framework of the skeletons which he has studied, without the clothings of the flesh and the roundings of the joints, as they appear in the living and moving form. In earlier times, this objection took the form of a doubt as to the propriety of Aristotle's proceeding in reasoning or using syllogisms in establishing the truths respecting Syllogism, as he has done in his Analytics; because, it was said, we "cannot use an instrument before we have constructed it." It was felt necessary, therefore, to answer this objection, by the distinction between "natural and artificial" Logic — "the natural, being that which even the most ignorant employ, as an instinctive power by which they form syllogisms and carry on argumentation; the artificial, that which Aristotle had constructed out of the natural, by observing the methods and processes by which others, by means of natural logic, philosophized, and reducing them all to precepts and rules of art."[1] So just is this observation of the ancient Latin logician, that it at once explains and vindicates the importance attributed by Aristotle to the Syllogism in every exercise of reasoning.

[1] "Quum enim duplex sit logica, una naturalis, altera artificiosa, logicam quidem naturalem, nemo unquam invenit, vel composuit; est enim innata quædam vis, et animis hominum insita, per quam etiam ignorantissimi homines, syllogismos et argumentationes faciunt, quum nullo studio, nulloque labore, eam acquisiverint; sed logica artificiosa ab Aristotele inventa et composita esse dicitur; ex logica namque naturali, qua alii, solo ducti instinctu naturæ, utebantur, Aristoteles artificiosam logicam genuit; nimirum observans methodos et progressus, quibus per logicam naturalem alii philosophabantur; omnesque ad præcepta, et ad regulas artis, redigens. . . Ex his quæ dicta sunt de syllogismo naturali et artificioso, colligitur solutio cujusdam dubii, quod plerisque negotium facessit: Aristoteles enim in lib. Categoriarum, et in libro de Interpretatione, sæpe ratiocinatur et syllogismos facit; quum tamen nihil adhuc de syllogismo docuerit; quod quidem non recte factum videtur; quia non possumus instrumento uti, priusquam ipsum construxerimus. Ad hoc dicimus, ignorari quidem syllogissimum artificiosum ante libros Analyticos, sed non propterea tolli usum syllogismi naturalis," etc.—Jacobi Zabarellæ, *Oper. Logic.—De 4ta Fig. Syllog.* c. 5. p. 106. *Basil.* 1594.

In following out his application of the Definition of Syllogism as a test of the validity of Arguments, we shall obtain a clearer idea of his proceeding by observing the peculiar phraseology which he employs. And this is rendered the more necessary by the fact, that his Logic has descended to us of the Western Church, in a Latinized form, by which it has lost something of its primitive character in appearance. The original technical terms appear to have been drawn from notions belonging to Geometry or Arithmetic, indicating their derivation through the schools of the Pythagoreans; devoted, as these were, to mathematics, and fond of interpreting the truths of Philosophy by fanciful applications of geometrical figures and of Numbers. Thus, what is "proposition" in the Latin expression, is in Aristotle, πρότασις, "extension, as from one point to another;" it would be represented probably by a line drawn; of which the two extremities would be the two terms; therefore called the extremes, ἄκρα, or the boundaries, ὅροι, of the proposition; and the distance between them as the "interval," διάστημα,—another form of expression for a proposition, as a line situated between its extreme points—carrying on the same notion. The two terms are distinguished as the first and last in position, and as the major and minor in magnitude; and when he has further to introduce the consideration of a third term, he characterizes it as intermediate in position, and also in magnitude, relatively to the two terms of the proposition with which it has successively to be compared in an argument. Even the derivation of the word Syllogism is from Arithmetic, as it implies a reckoning or summing up in a result the several items, like those of a sum in Arithmetic, which have been previously separately stated.[1] His use again of Letters to represent the subject and predicate of a Proposition, seems to have been adopted from the practice of mathematicians in denoting magnitudes in that manner.

[1] Among the moderns Hobbes has carried this notion of reasoning to the utmost excess, as it favoured his extreme Nominalism. With him, reasoning is nothing but reckoning of consequences of words.

The schoolmen, in carrying the notions of the Physics and Metaphysics into the science of Logic, obscured, by the strange dialect in which the truths of the science were thus delivered, its proper nature as a science conversant about language. Thus, according to them, we hear of the "substance," and "matter," and "form," of propositions and of syllogisms. On the contrary, the technical expressions of Aristotle himself are extremely few, and those strictly appropriate to the subject, elucidating the characteristic nature of a science conversant about words as they are signs of thought. The scholastic method and language however, from long prescription, have so ingrafted themselves on our modes of writing and speaking, that some acquaintance with them is in fact become necessary to us at this day; and may so far, therefore, be regarded as constituting a legitimate part of modern logic. But when the technicalities of this system are made a ground of objection to the Aristotelic logic, it may be answered, that these are not parts of Aristotle's system, as it is found in the original, but the refinements of his commentators.

It is, however, to the Latin schools, that our established terminology in Logic is to be almost exclusively traced as to its actual form; and much of the modern misconceptions of its nature may be attributed to that source.

Aristotle pursues the examination into Syllogisms, and determines what are, or are not, valid forms of its expression, in the following manner. Every conclusion is to be viewed, anterior to its proof by argument, as a question to be proved, and its subject and predicate as the terms of the question. The object of the argument is, to bring those terms into logical connection with each other, by means of a third, with which they separately have, each, such connection. This third term is designated by Aristotle a "mean" μέσον, or middle term. We must suppose a line on which the three terms stand, the first which is also the major, on one extremity of it, the third, also called the "last and minor," on the other extremity, and "the middle," on the middle of the line, or somewhere between the extremities. The first, the major, is

defined as "that in which another is;" the last, and minor, "that which is in another;" the middle, "that in which another is, and which is itself in another." When the major and middle and minor are placed in the three propositions of a syllogism in this their proper order, we obtain what Aristotle calls, by a mathematical designation, the First and perfect Figure, σχῆμα,[1] the true and proper model, as it were, of every valid argument; because in it the evidence of the necessity of the conclusion is direct, needing no extrinsic consideration to make it manifest; a valid conclusion in this Figure following, *of necessity*, from the premises, fulfils the requirement in the definition of Syllogism.[2]

But the middle term may be so displaced in an argument, as to occupy the position of the major instead of its own, and to become, in fact, the major term, and the predicate, of both the premises. Or again, the middle term may occupy the place of the minor, and become the subject of both premises. In the former of these two instances we have Aristotle's Second Figure; in the latter, his Third Figure. And these three Figures, according to him, are all the varieties of position in which the three terms can be regarded, in their relations to each other in a syllogism. His commentators,—Galen, or whoever it was that introduced the innovation,—added a Fourth Figure; looking rather, it seems, to the various combinations which might be formed of the four kinds of Propositions in the premises, than to the different positions of the middle term in relation to the two terms of the question, according to Aristotle's more correct view. But this Fourth Figure, whilst it reverses the proper position of the middle term, as it stands, according to its definition,—making it the predicate of the premiss in which the first and major term

[1] Quemadmodum enim figura mathematica consurgit ex dispositione linearum, ut patet in triangulo et quadrangulo, sic etiam syllogistica consurgit ex dispositione terminorum.—Cursus Philosoph. Acad. Complutens. per Fr. Murciam. Colon. 1644, p. 58.

It is to some geometrical lines or figures used in illustrating the logical treatises of Aristotle, that St. Augustine refers, when he speaks (*Confess.* iv. 16) of some studying the Categories, magistris eruditissimis, non loquentibus tantum, sed multa in pulvere depingentibus.

[2] Anal. Pr. 1, 4.

is,[1] and the subject of that in which the last and minor is, and greater in extent, accordingly, than the major, yet less in extent than the minor,—involves an absurdity in the conception of it as a *middle* term; so that we must then abandon Aristotle's definition of it, and in such case regard the major as, virtually, the middle. On this account the Fourth Figure of modern logicians appears to have been justly omitted by Aristotle.[2]

Subordinate to this arrangement of Syllogisms in the Three Figures, is the distribution of them into Cases, πτώσεις, or Modes, analogous to the different cases of a geometrical theorem or problem. Here we have to suppose the four classes of Propositions—Universal Affirmative, Particular Affirmative, Universal Negative, Particular Negative, combined in every possible way as the premises and conclusion of a syllogism, in each of the Three Figures, and to determine what are valid cases or not, in accordance with the definition of a Syllogism, by observing when a conclusion follows of necessity from each given combination, and when it does not.

This inquiry has been greatly facilitated by the method in which it is pursued in modern Treatises. We are furnished in these with several distinct principles, or rules, by which we may at once determine, that, from certain combinations of propositions in each Figure, no valid conclusion can be drawn. We are directed to observe, whether the middle term is "distributed," *i. e.* taken in its full acceptation as an universal, once at least in the premises; whether one, at least, of the premises is universal, and one, at least, affirmative; to see that no term

[1] Aristotle's expression of "being in," has been sometimes misconceived, as if it were equivalent to "being contained in," as one box may be contained in another. The fact is, that the term or notion which is said to be in another, is conceived to be greater in extent than that in which it is said to be—or to extend over that, in which, in logical phrase, it is said to be.

[2] Locke (Hum. Und., iv. c. 17). objects to Aristotle's account of the Syllogism, that it puts the middle term in an unnatural place. He has been evidently misled by the circumstance of the middle appearing accidentally out of its proper position as it occurs in the premises of a Syllogism, and which is an arrangement belonging to the consideration of grammar rather than of logic.

be distributed in the conclusion, which was not distributed in the premises: all which observations are useful practical directions, enabling us summarily to dismiss a great number of combinations of propositions as invalid for the construction of a syllogism. Propositions are now familiarized to us in logical Treatises under their respective letters, A, E, I, O, as marks of their quality and quantity: A denoting Universal Affirmatives, E, Universal Negatives, I, particular Affirmatives, O, particular Negatives; these vowels forming, by ingenious combinations in words, with certain consonants,—which are also indices to processes to be performed in the investigation of each case,—the several names of the valid syllogisms in each Figure,[1] and at the same time marking the propositions themselves, in their order, in each syllogism.

Aristotle directs our attention simply to the question of the *necessity* of the consequence. He gives us the three terms without throwing them into propositions, and directs us to the consideration whether they follow (ἀκολούθει) one another, in logical sequence, in the three propositions which make up the syllogism. It is manifest in the four Cases or Modes of the First Figure, that the terms are so placed as to "follow one another in this relation and order;" that, therefore, all syllogisms so constructed are valid, whilst all other combinations of propositions in the same Figure not answering to this condition of relation in the terms, are invalid. Then the syllogistic character, or conclusiveness of each, is tested, in cases where it fails, by particular experiments. If, in any formula, the same *disposition* of the terms being supposed; an affirmative conclusion is true in one case, and a negative one in another, by a change in one of the terms as to matter and meaning; it is evident, that there is no invariableness in that *mode*, and no necessity of sequence; and the definition of the syllogism, accordingly, is not exemplified in it.

[1] Alexander of Aphrodisias, the great commentator on Aristotle in the latter half of the second century, is supposed to have been the first to introduce a technical system, such as that which has descended to us through the Latin logicians.

In the Second and Third Figures, however, the middle term being out of its own proper position, the necessity of the consequence is not *self-evident* as it is in the First, and on that account the syllogisms in them, though valid no less than those in the First, are styled incomplete, or imperfect.

This introduces the consideration of what is called the Reduction of Syllogisms; or the bringing the imperfect modes of the Second and Third Figures to the corresponding perfect ones of the First. It is not that their *conclusiveness* requires to be proved by other syllogisms in the First Figure, or confirmed by them. It is only in the sense that they are accidental deviations from the natural logïc of the mind; and require therefore to be reduced to that order, and thus shewn to be real though indirect evidences of it.

This Reduction is of two kinds. It is either (1) Ostensive, or (2) *Ad impossibile.* It is Ostensive, when the very same conclusion as before in the imperfect mode, or one which implies it, is proved also by a mode of the First Figure.[1] It is *Ad Impossibile*, when, by some mode in the First Figure, the conclusion of the imperfect mode is proved (not directly as true, but) that it cannot be false. The principles of Opposition and Conversion furnish the rules for effecting these purposes.

Strictly then, in a true science of Logic, in the Philosophy of Reasoning, the First Figure, in its four valid cases or modes, alone deserves a place. This alone is a portion of the history of the mind. The other Figures take their rise from the expedients of Argument, and belong rather to the dialectician, as he is distinguished from the logician. And they are, accordingly, adduced by Aristotle for his purpose. The Second Figure, for example, spoken of is as of especial use in refutation of an opponent in disputation: the Third Figure for bringing objec-

[1] Hence the excellent service of the well-known mnemonic lines:—

"Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque, prioris,
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroko, secundæ,
Tertia, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton,
Bokardo, Ferison, habet; Quarta insuper addit
Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison."

tions. For in the Second, we have none but negative conclusions; in the Third, none but particular ones. And these serve respectively for refutation or objection. It is only the First Figure that is available for universal affirmative conclusions, and, accordingly, for direct scientific demonstration of what IS.

If indeed the two latter Figures were nothing more than expedients in argument resorted to by the disputant, the consideration of them would properly enter into a treatise of Logic. The artificial forms of Reasoning which human ingenuity has produced should not be overlooked in such a science; inasmuch as these forms are in themselves phenomena of the mind. And instead of its being any just matter of the complaint which has been made of his seeking to demonstrate a demonstration, it is a great merit in the system of Aristotle, that he has thus reduced instances which appeared at variance with his theory of argumentation, to a conformity with it.

Nor has the utility of this portion of Logic ceased with its application to the business of the disputant. The Reduction of Syllogisms, from an imperfect mode to the perfect one, still remains as an excellent exercise of the mind in order to an acquaintance with the science of Logic, and for a practical dexterity in the use of its rules in argument; and it is therefore, further, by no means to be despised or neglected in our study of the Science.

Having thus pointed out the several cases of Syllogisms into which every valid argument must resolve itself, Aristotle, in pursuit of the adaptation of his method to the business of disputation, according to the practice of the Greek schools, and the colloquial discussions in conformity to that practice, proceeds to shew further how Modal propositions,—propositions, in which the statement is not simply as in those previously considered, that A is B; but with some modification; as, that A is necessarily B, or possibly B; and to point out how the conclusion must be affected by such statements in the premises. This, perhaps, is the most intricate part of his discussion; as it turns on subtile distinctions with respect to the force of the con-

ditions thus imposed on the predicate. But however useful it may have been for its original purpose,—that nothing might be omitted which would supply the disputant with a ready answer under whatever point of view an argument might be presented, this discussion is, in great measure, superseded in the modern study of Logic, by the consideration that a modal proposition may be immediately transformed into a pure categorical one, by attaching the condition of necessity or possibility to the predicate as a part of the notion of the predicate: as, for example, the modal proposition "A *must be* B," is identical with the categorical "A is a necessary B;" or "A *may be* B," is identical with "A is a possible B."

From his whole examination thus carried on through the two books of the *Prior Analytics*, of all the forms in which a valid argument may be alleged, the conclusion results, that the *principle* of the reasoning is the same in all; each instance of such argument developing the theoretic power of language; according to which, terms denoting Being are classes more or less comprehensive, more or less extensive, of observations on the thing, the object of thought, whose being it expresses.

This ultimate principle of all reasoning is commonly stated in the form of a theorem, enunciating that "whatever is predicated (affirmed or denied) universally, of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner of anything contained in, or signified by, that class." This is that form of it known by the scholastic designation of the "*Dictum de Omni et Nullo*." From the mode in which this principle has been introduced in systems of Logic founded on the method of the School-authors, a prejudice has been excited against Aristotle, as if he had employed the principle in establishing the conclusiveness of arguments already granted to be conclusive. Aristotle, however, does not introduce the principle in any formal manner, as a dogma or *a priori* ground of logical truth. On the contrary, it pervades the whole of his system, as resulting from every part of his inquiry. He is only concerned to shew that every argument, however varied in its mode, or form, is reducible to a form by which the truth

of the theory shall be evidenced in it. Syllogisms are not proved by the principle ; but the principle itself is proved by the nature of the syllogism, as any other philosophical truth is deduced from varied observations and experiments. In short, by his reference to the principle, he does not *prove* the conclusiveness of a given argument, but *accounts* for it.

In modern treatises of logic, we find the notice of a form of syllogism, the hypothetical, of which no express mention is made by Aristotle, though he frequently throws his reasonings into that form. The account of this omission may be, that this form seems to belong more directly to the business of Investigation than to that of Argument. For, in investigating the truth on any matter, it is most important, in the first place, to limit the inquiry as far as possible, by examining hypotheses concerning it, and setting aside such as may be found impossible or insufficient ; or to commence, by considering, in how many ways certain phenomena may be accounted for, and to accept that which gives the best solution of the facts. A Hypothetical Syllogism, in fact, as such, calls our attention more to the truth involved in the several propositions of a syllogism, than to the formal connection of its terms. That connection is assumed to be logically correct ; the conclusion necessarily following from the premises. Now, as a true conclusion may be drawn from false premises, inasmuch as a conclusion depends simply on what is formally affirmed or denied, and not on what is true, in the premises, there is occasion for considering the relation of the premises to the conclusion, as to how the assertion or denial of the one affects the assertion or denial of the other in point of truth or falsehood. Hypotheticals, then, are evidently not logically distinct from categorical Syllogisms.[1] When argumentatively employed, they are only compendious modes of stating a syllogism, or several syllogisms, when several are combined in one argument, as the

[1] Archbishop Whately (Elements of Logic, p. 120), points out, how a Hypothetical may be expressed in the form of a Categorical, by putting the hypothesis as "a case ;" as, for instance, "If A is B, C is D," may be stated thus ; "the case of A being B," is a case of C being D, etc.

case may be; or of putting an argument in a clear and striking form. The consideration of them appears, in this respect, to belong to Metaphysics, rather than to Logic; inasmuch as the premises of a given syllogism are, in a manner, the cause of the truth of the conclusion, and we speculate on them under this aspect as on two consecutive events, of which the one is the antecedent of the other. Hence, in treating of Hypotheticals, some logicians speak of them under the term of "Connected" syllogisms, and consider the premises and conclusion under the relation of antecedent and consequent; laying down rules for the examination of them under this aspect. Thus they divide them into the two heads of,—1. Conditional, in which the antecedent is granted, and therefore also the consequent; 2. Disjunctive, or in which the consequent is denied, and therefore also the antecedent; as in these,—the 1st, If A is B, C is D—A is B, therefore C is D, or, C is not D, therefore A is not B; the 2d, the Disjunctive, in which two or more alternatives are stated as the consequent, according to the formula, A is either B or C or D. But A is not B or C, therefore A is D. Aristotle speaks, indeed, of "Syllogisms from hypothesis, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως; but these appear to be, in his sense, arguments from analogy, rather than hypotheticals in the modern sense; since he places them under the speculation of "the like," ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρία, as a ground of argument; and he rests the usefulness of such a proceeding, on the principle, that it is probable that what holds in the hypothetical case, holds also in the proposition with which the question is concerned.[1]

The examination of Syllogisms is followed up in the *Posterior Analytics* by an inquiry into Demonstration; and in the *Topics*, into arguments founded on probable premises. The full discussion of the Syllogism was premised by him, inasmuch as the syllogistic process is common both to demonstration and to probable conclusions; and accordingly, as the more general subject of investigation, claimed the first notice in a scientific

[1] Topica, i. 16.

treatise of Dialectic.[1] Properly, indeed, being the only part of the science which is really universal,—belonging to Argumentation *as such*, under whatever form, whether by Induction, Example, or Enthymeme (all of which are only different modes of expression of the Syllogism),—whether the premises assumed be necessary or probable, it is the only province to which the science of Reasoning, in its strictest sense, extends. In examining further the nature of Demonstration and of Probability, we depart from the rigorous limits of the science of Reasoning, and approach those of Rhetoric. But it is useful, at the same time, to examine these subjects as detached from Rhetoric, and in their connection with Dialectic, so far as we then confine our attention to the mere force of different kinds of argument on the *understanding;* whereas Rhetoric combines also the view of them in their effect on the *will.* We then consider them as they are capable of producing either knowledge or opinion; whereas, in the latter case, we look at them in that complete result which is implied in Persuasion. It was for the former purpose that they were required for the disputant; and hence the consideration of them forms an important part of the several dialectical treatises which pass under the name of the *Organon.* For the same reason the concluding Treatise "*On Sophisms,*" is directed not only to the solution of Fallacies which may exist in the syllogistic process, or in the reasoning, strictly viewed as reasoning, but to such also as may be traced in arguments where the process itself, the pure logic of the case, is perfectly correct.

It has been objected,[2] that he resorted to abstract symbols, in the substitution of letters for terms having meaning, rather than to more familiar means of illustration, in order to leave the truths of the science partially veiled. There may be some truth in the assertion, that he did not intend his written works to be accessible to the public without oral exposition. But

[1] Anal. Pr. 1. 4. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός τις· ὁ συλλογισμὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς ἀπόδειξις.

[2] John of Salisbury (Metalog., l. 4, c. 2) complains of the use of Letters as a "studied confusion." So also Ramus abecedariisque exemplis obscuravit, Institut. Dialect., p. 199.

it does not apply here. The observation already made on the nature of logical being, may be sufficient to clear up any misconstruction on this point. The principle of classification, which is all that Logic, as the science of reasoning, is concerned with, could not be examined so scientifically and clearly in any other way as in that which expresses the principle itself nakedly. Everything else is irrelevant to the matter in hand. So far as anything else is attended to in a proposition, so far the mind is diverted from the logical point of view. His use of symbols, therefore, is only an illustration of his accurate and perfect method of developing the science.[1]

The discussion of Demonstration is an exposition of the nature of Science, Ἐπιστήμη, as it was understood by the Ancient philosophers. They restricted the application of the term, as has been already observed, to the knowledge of necessary truths—such truths as, when known, are known at the same time to be incapable of being otherwise. Aristotle, then, is employed, in the *Posterior Analytics*, in discussing the nature of the principles on which Science, as it was then understood, must be built.

Here he had to encounter perplexities and misconceptions introduced into the subject by the Platonic philosophy. In Plato's system knowledge was mere reminiscence. It was a penetration of the mind through the veil of sensible things interposed between itself and the realities of the intellectual world—its return to those purer perceptions which it had enjoyed before its present union with a body. This doctrine was altogether founded on a fallacious view of the nature of Demonstration. Because in Demonstration the conclusion is necessarily implied in the premises, it was conceived, that a science or proper knowledge of any particular was in all cases founded on a knowledge of the general principles in which it was implied. But this was an inversion of the actual order of knowledge, which commences with the particular, and ends in the general. In mathematical and metaphysical science the two things coincide; the notions

[1] The use of unmeaning symbols in Logic rests on the same footing as their use in geometry and algebra.

of our mind being, on the one hand, in themselves particular facts, from which we may argue to general principles; and, on the other hand, in their application to the business of philosophy, being the general principles of our knowledge. But Plato argued from this circumstance in these sciences to their general coincidence, and thus confused Demonstration with the scientific arrangement of facts. Aristotle, we find, was not free from the same fault in his Physics; but in his theory of Demonstration he has strictly provided against it. He has here pointed out the difference between the proof of matter of fact and matter of abstract speculation. Instead of inculcating the necessity of establishing every conclusion in Science by syllogism or a demonstrative process, he shews that all Demonstration proceeds on assumed principles in each science; which principles, accordingly, must be obtained from observations generalized, and not by a process of deduction from the general to the particular.[1]

There is one part of the work which deserves a more particular notice, as throwing light on his whole method of philosophizing, while it shews how far he approximated to the Induction of Modern philosophy. To obtain an accurate notion of the being of any thing, we require a definition of it. A definition of the thing corresponds, in Logic, with the essential notion of it in Metaphysics. This abstract notion, then, according to Aristotle, constituting the true scientific view of a thing,—and all the real knowledge consequently of the properties of the thing depending on the right limitation of this notion,—some exact method of arriving at definitions which should express these limitations, became indispensable in such a system of philosophy. But in order to attain such definitions, a process of Induction was required—not merely an induction of that kind which is only a peculiar form of syllogism, respecting all the individuals of a class, as constituting that class; but an induction of a philosophical character, and only differing from the Induction of Modern philosophy, so far as it is employed, not in the limitation of facts, but of the notions of the mind in their expression by words.

[1] *Analyt. Post.* ii. c. ult. 7, 4, i. 13.

There are, then, two kinds of Induction treated of by Aristotle. The first, that of simple enumeration. Its use is, where we may have not beforehand ascertained a class to which we may refer the subject under consideration, and the search is, in fact, for a middle term. In this case, then, a collection of all the individuals which are supposed numerically to make up the class, serves instead of a middle term. Assuming, accordingly, that these individuals are equivalent to the class, we throw our observations on them into a general form, declaring, that what is predicated of each of these individuals singly viewed, may be predicated of them as a whole—that is, of the universal which represents them. There is no process of investigation involved in regard to the particulars themselves; but it is assumed, that we have found the assertion made respecting them true in all known instances; and the Induction is simply the bringing them under a common principle, which is, in fact, a summary statement of them all, exempted from that actual plurality under which they present themselves to our observation. Such induction is reducible to the form of a syllogism, as Aristotle shews;[1] but in its immediate use as an argument it may be considered distinct; inasmuch as it is the necessary expedient of the disputant, where he has no middle term at hand that may at once connect the two terms of the question; when, accordingly, he must seek a substitute for it in the observation of the several individuals which are the subject of his argument.[2]

The Greek language, it may be observed, admits of a more correct statement of a Proposition than our own. Aristotle thus uses the expression πᾶς ἄνθρωπος in the singular in stating an

[1] *Analytica Priora*, ii. c. 25; *Topica*, i. c. 10. Induction, he there says, is more persuasive and more knowable in respect of perception, and common to the multitude; but syllogism more constraining, and more effective against those who are disposed to be contradictory.

[2] *Topica*, viii. c. 2; *Analytica Priora*, ii. c. 25. Rhet. i. c. 2. He uses the verb ἐπάγω, in a loose sense, that of bringing a particular to the universal, in which it exists antecedently to its being known so to exist; as when in a syllogism of the first figure the minor premiss is subjoined to the major. This notion appears to run through his explanation of Induction.

universal proposition of which "man" is the subject, when by the idiom of our language we are obliged to say "all men;" which is as if we meant to collect all the individuals of the human race under that term; whereas the Greek πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, strictly denotes the universal term "man" as *a whole*, and when joined in a proposition with a predicate, that that predicate is in the whole. Now, as an Induction takes that form of expression, stating that "all these individuals are this," it is open to the like misunderstanding as universal affirmatives in general. We are apt to suppose that the conclusion applies to the individuals themselves, instead of to that which is common to them, *i.e.*, the universal, in which they are regarded as one. The word "all" in the universal affirmative proposition, as Aristotle himself observes, does "not signify the universal," το καθόλου, denoted by the term to which it is attached; but that the predication is universal; and, in like manner, "none," μηδεῖς, does not, according to its etymology, mean "no one,"[1] but that the negation is wholly taken, the predicate entirely exempted from the subject. The term "man," in fact, in a particular proposition, is itself no less an universal, when we say "some men," than when anything is predicated of it universally.

Now, it is evident, that when the word "all" is used in Inductions, it is intended to apply to the universality of the predication, and not to that of the term which is the subject of the conclusion, from the following consideration:—that if it were applied to the individuals which are here the subject of the conclusion, the conclusion would not, so understood, be true. For then it would disregard all their peculiarities; it would state that to be true concerning them in their individuality, which was only true of them in regard to their possession of the common nature, or the universal. What is true, for example, of Triangle generally, is not true of the isoceles *as such*, but only as it has the common nature signified by the word, Triangle. What is true

[1] Interpret. cc. 7, 10, τὸ γὰρ πᾶς οὐ τὸ καθόλου σημαίνει ἀλλ' ὅτι καθόλου. . . . . Ὥστε τὸ πᾶς, ἢ μηδείς, οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαίνει, ἢ ὅτι καθόλου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἡ κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν.

of Virtue generally, is not true of Temperance or Courage, as these differ from one another individually.

On this account, it is clearly unnecessary, for a just inference from Induction, when considered as an Evidence of fact, that all the individuals belonging to the subject should pass in review before the mind. It is enough that a large survey of instances should be taken in which the predicate is found to hold good; and if it be found in such as have fallen under our notice in this survey, we may then infer, that the predicate applies universally to that common nature which exists in those instances, and in any others resembling them that may subsequently occur to our observation. Hence, in the investigations of Modern science, according to the method of Bacon, one instance, if only thoroughly examined, is sufficient for establishing the general fact resulting, or what, in Ancient Philosophy, would be called "the universal."

Aristotle, however, looking to Induction as a mode of Argument, rather than as an Evidence of Fact, requires that an Induction should be from "all the particulars."[1] Otherwise, indeed, it would not furnish a conclusive argument; there would be no formal necessity in the inference.[2]

But the higher kind of Induction is also employed by him, and in its application, as has been observed above, to the exact definition of terms. As it appears that words, when predicated of any object, are classes, more or less extensive, of observations on that object, it is evident, that we must gradually approximate towards a definition of any individual notion, by assigning class within class, until we have narrowed the extent of the expression as far as may be required in order to a distinct apprehension of it.[3] The first definition of any object cannot but be rude and imperfect, as founded on some obvious resemblance which it exhibits to

[1] *Analyt. Pr.* ii. c. 25 Δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν τὸ Γ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν καθ'ἑκαστον συγκείμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπαγωγὴ διὰ πάντων.

[2] Wallis reduces Induction to a Syllogism both in the First and Third Figures, but prefers the resolution into the Third; and for this purpose explains it nearly as above in saying:—estque ea enumeratio particularium, haud aliud quam ipsum generale aliis verbis prolatum, seu ipsius exegeticum.—*Logica*, iii. c. 15.

[3] *Analyt. Post.*, ii. c. 13, Ζητεῖν δὲ δεῖ ἐπιβλέποντα ἐπὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀδιάφορα, πρῶτον τί ἅπαντα ταὐτὸν ἔχουσιν, κ. τ. λ.

other objects. And it has been further pointed out, how, as we continue our observation, we find other classes included in the extent of the one to which it was first referred. Hence, as these several classes are subordinate to each other, and are all dependent on the primary one (for this primary one will be different according to the purpose contemplated in defining the object),[1] the full definition of the object, under the aspect taken of it in each case, will be the result of successive eliminations of everything extrinsic to it, everything unessential to it.[1]

Now, the process by which we discover these successive genera in forming a definition, is strictly one of philosophical Induction. As in the philosophy of Nature in general, we take certain facts as the basis of inquiry, and proceed by rejection and exclusion of principles involved in the inquiry, until at last—there appearing no ground for further rejection—we conclude that we are in possession of the true principle or law, of the facts examined; so in the philosophy of language, in drawing forth an exact outline of any object of thought, we must proceed by a like rejection and exclusion of notions implied in the general term with which we set out, until we reach the very confines of that notion with which our inquiry is concerned. This exclusion is effected in language by annexing to the general term denoting the class to which the object is primarily referred, other terms not including in them those other objects or notions to which the higher general term applies. For thus, whilst each successive term in the definition, in itself, extends to more than the object so defined, yet all viewed together do not; and this their relative bearing on the one point marks out and constitutes the being of the thing.[2] This is thus illustrated by Aristotle:—"If we are inquir-

[1] "Definitions are divided into Nominal and Real, according to the *object accomplished* by them; whether to explain, merely, the meaning of the word, or the nature of the thing: on the other hand they are divided into Accidental, Physical, and Logical, according to the *means employed* by each for accomplishing their respective objects; whether it be the enumeration of attributes, or of the physical or the metaphysical parts of the essence."—Abp. Whateley, *Elem. of Logic*, B. ii. c. 5.

[2] *Analyt. Post.*, ii. c. 13, ὧν ἕκαστον μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον ὑπάρξει, ἅπαντα δὲ μὴ ἐπὶ πλέον· ταύτην γὰρ ἀνάγκη οὐσίαν εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος, p. 173, Du Val.

ing," he says, "what magnanimity is, we must consider the instances of certain magnanimous persons whom we know, what one thing they all have, so far forth as they are such; as,—if Alcibiades was magnanimous, or Achilles, or Ajax,—what one thing they all have; say 'impatience under insult;' for one made war, another raged, the other slew himself: again, in the instances of others, as of Lysander or Socrates,—if here, it is 'to be unaltered by prosperity or adversity;' taking these two cases, I consider, what this 'apathy in regard to events,' and 'impatience under insult,' have the same in them. If now they have nothing the same, there must be two species of magnanimity."[1] So, again, he suggests a similar process in order to ascertain the nature of anything. He directs that the investigation should commence from the genus; since, having discovered the properties or sequences of the genus, we have also the sequences to the next class in the series,—and so on from that class to the next below in order,—until by this continued process we reach the individual object examined. In the course of investigation, also, he observes, that we should attend to whatever is common, and examine to what class of objects that belongs, and what classes fall under it;[2] and for the same reason select analogies; since, in both these instances, we obtain genera, under which the object investigated may be arranged. The process is virtually the same as if we should investigate a fact or law of nature. But the Induction of Aristotle, having for its object to determine accurately in words the notion of the being of things, proceeds, according to the nature of language, from the general, and ends in the particular; whereas the investigation of a law of nature proceeds from the particular, and ends in the general. In the process each kind of Induction is an analysis. But logical Induction is synthetical in the result, whilst philosophical Induction is analytical throughout. The former labours to particularize as much as possible, counteracting the uncertainty occasioned by the generalizations of language, whilst the latter is engaged in penetrating the confused masses in which objects

[1] *Anal. Post.*, ii. c. 13, p. 175, Du Val. [2] *Ibid.*, ii. c. 14.

first present themselves to the mind, and exploring their most general and characteristic form. Thus the Induction of Aristotle was strictly ἐπαγωγή, or the bringing in of notion on notion, each successively limiting the application of the preceding one in regular series, so as at length to present a distinct notion of the object defined.[1] The notion thus obtained in words is the *logos*, or expressed reason of the being of the thing; and hence perhaps the prevalence of the name Logic[2] as appropriate to this branch of science, instead of the more general and ancient designation of Dialectic,—which expresses rather the application of the science to the ancient mode of disputation, than its philosophical nature.

It would appear, then, that Bacon has not done strict justice to Aristotle in the contemptuous manner in which he has spoken of the Induction adopted and practised by philosophers before himself, as if the fault of it were entirely attributable to Aristotle. Doubtless, in the view of Aristotle, Induction, even in its higher sense, is extremely limited in its design and pursuit; as conversant about the correct statement of the particular notions on which an inquiry turns, rather than the discovery of new truth: nor is it set forth with a due appreciation of its scientific importance, or with any approach to that method which Bacon developed in the *Novum Organum*. But it is sound and valid so far as it reaches; and it shews that Aristotle was not intent on corrupting Philosophy with Logic, but rather on applying Logic to that very purpose which Bacon himself so much insists on—the bringing the intellect even and unprejudiced to the business of Science. Of the practical application of Induction in its extreme importance as an Evidence of fact, Aristotle presents abundant specimens, and particularly in his Treatises on Ethics and Rhetoric. His discussion of the Passions in the latter treatise is a masterpiece in that way. He sets out, indeed, abstractedly with definitions of the several passions; but these are the results at which he has arrived by Induction; being obtained, as his

[1] *Anal. Prior.*, ii. c. 23.

[2] Aristotle uses the adverb λογικῶς, as in *Met.*, vii. c. 4, and elsewhere; but not the noun λογική to denote the science, and only Διαλεκτική.

subsequent observations shew, by a close interrogation of Nature ; by examining accurately what belongs, or does not belong, to each particular passion,—and thus eliminating its exclusive character and proper nature.

Rhetoric.

As the Speculative Sciences had been confounded under a vague notion of Dialectic, so had Rhetoric, in the ostentatious study of it prevalent before the time of Aristotle, drawn into its system the practical sciences of Politics and Ethics. Observations had been accumulated on the mere accessories of the art ; but the proper business of the rhetorician—the inquiry into the argument itself of which a composition must consist—had been overlooked. Aristotle had therefore to dig a foundation for the fabric of a real science of Rhetoric. He had to clear away misconceptions ; to shew the data on which Rhetorical science must proceed, and the relative importance of its several parts.

He commences, accordingly, with pointing out the nature of its connection both with Dialectical and Moral science. It is first and most directly connected with Dialectic, inasmuch as it is a general method of providing arguments on any subject whatever. As Dialectic examines and discusses the principles of various sciences, considering them in their relations as principles in the abstract, and not as the principles of this or that science, and is so far equally conversant about all subjects ; so Rhetoric inquires generally into the nature of the principles of Persuasion, and therefore is also of equal application to the various subjects of human thought. In the discussion of these abstract principles under the head of Dialectic, it is found that they are referable to two general classes—that they are either probabilities or necessary truths. And Aristotle, accordingly, after having explained the nature of Syllogism, or the more general connection of principles, which is independent of their peculiar nature, proceeds to investigate the nature of deductions as drawn from necessary principles or from probabilities. The

consideration of this distinction anticipates in some measure the province of Rhetoric, touching on the point, as has been observed, in which Rhetoric differs from Logic strictly so called. As the science of eloquence, its office is to speculate on the effect of different principles in producing persuasion, and not simply on their abstract relations; and therefore it must examine the force of arguments, whether probable or necessary, in their influence both on the judgment and the will. Principles, in short, as they are grounds of Credibility, and not as they enter into a reasoning *process*, constitute its proper subject. In this respect it coincides with a part of the ancient Dialectic. But it differs, again, from Dialectic, inasmuch as it is connected also with Moral Science. In Dialectic the force of man's moral nature on his opinions is not considered. Will such or such a conclusion result from such or such arguments, according to the procedure of the human intellect in forming its judgments? is the whole inquiry of Dialectic. But Rhetoric further considers, what is the practical force of such and such arguments? what effect are they found to have in actual experience?—not according to their mere speculative truth, but as acting on the complex nature of man. Practically, it is found that questions are not examined on their positive merit as simple questions of truth, but with feelings and sentiments thwarting or aiding the discernments of the intellect. Here, then, is opened a wide field for a philosophical inquiry of a peculiar character, distinct from Dialectic, and yet strictly founded on it, and implying it throughout, as well as of the highest importance in order to the success of truth in the world. This inquiry is what Aristotle institutes under the head of Rhetoric.

He has evinced the most perfect comprehension of the nature of the science which he had undertaken to develop, in holding it, as he does, in exact balance between the two sciences of Dialectic and Morals with which it is associated. There is much of logical matter in the course of his inquiry, and still more of ethical. But he never suffers us to forget that we are not examining those sciences *in themselves* under the head of

Rhetoric, but in their relations to a science compounded of both. He would have the rhetorician versed in Dialectic, and deeply acquainted with Human nature. But he is intent on shewing how he is to apply his knowledge of both these sciences to the proper business of Rhetoric—the influence on the heart and mind of the persons addressed. It is not a vague and popular knowledge of those sciences which he is inculcating throughout, but a popular application of authentic principles drawn from them both, and a popular application founded on a deep philosophy of Human nature.

This philosophy consists in an investigation of the kinds of Evidence by which the minds of men are commonly swayed in accepting any conclusion proposed to them, and of those principles of their moral nature which generally induce belief. The whole, accordingly, is an inquiry into what is probable, or rather what is credible and persuasive, to a being so constituted as man.

Rhetoric, then, does not consider arguments as they are abstractedly necessary or probable. Such arguments appeal to the intellect alone; and the result from such is, either a full conviction, or a presumption of some point in question. Rhetoric, on the other hand, looks to probability in the *result*. Whether an argument be necessary or probable in *principle*, is comparatively of no consequence to the rhetorician, provided it be persuasive in its *effect*. He has to consider, therefore, only a probability of this kind—on what grounds men commonly *believe* an argument to be just, or are *influenced* by any statement.[1] Now men are found to receive arguments as conclusive on two different grounds—from considering them either as logically sound, deducible from admitted principles, or as coincident with some previous observation or fact. Hence the distinction between probability and likelihood; probability denoting conclusions proved by some reason alleged; likelihood

[1] When it is asserted, that Dialectic is concerned about truth, and Rhetoric about opinion, this must be understood to mean that Rhetoric has for its object to discover, not what any particular thing *is*, but what will give a *persuasion* or *belief* that it is. At the same time, those principles on which such a persuasion depends, are real truths about which the science is conversant.

denoting conclusions grounded on matter of fact, the conclusion being something like what has been experienced. Aristotle distinguishes these two kinds of rhetorical arguments as probabilities, εἰκότα, and signs, σημεῖα. The precise nature of the distinction he explains more fully in his Analytics.[1] In his Rhetoric he directs our attention rather to those practical forms which the two classes assume in Enthymemes and Examples; Enthymemes being probable arguments which state a conclusion with the reason of it, but without the formality of a syllogism; such as occur in familiar use; Examples, arguments in which a conclusion is drawn from particular facts or observations; or inductions in a popular form, inferences from one particular to another like it, both of which fall under the same general principle.

He points out, accordingly, the force and propriety of Enthymemes and Examples, as modes of producing conviction, both in themselves, and relatively to each other, according to the subjects in which they may be employed. And as Enthymemes are the more comprehensive head—for, in fact, every argument from Example is in principle an Enthymeme, the example cited being the reason of the conclusion,—he dwells more explicitly on the nature of Enthymemes. These he distinguishes in respect of the principles from which they are drawn. These principles may be, 1. Entirely abstract, unconnected with any particular subject, and equally common to all subjects; or, 2. They may belong to particular subjects, and the sciences of those subjects. Instances of the former class, called by the general name of τόποι, Topics, or common-places, are conclusions of the possibility of anything from abstract considerations of possibility,—of the existence of anything from the existence of that which implies it more or less, etc. Instances of the latter, εἴδη, or specific Topics, are conclusions drawn from the nature of human actions, or from some principle of government or commerce, or whatever it may be to which a speaker or writer has occasion to refer.

The matter of proof, or the grounds of Credibility in them-

[1] *Anal. Prior.* ii. cap. 29; *Rhet. ad Alex.* cap. 9, 13, 15.

selves being obtained, it comes, in the next place, to be considered how this proof is acted on and modified in the result by the complex nature of man, on whom the result is to be produced. The subjects, then, to which Rhetoric properly applies, are those in which there is some opening for the action of the moral feelings. In questions of pure science, the intellectual powers alone are concerned. There is no personal application to the individual; no reference to his own experience for the proof of the principles, as is the case with all inquiries involving human conduct; where a fairness of judgment is as much required in order to an acknowledgment of the principles, as a clearness of intellect. Whatever may be the nature of a mathematical enunciation or a fact in chemistry, when it is once stated and proved, there is no question whether we approve or disapprove it. Its truth is suffered to rest on its proper footing. But a conclusion respecting our own nature, or involving our own conduct, immediately calls all our moral principles to the survey of it. Our hopes, and fears, and wishes, are heard pleading for or against it. Here, then, is the proper province of the rhetorician. He is to furnish principles to the advocate by whom the case is to be laid before these internal judges; to suggest how to prepare the evidence for their reception; and by his knowledge of their former judgments, to enable him to present the truth before them in such form, that it may obtain a fair hearing, and be affirmed in their decisions.

For the convenient arrangement of rhetorical arguments, Aristotle divides Rhetoric into three different kinds, according to the different occasions on which it was employed among the Greeks:—1. The Deliberative, or its use in political debates; 2. The Judicial, or its use in popular assemblies, as those of Athens, in which the people collectively exercised the judicial functions; 3. The Epideictic, or, Demonstrative, or its use in panegyric and invective, when the orator had to gratify his hearers by the display of eloquence, as in the panegyrical and funeral orations among the Greeks.[1]

[1] *Rhet.* i. cap. 3, etc.; *Rhet. ad Alex.* cap. 2-6, 35-38.

In these several heads of inquiry he has given an admirable account of the various motives by which mankind at large are commonly actuated, and of the objects in their conduct and opinions which they pursue.

And here we should notice the peculiar complexion which the Happiness and the Virtue, described in this part of his philosophy, assume. He is led to speak of Happiness[1] as the great object of human desires—the point from which all views of expediency obtain their colouring. Here, however, he is not concerned to illustrate that Happiness to which the aim of mankind *should be* directed, but that which is *in fact* sought in the world as it is. He therefore portrays those various forms with which self-love commonly invests the idea of happiness. For it is evidently more to the purpose of the orator, whose object is to carry his point, to conform his arguments to the views entertained by his hearers, however theoretically false, than to a more just theory, of which they have no conception. Virtue, again, is here a law of Honour.[2] It is an appeal to those right feelings which exist in the nature of man, by which virtue is approved and vice disapproved. Independently, however, of discipline and cultivation, these feelings are not found in fact always duly exerted. There is ground, therefore, for a popular kind of Virtue, in a philosophical survey of those principles by which the human heart is *commonly* swayed in its decisions of right and wrong. This popular law of right is at least an approximation to perfect virtue. It is an irregular and uncertain application of the criterion of Approbation, which belongs to true Virtue alone ; leading to a preference of the more ostentatious virtues to the less obviously praiseworthy ; and to the exaltation of some qualities merely specious, or even faulty, to the rank of virtues, through the want of discrimination and corruption of principle in the world. Thus Virtue becomes, in the popular view, a power of benefiting others,[3] rather than an internal habit

[1] *Rhet.* i. cap. 5.

[2] *Ibid*, i. cap. 9.

[3] *Ibid*, i. cap. 9, Ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, πορισστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα.

of self-moderation. Men acquiesce in that general notion of it, under which it most strikes their attention, and calls forth their admiration. Such, then, is the kind of Virtue to which the orator must make his appeal. He cannot calculate on finding the bulk of his hearers moral philosophers, or persons whose sentiments have been highly cultivated. He must therefore proceed on those broad principles which may be presumed to exist in the heart of every man though imperfectly cultivated. It is to these he must conform his arguments, if he would produce that impression which he desires.

Further, as the habits of thinking and feeling among men are found to be affected by peculiarities of circumstances, it is necessary for the orator to have studied also the varieties of human character, and to have reduced these to general principles for his practical direction. Aristotle, accordingly, has not lost sight of this point in his Rhetoric, but has shewn a keen observation in the outlines which he has given of the effects of different governments, different periods of life, different worldly fortunes, in modifying the human character.

He had strongly condemned former rhetoricians for making the whole art consist of an appeal to the Passions. At the same time, he was aware that such an appeal was a necessary part of the orator's address ; and that no arguments, no merely intellectual proofs, could avail, independently of this. To overlook, indeed, the affections in arguments concerning human conduct, is to disregard the authorities to which the whole process of proof is ultimately addressed. Wherever evidence is not absolutely irresistible, and there is room for doubt—though the object be simply to induce belief—the hearer naturally proceeds in his analysis of the evidence, until he brings it home to himself, and finds it issuing in something natural to his own character and feelings. This it is that at last determines the wavering balance. The philosophy of Rhetoric, therefore, required some outlines to be given of these ultimate arbiters of all rhetorical questions. And we are indebted accordingly to his masterly view of the subject for an accurate and beautiful

delineation, in the course of this Treatise, of the leading Passions of Human Nature. Of its excellence as a specimen of the Inductive method of philosophizing mention has been already made.

In treating both of the Virtues and of the Passions, Aristotle's view was to enable the orator, not only to recommend his arguments to the moral sentiments and feelings of an auditory, but to bring also to their support the natural and just prejudice from Authority. We involuntarily ascribe to one who appears in the character of an instructor, the advantages of superior knowledge and kind intentions. The prejudice in favour of Authority is thus reasonably founded on a respect for wisdom and virtue. It is important, then, to the orator to avail himself of this prejudice. There must be nothing to counteract, in those addressed, the natural tendency to believe the speaker. On the contrary, his whole address must conspire to this end. It must give the impression that he is a man of intellectual ability, as well as of right sentiments and feelings. Hence Aristotle deduced a distinct class of rhetorical proofs under the head of, 1. *Ethos*, or character ; 2. The *Pathos*, or appeal to the passions ; and 3. The Demonstration, or Argumentative proof as such, constituting the two other heads. He thus shews, on the whole, how a speech may at once carry conviction, interest the feelings of the hearer, and give the weight of personal authority to the speaker.[1]

All such grounds of credibility and persuasiveness in a speech fall under the general head of Proofs, which Aristotle calls the Artificial, ἔντεχνοι—those which the Orator has to invent or originate for himself; on which he has to exercise his powers of observation and argument, in collecting the materials for his speech, as well as his skill in the use and disposition of them, so as to produce that persuasion which is the effect sought. But besides this strictly Artificial head of Proofs, there is another, termed in opposition to these, ἄτεχνοι, Inartificial—grounds of Argument, existing independently of the creative power of the Orator—which he finds to his hand, and has only to employ to

[1] *Rhet.* i. c. 2.

his purpose. Such are enumerated by Aristotle under a five-fold division:—1. Laws; 2. Witnesses; 3. Compacts; 4. Examination by Tortures; 5. Oaths.[1] But whilst the former head of Artificial Proofs is applicable to Oratory, whether Deliberative, Judicial, or Epideictic, the head of Inartificial Proofs properly belongs to Judicial Oratory alone; as the several particulars above indicated would seem to shew, at least according to the practice of Oratory among the Greeks. Each of these particular proofs then is briefly considered by Aristotle, and the mode in which it may be applied by the orator to the purpose for which he may be appealing to it, is distinctly pointed out. For instance, if the written law should be against him, he is to appeal from it to the unwritten law, the law of nature; or if the written law should, on the contrary, be in his favour, he is to insist on its obligation; and that, though it may be faulty, obedience to it is better than to accustom men to seek to be wise beyond it, and evade it. With respect to witnesses in general, he divides them into two kinds—ancient and recent: the ancient, are poets and other well-known authorities, touching the case in dispute; the recent, opinions drawn from the judgments of eminent persons on the like cases; and he observes, that the orator may never want some available testimony, either against his adversary in the cause, or in his own favour; or if there be none bearing on the matter itself, at least, he may bring some as to character, to establish his own, or impugn that of the adversary. Such, by way of specimen, are the practical observations furnished for the guidance of the orator, as to the mode of applying the Inartificial proofs.

As Rhetoric, further, has for its object to enable the orator to make the best of his case and to influence his hearers that they may pronounce their judgment in his favour, we are to expect in a rhetorical treatise that arguments will be considered as good and available for this ultimate effect, which are, logically viewed, of a sophistical character and unsound. Such, for instance, as the following:—When the conclusion does not actually follow from the premises, to assert it confidently as such, introducing

[1] *Rhet.* i. cc. 2, 15.

it thus, "*therefore* this is so, or not so;" when several particulars have been separately stated on their own grounds, to take them collectively, and draw some one conclusion as their common result: to argue again from that which is simply consequent on any thing, omitting the consideration as to *how* it is consequent; —or from that which is not the cause, as if it were the cause; or from that what is probable in a particular sense to the probable absolutely; or omitting, generally, all qualifications and reserves, and stating a conclusion universally. All such reasonings are, according to the view of the Art premised by Aristotle, at the outset of his exposition of its principles, just, so far as they subserve the great end of the orator in every case—which is Persuasion. And he rests his defence of the use of them on the broad ground, that the orator ought to see both the real and the apparent persuasive; as the dialectician ought to see the real and apparent syllogism; not that he is to use his acquaintance with the principles in order to persuade to what is bad; but that when others use them for a bad purpose, he may be able to refute them.[1]

This at the same time implies, that where a good end is in the design of the orator, even such arguments as though not logically valid are yet effective in inducing belief, are strictly within his province. And the difference of his case from that of the sophist appears to be, that, in the discussion of the dialectician, truth is the object; which precludes the employment of sophistical arguments though he must have studied them that he may be able to refute them: whereas the end of the orator is not truth in the abstract, but the persuasive or credible; and though he is forbidden from using his skill for an evil object, he seems justified, by the very nature of his art, in setting forth his statements and arguments in every form which may recommend them to the acceptance of his hearers.[2]

In the popular views of Rhetorical science, the subjects of

[1] *Rhet.* ii. c. 24: i. c. 1.

[2] *Ibid.* i. c. 1. Ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς· οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν· ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως, ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῖς μὴ δικαίως, λύειν ἔχωμεν.

style and method engross an undue importance. We are thus led to think that eloquence consists in the skilful use of the ornaments of style, in the flow of periods, and the structure of a composition advantageously distributing its lights and shades. The attention is diverted from the material itself of eloquence, the strong framework of argument, without which no eloquence can subsist. Aristotle, in proceeding to the discussion of style, has cautiously maintained the subordination of this part of Rhetoric to the proper business of the art—Persuasion; treating it as a necessary condescension to the weakness of the hearers. If, however, the manner in which we express our thoughts may contribute to the reception of our assertions and arguments, and it be allowed that the principles of Taste are real parts of the human constitution—the consideration of style must necessarily enter into a philosophical system of Rhetoric. The effect of the style is part of the whole result of the composition on the mind of the hearers, and is so far, therefore, an ingredient in that Probability or Credibility about which Rhetoric is conversant.

In conformity with this view of the importance of style, Aristotle lays down perspicuity as the great principle of good composition. It is with him "the virtue of style."[1] All the ornaments of language, whether from the structure of periods, or from the various modes of thought, by which a point, a propriety, or a dignity, or an animation, is imparted to a subject, are explained in reference to this fundamental law.

Nor has he left unconsidered the arrangement of the parts of a speech; though this also was in his opinion scarcely a legitimate portion of the art. Former rhetoricians had encumbered their systems with numerous artificial divisions, giving precise rules for the composition of each distinct head. Aristotle's more exact method admits no other divisions than the Proposition and the Proof; the former, founded on the necessity of stating the subject of discussion; the latter, on the necessity of proving the point stated: though he afterwards allows the convenience

[1] *Rhet.* iii. 2. *Poetic.* c. 22.

of a fourfold division into, 1. The Proem or Introduction; 2. The Proposition; 3. The Proof; 4. The Epilogue or Peroration.

The subject of Delivery, *τὸ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν*, did not escape his notice: but nothing had been effected by previous writers in this department of Rhetoric. And though he admits that the attention to the mode of Delivery might serve to recommend a speech, it is only, he observes, through the depraved taste of the people; as, in the contests of the drama, the poets who were actors, carried off the prizes; and in the correct view of the art of the orator it was a vain and superfluous addition.[1]

So deeply and fully has the science of Rhetoric been considered by Aristotle. His treatise on the subject, the *Rhetoric*, in three books, addressed to his disciple Theodectes, and his *Nicomachean Ethics*, are perhaps the most perfect specimens of systematic moral sciences extant in ancient or modern literature. For extent and variety of matter, the *Rhetoric* may be ranked even above the *Ethics*. It has been justly characterized as "a magazine of intellectual riches. Nothing is left untouched," says one who could well appreciate the value of the work, "on which Rhetoric, in all its branches, has any bearing. His principles are the result of extensive original induction. He sought them, if ever man did seek them, in the living pattern of the human heart. All the recesses and windings of that hidden region he has explored; all its caprices and affections—whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuse, to gratify, or to offend it—have been carefully examined. The reason of these phenomena is demonstrated; the method of creating them is explained. The whole is a text-book of human feeling; a storehouse of taste; an exemplar of condensed and accurate, but uniformly clear and candid, reasoning."[2] It is professedly adapted to the business of the orator; that being the original occasion of an Art of Rhetoric. But it is in fact a body of precepts for good writing;

[1] *Rhet.* iii. c. 1. Καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον.

[2] The late Bishop Copleston of Llandaff, in his *Defence of the Studies of Oxford*, p. 27.

furnishing authentic principles of criticism in every department of prose composition. His smaller Treatise in one book, entitled *The Rhetoric to Alexander*, the genuineness of which is questionable, is more strictly a science of political eloquence; being written, as the introductory address would intimate, in obedience to the King Alexander, who had requested a work of that description.[1] The same philosophical views of eloquence may be traced in this work; but more popularly set forth, with less of technical precision, and more of illustration from examples.

Poetics.

No work of Aristotle has been more justly estimated, in general opinion,—as none perhaps is so generally known,—than the fragment which has survived to us under the name of his *Poetics*. Imperfect as it is, it has been uniformly regarded as the great authority of the laws of criticism in poetry; subsequent writers having only extended and illustrated the principles laid down in it. The excellence of this little work, which is only one book of the three of which the whole Treatise is said to have consisted, shews how much we have to regret the entire loss of his other works on the same subject. The treatises *On Tragedies* and *On Poets*, mentioned in the catalogue of Laertius, probably contained much valuable information concerning Greek writers, whose works, perhaps whose names in some instances, have not been transmitted to us.

That portion which time has spared of the *Poetics*, is almost exclusively confined to the consideration of dramatic poetry. But the philosopher, with his usual depth and reach of thought, has here laid a broad foundation of principles applicable to the whole subject. He derives the nature of Poetry in general from the principle of Imitation inherent in man. Two natural causes,

[1] *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 1. Quintilian (*Instit. Orat.* ii. c. 17) speaks of a rhetorical work of Aristotle, entitled *Gryllus*. Aristoteles, ut solet, quærendi gratia, quædam subtilitatis suæ argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo. He considers the *Rhet. ad Alexandrum* to have been the work of Anaximenes of Lampsacus, a contemporary of Aristotle.

he says, appear to have originated Poetry ; the natural power of imitation,—and the pleasure which all men take in imitation, that is, in recognizing likenesses between distinct objects. These two causes thus stated by him are in fact but one principle ; the pleasure resulting from imitation being the principle itself of imitation, viewed in its tendency or proper effect, the production of pleasure : though, in the language of his philosophy, the first would be the motive cause, the second the final. The science then termed Poetics, is that which treats of the method by which the natural principle of Imitation obtains its proper and full expression ; or a collection of observations on the mode by which pleasure is produced in imitations of which language is the instrument. Hence the business of the Poet is stated by Aristotle to consist in representing things, "not as they have been, but as they ought to be ;" and therefore is described by him as of a more philosophical and excellent nature than that of the historian.[1] The pleasure of Imitation will not be answered, unless a likeness be recognized between the objects and events described, and the objects and events observed in the general course of nature. Otherwise it will be a mere pleasure in the execution, or in some circumstance of the work. The poet, therefore, in order to accomplish the end of his art, must possess a philosophical power of observation. He must have compared objects and events, and detected points of resemblance, and thus formed for himself general principles on which he may proceed to model his ideal world. At the same time he differs from the philosopher much in the same way in which the orator differs from the dialectician. He has not to consider what is *abstractedly* like in things, but what will be viewed and felt as like in its *effect* on the sentiments and feelings of men. Therefore it is that his creations are clothed with a beauty and loveliness surpassing nature. The resemblances which he shadows out partake of those hues, which the imagination, and the feelings, and every beautiful and noble sentiment of the heart of man, reflect upon them.[2]

[1] *Poet.* c. 9.

[2] *Poetic.* c. 4, 9, 25.

These fundamental notions of the art pervade the system of Aristotle's Poetics, though, from the briefness of the work in its present imperfect state, they are by no means fully developed in it. In the work, indeed, as it now is, the basis of the poetic imitation—the actions, passions, and manners of which a poem is descriptive—are exclusively considered; and we have no inquiry, as in the Rhetoric, into the principles of Human nature by which the pleasure resulting from the imitation is modified in its effect. From this circumstance, as well as from his accounting for the pleasure of poetry on the ground of a natural delight in tracing out resemblances, Aristotle has been sometimes thought to have placed the excellence of a poem in the mechanism of its story,[1] and to have neglected altogether the intrinsic poetry of thought and expression. But we shall not do justice to the comprehensiveness of his views, if we estimate them by the limits of the present work. He seems here to have premised only, what ought naturally to occupy the first place in a philosophical system of the art.

It must be remembered, also, that Greek Poetry was essentially dramatic. It was expressly composed with a view to public recitation or exhibition; and in poetry of this kind the character of the incidents would hold a much greater importance than in poetry intended chiefly to be read. The incidents would here hold a place analogous to the thoughts and expressions of the poem submitted to the contemplative study of a reader. This may further account for Aristotle's laying so much stress on the interest of the plot in Tragedy.

The definition of Tragedy given by Aristotle is remarkable, as savouring more of the spirit of Plato's philosophy than of his own. Describing its nature as it differs from Epic poetry and from Comedy, he farther characterizes it as, "by means of pity and fear, accomplishing the purification of such passions."[2] The

[1] *Poetic.* c. 6, ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας.

[2] *Ibid.*, c. 6, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. So, again, in his *Politics*, viii. 7, he speaks of "purification" as an effect of music. There he promises to explain his meaning when he comes to treat of poetry; but no explanation occurs in the Poetics.

purification of the soul was the object to which Plato directed the noble enthusiasm of his philosophy. By converse with the ideas of the intellectual world, he would have the soul disenchanted of the spells which bound it to sensible objects, and cleansed of the impurities of its earthly associations. Aristotle's description of the effect designed in tragedy, applies this doctrine to the particular emotions of the soul produced by pity and fear. His idea appears to be, that Tragedy, by presenting the objects of those passions, without the grossness and the violence with which they are attended in actual life, teaches us to feel the passions in that degree only in which an impartial spectator can sympathize with us. By familiarity with these pure abstractions —the pure philosophy of the passions so called forth—a moral effect is worked on the heart; the mimic occasions on which it is rightly exercised serving as a real discipline of purification. The question, on what the peculiar pleasure of Tragic incident depends, is not distinctly considered by Aristotle. But it may be accounted for on his principles; from the view already given of the purification effected by tragedy, and that which he elsewhere gives of pleasure as the result of every affection rightly exerted. That moderation of the passions of pity and fear which tragedy has for its aim, is that due exertion of them to which pleasure has been attached by Nature. There is nothing then to disturb or interfere with the pleasurable emotion; as happens when those passions are excited in the real occasions of life.

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

ETHICS.

It has been already observed, that under the head of Practical Philosophy, Aristotle treats of those sciences which are conversant about the goods of human life. According to this view, the practical sciences are reducible to two: 1. Ethics; by which man is furnished with the principles belonging to his natural good as man: 2. Politics; which inquires into the principles on which the constitution of Societies may be made subservient to the same end. Economics ought perhaps to be stated as a third branch of science under this head. But in the view of Ancient Philosophy, it naturally falls under Politics; inasmuch as it strictly means the regulation of families; the family being considered as the commencement or element of the association of men in cities and states.[1]

In taking a review of Aristotle's Ethical system, it would be injustice to the philosopher to withhold the expression of admiration of the real wisdom displayed by him in this department of science. We are little aware, living as we do in the sunshine of gospel truth, what a reach of thought it required, in those times, to see the science of Ethics in its proper light, as a discipline of human character in order to human happiness. The ethical writings of Aristotle, composed amidst the darkness of heathen superstition, abound with pure and just sentiments. Instead of depressing man to the standard of the existing depraved opinions and manners, they tend to elevate him to the perfection of his nature. They may indeed be studied, not only as an exercise of the intellect, but as a discipline of improvement of the heart; so much is there in them of sound practical observation on human nature. They were it seems the first writings

[1] Theophrastus is probably the author of the first book of the treatise of *Economics*, edited among the works of Aristotle (Niebuhr's *Hist. of Rome*, Transl., vol. i., p. 15). The latter part of that book, indeed, does not pretend to be more than a restoration of the Greek text from a Latin translation. The second book is acknowledged to be spurious.

of a didactic character, in which the subject of Morals was treated systematically; those of the Pythagoreans which preceded them being only of a preceptive and hortatory character. They are directed, it must be allowed, solely to the improvement of man in this present life. But so just are the principles on which he builds that improvement, that we may readily extend them to those higher views of our nature and condition to which our eyes, by the light of Divine Revelation, have been opened. And no greater praise can be given to a work of heathen morality than to say, as may with truth be said of the Ethical writings of Aristotle, that they contain nothing which a Christian may dispense with, no precept of life which is not an element of the Christian character; and that they only fail in elevating the heart and the mind to objects which it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal, and a Divine Example to realize to the life.

He has left three principal treatises in this department of Philosophy, familiarly known by these names:—1. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, or Ethics addressed to his son Nicomachus, in ten books;[1] 2. *The Magna Moralia*, in two books; 3. *The Eudemian Ethics*, or *Ethics addressed to Eudemus*, in seven books; besides a short popular tract (probably a summary by another hand), *On the Virtues and Vices*. *The Nicomachean Ethics* exhibits the most formal and complete development of his theory, and is the work on which his fame as a Moral philosopher is chiefly rested. The other treatises are entirely coincident with this in the views taken of the subjects discussed, and often coincident also in whole passages.

It is well known with what eager but unprofitable subtilty the inquiry into the Chief Good was prosecuted by the Greek philosophers. The speculation proceeded from a misapprehension of the nature of Moral Philosophy. They thought, consistently with their method in Physics, that, as every action of human life appeared the pursuit of good, there must be some one

[1] His son Nicomachus has been represented as the author of some of the books of this treatise. Cicero (*De Fin.* v. 5) is inclined to allow him this credit, but without any good reason.

common principle of good, the constituent of the moral nature of Actions. Again, as the object pursued when attained becomes an end in which the action rests, occasion was given for inquiry into the Ends of actions, and comparing them, and finding out the ultimate End. Hence they were busied in exploring the several objects of human pursuit, and drawing conclusions as to their relative goodness and finality in the order of pursuit. It is easy to see what a field for ingenuity was opened in determining the point where the two notions of the Best and the Final coincided; and in this consisted the determination of the *Summum Bonum*, or Chief Good.

Now Aristotle examined human Actions with a more philosophical eye. He readily saw through the vain realism of those speculations which supposed either some one Idea of Good, or some common quality of good to exist in everything that was called good.[1] He was aware, also, that when the "ends" of action were spoken of, it was not with reference to some ulterior object in the distance, as was implied in all those theories which laid down a speculative definition of the Chief Good; but that it was the very nature of a Moral Action, to be *in itself* an End.[2] Hence he turned aside from that track of inquiry which had misled his predecessors, with the exception of Socrates, and struck out for himself a new path of Moral Science. He has thrown his preliminary views, indeed, into a form resembling that of the speculative moralists, in unconscious deference to the prejudices of the method in which he had been trained. Thus he sets out in his *Nicomachean Ethics* with a sketch of the Chief Good as the final and perfect end of all Actions. And this may give the idea, that in reading this work we are examining a system of the same kind with the Greek Moral Philosophy in general—a view of it which Cicero[3] appears to have taken; since he speaks of Aristotle's having united two objects as together making up the Chief Good of man. On looking, however, closely into his

[1] *Eth. Nic.* i. c. 6; *Mag. Mor.* i. c. 1, 2.

[2] *Ibid.* vi. c. 2, 5, x. c. 6; *Polit.* vii. c. 3, 13; Cicero *de Fin.* ii. c. 22, "Id contendimus, ut officii fructus sit ipsum officium."

[3] *De Fin.* ii. c. 6; see also Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* xv. c. 3 and 4.

actual investigation, we find it very different in its pursuit; the agreement being only in the technical form of the argument.

The Chief Good[1] which he is intent on establishing is, the principle or general Nature of Actions as such. He investigates, that is, the law according to which Actions attain the good which is their object; and which, as being the *end* really designed in all Actions, whatever may be the immediate particular end sought in each, is the great final cause of all—the End of ends. He speaks of Moral virtue as conversant about Affections and Actions, περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις.[2] In strictness, however, Actions, or Affections as they are exerted in act, are the only proper subject of Ethics; which is conversant about Affections, inasmuch as Affections are implied in Actions. Actions are Affections exerted towards some object, and comprehend, accordingly, both external and internal acts,—as well those which are only known to the conscience of the agent, as those which are open to the observation of men. An Action, then, according to Aristotle, is good, in which an Affection attains its object; and, in that case, the Action itself may be regarded as a τέλος or End; the Affection being realized, completed, satisfied, in it. Accordingly, it may be inquired, how the Affections really obtain their objects, when exerted towards them, or in action; or what constitutes an Action an End. But this is a very different inquiry from one that, by comparison of particular objects, searches after some definite sole object of pursuit. In this it is presupposed, that every object of a natural Affection is an ultimate end, or an object in which that Affection, whatever it may be, when exerted rests, as in its natural good. It is sought, then, to ascertain how this is so; what that principle is, by which any Action whatever is really a Good in itself and an End. Such a principle is analogous to the Chief Good of the speculative moralists; because it exhibits Actions in that point of view in which their *goodness* consists, or in which they accomplish that good towards which the Affec-

[1] Laertius mentions, in the Catalogue of Aristotle's writings, a treatise, περὶ τἀγαθοῦ, in three books.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* ii. c. 3, 6, 9, etc.

tions naturally tend. But it differs, so far as it restricts the notion of the Chief Good to no one distinct class of objects. It is simply a general account of the right constitution of man's moral nature exemplified in the multitude and variety of individual instances of Actions. As Newton does not inquire what Gravity is, but develops the law by which it acts; so Aristotle does not give an abstract notion of the Chief Good, but explores the principle by which it is realized in human life. He thus obtains a view of it independent of any speculative opinions concerning the Chief Good or Happiness of man. His theory leaves the notion of Happiness entirely relative.[1] The philosopher and the uneducated, the rich and the poor, the barbarian and the civilized, each individual, in short, under whatever modifications of human life he may be conceived to exist, must, so far as he obtains the good attached to the exertion of an Affection, or performs a perfect Action, exemplify that law, or ultimate principle, which constitutes an Action a perfect Action, or Good.

His several treatises of Ethics consist of a development of this his characteristic view of human good. He had observed how mankind, through the force of passion and evil habits, mistake and pervert their proper goods. Ethical philosophy, he thought, might be applied to correct this misapprehension of men—to reform this perversion. The force of sound practical instruction, at least, might be tried. He wished therefore to propose to their view the real goods intended for them by the constitution of their nature, and to call the attention of each individual to the pursuit of these in his own particular case. His design throughout accordingly is, to direct the principles of man's moral nature towards their proper objects in such a way that they may rest in these objects as *ends*, and thus attain the proper good of man. When all the principles are so regulated

[1] The observations of Paley on "Human Happiness" (*Mor. and Pol. Philosophy*, B. i. ch. 6) are an excellent illustration of Aristotle's Theory,—shewing as they do, that there is no one notion of happiness common to all men and all states of life; and that consequently it is vain to attempt to define the notion of happiness.

that this effect takes place in each, the collective result is, in such a case, Happiness, or the entire and consummate Good of man. Whence he takes occasion to describe Happiness in general terms, as "Energy of Soul," ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια,[1] or "the Powers of the Soul exerted in act" "according to Virtue," or, if there are several virtues, "according to that which is best and most perfect." The mode of description is drawn from his physical philosophy. It is founded on a notion of some intrinsic power in the soul, working like the operations of the natural world. His theory of Happiness, then, contemplates this process of the soul at its termination, where the proper nature of the Soul as an *Active Principle* is fully developed. The truth is, we have then a general fact, representing the result in all particular instances in which an Affection is found properly and effectually exerted in act. He takes, indeed, into his estimate of the Chief Good, the effect of the circumstances of the world on the virtuous exercise of the powers of the Soul; adding to his description the condition of "a perfect life,"[2]—or an adequate duration of life and adequate opportunities,—for the development of the moral principles. This, however, is but to assert, that the law by which man attains the Happiness of his nature, must, in order to be judged of truly, be contemplated in its *tendency*—in the effect that it would realize, if it acted freely, without impediment from the world. To think that external goods are causes of happiness, he says, is like imputing the excellence of the music to the lyre rather than to the art of the musician. Prosperity, he also observes, has its limit in reference to happiness, since it may be *excessive*, and in that case would be an *impediment* to happiness.[3] This necessary qualification of the expression in his sketch of the Chief Good, gives the appearance of his including prosperity to a certain extent as a *constituent* of the Good. Whereas in this point, as well as in the whole form of his inquiry into the Chief Good, he is only following the

[1] *Eth. Nic.* i. 7.

[2] *Ibid*, ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ; x. 7, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειου.

[3] *Ibid*, i. c. 7, vii. 13, x. c. 8; *Eudem.* vi. c. 13; *Polit.* vii. 1 and 13, iv. 11.

abstract method of Ancient Philosophy. In reality he is pursuing a course of investigation strictly inductive. The terms themselves, "a perfect life," carry on the idea of the soul's working out its perfection; in which process the perfection of its physical existence would necessarily constitute a part.

Thus, too, the notion of Pleasure, considered as an abstract good, is distinctly examined in his Ethics.[1] The practice of Ancient Philosophy obtruded the question on his notice; whether Pleasure was to be identified with happiness, or was to be regarded as an evil. He accordingly formally discusses it; refuting the existing opinions on the subject, and establishing, that pleasure is a good, so far as it necessarily accompanies the exercise of every natural principle; and consequently, that the highest pleasures are attached to the exercise of the highest principles. The discussion itself is thrown into a form highly abstruse and speculative. But the conclusion at which he arrives is entirely practical, and of the greatest importance in order to a just theory of Virtue. It amounts to this, that the mere gratification of every natural Affection, by its exertion in action, is not to be distinctly proposed and aimed at as the end of that Affection. This would be to grasp at the result, and neglect the means in order to it. It may be illustrated thus: Suppose, in travelling, some place were pointed out to us in the distance. We may imagine that we shall arrive at it by making it our immediate object, and shaping our course directly towards it. But such a course might lead into insuperable difficulties; whereas by going along the road leading to it, though circuitous and indirect, it will be safely and surely reached. For, the gratification is, as explained by him, the mere *result* of the adaptation of the affection to its object,—something accruing and *consequent* on the attainment of the object,—not the object itself. It is the completion of the process of Nature involved in an Action. The attainment, therefore, of the highest pleasure attached to our nature, presupposes that the perfect work of Virtue has been performed, in adjusting the Moral and Intel-

[1] *Eth. Nic.* vii. c. 11–14, x. c. 1–5, i. 8; *Mag. Mor.* ii. c. 7.

lectual Principles to their objects. Pleasure, accordingly, is defined by him, in his *Rhetoric*,[1] physically, as "a kind of motion of the soul, and the bringing it into that full and perceptible state which is its proper nature."

In proceeding to expand this outline, or "type" as he calls it, of his Ethical system, Aristotle appears to have adopted the language of the Pythagoreans, according to which Virtue was defined a "Disposition or Habitude of Propriety;" or that state of man's moral nature in which all the Affections are in their due measure and proportion. Analyzing the moral principles into, 1. Affections, 2. Powers, and, 3. Dispositions, he rejects the first two classes of principles as inadequate to the production of Virtue; and directs attention to the Dispositions as its proper seat. He observed that the Dispositions were subject to modification by custom or habit,—that a moral character did not precede, but resulted from, moral actions; and that a character so formed alone enabled one to act morally. As it was thus evident that virtuous habits were the bond of connection between virtuous action and virtuous principle in the agent, he concluded, that the principle by which the soul "energized,"—by which its Affections were perfectly exerted in act,—was in its general nature, a Disposition, or Habitude, influencing the Choice.

He had observed also, that in every instance in which Good resulted from the exercise of the Affections, due regard was had to the person of the Agent, to the occasion, to the matter in hand, to the persons respected in the action, to the purpose, etc.; that thus, the virtuous character consisted in its power of due adjustment to all the circumstances of the case in every action. On the ground, then, of this general fact, he further concluded the nature of Virtue to consist "in a *mean* relatively to ourselves,"—relatively, that is, to the individual agent in each instance.[2] The abstract mode of expression is a continuation of the same physical notion under which his theory of the Chief

[1] Rhet. i. 11.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* ii. 6, ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

Good is represented. The soul when truly virtuous, is conceived to be wrought to a temperament or mean state, all its Affections and Actions being in their due proportions to one another, and to the whole nature and circumstances of the individual man.

To determine, however, this due measure of the Affections, is the great question of Ethics. An exercise of Reason is implied in the adjustment of the Affections and Actions, so as neither to exceed nor fall short of the due measure on each occasion, and of that particular function indeed of Reason which is conversant about the affairs of human life, and which we call Prudence. Aristotle, accordingly, includes in his outline of Virtue, the statement that "the mean" must be "defined by Reason, and as the prudent man would define it." Still the question remains, what is the standard of adjustment—what the criterion of the mean, as a mark to which the moral aim is to be directed?

Now, the instances in which this self-moderation belonging to the character of virtue is observed, become in themselves the objects of Approbation, exciting in us sentiments of love, esteem, admiration, honour, sympathy, etc. Hence the various expressions introduced into Moral Philosophy, of fitness, propriety, proportion, the decent, the fair, the honourable, the amiable, the expedient, etc.; the adoption of one or more of which tests of the morality of Actions, has given its peculiar complexion to different systems. Aristotle contemplates these sentiments of Approbation, not as they are in themselves, but as they are outwardly evidenced by the Praise accompanying certain Actions.[1] It is clear that men commonly praise some actions and censure others. Where men—not any particular class of men, but society at large—agree in praising any action,[2] there the action so commended may be regarded as good in itself, and an evidence of virtuous principle in the agent. The approbation thus signified was expressed in the Greek language by the term

[1] *Eth. Nic.* i. cap. ult., ii. cap. 5, 8, 7; *De Virt. et Vit.* p. 291.

[2] *Ibid.* x. cap. 2, ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν.

καλόν,[1] to which we have no perfect counterpart in our language, though the word "honourable" if understood in its full meaning, may sufficiently represent it.

Aristotle proceeds to apply this criterion to the discrimination of the several virtues; a distinct class of objects of the Affections constituting in his system the ground of a distinct virtue.

His enumeration of the virtues of which the perfect Moral Character consists, is, as we might naturally expect in an ethical writer of his age and nation, incomplete. It is, however, abundant as an evidence, by induction, of that moderation of the affections—"the mean"—in which the nature of moral Virtue consists.[2] His division, indeed, of Virtue is an analysis of it into its constituent *parts*, as a whole; such as, in fact, the moral world in which he lived presented it to his survey. He has been accused of attending chiefly to the splendid virtues. He was probably led, by the very criterion which he employed, as well as by his view of the connection between Ethics and Politics, to sketch more prominently those particular virtues which recommend a man in society. And thus he has drawn beautiful outlines of those charms of familiar intercourse—affability, frankness, agreeableness.[3] His introduction, indeed, of these qualities among the virtues of his system, is a striking evidence of the practical nature of that virtue which he inculcates. It is a virtue which is not to be forgotten in any part of a man's daily life. Whilst it nerves his arm in dangers, distributes his bounty, shields him against temptations of pleasure,—it unbends him in the hours of leisure, and is ever on his tongue, whether gravely pronouncing in his assertions and judgments, or playing in the sallies of his wit. These very instances shew that he did not regard splendour as the exclusive attribute of virtue. On the contrary, he expressly speaks of it as the heightening and decoration of the several virtues, and as excellent, because it presupposes all

[1] *Ethic.* passim; *Rhet.* i. cap. 9.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* iv. 7. Μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες· καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες.

[3] *Ibid.* iv. cap. 6, 7, 8.

other virtues in their perfection.[1] Another evidence of his not being exclusive in his regard to the more showy virtues, is his treating of Gentleness.[2]

He selects the virtue of Justice[3] for more particular discussion, distinguishing it as a particular virtue from the whole of Justice, of which it bears the name—in its being the moderation of the love of gain or self-interest.[4] Seduced, however, by the example of Plato, he departs, in his mode of treating this virtue, from the strict province of Ethics into that of Politics. The Justice which he explains is a political virtue, applicable to the citizens of a common state, rather than to man as man. And this confusion of ethical and political justice has led him into a speculative refinement, which involves a difficulty in reconciling the notion of Justice with his theory of Virtue. Looking at Justice as a dispensing and regulating power, he observed that it was concerned about "a mean," in things themselves; either in distributing to each person in a state his proportionate share of its common advantages, or in vindicating the persons and property of its members from aggression and wrong. On the ground of this observation he points out that justice is not "a mean," as the other virtues are, but is "of the mean"—not in itself "a relative mean," but "relative to a mean." Had he considered Justice solely as a moral habit; he would have seen that the distinction was unnecessary: since in this point of view it conforms precisely to his general notion of Virtue in being a principle of self-moderation. There is, however, a foundation for the remark in the circumstance, that Justice admits of greater exactness in its exercise than other virtues. "The rules of Justice," says an excellent writer,[5] "may be compared to the rules of Grammar; the rules of the other virtues to the rules which critics lay down

[1] *Eth. Nic.* iv. cap. 3, ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων· διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκἀγαθίας.

[2] *Ibid.* iv. cap. 5.

[3] Among his lost treatises was one "*On Justice*," in four books. (Diog. Laert.)

[4] Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν· . . . ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος. *Eth. Nic.* v. 4.

[5] Adam Smith, *Theor. of Mor. Sentim.*, part iii. chap. 6.

for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in composition." In the other virtues we are thrown more on our sense of propriety in forming our practical decisions. In Justice we have evident facts before us—the merit or demerit of individuals in themselves ; and these form an external standard to guide us in our conduct, over and above our internal convictions of right. So far, then, Justice may be regarded as "of the mean," besides being also a point of propriety, or a mean within ourselves. Aristotle, it should be observed, had no other more appropriate word distinct from "Justice" to express "honesty" or "integrity," or "uprightness;" and was led, it seems, to contemplate justice more as a public virtue, than as an inward principle, directing and controlling the thoughts and feelings of the private individual in every action of his life. It was not indeed that he regarded "the just" as existing by human institutions alone ; for he expressly distinguishes between Natural and Instituted right ;[1] but he takes the Laws established in each state as the particular views of natural right which belong to it, and the positive rule to which its citizens must conform their conduct.

What however, he goes on in the sequel to observe concerning Equity, should be taken in connection with his formal mode of treating the subject of Justice, as bringing the application of the social principle there asserted, home to the precincts of private life. For when he speaks of Equity as a better and higher kind of Justice, and of the equitable man, as one who is praised above the ordinary good man for his conciliatory character, in not insisting on strict right, but interpreting the law by considerate application of it to each particular case,—he is evidently proceeding on the notion, that the sense of Justice is to be sought, not in the mere institutions which embody it as an external form, but as it resides in ourselves ; inasmuch as the appeal is from the former to the latter, and the injustice and imperfection of the law without us must be remedied by that within us.[2]

[1] *Eth. Nic.* v. 7. [2] *Ibid.*, v. 10.

We may be surprised at first that he founds no particular virtue on the moderation of the feeling of shame Αἰδὼς,—that having evidently for its object, the prevention of one's doing shameful actions, and the avoidance of all shameful things; and, as a feeling or passion, requiring to be duly regulated in order to constitute it into a virtue, such as that we designate by the name of Modesty. But he considers Shame in a bad sense; and as a bodily affection,—shewing itself, as it does, by the blush on the face,—and consequently, as more like a passion than a habit. He allows indeed, that it may be praised in young men; because it may be a check in them to the indulgence of Passion; but regards it as quite out of place in the old, because they should never do anything to which Shame attaches. Whilst it obtains, accordingly, no place in his Ethics as a Virtue,[1] he considers it as a Passion very fully in his *Rhetoric;* and for the purpose of the orator, describes, as in the case of the other passions, the objects about which it is conversant, the persons susceptible of it, and those towards whom it is felt. But there it appears under its more proper designation of a passion, by the name, Αἰσχύνη, as "a pain and perturbation about those evils, whether present, or past, or future, which appear to tend to disrepute;"[2] and not as a principle capable of being elevated into a virtue under the respected name of Αἰδώς.

Aristotle's discussion of Friendship[3] is open to the like objection, as to the form in which it is cast, as that of Justice. He has considered it in its outward effects as a social principle akin to Justice—and to which Justice is subordinate and supplementary—rather than as an internal ethical principle, the moderated exercise of benevolence or kindness in the heart itself. His observations, however, on the subject admirably illustrate the importance of Friendship to the right constitution of society—the various modifications of the benevolent principle in the different relations of human life—together with the peculiar loveliness and charm of Virtue itself. In the last respect, indeed, the discussion forms an essential part of his Moral Philo-

[1] *Eth. Nic.* ii. 8. [2] *Rhet.* ii. 6. [3] *Eth. Nic.* viii. ix.

sophy, as it tends to shew his conviction that the moral principles have their seat in the heart.

Indeed, this part of his Ethics, as well as his inquiry into Justice, should be accurately studied by all who would obtain just views of the comprehensive character of the Virtue of his system. Together they comprise a body of relative duties. Under Justice would be classed the duties of "religion, memory of the dead, filial reverence, patriotism, civil obedience, veracity, honesty," etc.,[1] so far as these duties flow from *claims* on our respect, and are prescribed by human laws; under Friendship, the same duties as they are prompted by sentiment and feeling, and are known by the names of piety, gratitude, benevolence, fidelity, generosity, etc. Hence the character of Virtue, in the little compilation on the Virtues and Vices which passes among his works; that "it is of virtue both to benefit the worthy and to love the good; and to be neither apt to punish nor revengeful, but merciful, and placable, and indulgent: and thus there follow on Virtue, kindness, equity, candour, good hope; moreover, such qualities as, to be domestic, friendly, social, hospitable, philanthropic, and a lover of what is honourable."[2]

His theory, then, of Virtue must be regarded as involving a minute and distinct attention to all the particular virtues. And herein appears its great excellence, as contrasted with those of some modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to trace up all the virtues to some one principle of our nature, as benevolence, or self-love, or prudence. All such theories are in truth mere accommodations of language, by which different classes of phenomena are arranged under the same terms; the effect of which is to give a shadowiness to the form of virtue, instead of striking it out in distinct outline. Aristotle's theory is the law by which these different principles are held together, in fact—the common process by which the operation of each virtue is carried on; and which, when realized in the character of a man, gives him the command of all the virtues.

The ancient Moral Philosophy sought, like the Modern, to

[1] *De Virtut. et Vit.* [2] *De Virt. et Vit.* p. 296, Du Val.

resolve Virtue into some *one* principle. But the endeavour of the ancients was chiefly to ground it on some *Intellectual* principle. Socrates contended that the virtues were instances of Prudence or Knowledge, φρονήσεις, or λόγοι, or ἐπιστῆμαι. Aristotle shews the foundation of this misconception, in explaining in what respect the production of Virtue might be regarded as the work of the intellect. Each virtue consisting, as he shews, in the adjustment of the action to all the circumstances of the case, the virtue of an action must depend on the practical judgment of the individual agent; and an agent who is uniformly virtuous must exhibit this practical judgment uniformly operating, enabling him readily to decide on the point in which the virtue of acting lies.[1] This operation of the intellect on moral objects he designates as the intellectual virtue of Prudence or Wisdom.[2] When he speaks of it as "defining" or bounding the mean in which virtue consists;[3] he implies that, as a speculative definition presents to the mind an exact notion of the thing defined, so the principles supplied by Prudence give clear perceptions of the moral nature of an Action. For example, suppose a man to have received some evident wrong—some injury done to him without provocation. The Affection of Resentment naturally leads him to requite the injustice on his assailant. But by what method of action he should do so, is a matter of question. He must know exactly in what way his Resentment should be shewn, in order to act virtuously; besides having, as his general principle, the inclination to act virtuously.[4] He must, therefore, have had some experience of human life—some practical knowledge of the nature of Actions which have been generally approved as fulfilling the end of this Affection. An experience, then, of this kind, applied to the exercise of all the Affections, and operating invariably on the conduct, constitutes the Prudence of Aristotle's system. It is thus intimately connected with the moral principles, as the moral principles are with it. It is the

[1] *Polit.* vii. 13.

[2] Σοφία means Philosophy rather than what we understand by wisdom.

[3] *Eth. Nic.* ii, 6, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν.

[4] *Mag. Mor.* ii. c. 7; *Eth. Nic.*

combined result, in the intellectual part of our nature, of all the virtues of the heart; as, on the other hand, Prudence is the diverging of the intellect through the various virtues of the heart. Hence his conclusion, that it is impossible to be properly good —κυρίως ἀγαθόν— without Prudence; or to be prudent without moral Virtue; and consequently, that all the Moral virtues are inseparable, inasmuch as the possession of all is requisite for the perfecting of Prudence,[1] and with Prudence they all follow.

In this account of Prudence is to be traced the principle of Moral Obligation involved in Aristotle's theory of Virtue. He considers the Moral virtues as those of the inferior part of the soul, and therefore as formed to obey; whereas the Intellectual principles, as being purely rational, have, as such, an intrinsic authority. Prudence, accordingly, being the Intellectual virtue employed in conjunction with the moral in the production of Virtue, is, from its nature, supreme over its associated principles, and demands of right their submission to its dictates.[2] It must be confessed that such a ground of obligation is merely theoretic; and so Aristotle himself perceived it to be.[3] As a principle of observation and reflection, it resembles in some measure the supremacy of Conscience; but it does not come up to the force of that Master-principle. Conscience rewards and punishes by its judgments, carrying with it a sense of merit and demerit; whereas the dictates of prudence carry no such sanction in them. Properly, however, the notion of "Obligation" is inapplicable to his system. Not inculcating Morality as a law, but as a philosophy, or art of life, he was not called upon to shew why it should be obeyed as a law. It was enough for him to point out, from observations on human conduct, that it is in fact obeyed by all who attain their real good.

But though the principle of Conscience has no place in his theory, it is certainly implied in his test of virtue and vice—the praise and blame of mankind. The universal consent of man-

[1] *Eth. Nic.* vi. c. 13, x. c. 8; *Eud.* v. c. 12.
[2] *Ibid.* i. c. 13, iii. c. 12; *Polit.* viii. c. 14.
[3] *Ibid.* x. c. 9.

kind on these points he regards as decisive of the Moral nature of an action. But this is to allow a standard of right and wrong inherent in human nature, or what is equivalent to a Conscience. If all agree in praising a certain modification of the Affections, and in blaming another, it is clear that there must be some common principles in all to serve as the bases of these unanimous judgments. The same conclusion results from his admission of Dispositions or Capacities of virtue, and of the existence of Natural virtue, in man, antecedent to the proper formation of it in the character. Indeed, his analysis of Prudence is decisive of his real view of this point. Not only are the principles on which Prudence is to speculate to be drawn from the heart; but the very deduction of these principles to the particular cases of conduct involves moral perceptions. For how else is the precise point in which the "mean" lies—in which the due measure of the Affection exerted consists—to be ascertained? If the virtue of the Action consisted in an absolute mean, a mere intellectual process, such as that of Arithmetic or Geometry, might ascertain it. But the mean in question being neither more nor less than what is *proper*, this implies a sense of propriety. Right conduct, according to him, is not such because it is neither excessive nor defective; but is neither excessive nor defective because it is right. This is plain from his induction of the several virtues, in which he shews that there is a "mean," because there is a point of propriety; so that a Moral perception must precede every decision on Moral questions. It is of the greatest consequence, in order to a right understanding of his account of Virtue, to observe this necessary dependence of the knowledge of the "mean," on the adjustment of the moral principles to their objects. The want of attention to it has led to absurd objections against Aristotle's theory. He has been interpreted, as if he had said that we could have *too much* courage, *too much* liberality, etc.; which notion proceeds on the false assumption, that the mean laid down by Aristotle is a *quantity;* whereas it is only a proportion or correspondence existing between the principles of the agent and the objects of those

principles.[1] The term "mean," in fact, as employed by Aristotle, is merely negative, marking the exclusion of all unchastened, inordinate, or undue feeling from the character of Virtue. It is a mean, as the term expresses part of its logical definition; whilst in respect of its excellence, and "what is well," τὸ εὖ, it is an extreme.

But though his system is defective as an authoritative law, it develops a much nobler theory of duty than the philosophy which rests our obligation to virtue on a ground of interest. The "Prudence" of Aristotle's Ethics must be understood as widely different from the prudence of such a theory. The Prudence which he teaches is no calculation of consequences. It is a practical philosophy of the heart; inseparably connected with the love of that conduct which it suggests. Whereas, when we are taught to act on the ground of interest, the prudence then inculcated is a mere intellectual foresight of consequences, independent of any exercise of the heart.[2] Such a system, whilst it overthrows the distinction between right and wrong as a fundamental principle, requires either a very comprehensive power of intellect in order to its practical adoption, or an express revelation from the Deity, declaring the good and evil consequences annexed to particular actions. These are conditions which sufficiently expose its futility as a sole guide to duty. The heart of man leaves far behind this morality of consequences, and decides, even before the action itself has its birth, whether it is morally right or wrong. The appeal to the revealed will of the Deity is not only a *petitio principii*, inasmuch as no will of the Deity can be ascertained and proved divine, without the previous admission of principles of right and wrong; but is refuted by the simple fact, that theories of Virtue, such as that of Aristotle,

[1] *Eudem.* iii. cap. 7; *Eth. Nic.* ii. cap. 6, ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει, μήτε ἐλλείπει, τοῦ δέοντος—στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. . . μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν, τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος . . . Διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα, μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

[2] A moral philosophy of this kind is in fact a revival in a new form of the theory of Socrates, which made Virtue a science. It overlooks the Affections in the production of virtue, as the theory of Socrates did.

have been devised by men who had no positive belief in a Divine Providence. Independently of the excellence of such theories, the mere fact of their *existence* as accounts of Human Duties is sufficient for the argument. That "the difference, and the only difference," between an act of prudence and an act of duty is, "that in the one case, we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world—in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come;"[1]—is an assertion, disproved at once by the fact, that Aristotle saw a difference between the two acts, independently of that consideration on which the notion of duty is there made to rest. Whether he has stated the difference correctly or not, is immaterial to this point.

The principle of Self-love has also been well illustrated by Aristotle in its relation to virtue. He distinguishes between the culpable form of it or selfishness, and that form of it which is auxiliary to virtue. Self-love, then, in its good sense, may be acted on by the virtuous man, whose character is already framed on the principle of "the honourable;" and in that case, he shews, it will be coincident with Benevolence; since the person so pursuing his own interest, will also effectually promote that of others. But this is not the case with the bad man; since, in pursuit of his views of self-interest, the bad man will at once injure himself and others by compliance with bad passions.[2] It is further evident from the above, that he does not admit of Benevolence being made a principle of conduct, otherwise than as it presupposes other moral principles, and is regulated consequently in its exercise by a prevailing regard to the "honourable" or right. He has also enforced his primary notions of Duty by pointing out the proper amiableness of Virtue, both as the only sure tie of attachment between man and man,[3] and as the only thing which produces tranquillity, self-satisfaction, and delight, in a man's own bosom. On the latter point, indeed, he speaks almost in terms descriptive

[1] Paley's *Mor. and Pol. Philos.*, book ii. chap. 3.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* vol. ix. cap. 8; *Mag. Mor.* ii. 13, 14; *Polit.* ii. 3.

[3] See Bishop Butler, *Serm.* i.

of the joys and pangs of Conscience.[1] So justly has he embraced in his view the most powerful auxiliary principles, without exalting them, as some philosophers have done, to an undue place, by making the Theory of Virtue to rest on them.

Such, then, is that account of Virtue which Aristotle's Practical Philosophy develops. He delivers it as the theory of perfect conduct—as that which is exemplified in operation whenever human good is realized in life. It is at the same time, it should be observed, both on account of the Nature of Virtue, and of the internal process of Man's Constitution by which Virtue is produced. The affections being all habitually moderated by Prudence, Virtue is the result; and in that Moderation consists the Nature of Virtue.

He was not, however, inattentive to the fact, that the speculative perfection of a practical rule is not realised in Human Life. He was aware that a complete subordination of the Affections to the principle of Prudence, was a task of difficulty above the efforts of Man as he is. So also his view of Vice, as that state of man in which his principles are entirely corrupted,[2] —the affections being conformed to evil, so that he continually and insensibly[3] chooses evil rather than good[4]—is a philosophical limit of the extent of human depravity, and not an account of Vice as it actually exists in the world.[5] It is, indeed, a just conclusion, from experience of that degradation to which our nature is brought—the hardening of the heart, as the Scripture terms it, by the habitual violation of duty. "For of Virtue and Depravity," he observes, "the one impairs the moral principle,

[1] *Eth. Nic.* ix. cap. 4, Εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως, καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο. *Eudem.* vii. cap. 6.

[2] *Ibid.* vii. cap. 8, Ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχήν, ἡ μὲν φθείρει, ἡ δὲ σώζει; vi. 5, Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.

[3] *Ibid.* vii. cap. 9, ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει. *Rhet.* ii. 4, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ, ἥκιστα αἰσθητὰ, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη. See Bishop Butler's *Analogy*, Chapter on Moral Discipline.

[4] *Ibid.* vii. cap. 8, Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν· ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσίν ἐστιν.

[5] *Ibid.* iv. cap. 5, Οὐ μὴν ἅπανταί γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.

the other preserves it; so also of Vice, in particular, that it escapes the notice, *i.e.*, of the individual in whom it is; he is not sensible of it as iniquity and folly." He here describes what takes place with regard to all passive impressions. This insensibility to Vice is the natural result of habitual familiarity with it. A person, by the practice of it, becomes, at once, more expert in vicious acts; more ready to repeat them; more unscrupulous in his conduct; but gradually feels its intrinsic viciousness less, and comes almost to like it; if such a thing could be as a real liking for Vice, such as that avowed by the embodied Principle of Evil, in the words of the poet, "Evil be thou my Good." And a similar effect is realized in the virtuous character on the opposite side. The moral principles subsist as internal principles in their perfection, when they are so wrought into a man's nature as to operate without thought or effort in his conduct. As the end, therefore —as the perfect form of vice—this state of the heart demands to be sketched out by the moralist, to give the full truth and cogency to his admonitions. His outlines of Virtue must be drawn from Virtue realized in its tendency—from that condition of it in which it is the attainment of man's Chief Good; as Vice, on the other hand, must be contemplated where it stands fully confessed as man's Chief Evil. There may be a virtue above Man's nature, as there may be a vice below it; and Aristotle notices both these extremes. But neither of these presents a standard of human excellence or human depravity, and therefore requires no distinct consideration in an Ethical treatise. The actual virtues, however, and vices of men, as they are observed in the world, exhibit an endless variety of modifications within the theoretic limits of Virtue and Vice. The Affections are more or less brought into subjection to the rational principle in different individuals; and men are praised and blamed, in proportion as they have established this command over themselves; or have impaired and lost it. Hence a secondary or inferior kind of Virtue results, as well as a less odious Vice.

As it is in the indulgence of the sensual affections that human frailty is most seen, Aristotle distinguishes this secondary

virtue and vice by contrast with the particular virtue and vice of Temperance and Intemperance, Σωφρόσυνη, and Ἀκολασία, as if they were simply what we express by Continence and Incontinence, Ἐγκράτεια, and Ἀκρασία. But his distinction of their nature is a general one, and belongs to the whole character of Virtue and Vice.[1] In admitting however, a morality of this nature, he laboured under a speculative difficulty. Socrates had denied the existence of any such imperfect vice, on the ground that the virtues were sciences; and that it was impossible for a man to act against his knowledge of the best. Aristotle, who, though not agreeing with Socrates in regarding the virtues as sciences,[2] still admitted an intellectual process in the production of Virtue, felt himself required to explain, how this higher principle was ever overpowered by the weaker, as it is in the incontinent man. In the course of this explanation, he has touched on the true philosophy of those facts in which the principles and practice of men are evidenced at variance. He has accounted, in some measure, for the apparent anomaly of the same person exhibiting such contrasts of character—at one time commanding the passions, at another yielding to them. For he delineates, it should be observed, under the characters of "the continent" and "incontinent," not two different persons, as in the case of "the temperate" and "intemperate," but what will usually be the same person at alternate intervals; since no one can very long remain either. For by the one course continued long, and the habit consequently formed, a person will become the "temperate" man, by the other the "intemperate."

The question of the freedom of the Will has been admirably treated by Aristotle. It is discussed as it ought to be in a treatise of Moral Philosophy, independently of those metaphysical difficulties with which it is commonly overlaid. What the nature of the Human Will is, whether it is free or necessary, according to our abstract notions of liberty or necessity, forms no part of his inquiry. He points out simply, what are the classes of

[1] *Eth. Nic.* vii. c. 7; *Eudem.* vi.; *Ibid.* iii. c. 11.
[2] *Eudem.* vii. c. 13; *Eth. Nic.* vii. c. 3.

actions in which an agent is generally held *not* responsible for his conduct; and, excluding these, decides on the remainder; that, since in these, men *are* held responsible; (as is shewn by the praise and blame, reward and punishment, attaching to their conduct); the actions are voluntary. This is the extent to which the inquiry, so far as it is strictly ethical, ought to be carried. Whether we speculatively conclude the Will of man to be free or necessary, *practically* we must regard it as free. For to act on that supposition, accords with the facts of human life: whereas, to act on the theory that we are under a necessity, would lead us against the practice of mankind, which treats persons as responsible for their actions. Aristotle indeed argues, that though the question be decided in the negative, it leaves the relative nature of Virtue and Vice on the same footing. If their virtues may still be imputed to men, so may their vices.[1] But he more distinctly affirms the *voluntary* nature both of virtue and vice, on the ground that the ἀρχή, the principle of the action, is ἐφ' ἡμῖν—in ourselves—in our own power. Thus, though the virtuous or vicious habits that men have formed, may dispose them to a particular course of behaviour; so that, *as under their influence*, they cannot act otherwise; yet the actions so performed are voluntary; because it was in their power to pursue, or to forbear, that course of conduct which led to the settled habit, and to the corruption of their moral principles.

The principle thus described as "in ourselves," is, in Aristotle's Philosophy, the Motive of action. It is that from which the *effect* in the conduct originates; and it comes, therefore, under that class of principles which constitute the Motive or Efficient Cause. The term Motive, however, is, popularly, applied to the *object* or *end* of an Action,[2] which, being something

[1] *Eudem.* iii. c. 1, 5; which is in substance the conclusion of Bishop Butler (*Anal.* p. 1. chap. on the *Opinion of Necessity*). The whole doctrine of this Chapter is coincident with the views of Aristotle, and illustrative of them.

[2] Paley speaks of "private happiness" as "a motive." (*Mor. and Pol. Phil.*, b. ii. c. 3.) We use the term correctly, when we say that Ambition or Avarice is a person's motive, but not in saying that Power, or Interest, or Happiness, is so; for these are ends.

external to ourselves, or at least capable of being so viewed, gives occasion to question the voluntary nature of Actions. An aim, indeed, at a particular end is implied in every Action; and on the End sought depends the morality or immorality of the Action. But, in strictness, it is the Choice alone ἡ προάιρεσις, that moves the agent.[1]

But the principles employed in the production of Moral virtue are not the whole of our internal nature, nor are they the highest principles. And Aristotle's theory implies the exertion of all; and further, if there be a relative superiority among them, a preference of the higher. The moral virtues, according to the theory of Plato which he adopted, having their seat in that part of the soul which was termed irrational—or only rational as it was capable of obedience to Reason—were the virtues of the inferior part. Accordingly, the greatest Happiness must result from the exertion of the Intellectual principles. Analyzing these into the five heads of, 1. Science, or the knowledge of Demonstrative Necessary Truth, ἐπιστήμη; 2. Art, or the knowledge of Contingent Truth in the operations of man, τέχνη; 3. Prudence, φρόνησις, or the knowledge of Contingent Truth in the conduct of Life; 4. Intelligence, or the knowledge of First Principles, νοῦς; 5. Wisdom or Philosophy σοφία; he assigns the pre-eminence to the last, as the perfect combination of Science and Intelligence, and as having for its objects the highest natures.

That a philosopher, living amidst the disorder and misery occasioned by the want of true Religion, should have sought for a perfection of happiness out of the troubled scene in which moral virtue is disciplined, cannot excite our wonder. The calm regions of philosophical contemplation—*sapientum templa serena*—presented a natural refuge to the anxious mind, eager to realize its own abstractions in some perfect form of human life. It was a search, indeed, after that happiness which Revelation has made known to man—a happiness out of his present sphere of exertion and duty, where he might obtain the full end, or

[1] *Eth. Nic.* vi. c. 2; *Eudem.* ii. c. 11; *Metaph.* vi. c. 1.

consummate good, of his being. Aristotle accordingly describes the pursuit of *this* ulterior happiness, as the "immortalizing" of our nature; as the living according to what is "divine" in man; as what renders a man most dear to the Divinity, most godlike.[1] Not attributing, however, any real immortality to the nature of man, he could only draw his notion of perfect happiness from a view of the present life.[2] In this view, the Intellectual virtues are undoubtedly entitled to the preference; though experience must have convinced him, that even these were not without their alloy.[3] He by no means, however, regards the exercise of the Intellectual virtues as an exemption from the necessity of cultivating the Moral. The happiness of the Theoretic life is the highest privilege of man's nature. Still the practice of the Moral virtues is enjoined, that each person may perform his part as a man living amongst men. No philosophy but that of Aristotle has so justly maintained this proposition. Plato would lead his followers into the indolent reveries of mysticism; the Stoics would reduce theirs to indifference about human things; the Epicureans would absorb theirs in the fulness of present delights; Cicero would degrade the higher functions of the contemplative life below the ordinary moral duties, confounding the dignity and the indispensableness of an employment. But Aristotle elevates the aim of man to that happiness which, as purely intellectual, is inadequate to the wants of a nature consisting of body and soul; whilst he calls him also to the strenuous discharge of the duties belonging to that compound nature, and to his actual condition in the world.

Politics.

The experienced inefficiency of ethical precepts in themselves to produce morality in the lives of men, and the consequent appeal to some external sanction for their enforcement, led to

[1] *Eth. Nic.* x. c. 7 and 8.

[2] *Ibid.* x. c. 8, αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί, κ. τ. λ.

[3] See Bishop Butler's Sermon *On the Ignorance of Man.*

such works among the ancients as the Politics of Aristotle. The Christian observes the same fact, and draws from it a strong argument for the necessity of a Divine Revelation. Aristotle and other Greek philosophers looked to the influence of Education directed by civil laws and institutions, and to the rewards and punishments of civil government, as the great instruments for bringing mankind to that course of action in which their real interest consisted.

In ascribing this moral force to the law of the state, Aristotle adopted the current notion of Ancient Philosophy, which confounded moral and political good. The good of man as an individual was conceived perfectly coincident with his good as a citizen; and the science of Politics, therefore, was treated as including under it that of Ethics. Had not philosophers been misled by their extreme pursuit of abstract speculation, they could hardly have thus blended together the distinct objects of moral and political science in one common theory. They would have seen that the social union could only indirectly promote that good of man which belongs to his internal nature; that it could reach no further than to the protection of the individual from external aggression on his person and property, and allowing him the unobstructed exercise of his virtue. "Civil government," says Bishop Butler, "can by no means take cognizance of every work which is good or evil; many things are done in secret, the authors unknown to it, and often the things themselves; then it cannot so much consider actions under the view of their being *morally* good or evil, as under the view of their being mischievous or beneficial to society; nor can it in any wise execute *judgment* in regarding what is *good*, as it can, and ought, and does, in punishing what is *evil*."

In consequence of this misapprehension of the end of the social union, the Political philosophy of Greece was not a system of jurisprudence, nor any discussion of questions affecting the policy of particular states. It was a speculation concerning the Perfect Polity—a theory of social happiness considered as the result of positive institutions and laws. Ingenious men amused

themselves with fancying how society might be modelled, so as to exhibit an ideal optimism; instead of attending to the real phenomena of human life, and deducing from them the right administration of Society under its existing forms.[1]

Aristotle, accordingly, constructed a theory of Politics on this delusive principle. Proposing to himself the Perfect Polity, as that in which the virtue and happiness of the man and the citizen exactly coincide, he proceeds to sketch out the form of it, and thus to obtain an outline of the institutions on which his ethical system must depend for its support. But he was not so fascinated by the theory on which he worked, as to overlook the practical nature of the science. He complains of his predecessors, that however well they might have treated the subject in other respects, they had at least failed in the useful. They had contented themselves with devising forms of polity which could only be realized with a concurrence of every favourable circumstance: whereas the usefulness of the science required the delivery of principles such as were practicable in existing cases. We know, indeed, from the titles of other works on Politics which he is said to have written, *The Polities of One Hundred and Fifty-eight States*, four books *On Laws*, and two books *On the Political Man*,[2] that he did not consider the subject as exhausted in the theory of a perfect polity. The observations, too, on Justice and on Civil Policy, contained in his Ethics and Rhetoric, are proofs of the sound practical views with which he contemplated the subject. And even in the work now before us, which develops his professed theory of Politics, the substance of the inquiry is, judicious and enlightened instructions of policy, drawn from experience of human nature, and applicable to all times and circumstances. From its connection with his Ethics, it was intended, probably, to be applied by each individual in the practical business of Education. He wished the student to obtain that scientific

[1] Draco, however, and Pittacus, were only framers of laws, and not of polities. —Aristot. *Polit.* ii. c. *ult.*

[2] These works are mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. A portion of the *Polities of One Hundred and Fifty-eight States*, relating to the constitution of Athens, has been preserved by Julius Pollux.

knowledge of the effects of institution and discipline on the human character, which might assist him in the treatment of the particular cases of his own experience.[1] It thus harmonized completely with his Ethics ; the object of which was, as has been shewn, to enable each man to attain his own particular good by a general knowledge of the real good of man.

The perfect polity sketched by Aristotle is a theory of the end to which man, viewed in his social capacity, at its best estate, and unimpeded by external obstacles, may be conceived to tend. It is a view of the End or τέλος in his Political system, corresponding to his account of the Chief Good in his Ethics. He arrives at it by the same train of thought which led him to his account of the Chief Good. He considers, first, that man, independently of any calculations of expediency, is naturally a political being ;[2] as in his Ethics he assumes that man is endued by nature with active principles tending to his own good. He admits that Expediency is instrumental in cementing the union among men, but does not rest society on this principle ; wisely judging that man is induced originally to associate with man by various internal principles of his nature, and not simply by motives derived from reflection on his wants. Such motives are in truth only secondary causes, and auxiliary to the former ; in like manner as the principle of self-love is auxiliary to the natural affections on which virtue is founded. As, then, in his Ethics, he went on to inquire what principle rendered actions perfect, exhibiting them as attaining the end for which Nature had constituted the Affections ; and as this principle formed the Chief Good of his Ethical system ; so in his Politics, he carries on his view of the social nature of man to the point where the union to which it tends appears self-sufficient and perfect. The mode in which the social principles might be found to operate in this ultimate case would present the perfection of Social Virtue. And from this specimen of Social Virtue would be deducible right forms of government, institutions, and laws, just

[1] *Eth. Nic.* x. c. *ult.*

[2] *Polit.* i. 2, iii. 6.

as the rules of right moral conduct are drawn from the whole moral nature of man contemplated in its perfection.

To put ourselves, accordingly, into that posture of mind in which Aristotle contemplated the subject, we must suppose the case of a society analogous to that of an individual. The analogy between the principles of the heart, as a constitution, or system of related principles tending to a common end, and the elements of a political community, could not but be familiar to the mind of a disciple of Plato, who delighted in drawing his outlines of moral virtue from the imagery of social life. But Aristotle, though sometimes imitating the beautiful language of Plato in his ethical descriptions, has inverted the analogy, and framed his representation of a perfect society after the resemblance of the internal constitution of the heart. We must imagine, then, the various members of a community, when brought to the standard of perfection implied in the notion of a Perfect Constitution, all obtaining their respective dues, in a manner analogous to the due moderation of the affections in the virtuous character. A "mean" is to be attained in the one case as in the other.

Agreeably to this view of his mode of speculation on the subject, he describes the Perfect Polity as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy—as a state which appears to be both these forms of government, and yet neither of them; in which, no one of the component elements of Society has preponderance, but the claims of freedom, of wealth, and of virtue,[1] are all duly considered. A form of government which is thus a "mean" throughout, he designates by the name of "Polity" or commonwealth; appropriating to it the general name, and thus distinguishing it as the perfect form, the proper constitution of a πόλις, a City or State;—a city or state being the "end" of the Social union.

[1] Nobility, according to Aristotle, is "ancient wealth and virtue;" or "the virtue and wealth of ancestors;" and does not, in his view, therefore, form a distinct head of claims. According to Laertius, he wrote an express treatise, Περὶ εὐγενείας, in one book.

If, indeed, the promotion of virtue were the direct and proper object of the Social union, as Aristotle conceives, it must be allowed, that that only can be a perfect constitution of Society, in which the standard of political rights is the same with that of moral right. In this ultimate perfect form, upon such a supposition, the science of Politics becomes absorbed in that of Ethics. The community in this case acts as the dispenser of the laws of morality; and its honours and its penalties are but the channels through which virtue works its own rewards of happiness, and vice its own punishments of misery.[1] But this is, as was before observed, to intrude on a province far beyond that of political science. Schemes for the moral perfection of Society belong to the wisdom of a Providence more than human, working good out of evil, and, from a boundless survey of all the relations of things, accomplishing important results by means apparently incompetent or even adverse. Man, in his designs of moral good, has only to attend closely to the mechanism placed under his observation—to use the appointed means—to cultivate given powers—to provide against foreseen consequences;—and then, having done his part, to trust that the happiness, which must surely be the end of the whole under a wise and good Providence, will be the final result of his well-ordered exertions. Thus, it is manifest to our view, that from the ungoverned passions of men evil will ensue. Society, therefore, may lawfully be employed as an instrument for preventing this misery, so far as external means can reach it; and so far, too, it may encourage virtue, and indirectly promote human happiness.[2] But let it propose to itself "what is best" as the distinct aim of its constitution? and it bewilders itself with theories, no one of which will probably realize the expectations conceived of it; whilst, on the contrary, some evil must certainly ensue from artificial attempts on so large a scale. For it is impossible, as Aristotle himself observes, but that, "from false

[1] Bishop Butler's picture of a perfectly virtuous kingdom will readily occur here. (*Analogy*, part i. chap. 3.)

[2] *Polit.* i. cap. 2, φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ἕρμή, κ. τ. λ.

good in the outset, real evil must at length result."[1] He is quite consistent here, however, with the rest of his philosophy. Excluding from the course of nature a Providence distinct from Nature itself, he proceeded, according to his system, to attribute an internal self-adjusting power to Society considered as a work of Nature. The maxim, that "Nature does nothing in vain," is at the base of his moral and political philosophy, as well as of his physical. The perfect polity is an illustration of this maxim. It is the perfecting of the self-provisions of Nature in Man considered as a Social being.

The real excellence, however, of Aristotle's theory of the Perfect Polity consists in this; that, if we admit a Divine Providence, to whose foresight we ascribe the final cause or ultimate tendency of the social union, it is a negative description of the policy which should be pursued in every well-constituted state. It points out the manner in which the public welfare must be sought; that is, by not making any one of the objects commonly pursued in the political world the sole or chief object of pursuit to the community. On the hypothesis, that the happiness of the world is the care of Him who ordered it, every society should be so constituted as that no appointment of Providence be overlooked, but every part of the social machinery be brought into action. The love of conquest, for instance, will not be the aim of such a state. Such a policy would employ its military resources only, to the exclusion of its other materials of happiness. Aristotle particularly points this out in the instance of Lacedemon, whose whole policy was framed for war; whereas, as he observes, a state should be adapted for living well in peace, and enjoying that repose which is the end of its engaging in war.[2] Nor, again, will the mere accumulation of wealth be the express aim of the state in its whole policy. Such a ruling principle would tend to degrade the great mass of the population, and to undo the very connection itself between the members of the community, by pushing the boundaries between the rich and

[1] *Polit.* iv. cap. 12, v. cap. 1. [2] *Ibid.* ii. cap. 9., vii. cap. 14.

poor to the extremes of opulence and pauperism; of which condition of things the natural result is, the tyranny of an Oligarchy. Lastly, if even liberty is made the exclusive aim of state policy, unhappiness is the sure result. Whilst the members of the community grasp at an unrestrained liberty, they disregard the various gradations of society, by which the sphere of human duties is enlarged, and the greatest securities against violations of liberty are provided; and thus a wild Democracy usurps the place of a just Polity. Now, Aristotle's theory excludes all such gross schemes of policy. It admits only the general pursuit of the public welfare; which, like the private happiness sketched in his Ethics, is not to be made a *distinct* object under any particular form, but must be the *general* pursuit of the *whole* organization of the society; as private happiness is the *result* of the *general* regulation of all the moral principles. It is true, that he supposes a society to constitute itself in order to its own moral perfection and happiness; and herein is the error of his theory. But this notion being a substitute in his system for a Divine Providence, it did not imply that the individual members of the community should propose to themselves, as their direct object of pursuit in life, that happiness to which the social system, as a whole, should tend. It was to be brought about by that mysterious agency which, from not admitting a real Providence, he was compelled to ascribe to Nature.

This is further illustrated in his description of the three right forms of government, and the three improper, or deviations from the former. He admits that the public welfare may be promoted under other forms—under a Monarchy or an Aristocracy, as well as under "the Polity" or commonwealth. These three forms are indeed coincident in principle, according to him; being variations produced by differences in the character of the people among whom they arise.[1] The perfect "Polity" presupposes an equality among the members of the society,—that all are capable in turn of governing, as well as of being governed.

[1] *Polit.* iii. cap. 17.

But there may in some cases be marked differences between a family, or an individual, or a class of individuals, and the bulk of the people; and in these cases the rule of justice requires that there should exist in the former a monarchy, in the latter an aristocracy. So far, indeed, does Aristotle carry this principle, as to say, that any single person eminent in worth above the rest of the community, as one of a more divine nature, ought to have entire obedience from the rest, and to be perpetual Sovereign.[1] The three forms, then, of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Commonwealth, are right; because, being founded on the relative merit of the members of each society, and the standard of merit being virtue, the rule of justice is maintained in them. The public good follows, therefore, not from the ascendancy of this or that principle in the government in each case, but from a due regard to all subsisting relations in the state. But in the corresponding perversions of these right governments — in a Tyranny, an Oligarchy, and a Democracy—particular principles prevail, and particular interests, accordingly, are consulted, to the violation of justice and the sacrifice of public good.

Aristotle appears the only political theorist among the ancients who never lost sight of the moral nature of man in his speculations. The systems of other theorists, as Plato, Phaleas of Chalcedon, Hippodamus of Miletus, and the constitutions of Lacedemon, Crete, and Carthage, for the most part treated Human Society merely as a physical mass, capable of being moulded into particular forms by the mechanism of external circumstances. Aristotle, on the contrary, lays the chief stress on the force of "customs, philosophy, and laws,"[2] for producing the best condition of society. Still as, in his Ethics, in order to the development of his theory of the Chief Good of man, he supposes a condition of human life adequate to the exercise of the moral powers; so, in his Politics, he supposes a concurrence of circumstances favourable to the existence of the perfect Polity.[3] In this theory as in that, there must be no impediment from

[1] *Polit.* iii. cap. 13, p. 355, Du Val. [2] *Ibid.* ii. cap. 3. [3] *Ibid.* vii. cap. 1, 12.

without to the operation of the principles. Here, as in the Ethics, the production of the desired effect is the combination of three principles—Nature, Habit, Reason.[1] Therefore, also, as there must be certain elements of virtue in the heart, in order to the moral improvement of an individual, so there must be the proper elements of the perfect social life in the community where the perfect commonwealth is to be reared. Then, upon these natural principles of the head and heart, a course of public Education is to proceed, disciplining the members by habit and by reason to the perfection of the social character, in a manner analogous to the discipline by the individual of his own character.

We find the same fundamental agreement with the moral system of the Ethics, in the method of Education proposed by Aristotle for the citizens of the perfect Polity. The maturity of the intellectual powers is here also to be the end to which the system tends. The members of the community are to be trained so as to be capable of enjoying the leisure and repose of a peaceful state. This they are to regard as their ultimate proper sphere of happiness; whilst at the same time they are disciplined to the virtues of that active life, by which alone the permanence of their tranquillity can be secured. It is obvious how this harmonizes with the doctrine of the Ethics, which sets forth the happiness of the Theoretic life as the highest bliss of man's nature, but not independently of the practical duties of common life. For thus he directs the course of training through which the young must pass, to commence with the body; then to proceed to the disposition of the heart, and to end with the intellect; the inferior principles being disciplined in subordination to, and with reference to the higher. Even the sports of childhood were not neglected by him in the scale of Education. He would further provide for the best bodily constitution of the citizen, by regulating the period of marriages with a view to a healthy offspring, and the care of the mothers during pregnancy. Here, indeed, we are shocked at finding in such an author a sanction

[1] *Polit.* vii. cap. 13.

to infanticide and abortion. The law, he says, should forbid the nurturing of the maimed ;[1] and where a check to population is required, abortion should be produced before the quickening of the infant ; no law of morality, he thinks, forbidding it at this period.[2] These are striking instances of the infirmity of a philosophy, which substitutes an intrinsic agency in Nature for the counsels of an intelligent Divine Agent working on Nature. According to such a philosophy, everything adverse to the perfection of Nature is a stumbling-block. On the hypothesis of a Providence, the good and the evil may be contemplated with equal assurance that "the best" will in the end prevail. In the former case human reason removes, suppresses, destroys ; in the latter it moderates, counteracts, overrules ; doing nothing with rash violence, but gently conspiring with the appointed course of things, in opening a way for good out of the evil. In Aristotle, the immoralities here noticed are, moreover, at direct variance with the precepts and spirit of his Moral philosophy.

Again, the same moral complexion characterizes both the public and private discipline of the philosopher. The honourable, *τὸ καλόν*, predominates over both. By this standard every institution, whether of bodily or mental exercise, is to be regulated. No illiberal arts, such as required manual rather than intellectual skill, are to be taught. Not even are the liberal sciences to be pursued excessively, or with exclusive devotion to any particular ones, or with mercenary views ; the occupation of leisure being the end proposed by the system of education. What was useful or necessary was to be learned, but in subserviency to the honourable ; and the honourable rather than the useful or necessary.[3] Hence the stress laid by Aristotle on the Arts of Painting and Music. It was, in the result, a general cultivation of the mind by literature combined with moral discipline, and not the storing it with particular sciences, which his system of education contemplated. He saw that the

[1] *Polit.* vii. cap. 16, *ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον τρέφειν.*

[2] *Ibid.* vii. 16, *πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν, κ. τ. λ.*

[3] *Ibid.* vii. cap. 14.

tendency of particular studies was to contract the mental powers to that particular range of vision to which they were confined: whereas he sought rather to impart a largeness and masculine strength to the understanding, commensurate with the varied demands of the world in which human life is cast. It was what we should express by the education of the accomplished gentleman,—of one who, exempt from the drudgery of life, and having his actions freely at his own disposal, might be qualified for the highest functions to which Nature has destined man in forming him a moral and social being. For it should be observed, that Aristotle throughout supposes an entire immunity from all servile employments, both to the happy man and the happy citizen.[1] According to his view, a large proportion of mankind are physically incapable, either of the happiness of moral beings, or of that of social life. Persons so imperfectly constituted he conceives to be wholly dependent on others, and to be by nature *relative* beings or slaves; their proper nature being comprized in this relationship of dependence.[2] To this class, accordingly, he would commit all the labours of agriculture, of the mechanical arts, and the market, and all menial offices: whilst others, more gifted by nature, enjoy leisure for the proper duties of man, in the various relations of a moral and social being.[3]

The justification of the condition of slavery is thus rested by Aristotle on abstract grounds. He viewed it as an institution of nature; differing in this from other philosophers, and from the popular notion of his own countrymen, who either founded it on the right of conquest, or on an assumed original difference between Greek and Barbarian. This was a far more liberal view of the subject than that which prevailed generally in his time. For it implied, that no one had a right to retain another as his slave who was not thus physically dependent. Every one had a right to be free, who was capable of enjoying freedom in the performance of the duties for which man in his perfection was constituted. This doctrine further imposed on the master

[1] *Eth. Nic.* x. cap. 6, 7; *Polit.* iii. cap. 6, iv. 4.
[2] *Polit.* i. cap. 3, 6.
[3] *Ibid.* vii. cap. 9, 10.

a strict moral attention to his slave. The slave was thrown on him not only for support, but for direction in his duties.[1]

That Religion should have formed no part of the business of Education in his system, was further consistent with his Ethics. The Moral καλὸν terminated in the perfect fulfilment of all those relations in which man was placed as a being of this world. It was heightened by the consideration, that Gods might delight in looking down on such perfection, and that in its highest state it resembled the excellence of divinity. But it did not strike its roots into, or draw its nourishment from, Religion. Nor did the καλὸν of Social life. The accomplished citizen might be taught to contemplate himself in the thoughtful activity of a philosophical leisure, as holding a dignified station among men, analogous to the divine principles which maintain the order of the universe.[2] But there was no connection between his social virtues and his religious system. The religious colouring was only the borrowed light of Philosophy. All active Religion was consigned to the instrumentality of a particular body of men—the Priests. The obligatory force of Religion was recognized; but, being lodged in an external establishment, as its depository and sanctuary, reverence was sought for it by outward bonds of respect, by the privileges of the order to whose care it was intrusted, and the splendour of its public spectacles. Aristotle, accordingly, treats the subject merely as one of policy. He observes, that no one of the rank of a mechanic or peasant should be appointed a Priest, since it was necessary that the gods should be honoured by the citizens; and he points out the importance of the religious character to the absolute sovereign of a state, in order to the obedience of the subject.[3]

Aristotle's account of his theoretic Polity leaves off abruptly

[1] *Polit.* i. cap. 13, νουθετεῖον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

[2] *Ibid.* vii. cap. 3, Σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς, καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. "Sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intelligendum et agendum, esse natum, quasi mortalem Deum." (Cicero *De Fin.* ii. cap. 13.)

[3] *Ibid.* v. 11, vii. 9. In *Œconom.* i. 5 (probably the work of his disciple Theophrastus), slaves are spoken of as the class for whom especially sacrifices and festivities should be appointed.

at the end of the 8th book; and the treatise is thus, as now extant, an imperfect development of his views. But the theory of the Perfect Polity is only a part of the very valuable materials of the *Politics*. The work embraces a wide survey of the social nature of man. Throughout, indeed, it may be studied as elements of the philosophy of History. It lays open the principles of preservation and decay inherent in the different constitutions, and points out the common principles on which the maintenance of civil order, under any form whatever, must essentially depend.

Nor has the study which now obtains the name of Political Economy been overlooked by Aristotle. The nature of Money, and of the wealth to which it has given rise, particularly attracted his attention. It may suffice to shew how accurately he thought on the subject, to observe that his account of the origin of Money,—tracing it to its service, as a common measure of value in exchanges, and as a conventional substitute for a demand for commodities,—has been adopted by the author of the celebrated work, *The Wealth of Nations*.[1]

On the whole, justly to appreciate the labours of Aristotle in Political Science, we should compare them with the elaborate and eloquent works of Plato on the same subject—the Dialogues entitled *The Republic* and *The Laws*, and especially *The Republic*. Aristotle evidently had this work before him in the composition of his own, and in several places has made express allusions to it. His two treatises of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, convey incidentally a refutation of the errors in moral and political philosophy contained in Plato's speculations. It is but a small portion of Plato's *Republic* which belongs to Politics; the bulk of it being devoted to moral and metaphysical discussions. Aristotle's more exact philosophy discriminates the subjects strangely though beautifully blended in that episodic work. He has taken much of what is excellent in the treatises of Plato into his own; but at the same time has the merit of originality, in the correction and enlargement, as well as

[1] *Polit.* i. 9; *Eth. Nic.* v. 5. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, book i. chap. 5.

systematic arrangement, of the principles there diffusely delivered. He acknowledges, referring to the *Dialogues* of Plato, that all the discourses of Socrates have in them "the admirable, and the exquisite, and the inventive, and the searching;" whilst he claims a right to discuss them, on the ground, that "for everything in them to be right was perhaps difficult."[1]

Plato's theory was metaphysical throughout. That oneness which he sought to establish in his perfect Republic was an abstract unity, the realizing of which constituted, in his view, the best Polity; as the realizing of the one self-existent "idea" of good constituted the morality of actions. Thus, his Magistrates are philosophers, and his Virtue is wisdom. A character, on the other hand, decidedly practical, pervades the moral and political disquisitions of Aristotle. They are immediately adapted to the actual needs of man. They have not, on this very account, that peculiar charm which belongs to Plato's writings. The imaginative perfection shadowed out by Plato, imparts an interest even to his most subtile disputations, and engages the feelings of the reader, amidst the reluctance of his judgment. And thus his works tend to a practical effect, in opposition to their speculative character. But Aristotle, throughout intent on the business of human life, forbears to seize the imagination with romantic pictures of excellence, either in man individually, or in society. He points out such happiness as is attainable, or at least to which human endeavours may reasonably be directed, in that condition of the world in which man has been placed. His discussions on moral subjects are accurate observations, and powerful reasonings, applied to things as they are. But this character renders them of more general use than Plato's speculations. The man of genius and of sensibility might feel a stronger stimulant to moral and social energies from the study of the animated pages of the *Republic*. But the generality of mankind would undoubtedly obtain a more ready help in the duties of life, from the practical principles of conduct delivered in the less ambitious philosophy of Aristotle.

[1] *Polit.* ii. 6. Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν καὶ τὸ κομψὸν, καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον, καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν· καλῶς δὲ πάντα, ἴσως χαλεπόν. ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι,

CONCLUSION.

DESIGN OF ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY—STYLE OF HIS WRITINGS—HIS OBSCURITY—METHOD OF DISCUSSION—ORIGINALITY.

From the review which has been taken of the extant writings of Aristotle, it would appear that the great object of the philosopher was to discipline the mind by a deep and extensive course of literature. The various inquiries embraced in those writings,—the unwearied research into subjects the most repulsive from their abstruseness, or the most interesting from their connection with the feelings and actions of men,—the richness of illustration from the volumes of ancient genius, and from observations of mankind with which they abound, are so many proofs of the noble object proposed in his philosophy. It may be fully concluded that it was not the mere sophist of former days, or the disputant on any given question, that Aristotle aimed to accomplish. His object was, like that of Socrates, to render man really wise, by a cultivation of all the moral and intellectual powers of the soul; in order that the great moral of the whole—the good towards which Nature tends—might be realized in each individual so instructed and disciplined. Agreeably to this view is the answer attributed to him, when, on being asked what advantage had accrued to him from philosophy, he replied, "To do without constraint what some do through the fear of the laws."[1]

Some of his works appear to have been written in the form of Dialogue. These were probably of the class called Exoteric; that form being more adapted to the purpose of explanation and fuller discussion,—which seem to have been characteristics of the Exoteric treatises, in contrast with the concise and suggestive form of the Esoteric or Acroamatic. Among his works are also mentioned Epistles to Philip, to Alexander, Olympias, Hephæstion, Antipater, Mentor, Ariston, Themistagoras, Philo-

[1] Diog. Laert. *in Aristot.*

xenus; besides a collection entitled *Epistles of the Selymbrians.* A hymn in praise of the virtues of his friend Hermias has been already noticed; which formed matter of accusation against him on the ground of impiety. It has been preserved by Diogenes Laertius. It consists of twenty-three lyric verses, celebrating Hermias among the heroes who had sacrificed their lives for the cause of virtue. Laertius has also preserved four lines inscribed by him on the statue of Hermias erected at Delphi. His poetical talent was further displayed in verses addressed to Democritus, and in the composition of an elegy; of both which poems the first lines are given by Laertius. The titles of various other works, or parts of works, occur in the catalogue of his writings. So laborious, and so diversified, were the literary pursuits of this great philosopher. These were works, too, written, we must remember, not by a sequestered individual, enjoying the privacy of a privileged leisure like the Priests of Egypt, but amidst the agitation and troubles of Grecian politics, or in the courts of princes. We may well, therefore, wonder at the abstractedness of mind, the single-hearted zeal of philosophy, which thus steadily pursued its course, creating its own leisure, and keeping the stillness of its own thoughts. Probably, indeed, such writings could hardly have been produced, except with a concurrence of such opposite circumstances. They imply at once the man of the world, and the retired student,—ample opportunities for the contemplation of human nature in the various relations of life, familiarity with the thoughts of others by reading and conversation, as well as intense private meditation, that communing with a man's own heart, which alone can extort the deep secrets of moral and metaphysical truth.

The style of his writings bears the impress of his devotion to the real business of philosophy. The excellence of his style is, we believe, the last thing to attract the notice of his readers; and yet, as a specimen of pure Greek, it is found to stand almost unrivalled. The words are selected from the common idiom; but they are employed with the utmost propriety; and by their collocation are made further subservient to the perspicuity and

force of his meaning. There is nothing superfluous, nothing intrusive, in his expressions; but the very ornaments add to the terseness of the style. The metaphors and illustrations employed are apt and striking analogies, availing as arguments, whilst by their simplicity they familiarize the truth to the mind. That these excellencies should escape the notice of the reader engaged in the matter itself of the author, is a proof of the strict adaptation of the style to the matter. We can imagine, that to the Greek reader nothing could have been easier than to apprehend the meaning of the philosopher. To the modern, the necessity of studying the language gives an apparent hardness to expressions, whose propriety depends on an accurate perception of the genius of the language. Thus, what was a facility to the ancient reader is a difficulty to the modern, until the latter, by study of the language, has brought himself as much as possible into the situation of the former. This observation will be illustrated by a comparison of the style of Plato with that of Aristotle. Plato's style, undulating with copiousness of diction, is more attractive to the modern reader; his meaning is often more readily apprehended at the first glance, by the number of expressions which he crowds on a point, and their accumulated force of explanation. But in Aristotle, if we miss the force of a term or a particle, or overlook the collocation of the words, we shall sometimes entirely pervert his meaning.[1]

There are, however, passages in which Aristotle departs from his usual conciseness, and approaches towards the eloquence of Plato. The concluding chapters of his *Nicomachean Ethics* may here be particularly pointed out; or a part of the ninth book of that treatise, in which, evidently imitating Plato, he compares the tumult of uncontrolled passions to the disturbance of civil sedition. There is a dignity and a pathos in these passages, controlled by the general character of severe precision belonging to his style, yet admirably harmonizing with it. Sometimes,

[1] It is probable that the number of his distinct works has been made to appear larger than it really is, by the circumstance of parts of those now extant being described by the titles of the particular subjects to which they refer, and thus represented as separate treatises.

indeed, his style is chargeable with too strict a conciseness, as well as, on the other hand, with prolixity. These opposite faults are in him the same in principle; resulting from the pursuit of extreme accuracy ;—an error in composition, compared by himself to that illiberality, which consists in too close an attention to minute matters in contracts.[1]

Nor can it be denied that there is considerable obscurity in the writings of Aristotle. It is important, however, to distinguish this obscurity from that of mere style. It is an effect of the peculiar design with which he appears to have composed them. Some are evidently outlines for the direction of the philosopher himself and his disciples in their disputations—notices of points of inquiry rather than full discussions of the subjects. This is very observable in the *Metaphysics*, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Rhetoric*. Sometimes he contents himself with a reference to his exoteric discussions.[2] It is probable that the most important works of his philosophy were not published in his lifetime ; and that they thus constantly remained by him to receive improvements which further observation might suggest. This may partly account for some abruptness in those treatises. In our progress through them, we come to discussions which we had not been led to expect by anything previous in the work. The seventh book of the *Ethics*, for instance, appears to have been an afterthought ; and so also the eighth and ninth of the same treatise. The work might have been regarded as complete in itself without them. In the *Metaphysics*, indeed, we can hardly judge what was the exact arrangement of the work ; since it has descended to us in an imperfect, irregular form. But there are like marks in it of successive additions from the author.[3] The fact that the writings of Aristotle were left to Theophrastus, and not to his own relatives, would further imply, that they were intended primarily for those who had been trained in his school,

[1] *Metaph.* ii. 3.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* i. 13. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. *Ibid.* vi. 4, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. *De Cœlo*, i. 9. καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι. *Eudem*, i. 8.

[3] Niebuhr (*History of Rome*, trans. p. 16) remarks this particularly of the *Rhetoric*.

and by whom his philosophy would be rightly transmitted. The immediate occasion of this reserved mode of writing may have been the jealousy of rival philosophers,[1] or the dread of pagan intolerance.

His method of discussion is conformable with the principles proposed in his Dialectical treatises. It is throughout a sifting of the opinions and questions belonging to the subject of inquiry, by examining each in its several points of view, and shewing the consequences involved in it. Accordingly, generally, before fully stating his own conclusions, he considers what may be urged on both sides of the question, putting the objections strongly and fairly, and giving the most candid construction to the views of his predecessors.[2] The difficulties proposed he sometimes briefly removes in passing on, having just glanced at them; at other times he devotes several sentences to their explanation. This, which is his method in parts of his system, is only a specimen of what is the collective result of the whole. His philosophy, dialectically viewed, is an analysis of the theories proposed by the philosophers who had preceded him. Consistently with this, he commences sometimes with observations on logical grounds, or those views of a thing implied in the classifications which language expresses; and afterwards inquires into the subject physically or philosophically; when the discussion proceeds on principles of physics or philosophy in general.[3]

With respect to the originality of his writings, there can be no doubt that he derived important aid from the labours of his predecessors, and especially from those of Plato. An accurate examination of his writings will convince the reader that they are

[1] Valerius Maximus, viii. 14, reprehends Aristotle's sensitiveness on this point, mentioning his annoyance at the authorship of his *Rhetoric* being imputed to Theodectes, to whom he had presented the work for publication, and his care to assert his right to the treatise in a subsequent work.

[2] *Metaph.* iii. 1; *Topic.* i. 2; *De Cœlo*, ii. 13, etc.

[3] Occasionally he illustrates from etymology, as in deducing ἦθος from ἔθος (*Eth. Nic.* ii. 1), σωφροσύνη from σώζειν φρόνησιν (*Eth. Nic.* vi. 5). "It is a practice with us all," he observes (*De Cœlo*, ii. 13, p. 467), "to pursue an inquiry, not as it belongs to the thing, but relatively to an opponent in argument."

the productions of one who had deeply drunk of the fountain of Plato's inspiration. But they shew, at the same time, such a disciple as we may suppose the spirit of Plato would have delighted in ; one who cherished the authority of the preceptor, and yet had the courage to love the truth still more ;[1] one who thought it necessary to consult what others had said wisely and truly before him, and yet would examine a question finally with an independent discriminative judgment.[2] Estimating his philosophy thus, we may pronounce it to be truly his own. It was the fruit of his own sagacious, penetrating mind. A sufficient proof of this is his disagreement with Plato on the theory of Ideas,—the Origin of the universe,—and the Immortality of the soul. He has been charged, indeed, with invidious opposition to Plato, with corruption and misrepresentation of the tenets of his predecessors. Jewish writers have even absurdly accused him of plagiarism from the books of Solomon.[3] But there is no real foundation for these charges ; they are at best but surmises ; and they are fully contradicted by the internal evidence of the writings themselves.

[1] *Eth. Nic.* i. 6, ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. This is also the sentiment of Plato, *Rep.* x. 595, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ.

[2] *De Cœlo*, i. 10, τὸ γὰρ ἐρήμην κατα- δικάζεσθαι δοκεῖν, κ. τ. λ. ; *Polit.* ii. 6 ; *Metaph.* xiv. 8, p. 1002, Du Val.

[3] Brucker, *Hist. Crit.* Phil. vol. i. p. 794. This was merely to excuse their own adoption of his philosophy, as Brucker observes.

PLATO.

THE birth of Plato is nearly coincident with that great epoch of Grecian history, the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. In the first year of that war, the Athenians, having ejected the unhappy people of Ægina, apportioned the island amongst colonists from themselves.[1] Amongst these Athenian occupants were Aristo, and Perictione or Potona, as she is also called, the father and mother of Plato. Their residence, however, in the island was not permanent nor even long, as the intrusive colony was in its turn ejected by the Lacedæmonians, on which occasion his parents returned to Athens.[2] It was during this interval, and in the year 429 B.C., that the philosopher was born.[3]

From these circumstances, it has been commonly supposed that Plato was born in Ægina. They are not, however, sufficient to establish such a conclusion. For a colonization of the kind here described did not necessarily imply residence on the part of those persons to whom the lands were allotted.[4] Nor is the fact of the recovery of the island by the Lacedæmonians from the hands of the Athenians, mentioned by the contemporary historian. Ægina was still in the occupation of the Athenians in the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war;[5] and in the eighth year of the war we find that the poor exiles, who had meanwhile obtained a refuge at Thyrea, were there cruelly exterminated by the Athenians.[6] On the whole, it seems more probable, from the constant designation of Plato as "the Athenian," without any other addition, though

[1] Thucyd. ii. 27.
[2] Diog. Laert. in *Vit. Plat.*
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Thucyd. iii. 50.
[5] *Ibid*, iii. 72.
[6] *Ibid*, iv. 56, 57.

this alone, it must be allowed, is not decisive of the fact, that Athens itself may claim the honour of having been his birthplace.

It is remarkable that his proper name was not that which his fame has immortalized, but Aristocles, after his paternal grandfather.[1] The name of Plato is said to have been given to him by the person who was his master in the exercises of the gymnasium, as characteristic of his athletic frame in his youth.[2] In this way, being familiarly applied to him, it gradually prevailed, to the entire disuse of his family name.

The philosopher was connected by descent with the ancient worthies of Athens; on his mother's side with Solon, and on his father's with the patriot king Codrus.[3] And thus, according to the notions of nobility prevalent amongst the Greeks,[4] he could trace up the honours of his parentage to a divine founder, in the person of the god Neptune.

A circumstance is related of his infancy, which, though obviously fabulous, cannot properly be omitted in his biography, as a pleasing and appropriate tribute of the imaginative genius of the Greeks to their poet-philosopher. Whilst he was sleeping when a babe, on Mount Hymettus, in a bower of myrtles, during the performance of a sacrifice by his parents to the muses and the nymphs, bees, it is said, lighted on him and dropped honey on his lips, thus giving an evident augury of that peculiar sweetness of style by which his eloquence would be distinguished.[5]

For the same reason, a similar fancy, which has thrown a poetical ornament over the account of his first devotion to philosophy, must not be passed over in silence. Socrates, it is related, was apprized beforehand, in a dream, of the first visit of the gifted pupil, who was destined to carry philosophy forth on

[1] Aristocles was also a Spartan name, being the name of the brother of the king Pleistoanax. Thucyd. v. 17.

[2] As derived from πλατύς, *broad*. Laertius gives this explanation, which Seneca also adopts (*Epist.* lviii. 27), but says others interpreted the name as denoting a broad forehead; others, as characteristic of his style of eloquence.

[3] His family also is shewn to have been of rank, from its connection with some of "the Thirty," called "the Thirty Tyrants," established at Athens by the Lacedæmonians. See Plat. *Ep.* vii.

[4] See Herodot. *Euterp.* 143.

[5] Cicero, *De Divin.* i. 36.

the wings of his genius to its boldest flights. Socrates was telling his dream to some persons around him, how he seemed to see a young swan coming from an altar in the grove of Academus, and first nestling in his bosom, then soaring up on high, and singing sweetly as it rose in the air, when Aristo presented himself, leading his son Plato, whom he committed to the instruction of the sage. Socrates, it is added, struck by the coincidence, immediately recognized the fulfilment of his dream, and welcomed Plato as the young swan from the altar, represented to him in the vision.

The accounts of his early education, to which we should naturally have looked with great interest, are extremely meagre. We only know by general notices that he passed through the usual course of education adopted amongst the higher classes of the Greeks. That education was directed to the cultivation at once of the powers of the mind and of the body, under the two great divisions of literature and gymnastics. The youth was delivered to the charge of the grammarian, the teacher of music, and the trainer. From the grammarian he learned the art of reading and writing his own language, and a knowledge of its authors, especially its poets; from the teacher of music, skill in performing on the lyre and the flute, together with the principles of the science of music; from the trainer he acquired strength and expertness in the several exercises of wrestling, and boxing, and running, by which it was intended not only to mature the powers of the body, but to qualify the youth for attaining eminence at the public games. These were the schoolmasters of the accomplished Athenian, and with these he was occupied until he had reached about his twentieth year. Accordingly the names have been transmitted to us of those who discharged these offices for Plato; of Dionysius,[1] as the grammarian under whom he learned the elements of that command over his own language, and its literary resources, which his matured eloquence so richly displayed; of Draco of Athens, and Metellus of Agrigentum, as his masters in music; and of Aristo the Argive, as his master in gymnastics.

[1] Mentioned by Plato in *Amatores*, and by Aristotle, *Top.* vi. 10.

It is added that he also studied painting; but the name has not been given of any individual who acted as his preceptor in the art.

In evidence of his great proficiency in these early studies, it has been stated that he gave specimens of his genius in every department of poetical composition; that in epic poetry he laboured after the highest excellence, and only abandoned the attempt on comparing his efforts with the poems of Homer, and despairing of reaching so high a standard; that in dramatic poetry, he had prepared a tetralogy, the four plays usually required of an author in order to competing for the prize at the festival of Bacchus, but changed his purpose only the day before the exhibition, in consequence of impressions received from Socrates. And even in gymnastics excellence has been claimed for him; since it has been asserted that he actually entered the lists at the Isthmian games.

Whatever credit we may give to these particulars, there can be no doubt, that so inquisitive a mind as that of Plato, and so resolute a spirit in the prosecution of its undertakings, received the full benefit of this preliminary culture; and that he was thus amply prepared for entering on the severer discipline of those pursuits which engaged him when he became a hearer of Socrates.

This preliminary education, in fact, was very imperfect as a discipline of the mind. It gave the youth a forwardness and fluency of knowledge, so that he was fain to fancy himself, when he had scarcely attained manhood, equal to undertake affairs of state, and to serve the highest offices of the government. But it did not form his mind or character. He had yet to learn the nature of man; to study the principles of ethics and politics. This task of instruction devolved on the sophist or the philosopher (as the same person was at first indifferently called), into whose hands the Greek youth was now delivered.

Plato, accordingly, at the age of twenty years, began to be a regular attendant on the lessons of Socrates. The reputation of Socrates as a teacher in this higher walk of education, now eclipsed that of all other professors of philosophy. He had at

once exposed the incompetence of the Sophists who preceded him, and superseded them in their office. Plato would be conducted to him by his father, as the account states he was, very much in the way which is depicted under caricature by the comic poet,[1] as to the most distinguished master of the day, to be qualified for taking on him those public duties to which every citizen of Athens might be called; to enable him to distinguish himself in counsel and argument, and obtain influence and importance in society. From the numbers that resorted to Socrates, as well as to the Sophists before him, it is plain that, to obtain instruction in Philosophy for its own sake, or to become philosophers themselves, was not the object with which he was sought by the generality. Here and there the spark fell on a kindred genius, and lighted up a flame of philosophy in the breast of a disciple. Thus from the school of Socrates came the founders of several other schools; and, on the whole, a greater impulse was given by his teaching to the study of Philosophy than had ever been felt before in Greece. Still, as Socrates himself did not profess to teach his hearers wisdom, so neither did they in general come to him as learners of wisdom, or as actuated by the pure love of wisdom, but to acquire practical information which their previous studies had not given them. We may imagine such a disciple as Plato first presenting himself amongst the multitude of hearers; how he would be struck, on the first observation of the extraordinary manner of Socrates, especially at finding the very person to whom he came to be taught professing that "he knew nothing;" and that he was only wiser than other men on this account; that, whilst others knew not and presumed they knew, he neither knew nor presumed that he knew. The interest of such a mind as Plato's could not but be powerfully called forth by so strange an avowal on the part of a man whom he had been led to look up to as the wisest of men. To him it must naturally have prompted the questions, what Philosophy might be; what the nature and condition of Man; what the criteria of truth and falsehood; and thus have firmly

[1] Aristoph. *Nubes*.

laid hold of those tendencies to speculation which we see fully developed in the mature fruits of his genius. Again and again he is present at the searching investigations carried on in the discussions of which Socrates is the leader; soon he is himself interrogated by Socrates; and we cannot doubt that he is thenceforward irrevocably become, not the disciple of Socrates only, but the disciple and votary of Philosophy.

That Plato was thus won over to Philosophy from an early period of his life, is evident from the statement of Aristotle respecting him, that "from his youth he had been conversant with Cratylus, and the opinions of Heraclitus,"[1] and from the indications in two at least of his dialogues (and these supposed to be the earliest in the date of their composition, as written indeed during the lifetime of Socrates), the *Phædrus* and the *Lysis*, of his early acquaintance with Pythagorean notions.

There seems, too, but little room to doubt that he had begun at the same time to study the doctrines of the Ionic school under Hermogenes, as well as those of Parmenides and Zeno. For what he puts into the mouth of Socrates in the *Phædo*[2] respecting Anaxagoras, is probably (as Socrates himself was known to have had a strong aversion to physical science) the expression of his own disappointment and dissatisfaction at the outset of his studies, in the conclusions of the school, of which Anaxagoras was then the chief authority. Of Parmenides, again, he more than once speaks in terms of enthusiasm, as of a name with which he had very early associations of reverence;[3] here, as an instance of Anaxagoras, we are disposed to think, depicting in the person of Socrates, a portion of the history of his own mind.

Judging indeed from the tenor of his writings, we should conclude that his curiosity was excited, from a very early period, to explore the whole field of philosophy; and that, so far from

[1] Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 3.

[2] *Phæd.* pp. 220-225, ed. Bip.

[3] Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἓν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι εἶναι ἅμα δεινός τε· συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ, πάνυ νέος, πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ· καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. (*Theætet.* pp. 137, 138. *Parmenid.* p. 72.)

resting on what he learned from Socrates himself, he applied the lessons of Socrates to the extending and perfecting those researches which he was carrying on at the same time, by means of books, or oral instruction from others.[1] Socrates was to him the interpreter, and commentator, and critic, of the various philosophical studies in which he was engaged. For this is the view which he has given us of Socrates in his Dialogues. Socrates there seldom or never appears as a didactic expounder of truth. He is presented as the critic of opinions and doctrines and systems, and the judge to whom everything is to be submitted for approval or rejection, or modification, as the case may be.

Indeed, so exuberant and energetic a mind could not have been satisfied with being simply a learner in any school. It would eagerly seek the means of comparing system with system, and of examining into points of agreement or disagreement in the theories proposed. The doubts raised by Socrates, the hints thrown out by him, the conclusions to which he pointed, but which he yet left unconcluded, would to such a mind seem as so many points of departure for its own excursions. They naturally suggest that much more must be done than merely to take up what has been said by Socrates, in order to work out, or even rightly to conceive, what had fallen from his lips. For the conversations of Socrates were not framed to convey positive instruction, so much as to set the mind of the hearer thinking, and to provoke further inquiry. In the living pictures of them which Plato has drawn, they leave off just at the point, where we expect the teacher would proceed to speak out more distinctly, and tell us precisely what his view of the subject is. If these pictures represent, (as we may reasonably believe they do), the impressions received by Plato from the conversations of

[1] This evident early devotion of Plato to the pursuit of his whole life, argues the mere calumny of that statement which represents him to have at first sought his fortune by the profession of arms. The calumny is a current one, which has been applied to other philosophers. He has also been absurdly represented as present at the battles of Tanagra and Delium, when he was, in truth, a mere child.

Socrates, what stimulants to inquiry must he not have felt in the several particulars which he has so forcibly touched,—in the mingled lights and shadows of the scenes in which the great master occupies the foreground. Well therefore may we conceive that, at the time when he enjoyed the guidance, and control, and encouragement of Socrates, he was laying a broad foundation of erudition for that vast and richly-ornamented fabric of philosophy which the existing monuments of his genius exhibit.

From Socrates himself, this demand of the inquisitive hearer could evidently not be supplied. Socrates was deficient in erudition properly so called. He had studied men rather than books. His wisdom consisted of deep and extensive observation accurately generalized, drawn from passing things, and capable accordingly of ready application to the same course of things; forcibly convincing his hearers by the point and propriety with which it met each occasion, and giving experimental proof of its soundness and truth. Erudition, accordingly, was to be sought elsewhere; and Plato therefore supplied this need from other sources, infusing it into, and blending it with his own speculations, whilst the Socratic spirit mellows the whole mass, and gives unity to the composition.

The death of Socrates—over which how his disciples mourned, appears in that affecting account of the last moments of their loved master, consecrated to his memory by the genius of Plato, the Dialogue of the *Phædo*—naturally excited alarms for their own safety amongst those who had been conspicuous among his associates. They saw, by the violent extremity to which the spirit of intolerance had proceeded, unchecked by any feeling of humanity or regard for truth, that no wisdom, or gentleness, or benevolence of character could be a security against the deadly hatred of jealousy. They found that priestcraft could stoop to employ any instruments, however mean, for the accomplishment of its vengeance; that it could instigate the actor on the scene of civil affairs to do its work of destruction, whilst the prompter of the mischief wore the mask of concern for the public good,

and arrogated the merit of upholding the cause of religious truth. Persecution has ever been the same. Its essential features are vices of the human heart, not of any particular system of religion. We find it, accordingly, in several recorded instances in the heathen world, displaying itself very nearly as in the dark times of anti-Christian corruption. Athens itself had already furnished examples of its operation. In particular, the case of Anaxagoras had been a striking illustration. When not even the power and the eloquence of Pericles could save Anaxagoras from a prison, and expulsion from Athens, on account of his physical speculations,—the very philosopher whose system of physics raised an insuperable barrier against atheism, by demonstrating the supremacy of mind,—it was but too evident that there was a mysterious agency working in the heart of society, like secret fires in the depths of the earth, capable of awing and paralyzing every other power that might rise up against it.

A more recent experience of the same truth, within the memory of the youngest disciple of Socrates, was in the dark proceedings consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, the rude images of Mercury erected in the vestibules of private houses as well as in the sacred places of Athens, and on the discovery of the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries by the mock representation of them in private houses.[1] The secret information on which those proceedings were carried on; the indifference shewn at the period of alarm to everything else, even on an occasion of great public interest, but the vindication of the popular superstition; the effect which the charge of being implicated in these outrages had in checking the career of Alcibiades at the moment of his triumph over his political opponents; all shewed, that it was a vain hope to resist the secret arbiters of public opinion on questions of religion. Then came the fearful consummation of this vengeance in the death of Socrates by the poisoned cup; leaving no doubt in the minds

[1] The performance of religious rites in private houses is forbidden in Plato's Dialogue on Laws, x. p. 117, ed. Bip.

of any, that they who would follow his example in boldly and honestly inquiring into current opinions, and declaring their convictions of the truth on matters affecting the conduct of men, must either prepare themselves for exile (which alone was a great punishment in the ancient world),[1] or drink the hemlock.

Socrates himself had the courage to take the latter part of the alternative. To him it was the natural termination of that energetic course which he had from the first adopted. He would, otherwise, have unsaid all his teaching; he would have practically recanted the strong language in which he had, through all his life, been discoursing of the worthlessness of the body and of the present life, and of the immortality and perfection of the soul. His philosophy, and the sense of the dignity of his character and position, kept him immured in his prison, and riveted the chains on his limbs, far more than the condemnation of his judges or the strength of the iron with which he was bound. For, as he says of himself, in the words in which Plato has expressed his sentiments, "these sinews and bones would long ago have been either about Megara or the Bœotians, had I not thought it more just and more honourable, instead of flight, to submit to the judgment of the state."[2]

But this was not the case with the hearers of Socrates. They were not, like him, placed in a commanding post, from which they could not retreat without being stigmatized as deserters of their profession, and betrayers of the truth. They might with honour and propriety consult for their safety. Whilst, therefore, as is probable, the bulk of those who had attended on the teaching of Socrates simply withdrew from public notice, and sought their homes at Athens or elsewhere, the principal disciples of the school—those who were most known as followers and admirers of Socrates—left Athens, and sought an asylum for themselves and for philosophy at Megara.

[1] Cicero says of exile, endeavouring to reconcile the feelings to it, "jam vero exilium, si rerum naturam, non *ignominiam nominis* quærimus, quantum demum a perpetua peregrinatione differt?" (*Tuscul. Quæst.* v. 37.)

[2] See *Phædo*, Op. I., p. 224, ed. Bip.; also *Crito*, throughout.

Amongst those whom Socrates drew around him were several individuals of mature age, already trained in some sect of philosophy, and eminent in their own walk of science, yet desirous of availing themselves of the far-famed wisdom of the sage of Athens. Of this class was Euclid, the dialectician, of Megara, from whom the Megaric school derives its existence and celebrity.[1] As a disciple, Euclid belonged to the Eleatic school, and, trained by Zeno, the great master of dialectic before him, had made that science his especial study. He had shewn a singular zeal in attending on the teaching of Socrates; for he continued to resort to him even after the passing of the Athenian decree by which Megarians were excluded, under the penalty of death, from the harbours in the Athenian empire, and from the agora of Athens itself. For this purpose, he would set out from his home at nightfall, a journey of more than twenty miles,—such was the distance from Megara to Athens,—assuming the disguise of female attire that he might enter the city unnoticed.[2] His conduct on the occasion of the dispersion of the school of Socrates corresponded with this zeal. He received the members of the school with open arms, and gave them a home with him at Megara. There, for a time at least, they gathered themselves, in shelter from the storm which had driven them from Athens. But the school, in fact, was broken up. It had subsisted and been held together by the personal influence of Socrates himself, and with him its principle of vitality, as a body, was gone. He had not laboured to establish a sect or a theory; and he left, therefore, no particular symbol of union around which a party might be formed. He was himself the principle and bond of union to his disciples; bringing together around him the professors and disciples of every different sect. There was yet to arise out of his society one who, richly imbued with his teaching and method, should rekindle the extinct school with his own spirit, and bid it live again in its genuine offspring; and that individual was Plato. But the times were not yet ripe for this.

[1] Euclid the mathematician flourished about a century after him.

[2] Thucyd. i. 139; Aul. Gell. *Noct. Att.* vi. 10.

In the meantime, Plato was destined to spend several years in journeying from place to place, at a distance from the past and the future scene of his philosophical labours. These were doubtless years of great importance to him, for the perfect formation of the peculiar character of his philosophy. In the course of them, we find him visiting Megara, Cyrene, the Greek settlements on the coasts of Italy, Sicily, Egypt, "exploring (as Cicero says of him in oratorical language) the remotest lands,"[1] after the manner of Solon and Pythagoras, and other wise men before him, who had enlarged their minds by contemplations pursued in foreign travel. Thus did he singularly combine in his studies the more ancient with the Socratic mode of philosophizing. The method of Socrates was exclusively domestic. He studied mankind within a small compass (the circle of Athens itself), only with a more accurate and searching eye than any one had ever done before him; and therefore drew sound general conclusions from his observations within that range of view. He evidently judged it better thus to restrict the attention, and require men to investigate closely what lay before them, than to encourage them to indulge the prevailing habit of more diffusive and vague observation. This is told us in other words by Plato himself; where he introduces Socrates as a stranger even to the beautiful scenery in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens, and as one who appeared never to have been out of the walls of the city; and as owning that, in his fondness for moral study, he was content to learn of the men in the city, who could teach him what the fields and the trees could not.[2] But this method, good as a foundation, and necessary as a corrective of desultory and superficial habits of thought and study, was not sufficient for the requirements of Plato's mind. He observes in one of his works, that there is much to be gained from contemplation rightly directed in foreign travel both by land and sea; that we are not only to look to our own country for examples, but seek

[1] Ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem, accepimus: ubi enim quid esset quod disci posset, eo veniendum judicaverunt. (*Tusc. Qu.* iv. 19.)

[2] *Phædr.*, p. 287; *Crito*, p. 122.

in the world at large for specimens of the highest, divine order of men, who, though rare, might from time to time be found under every form of government; and that no perfect civilization can be attained without this means of observation and improvement.[1] He describes, in fact, the course which he had himself pursued, and the benefit which he had found resulting from it.

Having sojourned for a time at Megara, together with the other disciples of Socrates, and probably there, with the assistance of Euclid, increased his acquaintance with the writings of Parmenides and Zeno, as well as studied more intimately the dialectic of their school, he appears to have proceeded to Cyrene. Cyrene was the home, not only of Aristippus, to whose school it afterwards gave its name, but of the venerable Theodorus, the most eminent geometrician of his day. Theodorus had been occasionally a resident at Athens, and an attendant on the teaching of Socrates, whilst he was himself resorted to by the Athenian youth for instruction in the science of geometry.[2] Plato, no doubt, had been amongst those who had thus availed themselves of the presence of Theodorus at Athens. His predilection for mathematical studies is conspicuous throughout his writings. His skill in geometry, in particular, requires no other evidence than the fact of his ready solution, in that state of the science, of the problem of the Delphic Oracle, which required the doubling of the cubic altar at Delos.[3] He has described Theodorus as present at Athens at the time when the prosecution was instituted against Socrates.[4] He now went to Cyrene, probably with a view of following up that course of geometrical study which had been so abruptly terminated; whilst he regained also the society of a friend for whom he evidently felt respect and admiration.[5]

The course of his travels conducted him to the Greek settle-

[1] *De Legib.*, xii., Op. vol. ix. p. 196, 197, ed. Bip.

[2] Plat. *Theætet.*, p. 51, 52; Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 2, 10.

[3] Plutarch. *De Socrat. Genio*, Op. vol. viii. p. 288, ed Reiske. The inscription said to have been over the portal of the Academia, "Let no one enter who is not a geometrician," seems to belong rather to Pythagoras, or perhaps was imitated from the Pythagoreans.

[4] *Theætet.* ad fin.

[5] See *Theætet.* throughout.

ments on the coast of Italy and Sicily, where the colleges of the Pythagoreans were established. It may readily be imagined with what eager curiosity Plato undertook this voyage, what delight he promised himself in seeing the place itself where Pythagoras had taught, and in personal conference with the living successors of the mystic sage, and in obtaining a greater insight into the doctrines of a school which had such charms for him. He had much to observe also in the peculiar discipline by which the Pythagoreans were formed into a distinct fraternity amongst themselves. Greece Proper had nothing to exhibit like this. For though the different sects of philosophy were distinguished there by the names of founders and places, they were not held together by any rules of discipline. But the Pythagoreans at Tarentum, Crotona, and elsewhere in Magna Græcia, had incorporated themselves into synedria or colleges; each individual giving his property in common, and regarding the bond of connection with his brethren of the sect as closer than the ties of kindred.[1] Associations of this kind must have appeared, at the first, as anomalies even to the philosophical Athenian, accustomed as he was to regard the free intercourse of social life as indispensable to his very existence.

It has been said that Plato was admitted to the secret discipline of the Pythagoreans. Probably he was only received by them with great cordiality, and had access to writings and information respecting their doctrines, which might have been denied to one, who came less recommended to them by the sincere enthusiasm of philosophy, and approximation to their views. There are no traces certainly in his writings, or elsewhere, of his having been a professed Pythagorean; although he undoubtedly was greatly captivated by the Pythagorean doctrines, and has introduced them largely into his own speculations.

Archytas, the greatest name of the Pythagorean school after that of Pythagoras himself, was then flourishing at Tarentum. It must have been an interesting occasion when there were

[1] See Plato, *Rep.* x. p. 293; Polyb. ii. 39; Aul. Gell. i. 9; Origen. *C. Cels.* ii. p. 67, iii. p. 142, ed. Spenc.; Jamblich. *Pyth. Vit.* c. 17, p. 154.

assembled together at Tarentum,[1] as Cicero relates, Pontius the Samnite, the father of that Pontius who defeated the Roman consul at the Fauces Caudinæ ; Archytas the Pythagorean, discoursing against pleasure ; and Plato the contemplative Athenian traveller. The very place where they met,—a point of contact between the old empires of the world, and the rising power destined to break them in pieces,—in itself adds to the interest. Then the characters of the two philosophers who thus met, further arrest our attention :—Archytas, the representative of the old traditionary theological systems now moulded into a scheme of philosophy and an ascetic discipline of life ; and Plato, the accomplished artist-philosopher, who was soon to take up the scheme of Philosophy where the Pythagoreans left it, and consecrate it by the inspirations of his own genius to an eternal empire on the throne of literature :—Archytas, nurtured in the reserve and mysticism of the Pythagorean discipline ; Plato, formed to busy and importunate discussion by the ever-colloquial Socrates,—two philosophers so contrasted with each other in many respects, and yet so concordant in their love of ancient wisdom and indefatigable research after truth.

From the Pythagoreans Plato proceeded to Egypt to converse with the priests of that ancient land, from which Greece had derived her original civilization and science. Since the settlement of the Greek colony in Egypt by Psammetichus,[2] there had existed a regular channel of intercourse between Greece and Egypt, and accurate means of information to the Greeks respecting Egypt. The history of Herodotus must in itself have awakened the curiosity of those who had any taste for such inquiries, to know still more of a people from whom Greece had already learned so much, and from whom evidently so much was to be learned ; and must have stimulated them to avail themselves of the existing facilities of gratifying that taste. To

[1] *De Senect.* c. 12. Cicero says Plato was at Tarentum in the consulship of L. Camillus and Appius Claudius. There appears some inaccuracy in the tradition, but we may believe its substantial truth.

[2] About B. C. 650. Herodot. *Euterp.* 154.

Plato, indeed, if, according to Herodotus, the Greeks derived the notion of the immortality of the soul from the Egyptians, who were the first, he thinks, to teach it in connection with that of the transmigration of souls,[1] a visit to Egypt must have been most attractive. Herodotus has given a most instructive and interesting view of the impression which such a visit produced on his mind. What an animated picture must the still more philosophical mind of Plato have presented, of the result of his conversation with the priests of Egypt. Though the account of his having had the mysterious wisdom of the inscriptions on the Hermetic Columns unfolded to him by the priests, and of his being instructed in magic,[2] on this occasion, seems without sufficient authority, there are evident traces of information collected in Egypt, throughout his writings, and, so far, it cannot be doubted, that this visit was not without its influence on the character of his philosophy.

Indeed it has been further asserted, that, whilst in Egypt, he had access to an existing Greek version of the Old Testament, and that to this circumstance we must attribute that purer and more elevated theology which his works exhibit, in comparison with those of other heathen philosophers. A strange oversight in chronology has also attributed to him a personal intercourse with the prophet Jeremiah.[3] These statements are obviously mere suppositions, by which Christians, over-zealous for Plato's philosophy, or rather for that form of it, which it had assumed in the school of Alexandria, vindicated their admiration of it, whilst they asserted also the originality and supremacy of Scripture truth. At the same time, it is indisputable that Judaism diffused much religious and moral truth beyond its own pale; and that not only Plato, but the Egyptian priests, his instructors,

[1] Herodot. *Euterp.* 123.

[2] Pliny says that Plato went to Egypt for the purpose of learning magic. *Hist. Nat.* xxxi. c. 1.

[3] Quapropter in illa peregrinatione sua, Plato, nec Hieremiam videre potuit tanto ante defunctum, nec easdem scripturas legere, quæ nondum fuerant in Græcam linguam translatæ. (Augustin. *De Civ. Dei*, viii. 11.) Clement of Alexandria, however, asserts that there existed a version of the Law prior to that of the Septuagint. *Strom.* i.; Euseb. *Præp. Evan.* ix. 6.

unconsciously derived much from the inspired sources, in collecting, under the form of fable, or allegory, or maxim, portions of truth which the sacred oracles had scattered around them in their transmission.[1]

Having traversed Egypt, where he is said to have assumed the disguise of an olive-merchant, in order to journey more securely in a country not naturally tolerant of strangers, he purposed penetrating into Persia and India. But the disturbed state of those parts of Asia prevented his fulfilling his intentions. He returned accordingly to Magna Græcia, once more to enjoy the society of the Pythagoreans. At length, having spent several years in these travels, he turned his steps homeward. We have no means of ascertaining the exact time which these travels occupied, or at what period of his life precisely he undertook the office of teacher of Philosophy at Athens. From the Epistle addressed to the friends of Dion, it appears that he was scarcely forty years of age when he first went to Syracuse;[2] so that probably not more than about ten years were taken up in his wanderings.

The visit to Sicily here referred to, had for its object to explore the crater of Mount Ætna, and therefore properly belongs to that part of his history which we have just been tracing. But it had also very important bearings upon the future fortunes, both of himself and many others; so important, indeed that Plutarch, following out a remark which occurs in the supposed Epistles of Plato, attributes it to a providential arrangement, in order to the restoration of liberty to the Syracusans.[3] For it was at this time that he became acquainted with the elder Dionysius, Tyrant of Syracuse, and Dion, whose sister Dionysius had married. He reclaimed Dion, who was then quite a youth from a life of vicious indulgence, to habits of sobriety, and inspired him with an ardent love of Philosophy Thus began an

[1] Hence it was said by Numenius the Pythagorean, *τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων, ἢ Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων*, "What is Plato, but Moses speaking in Attic idiom."

[2] B. C. 389. *Ep.* vii. p. 93, ed. Bip.

[3] Plutarch in *Dion.* Op. vol. v. p. 262, ed. Reiske.

intimate friendship between the philosopher and Dion, which subsisted unimpaired until the tragical death of the latter.

Through the influence of Dion, the Tyrant Dionysius, who was himself a literary man and a patron of literature, was induced to receive Plato into the circle of his court. The result, however, whether it was owing to the jealousy of other philosophers who were then at the court of Syracuse, or to an excess of freedom of speech in Plato, and an ebullition of temper and disappointed literary vanity on the part of Dionysius, was unfortunate. Dionysius was affronted at some words that passed at an interview with him, and was only prevented by the interposition of Dion from slaying the philosopher in a moment of exasperation. But still he did not remit his displeasure; for on suffering him to depart, he instructed the Lacedæmonian ambassador, Pollis, in whose vessel he was to be conveyed from Sicily, either to slay him on the voyage or to sell him as a slave; observing sarcastically, "that being a just man, he would be equally happy though reduced to slavery." Pollis is said to have so far lent himself to this cruel treachery, that he actually caused the philosopher to be sold as a slave, by landing him at Ægina at a time when a decree was in force there, sentencing to death every Athenian who should set foot in the island. From this shameful indignity, however, Plato was immediately relieved by the generous kindness of Anniceris, a philosopher of Cyrene, who happened to be at Ægina at the time, and paid the twenty minæ, the price of his redemption. And such, it is added, was the noble concern which Anniceris felt for him, that he could not be prevailed on to receive back the money from the friends of Plato at Athens, but refused it, saying "that they were not the only persons interested in the welfare of Plato."[1]

The story is related with circumstantial particularity, and so far bears the aspect of truth. Still it has been questioned, as inconsistent with the character of Dionysius, who, though despotic in the power which he possessed, and often cruel in his use of it, was a man of education and courtesy, and the patron

[1] Laert. in *Vit. Plat.*

of literary men. And the treachery of Pollis, as thus exhibited, has been regarded as altogether unlikely in the high-minded Spartan. Nor again do we find any allusion in the writings of the philosopher himself to so affecting an incident in his life. The story may be thought still more improbable, if the account be true that Dionysius presented him with a considerable sum of money, with which he was enabled, during his residence in Sicily, to purchase a treasure inestimable to him, the books of Philolaus the Pythagorean. These arguments, however, may be pressed too far. Individuals possessed of absolute power have often been found capable of deeds from which their own feelings, apart from that great temptation, would have shrunk: and sudden and most unreasonable and absurd outbreaks of violence, inconsistent with their general behaviour, are characteristics of such power. And as for the Lacedæmonians, we know that at the height of their civilization they were guilty of the acts of barbarians. Their extreme cruelty to the poor debased Helots is well known; and in the Peloponnesian war they slaughtered indiscriminately all whom they met with at sea, even neutrals, and persons inoffensively engaged in the business of commerce.[1] Further, there are repeated instances of Greeks selling as slaves the free inhabitants of captured cities in their wars with each other. There is no reason, at any rate, to question the general truth of the story, whatever may be thought of the particulars. There can be little doubt that the visit of Plato at Syracuse ended unsatisfactorily; that offence arose between the Tyrant and himself; that he was treated with great indignity, and returned to Athens in disgust.[2]

From this time we may contemplate him as pursuing, with

[1] Thucyd. iv. 80. *Ibid.* ii. 67. δικαιοῦντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀμύνεσθαι οἵσπερ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπῆρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλεόντας ἀποκτείναντες, καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅσους λαβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ξυμπολεμοῦντας, καὶ τοὺς μηδὲ μεθ' ἑτέρων.

[2] The conduct of Dionysius towards Philoxenus, the dithyrambic poet, for freely giving his opinion on the bad poetry of Dionysius, was very similar. See Diodorus Siculus, xv. 6, who also, in xv. 7, confirms the account of this treatment of Plato.

little interruption, the course of philosophical labour for which his whole previous life had prepared him. The term "Academy" is now familiar to every one as synonymous with a place of learning. How strongly does this mark the celebrity of a school, which has thus immortalized in vernacular language the grove of the hero Academus or Hecademus, the ground on which Plato walked, and, as he walked, imparted to the throng around him the riches of his genius, and taste and learning! Here, in the most beautiful suburb of Athens, the Ceramicus, Plato possessed a small patrimony, a garden, where he fixed his abode, in the immediate vicinity of the grove, his daily resort. Here, amongst the tall plane-trees which shaded the walks, were assembled, year after year, the master-spirits of the age, whether in pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, or for counsel in the direction of public or private life,—the philosopher, the statesman, and the man of the world,—to converse with the Athenian sage, and imbibe the wisdom which fell from his lips. What an interesting assemblage must that have been which comprised in it, amongst other influential persons, and young men who afterwards rose to importance in their respective states, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Dion! At once you might see in the throng the young and the gay by the side of the old and the sedate; the stranger from some distant town of Asia Minor, or Thrace, or Magna Græcia, and the citizen of Athens; the Tyrant of some little state learning theories of government and laws from the philosopher of the Republic; and the haughty Lacedæmonian paying deference to the superior wisdom of an individual of a country which his own had humbled in arms.[1] Nor was the audience exclusively of the male sex. The wives and daughters of Athenian citizens, indeed, were not in that assembly; for custom excluded these. But the accomplished courtezan, whom the unnatural exclusion of the chaste

[1] In the Dialogue "on Laws," it is the Athenian stranger who instructs the Lacedæmonian and Cretan in the theory of legislation. Here we have probably a representation of what actually was seen in the Academia itself. Socrates is away; Plato speaks; Cretans and Lacedæmonians, among others, are the auditors.

matron and daughters of a family from the social circle beyond their own homes, had raised to importance in Grecian society, was there, seeking the improvement of her mind by joining in the discussions and listening to the instructions of the philosopher, and thus qualifying herself for that part which she had to sustain as an intimate with the men of the highest rank and most intellectual cultivation in Greece. As Aspasia, so celebrated in History, on account of her intimacy with Pericles at the height of his power, and her influence with that great man, was herself a disciple of Socrates; so in Plato's own school of the Academia were found, with others, probably, of less name, of the same class, the Mantinean Lasthenea, and Axiothea of Phlius.

Socrates attracted persons around him from all parts of the Grecian world, by the charm of his engaging conversation, and thus became in himself a great object of interest.[1] Plato made Athens itself also, even more than his own person, an object of interest to the civilized world of his day; converting it from being only the centre of political intrigue and agitation to the cities of Greece, into a common university, and common home for all. Compare what was said of Athens about half a century before, "that it was the nature of Athenians neither to keep quiet themselves, nor to suffer other people to do so,"[2] and its well-known character at that time of a "tyrant state," with the respect which Plato had won for it, when it became, not through the versatility of its citizens, and its inexhaustible resources, but by a truer title, through the lessons of virtue and wisdom, which it freely imparted to all, pre-eminently the School of Greece;—and what an exalted opinion does the change now operated give us of the influence of Plato!

Isocrates had, at the same time, his school of Rhetoric overflowing with pupils. Aristippus, also trained in the school of Socrates, was inculcating his scheme of ethics, which maintained

[1] During the representation of "the Clouds," he stood up in a conspicuous part of the theatre to gratify the curiosity of the audience, many of them strangers visiting Athens at the festival, to see the philosopher who had attracted so much notice as to be personated on the stage. Ælian. *Var. Hist.* ii. 13.

[2] Thucyd. i. 70.

the theory of Pleasure as the Chief Good. But esteemed as Isocrates was for the gentleness of his life, and his skill as a master of Rhetoric ; and acceptable as the doctrines of Aristippus must naturally have been to a corrupt society ; neither of these great names sufficed to obscure the greater name of Plato, or could rival the pretensions of the Academia to be the great school of philosophy, and literature, and civilization.

A mind so intensely occupied as that of Plato, would scarcely find leisure for taking part in the political affairs of his country. The profession of Philosophy was not as yet, indeed, become entirely distinct ; but the teaching of Socrates had greatly tended to render it so. His rigorous method of interrogation which called forth the latent difficulties on other subjects, could not but produce great distrust in those who laid themselves fully open to it, as to their own ability to manage the complex matters of public concern, as well as impress them with despair of success in that walk of exertion. Socrates himself avoided as far as possible all interference in the politics of Athens. Plato strictly followed his example. Accordingly, we find, in several places of his writings, a contrast drawn between the philosopher and the man of public life ; and an indirect apology for himself, as one who kept aloof from the public assemblies and the courts.[1] He betrays, indeed, strong disgust, not unmixed with contemptuous feeling, at the state of misrule into which the democracy of Athens had degenerated in his day, and he was evidently glad to avail himself of the plea of Philosophy, to absent himself from scenes so uncongenial to his taste. Doubtless, independently of any political bias, he was glad to escape from the sycophancy and tumult of the popular assemblies at Athens, and to enjoy the calm shades of his beloved retreat. This was the sphere of action for which nature and his whole previous life had peculiarly fitted him. Here he could effectually diffuse the salutary influence of his philosophy, in counteracting, in some measure at least, the selfishness of the

[1] *Phædo*, p. 145 ; *Theæt.* p. 115, et seq. ; *Gorg.* p. 82, et seq. ; *Repub.* vi. p. 79 ; *Epist.* vii. ed. Bip.

world. Here he could maintain an undisputed supremacy over minds, which (such was the impatience of all authority in those times) no mere external power could have controlled, or so entirely subjected to the direction of an individual.

Through the influence, however, of his Pythagorean friends, with whom he appears to have held constant intercourse, Plato was prevailed upon, at the age of sixty-five years, to quit the retirement of his garden for a time, and pay a second visit to Sicily.[1] It was the policy, indeed, of the Pythagoreans, like that of the Jesuits in modern times, to keep up an active intercourse with society, whilst in their internal system they cultivated philosophy with the ardour of exclusive devotees. Socrates wished to govern the conduct of men by an appeal to their reason; convincing them of their errors and follies, and leading them to seek the means of informing themselves aright. The Pythagoreans, like the Jesuits, aspired to carry out their views by a moral hold over men in society; by taking part, accordingly, in the management of states, and by a secret influence over those in power. The accession of the younger Dionysius to the throne of Syracuse, and the opening presented for producing an effect on him through Plato's influence with Dion, the next in power to the Tyrant, were opportunities which would not be lost by their watchful zeal. Such seems, if we may proceed on the authority of the Epistles, to have been the occasion of this invitation of Plato to Syracuse. We see, at the same time, that there was a struggle of factions at Syracuse at this period. The party opposed to Dion, in order to counteract his influence, obtained the recall of Philistus, a man distinguished alike as a statesman, a commander, and an historian,[2] and a strenuous supporter of

[1] Diogenes Laertius says, he went to Sicily on this occasion, in order to found a city according to the principles of his Republic, but that Dionysius failed in his promise of land and men for the purpose. But others, he adds, stated that the object of his visit was the liberation of the island from tyranny. In *Vit. Plat.*

[2] Cicero speaks of Philistus as a writer in the following manner: Philistum doctum hominem et diligentem. (*De Divin.* i. 20.) Catonem cum Philisto et Thucydide comparares? . . . quos enim ne e Græcis quidem quisquam imitari potest. (*De Clar. Orat.* c. 85, Op. Tom. i. p. 480, ed Olivet, 1758.)

the existing government, but then in banishment through the ingratitude and caprice of the elder Dionysius. The result was, that though the reception of Plato at Syracuse was most flattering, for he was welcomed with the royal pomp of a decorated chariot, and the celebration of a public sacrifice, his mission was, after all, utterly fruitless.

At first everything seemed prosperous. The change wrought in the manners of the court is described as marvellous. Philosophy became the fashion; and the very palace was filled with the dust stirred up by the number of geometricians. Even the expulsion of Dion, which soon followed, through the successful intrigues of his enemies, did not at once estrange Dionysius from the philosopher. He would not, indeed, allow Plato to leave Sicily with Dion: but, using a gentle constraint over him, detained him within the precincts of the citadel; shewing him at the same time all respect, and hoping at last, as it seems, to bring him over to his interest. At length the attention of Dionysius was called to preparations for war; and Plato, released from his embarrassing situation, was enabled to return to Athens.

He was not, however, deterred from once more making the trial, how far an impression could be made on the mind of Dionysius, and the restoration of Dion to his country effected; and, as on the former occasion, so now, he was chiefly induced to undertake the enterprise, by the earnest intercession of his Pythagorean friends. Dion himself was living at Athens, waiting the opportunity of returning to his country; and his relatives at Syracuse sent letters to Plato, urging him to use his exertions in behalf of Dion. Even Dionysius himself wrote a letter to him, entreating him to come, and promising satisfaction at the same time in regard to Dion. He also sent a trireme for him, with Archidemus, a disciple of Archytas, and others with whom the philosopher was acquainted, to render the voyage more agreeable to him.[1] For a while Plato persisted in declining the invitation, pleading his advanced age, for he was now sixty-eight years old;[2] but at length he gave way to these united solicitations.

[1] Plat. *Epist.* vii. p. 124.

[2] B. C. 361.

The second Dionysius, indeed, like his father, was fond of drawing around him men of eminence for literature and philosophy. At this time, amongst others of the same class at his court, were the philosophers Diogenes, Æschines, Aristippus, and some Pythagoreans. Plato might have not unreasonably hoped, therefore, that a mind delighting in such society, or at least ambitious of the reputation of being a patron of literature, might yet be influenced to sound philosophy. He was, besides, desirous of making an attempt to produce a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dion. Thus did he pass the Straits of Sicily a third time, to be a third time disappointed in the object of his voyage. Though he was welcomed, as before, with great splendour and demonstrations of respect, not only were his endeavours for the restoration of Dion unsuccessful, but he incensed the tyrant by venturing to intercede in behalf of Heraclides, a member of the liberal party at Syracuse, who was under suspicion of having tampered with the mercenaries. Still Dionysius was desirous of retaining the friendship of the philosopher. Plato was removed, indeed, from the garden in which he lived, under the pretence of a sacrifice about to be performed there by women, and placed in the quarter of the mercenaries. Such a situation was most unpleasant to him; as he could not but feel himself in danger amongst that lawless class, who naturally disliked him, as an enemy of the power which gave them employment and pay.[1] But this indignity was probably more the effect of the hostility of the opposite party against Dion, than an act of the weak Tyrant himself. Plato, in his perplexity, applied to Archytas and the Pythagoreans at Tarentum, to extricate him from these difficult circumstances. At their instance, accordingly, Dionysius consented to the departure of Plato, and dismissed him with kindness, furnishing him with supplies for his voyage.

Thus did Plato once more return to Athens, heartily disgusted with the untoward result of his visits to Sicily.[2] Though the friend of Dion, the head of one great party at Syracuse, he had

[1] Plutarch. in *Dion.*

[2] Μεμισηκὼς τὴν περὶ Σικελίαν πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν. (Plato, *Ep.* vii. 149, Bip. ed.)

acted in Sicily consistently with his conduct at Athens, in not taking any active part in political affairs. Even Dionysius himself seems, throughout his conduct towards him, to have been jealous rather of his personal regard for Dion, than suspicious of any exertion on his part in the cause of Dion against him, and to have sought to detain him at Syracuse, not out of fear or ill will, but for the honour of the presence of the philosopher at his court. This is further evinced by the subsequent conduct of Plato. For, in the expedition which Dion planned and executed against Dionysius, he took no part; making answer to the invitation to join in it, "that if invited to assist in doing any good, he would readily concur; but as for doing evil to any one, they must invite others, not him."[1]

The remaining years of his life were gently worn away amidst the labours of the Academia. These labours were unintermitted to the very close of a long life; for he died, according to Cicero's account, in the act of writing; his death happening on the day in which he completed his eighty-first year. "Such," adds Cicero, "was the placid and gentle old age of a life spent in quietness, and purity, and elegance."[2] Another account, however, of his death, states that he died during his presence at a marriage-feast.[3] And another account besides (evidently the invention of some enemy to his fame), attributes his death to a loathsome disease.[4] On his first residence in the garden of the Academia, his health had been impaired by a lingering fever, in consequence of the marshiness of the ground. He was urged to remove his residence to the Lyceum, the grove afterwards frequented by the school of Aristotle; but such was his attachment to the place, that he preferred it, he said, even to the proverbial salubrity of Mount Athos; and he continued struggling against the disorder for eighteen months, until at length his constitution successfully resisted it.[5] Adopting habits of strict temperance, he thus preserved his health during the remainder of his life,

[1] *Ep.* p. 149. [2] Diog. Laert. in *Vit.* after Hermippus. [3] *De Senect.* c. 5. [4] Diog. Laert. in *Vit.* [5] Ælian.

amidst the harassings of foreign travel, and the undermining assiduities of days and nights of study.

Plato was never married. He had two brothers, Glauco and Adimantus, and a sister, Potona, whose son, Speusippus, he appears to have regarded with peculiar affection and interest, as the destined successor to his school of Philosophy. He inherited a very small patrimony, and he died poor, leaving but three minæ of silver, two pieces of land, and four slaves, and a few articles of gold and silver, to the young Adimantus, the son, or grandson, as it would seem, of his brother of that name.[1]

In person he is described as graceful in his youth, and if the etymology of his name be correct, as remarkable for the manly frame of his body.[2] One circumstance, however, is mentioned, which detracts in some measure from his bodily accomplishments; the imperfection of his voice, which has been characterized as wanting in strength of tone.[3]

In regard to moral qualities, he was distinguished by the gravity, and modesty, and gentleness of his demeanour. He had never been observed from his youth to indulge in excessive laughter.[4] Several anecdotes are told of his self-command under provocation, as, for example, his declining to inflict the due punishment on a slave when he found himself under the excitement of anger.[5] A pleasing instance is given of his amiableness and modesty, at a time when his fame was at its height. Some strangers, into whose company he had been thrown at Olympia, coming afterwards to Athens, were received by him there with the greatest courtesy. All the while, however, they were ignorant who their host was. They merely knew that his name was Plato. On their requesting him to conduct them to the Academia, and shew them his namesake, the associate of Socrates,

[1] Diog. Laert. in *Vit.*; Aul. Gell. *Noc. Att.* iii. 18.

[2] Erat quidem corpus validum ac forte sortitus, et illi nomen latitudo pectoris fecerat. (Seneca, *Epist.* 58.)

[3] Ἰσχνόφωνος. Diog. Laert. in *Vit.*

[4] Diog. Laert. in *Vit.* after Heraclides.

[5] Diog. Laert. in *Vit.* Seneca *De Ira.* The anecdotes themselves can hardly be regarded as original. Similar stories are told of others, as of Archytas. Ex quo illud laudatur Archytæ; qui cum villico factus esset iratior, "Quo te modo, inquit, accepissem, nisi iratus essem?" (Cicero, *Tusc. Qu.* iv. 36.)

they were astonished to find, by his smile and avowal of himself, that they had experienced so much unpretending kindness from the great philosopher himself.[1] Again, being asked by some one if there would be any saying recorded of him, he answered with the like modesty, "One must first obtain a name, and then there will be several."[2]

The gravity of his manner was by some interpreted as severity and gloom. The comic poet Amphis complained of him, that "he knew nothing but to look sad, and solemnly raise the brow." Aristippus charged him with arrogance. It is no wonder, indeed, that, in contrast with the coarse freedom of Diogenes, and the excessive affability of Aristippus, he should appear haughty and reserved. But that this character did not really belong to him, we may judge from the social humour which mingles even with the sarcastic touches of his Dialogues, and from the anxiety which he shewed to correct such a disposition as a fault in Dion. His favourite pupil Speusippus was distinguished by the opposite quality of a lively temper; and to his especial direction we find Plato sending Dion, that he might learn, by the conversation and example of Speusippus, a more conciliatory and agreeable mode of address.

The instance given of his vanity in putting himself forward at the death of Socrates, as competent to retrieve the great loss in his own person alone, bears evident marks of a calumny. It may be so far true, as it represents a desire upon his part to console his brother disciples under their common affliction. But as an evidence of an assumption of superiority over them at such a moment, it accords little with that feeling of dismay for themselves, under which he, in common with the rest, fled to Megara as an asylum; or with his indisputable affection for the person of Socrates, and veneration for his wisdom and talents.

Again, the strictness of Plato's philosophical profession, amidst the general dissoluteness of manners at Athens, was construed by some who had an envious eye on his reputation, as only an affected austerity. It was complained of him, that

[1] Ælian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 9. [2] Diog. Laert. in *Vit.* p. 23, Bip.

his life did not answer to the high requisitions of his moral teaching.[1] Two of his brother disciples in the school of Socrates, Antisthenes and Aristippus, imputed to him the grossest licentiousness. The former taking offence at Plato for objecting to a treatise, which he proposed to read, *On the Impossibility of Contradiction*, vented his spleen in a most abusive dialogue, which he entitled "Satho," intending at once by that term a satirical play on the name, and a stigma on the character of the philosopher. These calumnies are in some measure supported by the tenor of certain epigrams attributed to Plato, and by passages of his Dialogues, which display a license of impure allusion, shocking to the feelings of the reader, in these days at least. His calumniators then found occasion for their scandal, in observing amongst those by whom he was surrounded, the young and the handsome. But though we may see much to reprobate in such passages, and painful as the impression is which they leave on the mind, as evidences of the deep corruption of human nature, we are not warranted in regarding them as conclusive of corresponding immorality of conduct in a writer of his age and country. They would shew, indeed, that the writer has not escaped the contagion of the vicious atmosphere which he breathed; and they are, of course, a great drawback in our estimate of his sentiments and character. But we ought to set off against them the high tone of religious and moral feeling which is the general characteristic of his philosophy; the beacon which it holds up to warn men of the debasing allurements of pleasure, and of the misery consequent on the indulgence of passion; and its glowing exhortations to seek for true happiness, not in externals, or by aiming at a mere human standard of virtue, but by internal purification, and by imitations of the perfections of the Deity.

Much has been said on the absence of any reference to

[1] Seneca *De Vit. Beat.* c. 18. "Aliter, inquit, loqueris; aliter vivis." Hoc, malignissima capita, et optimo cuique inimicissima, Platoni objectum est, objectum Epicuro, objectum Zenoni. Omnes enim isti dicebant, non quemadmodum ipsi viverent, sed quemadmodum vivendum esset.

Xenophon in the Dialogues of Plato. Xenophon, in his *Memorabilia*, has spoken of Plato, and alluded to the affection with which Plato was regarded by Socrates.[1] But Plato has not availed himself of any opportunity of paying the like compliment to Xenophon. This silence cannot, perhaps, be entirely accounted for, without supposing that there was a feeling of literary jealousy on the part of Plato. But there are some considerations which may partly account for Xenophon's not appearing as an interlocutor in the Dialogues. Xenophon, though a man of philosophical mind, evidently attended the teaching of Socrates, not to learn the art of disputation, or for the indulgence of a speculative curiosity. When he philosophized, it was as a man of the world, acquainting himself with human nature, with the manners and opinions of men, in order to his own conduct in life. He was not one of those eager and flippant sciolists, whom Plato takes delight in submitting as apt experiments to the interrogatories of Socrates. Nor was he, again, a devotee of science, like the young and wise Theætetus, the interesting person who gives occasion to the dialogue of that name, and whom in some points he resembled. He would not therefore naturally be selected by Plato, in order to the carrying on of discussions intended for the development of his philosophy. It is remarkable, that Plato has only in two places even alluded to himself; in the *Phædo*, to explain his absence from the death-scene in the prison;[2] and in the *Apologia*, as amongst those present at the trial of Socrates, and capable of giving evidence as to the nature of those instructions which Socrates addressed to the young.[3]

Such was the character of this eminent man. His distinguished career exposed him to the shafts of envy and detraction; and the high aspirings of his mind were clogged and weighed down by that corrupt heathenism with which he was surrounded. Still his reputation for wisdom and virtue stands above all these attacks and circumstances of disparagement. The more we converse with him in his writings, the more we are charmed by the deep feeling of natural piety which pervades his philosophy as

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iii. 6. [2] *Phædo*, § 6. [3] *Apol.* p. 78, Bip. ed.

its master-thought, and by the sound practical wisdom which shines forth from them as the real character of the man, reclaiming and subduing the wild aberrations of his speculative fancy.

His remains were buried in the place which he had ennobled whilst living. Nor were they unattended by the customary tributes of honour and affection. Aristotle, who had been his constant disciple during the last twenty years preceding his death, displayed his veneration for his preceptor by consecrating an altar to him. A festival, called after him Platonea, was instituted in honour of him, and celebrated annually by his disciples. A statue, dedicated to the Muses, was afterwards erected in the Academia by Mithridates the Persian. He had not, indeed, been dead but a very few years, when the great celebrity of his name called forth from his nephew and successor, Speusippus, an express work in his praise. Seneca further tells us of a singular mark of honour which was paid to him on the very day of his decease. There were some Magi, he relates, at Athens at the time, who, struck by the singular circumstance of his having exactly completed the perfect number of nine times nine years, performed a sacrifice to him, esteeming him on that account to have been more than man.[1] The story is evidently the invention of his later admirers. It is referred to here, as a testimony of the enthusiastic admiration with which his name has been ever attended. To the same feeling must be ascribed the fiction of the discovery of his body in the time of Constantine the Great, with a golden tablet on the breast, recording his prediction of the birth of Christ, and his own belief in the Saviour to come.[2]

[1] Senec. *Ep.* lviii. 28. [2] Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Phil.* tom. i. p. 654.

PLATO'S WRITINGS AND PHILOSOPHY.

The writings of Plato obtained an early popularity. Already, during his lifetime, copies of them appear to have been circulated. An iambic line, λόγοισιν Ἑρμόδωρος ἐμπορεύεται, proverbially applied, long after the time of Plato, to those who made a traffic of the writings of others,[1] shews that there was an immediate demand for them in Greece. The Hermodorus here referred to, was one of his hearers, who is said to have sold the writings of the philosopher in Sicily for his own profit. The fact of their early circulation is further evidenced, if it be true, as has been stated, that complaints were made by some of the persons whose names appear in the Dialogues, and even by Socrates himself, of the manner in which they had been represented in them by Plato.[2] It is very probable, also, that during the long time in which he was publicly teaching at Athens, and, doubtless, recurring frequently to the same topics of discussion, considerable portions of what he delivered orally, were treasured up in the memory of some who heard them, and afterwards written down, and thus published to the world without having received the finishing touches of the author's hand. The practice, indeed, of thus carrying off the oral lessons of the philosopher is alluded to by Plato himself in passages of his writings, as in the *Phædo*, and *Theætetus*, and *Parmenides;* where the dialogue is related by some one remembering what has passed in conversation on a former occasion. This circumstance may, at once, account for the comparative inferiority of some of the Dialogues in point of execution, and for the fact that some have been passed under his name which are not really his; whilst we have, at the same time, a very considerable collection of writings authenticated by testimonies descending from his own times.

[1] Dic mihi, placetne tibi, primum, cedere injussu meo? Hoc ne Hermodorus quidem faciebat, is qui Platonis libros solitus est divulgare; ex quo λόγοισιν Ἑρμόδωρος. Cicer. *Ep. ad. Att.* xiii. 21.

[2] Athenæus, xi. 113.

It is by no means necessary for our purpose here (which is to obtain a just general view of the character of the philosopher and his writings), to enter into the criticisms by which doubts have been thrown on particular Dialogues, and on different dialogues by different critics, out of the number commonly included amongst the genuine works of Plato. We may only remark, that these doubts do not rest on external testimony, but are drawn from considerations of the internal character of particular writings, which have been judged inferior to the rest in matter and execution. Nor is it necessary that we should discuss the various theories proposed for connecting the several Dialogues, and tracing in them the gradual formation and development of the philosophical system of the author. This inquiry certainly has its interest; and could we arrive at any clear results in the prosecution of it, it would be valuable, for the light which it would throw on the interpretation of the philosophy of Plato. But though we can discover a connection between several of the Dialogues, like that of a series of discussions on the same subject, it is not possible to decide on the order in which the points discussed presented themselves to the philosopher's mind, or which we are to regard as the more mature expression of his doctrines. This inquiry further demands a decision of the agitated question concerning the double teaching practised in the ancient schools, known by the technical division into esoteric and exoteric, or mystic and popular; the former addressed to the mature disciple, the latter to the novice or general hearer. There are undoubtedly marks of a recognition of this distinction throughout the writings of Plato;[1] and it is also probably referred to by Aristotle, when he speaks of the "unwritten doctrines" of Plato.[2] But we cannot practically employ it in determining the relative value of particular discussions or statements in his writings, without involving ourselves in a maze of theoretic disquisition, and ending at last, perhaps, in absolute scepticism respecting his doctrines.

But there is a particular class of writings attributed to him, which would possess a peculiar interest for us, if we could

[1] *Conviv.* p. 245. [2] Aristot. *Phys.* iv. 2. τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν.

establish their genuineness; respecting which, however, the severe verdict of modern criticism compels us to hesitate in pronouncing on their genuineness. We mean what are commonly published in the editions of his works as the Epistles of Plato. By some the question has been regarded as settled beyond controversy, against their reception.[1] The style of their composition has been judged to be quite below the character of Plato's mind. The apologetic tone of the chief part of them has also been considered as evidence of their having proceeded from friends or disciples of Plato, vindicating his character from misrepresentations in regard to his intercourse with the court of Syracuse. But though we may allow weight to these considerations, they are not sufficient peremptorily to decide the question against the Epistles; particularly as we have in their favour the authority, not only of Plutarch, who founds much of the narrative in his life of Dion upon them, but of Cicero, referring to them and quoting them expressly as writings of Plato.[2]

Perhaps no philosophical writer has ever received so early and ample a recompense of his labours, not only in the reception and circulation of his writings, but in the still more glorious tribute of the spread of his philosophy, as Plato has received. We have mentioned the ordinary marks of admiration which accompanied him during his life and after his death. A more enduring monument was reserved for him in the foundation of the school of Alexandria, not many years after his voice had ceased to be heard in the groves of the Academia. There, as in a fitting temple, on the confines of the Eastern and Western Worlds, was enshrined the Philosophy that had moulded into one the philosophical systems of the East and the West. And though, in the course of things, the infusion of Eastern Philosophy predominated at Alexandria, it was still under the venerated name of Plato that the new system was taught. The disciples of the Alexandrian school were proud to call themselves

[1] Mitford, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. vi.; Ritter, *Hist. of Anc. Phil.*

[2] Est præclara Epistola Platonis ad Dionis propinquos; in qua scriptum est his fere verbis: "Quo cum venissem, vita illa beata quæ ferebatur," etc. *Tusc. Qu.* v. 35; also *De Offic.* i. 7; and *De Fin.* ii. 14.

Platonists, and to regard themselves as interpreters of the teaching of Plato, whilst they altered and disfigured that teaching. Here, then, was erected the proper monument to his fame. Meanwhile, in the Academia, teachers in regular succession transmitted their inheritance of his name, and by the charm of that, prolonged a feeble existence. For the spirit which had formed and animated the school had fled with him; and the Middle and New Academics only attested, by their lingering decay, the strength of the foundation on which they had been built. How great the influence of Plato was on the philosophy of the Romans, needs not to be told to those who are even slightly acquainted with the philosophical writings of Cicero. And even when Christianity threw into the shade all systems of man's wisdom, the only philosophy which maintained its credit at the first, was that of Plato. Christian teachers were found, not unwilling to own that there was great accordance between his doctrines and the revealed truth. Whilst, on the one hand, there were disciples of the philosopher who claimed for him all that was excellent in the Christian scheme, there were Christians who asserted, that he had learned his superior wisdom from the elder Scriptures. All this shews the hold which his name still retained over the minds of men at this period. The great Father of the Western Church, St. Augustine, avows himself a warm admirer of Plato. He concedes the approximation of the Platonists to the Christian doctrines; affirming that all other philosophers must yield to those who had speculated so justly as they had respecting the Chief Good.[1] Afterwards, indeed, we find Aristotle supplanting Plato in favour with the Christian controversialist. The struggle had been for some time between their respective advocates, which of them should obtain the lead in the Christian schools. But Plato, on the whole, had the mastery, though the result of the struggle was an eclectic system, in which the principal differences of the two philosophers were studiously recon-

[1] Augustin. *De Civit. Dei*, viii. Chapter after chapter is taken up in Eusebius' *Præparatio Evangelica*, in shewing the agreement of Plato with the Scriptures.

ciled. In fact, we may consider Platonism as in the ascendancy in the Christian Schools, until the period of Scholasticism, that is, until the twelfth and the following centuries, when the discipline of argumentation was at its height in the Church, and with it the study of Aristotle's Philosophy. Even then the theories of Plato maintained their ground. The speculations pursued by members of the Church continued to be for the most part Platonic in their principles, though they were conducted and modified by the dialectical method of Aristotle.

What, then, was the character of this philosophy, it will naturally be asked, which both rendered it so attractive to those amongst whom it arose, and also secured for it such an immortality?

It is a very remarkable circumstance that, as far as we know, Plato should have escaped all censure at Athens on account of his philosophy, when other philosophers, who, like him, became centres of popular attraction, were the objects of extreme persecution. It is the more remarkable, as not only his master experienced such persecution, but his immediate disciple, Aristotle, was forced to fly from Athens to escape the storm with which he was threatened. Coming between these two, and enjoying, at the height of his popularity, an influence perhaps surpassing that of either, he yet was suffered to wear out his life unmolested, amidst the tranquil labours of his school.

The only evidence to the contrary of this is an unauthenticated anecdote, told by Laertius, of Plato's having accompanied Chabrias to the citadel of Athens, and shewn his zeal in support of that general, under the capital charge brought against him. Upon this occasion, it is said, Crobylus the sycophant, meeting him, observed, "Are you coming to plead for another, as ignorant that the hemlock of Socrates awaits you too?" to which he replied, "When I served my country in the field I underwent dangers, and now in the cause of duty I undergo them for a friend."[1]

But though we may refuse to believe this story, it is quite evident, that the condition of Philosophy at Athens was not

[1] Diog. Laert. *in Vita Plat.* 18.

without its obloquy and danger even in its most flourishing times under Plato. We may gather from many passages of the writings of Plato, that the cause of Philosophy still needed defence, and that great caution was required on the part of those who publicly professed the study of it. A re-action indeed had taken place in favour of philosophers, in consequence of the severity with which Socrates had been treated; and the assailants of Socrates suffered retribution from the popular feeling. Still there was in the mass of the Athenian people a strong antipathy to Philosophy, from their ignorance of its real nature. They had been taught to regard philosophers as idle and mischievous drivellers, ever prosing about nature and the phenomena of the heavens, and as contemners of the gods.[1] They had seen also how some of those to whom Athens owed her greatest calamities, had been amongst the students of philosophy. Alcibiades, for example, had been a hearer of Socrates; one of singular natural endowments, in the formation of whose mind Socrates had taken especial pains, and who might therefore be regarded as the test of what Philosophy could effect. The people had loved him as their spoiled child, in spite of all his follies; but they had felt also the mischief and misery of his wild career of ambition; and they threw the blame on his instructors, and the system in which he had been trained. Again, a great prejudice had been excited in the public mind against Philosophy in general, from the many low and mercenary professors of it with which Greece abounded; minute Philosophers, patronized by the public for their temporary services in teaching the arts of public life, but who produced ignominy and disgust to the true profession by their unworthy monopoly of its name. Add to this, that popular opinion had been corrupted by the false teaching, which had been so long and extensively at work throughout Greece. Erroneous principles of judgment and conduct had taken root in the public mind; or, to describe the case more correctly, all principles were unsettled; and the state

[1] Οὔκουν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ, καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. *Phædo*, Op. vol. i. p. 159, ed. Bip.; *Polit.* vol. vi. p. 92, *et alib.*

of the public mind was one of inward anarchy, and insubordination. A Philosopher, therefore, especially in questions of Religion and Morality relating to the conduct of life, seriously devoted to his profession, and pursuing it with a single eye to the advancement of truth, was necessarily regarded with suspicion and dislike. For it is a natural propensity of the mind to adhere to established opinion, simply because no effort of thought is required, no trouble of self-examination imposed, no censure of self exacted, in leaving things as they are; and there appears difficulty and hazard in a change; and what is inveterate in their own minds, often passes with men for the oldness of truth and nature. A reformer, therefore, is always at first an object of aversion; and no reform is successfully accomplished, until it has worked its way by subduing the prejudices which it has to encounter at the outset, and turning the majority committed against it into a minority, by its gradual advances, like a wave encroaching on the shore on which it has long seemed to beat ineffectually. Not only was the opposition to sound philosophy produced in the minds of the vulgar by this distemper of public opinion; but even the better part of society, the more educated and reflecting members of the community, were infected by it. The majority of these would be deterred from taking up a profession exposing them to so much dislike and risk. Some of them, too, with a view of standing well with the mass of those amongst whom they lived, and promoting their own interest, would avail themselves of the popular clamour against Philosophy, cry down the pursuit of it as innovation and danger, and make it their business to exaggerate, instead of counteracting, vulgar prejudices on the subject.

These obstructions to the teaching of philosophy are pointedly referred to by Plato, as existing in his time, and demanding his attention, in order to the success of that mission of reform which he had undertaken. He treats the vulgar prejudice against philosophy as not altogether unreasonable,[1] in consequence of

[1] Ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει ἀλλ' ὅιαν τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φιλονεικῶν, ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος, καὶ ἀπολυόμενος τὴν τῆς

the perverse opinions which had been popularly inculcated; and endeavours to disarm the public hostility, by alleging the causes of the disrepute into which philosophy had unjustly fallen. Alluding, as it seems, particularly to the instance of Alcibiades, he points out, that it is not philosophy which corrupts the young, but the passions of the young and high-spirited which pervert the means of good to the greatest mischief. None but those of the highest order of talent and natural gifts are fully susceptible of its influence; but then these are the very cases, he observes, which are also capable of the most mischief, through their greater susceptibility of the seductions of the world. There cannot but be objections against Philosophy, he further observes, as long as the mass of mankind is, as it is found, incapable of appreciating real essential good for its own sake; and as long as those of superior nature, who should be its devoted friends, and examples of its influence, are drawn away from it in pursuit of popular opinion. He endeavours accordingly, to evince that there is no just ground for alarm, at least in those days, at the power of Philosophy. It was now deserted and helpless, fallen amongst those who were not its own people. If disgrace now attached to philosophy, it must be imputed to the unworthy connexion into which it had been forced by circumstances. The mean mechanic, "the smith, bald, and little," (such is his illustration of the unhappy condition to which Philosophy had been reduced in those times), who has obtained some money, and has just been released from his bonds, and washed in a bath, having got a new dress has decked himself out as a bridegroom, about to marry the daughter of his master, on account of her poverty and destitution.[1] It was no wonder, therefore, that such spurious fruits, of so unsuitable an alliance, were then seen in the world, and that the few who clung to the true profession were like stran-

φιλομαθείας διαβολὴν, ἐνδεικνύῃ οὓς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, κ. τ. λ. (*Rep.* vi., Op. vol. vii. p. 101, ed. Bip.)

[1] Δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἦν δ'ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριον κτησαμένου χαλκέως, φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου, νεουργὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν; (*Rep.* vi., Op. vol. vi. p. 93.)

gers in the world, living away from public affairs, as unwilling to join in the general iniquity, and unable to resist it effectually by their single strength.[1]

If Plato thought it necessary thus to apologize for the pursuit of philosophy, it is clear that there was yet reason to apprehend an outbreak of violence against its professors. In fact, however, he appears not only to have escaped all such outrage, but, whilst he propagated, by his oral teaching and his writings, a system of doctrines directly contrary to the impure morality and superstition established around him, to have enjoyed an esteem beyond that which any other teacher on the same ground ever obtained.

The explanation of this is in a great measure to be sought in the circumstances under which his philosophy was formed and matured, and to which it was peculiarly adapted.

What Themistocles admitted truly of himself when he answered, that he should not have achieved his glorious deeds if Athens had not been his country, was as truly applied by Plato to himself, when he enumerated amongst his causes of gratitude to the Gods, that he was born an Athenian. For his philosophy was eminently Athenian. Viewed at least as we have it in his writings, it was the expression, by a master-mind, itself imbued with the spirit of the age, but rising above that spirit by its intrinsic superiority and nobleness, of those tendencies of thought and action, which had been working in Greece, and especially at Athens, the centre of Grecian civilization.

The Peloponnesian war terminated with leaving Athens humbled before the confederacy, which the hatred and jealousy of her power had leagued against her. But the loss of her ascendancy in Greece was not the worst evil brought on Athens by the effects of that war. The machinery of faction, by which the war had been principally carried on, produced the most mischievous effects on the character and happiness of the Greeks at large; aggravating the symptoms of evil already existing in

[1] *Rep.* vi. p. 95.

the constitutions of the several states, and, not least, in that of Athens. Not only did the insolence of the Athenian democracy gain strength in the result, and rise beyond all bounds, but the excesses in which party spirit had indulged, drew into prominence the selfishness and ferociousness of a demoralized people. Then might be clearly seen the levity and licentiousness of men, who, living amidst constant hazards, had learnt to regard nothing beyond the enjoyment of the passing hour; the cunning and cruelty engendered by mutual distrust; and the wanton contempt of all law and religion, prompted by the sight of the calamities which the tempests of social life scatter indiscriminately on the good and the evil. The first impulse to this decline appears to have been given by the outbreak of the plague which desolated the city in the second year of that war. For so the great historian describes that dreadful visitation as the first beginning of the increase of lawlessness to the city. And he sums up the account of the evil which had already manifested itself, in saying that, "as for fear of Gods, or law of men, there was none that restrained them."[1] On this stock of corruption, speculative irreligion, and speculative immorality, had grown up as its natural offshoots. Men were found hardening themselves against the reproaches of conscience and the fear of retribution, by arguing against the fundamental truths of religion and morals. In Religion, it was contended that there were no Gods; or that if the existence of a Divine power were conceded, there was no Providence over human affairs; or, lastly, that if there were a Providence, the wrath of the offended Deity was placable by the prayers and sacrifices of the offender. In Morals, the question was debated, whether all was not mere matter of institution and convention, and the device of the weak against the stronger power; and whether right might not change with the opinions of men.

This state of things had fostered a peculiar race of philosophers, familiarly known by the name of the Sophists; a term, not at first implying that disrespect with which it subsequently

[1] Thuc. ii. 53.

marked the ambitious pretensions of the class to which it was attributed, and with which it is now regarded amongst us. Thus, we find Herodotus speaking both of Solon and Pythagoras as Sophists, and even Pindar does not disclaim the title for the poet. Those who obtained celebrity on account of their intellectual ability as instructors and benefactors of the world of their day, appear to have been, at first, distinguished only by the general appellation of σόφοι, the wise, as in the case of "the Seven" so called; men, who were not mere students, but actively employed, if not in legislation, as Solon was, in some other public service. As, however, in the progress of civilization, leisure was afforded to many for devotion to intellectual pursuits for their own sake, and a taste for such pursuits was more widely spread, and they who had taken the lead in cultivating that taste would be looked up to, as authorities and guides for the instruction of others; there would arise, in the course of time, some who would no longer be known, like those of a former age, simply as "the wise," but as professors of that wisdom which was now admired and sought after in the world around them. Henceforward, the term "Sophist," would be the appropriate designation of those who professed wisdom as the pursuit of their lives, denoting not only a student of wisdom but a teacher of it.

Such were those men, so eminent in their day, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos,[1] Hippias of Elis,[2] Gorgias of Leontium, chiefly known as the Rhetorician, and others, men of great ability and various extensive acquirements, and whom we may justly regard, notwithstanding the ridicule and contempt which are thrown on them by the sarcastic irony of Socrates, in the Dialogues of Plato, as useful in their generation; so far as they excited or sustained attention among their contemporaries to the need of men-

[1] Author of the well-known "Choice of Hercules," given by Xenophon, *Mem.* ii. c. 1.

[2] Hippias of Elis appears to have surpassed all in vanity and ostentation. He boasted a skill in every kind of composition in prose and verse, and in various arts; making a display of himself at the Olympic festival, on some occasion, in a splendid vestment, and which, as well as his shoes and the ring on his finger, with the device engraved on it, he asserted, were all the workmanship of his own hands. He has the merit of having invented a system of mnemonics. Plato *Hippias*, Op. vol. iii. p. 208.

tal and moral improvement, and thus, unconsciously, preparing the way for the wiser teaching of their great antagonist, Socrates himself; leaving him indeed many a false opinion, and immoral speculation, to root up as a noxious weed out of the soil, but opening at the same time, the ground for receiving the good seed which he should scatter on it, as he followed on their steps. Viewed as they are by us, in a picture painted by a master-hand, in which the figure of Socrates occupies the foreground, they are cast into deep shadow in contrast with the full light in which he stands out to the eye; and we can hardly avoid forming a disparaging opinion of them, as a class. We must then look off for a time from Plato's picture before us, if we would do justice to these celebrated men, and assign to them, in spite of all their faults, their due importance in the History of Philosophy. There were doubtless some who were indeed a scandal to their profession, pursuing it as a matter of personal profit to themselves, mere arrogant pretenders to that wisdom which they professed to impart; who corrupted instead of improving the young men by the principles which they inculcated. Such appear to have been Thrasymachus, introduced in the *Republic* of Plato, as arguing that the interest of the ruling power is the law of right, and that injustice was more expedient than justice; and Callicles in the *Gorgias*, advocating the free indulgence of the passions as virtue and happiness. Yet there were others of the class, who, though they made the profession of a Sophist a source of gain, and who obtained great wealth by means of it,[1] and incur on that account the strong reprobation of Socrates; who, nevertheless, by their earnest and sincere application of their minds to the studies in which they were engaged, evinced a real love of that wisdom which was their ostensible pursuit, and would be entitled, therefore, to the far higher praise beyond that of Sophists, of being

[1] Protagoras is described, in the *Hippias Major*, as having made more money by teaching in different places of Greece, during the forty years of his employment in it, than Phidias and ten other sculptors together had made by their works; Hippias also, as boasting that he had obtained by his teaching, in a short space of time, more than 150 minæ in Sicily, and 20 minæ from one small place, Inycus, in that island.

"lovers of wisdom," philosophers in truth as well as in name. In time indeed, the name of Sophist would become odious and disreputable, and fall into disuse, as we find it in the time of Plato and Aristotle, and that of philosopher would prevail and be affected by all engaged in the pursuit.

The Sophists, so called, evidently were not the primary corrupters of the public mind in Greece, but themselves the offspring of that moral chaos, which resulted from the internal disorders of the country, and which they sustained by the character and tendency of their teaching; like children paying the due but unhappy recompense of their education to the parent that had trained them in evil. They were an evidence of the corruption having reached the higher classes of society; for their instructions were sought by those who could pay liberally for them, and who desired to qualify themselves for office and power in the state. Going about from place to place, wherever they could obtain a reception at the houses of the wealthy, everywhere, indeed, except at Lacedæmon, where the discipline of Lycurgus excluded all foreign element from the education of the young, they undertook to render all that flocked to them, adepts in the art of government, in oratory, and even in virtue. This last pretension would have been extravagant and absurd, but for the prevailing looseness of opinion on moral subjects. But when the notion of right was understood, or could be represented at least, without shocking public feeling, as nothing more than what was instituted and in fashion, there was an opening to every unprincipled teacher, to adopt his moral lessons to the varied requirements of each distinct society.

At no place were these universal teachers more cordially received than at Athens. The anxiety with which an expected visit from any one of greater note among them was expected at Athens, and the zeal with which the young hastened to see and hear the wise man on his arrival, are depicted in lively colours by Plato.

In the dialogue entitled *Protagoras*, Socrates gives an account of the reception of the famous Sophist of that name, with other eminent individuals of the class, at the house of Callias, the

Athenian. Hippocrates, a young man of a noble and wealthy family of Athens, having heard of the arrival of Protagoras, is so impatient to see him, that, by the dawn of day, he is on his way, in company with Socrates, to the house where the great man was lodged. Socrates and himself arrive at the house, where there is already a considerable gathering of Sophists, and also of young men of rank and importance. Alcibiades and Critias, and two sons of Pericles, are among those attending on the occasion. The crowd is so great that they have great difficulty in obtaining admission. The porter, an eunuch, as Socrates ironically describes him, disgusted with the intrusion of so many visitors, on opening the door and seeing them, at once repels them with the exclamation, "Ha! some Sophists! he is not at leisure;" and, at the same time, vehemently with both his hands, shuts the door against them. They continue, however, knocking; and the porter answers them again from within, without opening the door, "Sirs! have you not heard that he is not at leisure?" "My good man," says Socrates, "we are not come to Callias, nor are we Sophists; but take courage; it is Protagoras we want to see; announce us therefore." At length then, though reluctantly still, he opens the door. On entering, they find Protagoras walking up and down in the vestibule, with several persons following in his train, who were studiously attending on his steps, taking care to give him precedence as he turned, by filing off and opening a way for him through themselves. Socrates immediately addresses him, expressing the purpose for which they were come, and the interest with which the young Hippocrates had sought that interview. Callias has given up his whole house to his distinguished visitors, for even his store-room is occupied. In that apartment was observed Prodicus, not yet risen from his couch, covered up with skins and carpets, with a group of persons around him; and in another opposite vestibule was seen Hippias, with his circle of listeners, discoursing to them about questions of meteorology and astronomy. The attention of all, however, is soon concentrated on Protagoras, who proceeds, at the request of Socrates, to give

them a display of his art, in a discourse illustrative of the nature and importance of that moral instruction and general education which it was the profession of the Sophists to impart. All were charmed with his eloquence, even Socrates himself; only he cannot let the opportunity pass without an exercise of his elenchtic skill, and by his method of interrogation clearing up those points which Protagoras, in his discursive style, had left indistinct and uncertain. They part, however, with mutual expressions of goodwill, notwithstanding their differences of opinion in the discussion. And so the scene of this interesting dialogue closes.

At Athens, evidently, if anywhere, the Sophist felt himself at his proper home. There, at the houses of the noble and rich citizens, was his readiest market.

Herodotus may justly have been surprised at the success of so vulgar a deception at Athens, the seat of literature, as that practised by Pisistratus, when he exhibited to the people a woman of great stature, arrayed in full armour, and pompously borne in a chariot into the city, as the goddess Athena, reinstating him in her own citadel.[1] It would have been still stranger if these impersonations of Athenian wisdom had not succeeded in imposing on the understanding of Athenians. For their minds were in that fluctuating state which disposed them to receive every various form of impression from any plausible teacher. Their general cultivation of mind, and taste for literature, prepared them for listening with pleasure to exhibitions of rhetorical and dialectical skill, such as the Sophists gave. And from admiration of the skill thus displayed, the transition was natural to regard that as the only wisdom, which was capable of maintaining both sides of a question with equal plausibility, and that as the only virtue, which could shift and accommodate itself to every expedient with equal satisfaction.

Yet the Athenian was not entirely the creature of those circumstances, which had so considerably modified his character. He still retained some traces of that high feeling so beautifully touched by his own tragic poet, when that poet speaks of "the

[1] Herodot. *Clio*, 60.

pious Athens," and appeals to the ancient associations of Religion which consecrated the land. Religion indeed had acquired the name of superstition, or the fear of supernatural powers, δεισιδαιμονία: but even this marks that there were some who cherished, though in that degenerate form, a veneration for the truths of the existence of the Deity, and of the Divine agency in the world. Nor was the Athenian ever insensible to his pride of birth and rank among those of the Grecian name.[1] He dwelt on the recollections of a remote antiquity of origin, as distinguishing him among the members of the Greek family. He claimed to be the offspring of the Attic soil, αὐτόχθων, whilst others were descended from successive immigrations of strangers. Amidst his fickleness, and susceptibility of every passing impulse, he yet felt himself strongly influenced by his veneration for the past, and loved to connect himself with the ancient glories of his country. In the Athenian character, accordingly, may be observed the union of extremes; devoutness of deep inward feeling, accompanied with superficial irreligion and profane dissoluteness of morals; a mercurial temperament, ever eager for change, floating like a light cloud over a deep-rooted reverence of antiquity, and the traditions of ancestral wisdom and virtue.

Now, on accurately studying the writings of Plato, we find them, both, a reflexion of this state of the public mind at Athens, and a corrective of it. Full of imagination and of severe subtile thought, they are formed to attract and fix the attention of the literary Athenian. Bringing the Sophist on the scene, and giving sketches of the social life of Athens, and making conversation the vehicle of his instructions, Plato in a manner transferred to his own teaching, what was every day witnessed at Athens in the professorial exhibitions of the Sophists themselves. His philosophy, a counterpart, in its way, to the drama of the comic poet, instructed the people, at once, through their wisdom and their folly. As Aristophanes spoke to them under

[1] The remark of Thucydides, vi. 59; in reference to Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, giving his daughter, Archedice, in marriage to the son of the Tyrant of Lampsacus,—Ἀθηναῖος ὢν Λαμψακηνῷ,—shews in a few words the Athenian estimation of themselves.

the mask of folly, and gave utterance to lessons of severe wisdom under that mask ; so Plato, on the other hand, put on the mask of the sage, and in grave irony ridiculed and exposed the light-hearted folly of his countrymen. Both were wiser than they seemed to the outward observation ; as was indeed the volatile Athenian, to whom they addressed their counsel. Both presupposed that delicacy of perception and quick tact in their fellow-citizens, which would be flattered by such indirect modes of address, and would, at the same time, appreciate the jest of the one, and the irony of the other. Both speak with the freedom of the democratic spirit. But the counsel of Aristophanes is that of the privileged jester of the sovereign-people amidst festal scenes and the enthusiasm of mirth ; whilst Plato appeals to the Athenian at the moment of quiet, serious reflection on the surrounding folly, and treats him as a contemplative spectator, rather than himself an actor in it.

Before the time of Plato, there were no philosophical writings which answered the requisitions of the Athenian mind. There were poems of the early philosophers. There were didactic writings of the later Pythagoreans, and even dialogues discussing speculative questions. Anaxagoras, too, whose name was well known at Athens, had published a treatise of philosophy.[1] But none of these, if they were even accessible to the Athenian, were calculated to attract his attention. The philosophical poems differed nothing from prose but in the metre, and were exceedingly dry and uninviting to the general reader. The books of Pythagoreans were very few, at least at this time, and hardly known to any but the devoted student of philosophy.[2] Nor would the dialogues of Zeno or Euclid, concerned about mere logical subtilties, or the physical discussions of Anaxagoras, possess any charm for the lively Athenian. Even afterwards, the instructive writings of Aristotle did not obtain that reception

[1] Laertius says that Anaxagoras was the first to publish such a treatise. In *Vit. Anax.* viii.

[2] It must be of the more modern Pythagoreans that Dionysius of Halicarnassus speaks, when he recommends the reading of them, not only for their matter, but for their style. *De Vett. Scr. Cens.* iv.

which could save them from a temporary oblivion. But the dialogues of Plato supplied exactly what was yet wanting in this department of Athenian literature. They were the proper development of the philosophical element in the genius of the people. The shrewd practical talent of the Athenians had been strikingly exhibited in the successful achievements of their great generals and statesmen, and in the lead of Athens itself amongst the states of Greece at the close of the Persian war. Their taste in arts, and poetry, and general literature, had put forth splendid fruits in the works of Athenian artists, Athenian masters of the Drama, and of History. But their genius for abstract speculation as yet had nothing which it could claim as strictly its own. Socrates indeed laid the basis for such a work. During the half century preceding the appearance of Plato as the leader of a school of philosophy, Socrates had been engaged as a missionary of Philosophy, awakening the curiosity of men ; turning their thoughts to reflection on themselves, as creatures endued with moral and intellectual faculties ; and inspiring them with longings after some information on questions relating to their own nature, and a taste for discussions addressed to the resolution of such questions. Plato succeeded him, and carried the philosophical spirit, now fully called into action, to its result. His works accordingly display this spirit at its maturity ; exemplifying at the same time that peculiar combination of qualities which formed the Athenian character. Thus are they at once serious and lively, abstract and imaginative ; full of deep thought and feeling intermingled with gaiety and humour ; instinctive with the awe of religion and ancient wisdom, whilst they present also an image of Athenian versatility, and frivolity, and love of change. They convey indeed a strong rebuke of the vices of the times. They draw, in no softened colouring, outlines of the evil and misery resulting from the profligacy of existing governments, and the excesses of individual cupidity ; the two great causes assigned by Plato for the prevailing evil of his times. But these lessons were calculated rather to interest the hearer or reader by their faithful representation of manners,

than to alienate him, as we might at first think, by the justness of the censure. Athenians would give their attention to such descriptions, as they did to the invectives of their orators,[1] acknowledging the general truth of the representation; and each, at the same time, taking no offence of what he applied to others, and to every one rather than to himself. Philosophy too, taught, as by Plato, colloquially, was such as peculiarly to suit the taste of the Athenian, whose life was in the Agora, or the Ecclesia, or the Courts of Law, or the Theatre; and who regarded the interchange of words as no unimportant ingredient in everything that he had to do.[2] Such conversation, too, as that of Plato's Dialogues, elegant conversation, steeped in the well-spring of Grecian poetry and literature, and expressed in language such as Jove, it was said, might use, and adorned with the charms of an exquisite musical rhythm, could not but be highly attractive to Athenian ears. We may see, accordingly, in these circumstances, at once, an occasion for the existence of such writings as those of Plato, and a reason of the peculiar mould in which they were cast, as well as of the success which attended them.

Not only, however, was the general character of his philosophy, as viewed in connection with the writings which convey it, derived from such influences; but the internal structure of it was the natural result of the peculiar education of such a mind as his, under the circumstances to which we have referred. His philosophy was essentially dialectical or colloquial; an examination and discussion of systems, and doctrines, and opinions. According to his notion, the true philosopher is the dialectician; the investigator, who has fought his way, step by step, through every argument capable of being adduced in support of, or against, a particular opinion, refuting those that are unsound, until at length he has found rest in some position that cannot be shaken.[3] Hence he is the disciple of no particular system of

[1] Thucyd. iii. 38; Demosth. *passim*.

[2] Οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι, μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον, ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν, κ. τ. λ. (Thucyd. ii. 40; also iii. 42.)

[3] Repub. vii. 14. Ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται. Op. vol. vii., p. 167.

philosophy, whilst he brings all systems under his survey, and compels all to pay a tribute to his stock of truth, by discussing them, and rejecting in them what will not abide the test of examination. We have seen that he was engaged in studying the doctrines of Heraclitus, and of the Pythagoreans, and of the other schools, whilst he was also a hearer of Socrates. He had thus begun in early life to analyse different systems by the searching method of Socrates; and his mature philosophy was only the same proceeding more deeply imbibed in his own mind, more extensively carried on, and more vigorously applied. So far, indeed, does the colloquial spirit predominate over his philosophy, so entirely dialectical is it in its whole internal character, that it leaves on the mind of the reader more an impression of a series of discussions, in order to the determination of the questions considered, than the conviction of anything positively determined. Hence it is that Cicero, speaking of Plato's writings, says, that "in them nothing is affirmed; and much is discoursed on both sides; everything is inquired into; nothing certain is said."[1] So also Sextus Empiricus raises the question, in what respect the philosophy of Plato differs from that of the Sceptics.[2] And again his doctrines have been characterized as brilliant clouds, which we seem at the point of grasping, when they vanish from our hands. This effect is doubtless partly to be ascribed to the disguise of his irony; to the artist-design which presides over his whole instruction. But it is also the proper effect of that dialectical philosophy which is worked out in the Dialogues. Whilst he is a consummate artist throughout, he is also illustrating the lessons which he had learnt from Socrates, by bringing false opinions to the test of discussion, and leaving truth, for the most part, to be collected from refutation of error, rather than positively enunciating it, or exactly defining it.

For when we come to examine his philosophy more closely, we find, that it begins and ends, like the lessons of Socrates, with a confession of the ignorance of man. Socrates had led

[1] Cic. *Acad. Quæst.* i. 12.
[2] Sex. Emp. *Pyr. Hyp.* i. 33; Diog. Laert. in *Vit. Plat.* 33.

him to perceive how much was taken for granted in the popular opinions and systems of philosophy ; how even those who had a reputation for wisdom and talents took up principles which they had never examined, and which they could not satisfactorily account for, or defend, when pressed in argument. Imbibing, accordingly, the spirit of the Socratic method, he did not endeavour to *teach*, in the proper sense of the term, so much as to explore and test the minds of men ; to ascertain how far they really understood the doctrines and opinions which they professed. The fundamental error of the Sophists was, that they assumed all current opinions to be true. They did not think it necessary to examine this preliminary ; whether the opinions on which they built their fabric of knowledge were true or false. It was enough for them that certain opinions were *actually* held ; and to these, as given principles, they directed their whole system of teaching. Their teaching, accordingly, was entirely πρὸς δόξαν, relative to opinion ; and it must, consequently, stand, or fall, as existing opinions could be maintained or impugned. Now, with Plato, as with Socrates, the investigation of this preliminary point (that is, whether existing opinions are true or no), is everything. The presumption that they are true, is what he will by no means admit. He demands a positive evidence of them. And as the presumption of their truth is a bar to all inquiry concerning them, he commences with the opposite presumption of their falsehood, or at least a confession on the part of the inquirer, that as yet,—until he has investigated,—he does not *know* the *truth* of his opinions.

For the same reason, he avoids all dogmatism in his conclusions. Those might aspire to communicate the knowledge of new truth to the mind, who, as the Sophists did, assumed that knowledge was entirely subjective ; or who held that any opinion which could be produced in the mind, was simply true, was really known, because it was there. But as Plato denied the truth of Opinion, if it had no other evidence, but that of its mere presence in the mind ; so, neither would he concede that any process of the mind in itself, or any argumentative and per-

suasive instructions, could produce, *by their own force*, a conviction of truth in the mind. In other words, he required the student of philosophy, not only to begin, but to end, with a confession of the ignorance of man.

We have an apt illustration of this in the dialogue entitled the *First Alcibiades*. There Socrates is introduced, questioning Alcibiades concerning his plans of life, and shewing how entirely he had presumed on his knowledge of matters with which he was unacquainted; and that until he could be brought to feel and confess his ignorance, there was no possibility of his being able to direct himself or others aright.

In the *Meno*, the same is illustrated by the comparison of the effect of the searching questions of Socrates, on the mind of the person submitted to them, to that of the torpedo. Meno says he had thousands of times, and to many a person, and with much credit to himself, as he thought, spoken on the subject of virtue; but on conversing with Socrates, he was quite at a loss now to say even what virtue was.

To the same purport is the general application by Socrates in the *Apologia*, of the oracle which pronounced him the wisest of men. The oracle, he observes, had only used his name by way of example, as if it had said, "He, O men! is the wisest of you, whoever, like Socrates, is convinced, that he is in truth worthless in respect of wisdom."[1]

The method of Plato, accordingly, is the reverse of didactic. The Sophists could employ a didactic method; because they assumed principles as true, from which they might proceed to argue and persuade. But this was precluded to Plato, assuming, as he did, that all opinions demanded a previous examination. It was necessary for him to extort a confession of ignorance, to make men sensible of the difficulties belonging to a subject. It only remained, therefore, for him to proceed by Interrogation. In a colloquial philosophy, Interrogation is what experiment is

[1] Ὥσπερ ἂν εἴποι ὅτι Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις, ὥσπερ Σωκράτης, ἔγνωκεν, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, πρὸς σοφίαν. (*Apolog. Soc.* p. 53.

in physical inquiry. It is the mode of discovering what the real state of a person's mind is, in regard to the opinions which he professes. The whole art of Socrates consisted in putting questions to the person with whom he conversed, so that an answer bearing on the point in debate might be elicited; that the grounds on which a given opinion was held might fully appear; and the person's own answers might open his mind to see it in its proper light. This method Plato has followed out in the interrogatory of his Dialogues. Under such a method of philosophy, the answerer is brought to teach himself. The lesson thus given by the philosopher, consists wholly in the questions which he puts. He preserves, from first to last, the simple character of the inquirer; and he *pronounces* only so far as he approves or rejects the answer given.

The popular opponents of this method called it a method of producing doubt; and regarded it as dangerous to the principles of the young. Plato carefully obviates such a misrepresentation of his proceeding, and guards his method from being confounded with that of the Sophists. The Sophists taught the art of exciting doubts on every subject; a mere effort of gladiatorial skill. They professed to make men apt to cavil and dispute on any given subject.[1] All principles, according to them, were equally stable; all were equally open to be impugned. They, therefore, did not care how they unsettled the minds of men, if their skill could only find materials on which to exercise itself. In Plato's hands, however, the awakening of doubt has for its object, to remove the unstable ground on which opinions may happen to be rested, and to lead to more settled convictions. With him it is exalted into a regular discipline of the mind. With the Sophists, it was perverted to strengthen that universal scepticism in which their whole teaching was based. So strictly does Plato confine the application of his method to the single purpose of investigating the truth, that he strongly objects to the use of it as a mere exercise for ingenuity; lest the young, led on by the pleasure of refuting and perplexing others, should think, at last, that there were no real distinctions of right and wrong.

[1] *Rep.* vii. p. 177.

Plato seems the more anxious to distinguish his method of inquiry from that of the Sophists, as his method did in some measure resemble theirs. It was inquisitive on every subject, as theirs was. It did superficially appear to be nothing but questioning, and doubting, and cavilling. It did appeal to the reason of every man, and oblige him to see how he could defend his opinions. And on this very ground Socrates had been attacked: for he was accused of corrupting the young, by making them "doubt," ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα.[1] Plato fully admits that this practice, as pursued by the Sophists, was dangerous to the principles of the young. In fact, he observes it would be even better to suffer them to remain under the guidance of some principles, which, though not true, served as restraints on their passions, than to remove everything from their minds, and leave no check whatever to licentious indulgence. By a beautiful illustration, he compares the effect produced by the sophistical method, to the case of a child brought up amidst wealth and luxury, and high connection, and the society of flatterers, but in ignorance as to his real parentage. Suppose, he observes, such a person to come to know that those, whom he has hitherto believed to be his parents, are not so, and at the same time not to know who his real parents are. It is clear, that whilst in his state of ignorance concerning his supposed parents, he would respect and attend to them more than to his flatterers; but on finding out his mistake, unless he were of a superior character, such as is rarely met with, he would attend to his flatterers more than to those whom he once supposed to be his parents. So would it be then, he shews, with one who should find out that the popular principles of morals in which he had been trained, were not the truth, without arriving, at the same time, at the real truth. He would no longer be controlled by those moral principles of which he had discovered the falsehood; but having nothing to substitute in their place, he would give way afterwards, without reserve, to the seductions of pleasures, the flatterers, whose blandishments he had before in some measure resisted.[2] In opposition to such

[1] *Gorgias*, Op. 4, p. 162; *Meno*, p. 348; et alib. [2] *Rep.* vii. pp. 174-178.

a system of cavilling, Plato holds an even course between the scepticism which merely doubts about everything, and the dogmatism which pronounces on everything without examination.

The method by which he accomplishes his object, carried out to the fulness of a regular system and discipline of the mind, is, what he calls by a term conveying to a Greek ear its colloquial origin and application, DIALECTIC. As contrasted with the spurious method of the Sophists, or the method of contradicting on every subject, and involving the mind in endless perplexity, it was the true art of Discussion. As contrasted with the mere wisdom of opinion, δοξοσοφία, which the Sophists inculcated, it was philosophy, real science, or knowledge of the truth. The method of his philosophy, and his philosophy itself, thus run up into one, and coincide under the common name of Dialectic.[1]

To trace the manner in which this coincidence was effected, will lead us to a perception of the true character of Plato's philosophy, as a system mediating between the dogmatism of the sciolist on the one hand, and the scepticism of the disputant on the other.

The hypothesis, we observe, on which he founded the whole of his proceeding, was the fallaciousness of Opinion; the Sophists, on the contrary, assuming the truth of Opinion universally. Whilst to the Sophists every opinion served as a ground of argument, and for them there was no need to look beyond the *apparent;* it was necessary for Plato to seek for some Criterion of Truth out of the region of mere Opinion. Commencing with denying the sufficiency of what metaphysicians call Subjective truth, or the assumption, that whatever is perceived by the mind is true, because it is so perceived; he had to search after Objective truth, truth independent of the mind of man, and exempt from the contingencies and variations of human judgment, as a foundation of his system of knowledge.

[1] Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι. *Sophist.* p. 275, 253. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ. (*Rep.* vii. p. 173.) *Meno*, 75, ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον, μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος.

The hypothesis, accordingly, of the fallaciousness of Opinion from which his Method set out, involved a corresponding hypothesis in philosophy of the fallaciousness of the senses. It is the joint application of these two fundamental principles that combines his Method and his Philosophy in one master-science of DIALECTIC. Opinion, according to him, is the kind of knowledge derived from the information of the senses, and is therefore no proper knowledge at all, but mere belief or persuasion, πίστις; whereas true knowledge is founded on that which is purely apprehended by the intellect, without any intervention whatever of the senses. Dialectic, as it is Philosophy, is conversant about that which IS, or which has BEING, as contrasted with presentations to the senses, which have only the semblance of Being; as it is a Method, it investigates the reason, or account of the Being of everything;—the account of everything as it IS, and not as it APPEARS; not being satisfied, like its sophistical counterpart, with opinions of which no account can be given, but bringing all to the test of exact argument and definition.

In order, therefore, to give his Method a firm basis, and his Philosophy a distinct object, it was required that he should establish a sound theory of Being, or, in other words, a sure Criterion of Truth. Such, then, was his celebrated Theory of IDEAS.

There are four distinct views embraced in this theory as it is developed by Plato; four phases, as it were, under which it is presented.

I. The first, and most strictly Platonic view of it, according to what we have already stated, is in connection with logical science. None of the great philosophers before Plato; none, that is, of those who had speculated on the Universe at large, as Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, were conversant with logical science. Zeno the Eleatic, and Euclid of Megara, were known indeed as dialecticians. But the kind of logical science which they professed, was a rude and imperfect art, consisting chiefly in the knowledge and use of particular fallacies, and not founded in any deep study of the nature of

thought and reasoning. They were, besides, mere dialecticians, rather than philosophers in the most extended sense of the term. Plato's mind, however, while it was engaged in logical studies, was also no less intent on the investigation of the first principles of all things. And, as has been often observed in other cases, the favourite study of his mind gave its complexion to his theory of first principles, or doctrine of Ideas.

The term "Idea" does not indeed convey to the understanding of a modern any notion of a connection of the theory with logical science. In our acceptation, it belongs exclusively to Metaphysics. But in Plato's view there was no separation of the two branches of Logic and Metaphysics. Both were closely united in the one science to which he gave the name of Dialectic, and which was accordingly at once a science of the internal reason,—that is, of the processes of the mind in its silent speculation on things; and of the external reason, that is, of the processes of the mind in communicating its speculations to others in words. The terms, therefore, belonging to the one process, are indiscriminately applied to the other. Thus, to "give a reason" of the being of a thing, διδόναι λόγον τῆς οὐσίας, was equivalent to a scientific view of it; and the word λόγος denoted at once the terms of language by which that reason was expressed, and the reason itself as it existed in the mind. Thus, too, the word, ἰδέαι, or ideas, was only a little varied from the logical term εἴδη, or species, which indeed is sometimes substituted for it in the phraseology of Plato. The simplicity, accordingly, and invariableness, and universality, which belong to terms denoting the agreement of a variety of objects in certain characteristics, were transferred to supposed counterparts in the mind itself, or to the notions represented by the terms which are the name of the species. Hence the idea, or *eidos*, was conceived to be, not simply a result of a process of the mind, but something *in* the mind, and as having a being independent of the mind itself. As the species expressed in words was universal, so its counterpart in the mind was the universal nature in which the individuals to which it referred, participated.

In that, the mind, perplexed by the variety and anomaly of individual objects, found an invariable sameness. In the contemplation of it, the mind no longer wavered and doubted, but obtained a fixedness of view. The idea, or species, therefore, was to be explored and reached in order to a just theory of everything, and was in itself that theory.

Further, as there is a relative classification of objects by means of words; some standing for characteristics common to a greater number of objects, whilst others stand for characteristics of only some out of that number; this property of words was in like manner conceived to have its counterpart in the mind. A graduated series of species was supposed to exist, first in the mind, and then independent of the mind, by means of which, as by steps, the mind might rise to the highest species, the ultimate Idea itself, in which all others were comprehended. And hence there was no real perfect science but that which penetrated to this ultimate nature or being; and all other ideas, or theories, were truly scientific only as they participated in this.

This notion of "participation" of the Ideas, was a still further application of logical language to the business of philosophy in general. For, as the several particulars belonging to a species all possess those characteristics which constitute their species, as well as those which connect them with a higher species or genus of which they are the species, their logical description is made up of an enumeration of those characteristics, together with the name of the higher class or genus under which the whole species is included. The higher class is an ingredient in the specification of a lower; or, conversely, a lower class participates in a higher.[1] So Plato considered everything in the Universe, as being what it is, by a "participation" of the Ideas; and consequently, that to explore its nature we must ascertain the idea which thus constitutes it. The Pythagoreans before him spoke of things as existing by "assimilation" to the essential being. Plato's logical views occasioned this change of phraseology; for he varied only the term, as Aristotle observes, whilst

[1] See Aristotle, *Effic. Phil.*, supra.

he followed the Pythagoreans as masters, in the fundamental conception of his theory.[1] Aristotle, indeed, whilst he assigns the logical studies of Plato as the occasion of the form of the ideal theory, more particularly accounts for the theory, from Plato's observation of the importance of Definitions in the ethical discussions of Socrates. Plato found how effectual an instrument Definition had been in the hands of Socrates in silencing the impertinencies of false opinion on moral subjects. As it had brought moral questions to an issue, so it might be applied, he thought, generally, as a stay to the extravagances of opinion on all subjects whatever. Accordingly, he had only to generalize the principle of definitions; and the result was the theory of Ideas, or the universal science of reasons, and the ultimate criterion of all truth.

To understand, however, rightly how Plato was led by logical considerations to his theory of Ideas, we should observe more particularly what his view was of the nature of Logic. We should greatly misapprehend him, if we supposed that he had that notion of the science which has prevailed since the systematic exposition of it by Aristotle. As it was conceived by Plato, it answered strictly to its original name of Dialectic, rather than to that of Logic; being the art of discussion, or the art of drawing forth the truth from the mind by questioning, rather than the art of deducing consequences from given principles. It was a higher, more comprehensive science, than the art of Deduction. For it was conversant about the discovery and establishment of principles; whereas the logical science which is employed about Deduction, assumes the principles in order to speculate about their consequences. It left the latter inquiry to be pursued by subsequent research; whilst the more ambitious flight of those who first speculated on the nature of Discourse, was directed to the discovery of Truth. In Plato's hands it was an energetic reform of the quibbling shallow logic, which was as yet known and practised in the schools. This Logic had no concern for truth, but only for victory and display. It consisted

[1] Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 6.

in a skill of wielding certain sophisms, known by familiar names in the schools, and founded for the most part, on the equivocations of words. An appearance of truth being all that it aimed at, it did not exact of the student any consideration of the nature of things. It was enough that he could give the word-reason, the mere logos, the symbol or counter. He was not taught to go beyond this legerdemain of language, or to search out the reason of the being of things, and correct the paralogisms involved in the use of words, by reference to the realities represented by them. This sophistical method affected indeed to be a didactic art; to instruct and furnish the mind with principles applicable to every subject of discussion. It considered, forsooth, language as an universal science of Nature already constructed; and, proceeding on this supposition, professed to enable the student to apply the wisdom already embodied in language, to the purpose of appearing wise himself, and imparting to others the same apparent wisdom. But going no further than this, it ended in mere δόξα, mere opinion. It produced, that is, in the result, only a wavering state of mind, subject to be changed by every new impression of opposite arguments, and, after all, imparted no steady knowledge.

It was a great reform, then, which Plato undertook, in following up the example proposed in the conversations of Socrates, and instituting a proper science of Dialectic, a science of the reason of the Being of things. It was a change from an empirical system, a vain art of words, to a scientific method or investigation of the reasons themselves, on which an instructive use of words must be founded.

For, we must observe, it was still a science of words which he teaches as the true Logic or Dialectic. It had throughout a reference to discussion. Still it was a real science, as compared with the verbal and technical logic of his predecessors. Though it was a science of words, it had for its object the determination of such words as should fully correspond to their intention as symbols, in characterizing and denoting the proper Being of the thing signified. These reasons of the Being of things, the λόγοι τῆς οὐσίας, were the Ideas.

His logical method, accordingly, was an analytical, inductive method. Setting out on the assumption of the erroneousness of opinion as such, it examines hypothesis after hypothesis on each subject proposed for discussion, rejecting and excluding, as it proceeds, everything irrelevant. The scrutiny instituted consists in searching for the grounds of contradiction with regard to each opinion, and shewing that opposite views on point after point in the matter discussed, are at least as tenable as the assumptions contained in the given opinion or hypothesis. Hence it consists almost entirely of refutation, or what both he and Aristotle denominate *elenchus*, a process of reasoning by which the contradictory of a given conclusion is inferred.

A method of this kind was calculated fully to put to the test every unsound opinion. It collected everything that could be said, either for, or against, a given opinion. It made the maintainer of it state on what grounds he maintained it, what consequences followed from it; and either forced him to self-contradiction in his defence of it, or obliged him to modify it according to the requisitions of the argument. And the result was, that whatever stood its ground after this complete sifting of the question, might be regarded as stable truth. When refutation had done its utmost, and all the points of difficulty and objection had been fully brought out, the dialectical process had accomplished its purpose; and the affirmative which remained after this discussion, might be regarded as setting forth the truth of the question under consideration. For everything connected with it, and yet not founded in the truth of things, was then removed. And the result therefore might be accepted as a simple truth of Being, an object which the eye of the intellect might steadily contemplate, and therefore matter of Science.

The process throughout corresponds with that of Investigation in Modern philosophy. Only we must conceive the dialectical Investigation of Plato as nothing more than an admirable scheme for clearing a question of everything foreign to it; whilst the latter draws out the true law of Nature from the promiscuous assemblage of phenomena, under which, it is

presented to observation, and lies concealed, until analysis has done its work on the mass. The nomenclature of the two methods varies accordingly. Argument is the instrument of the former; experiment that of the latter. Refutation is the primary business of the former; rejection and exclusion of irrelevant phenomena that of the latter. Definitions of words, as they are signs of the Being of things, are the result of the former; whilst the latter develops Laws of Nature.

Both processes are carried on by Interrogation. But whereas the analysis which investigates a law of Nature proceeds by interrogation of Nature, the analysis of Plato's Dialectic proceeds by interrogation of the Mind, in order to discover the true Being or "Idea" of the thing discussed. Therefore it was that Socrates called his art, in his own playful manner, μαιεία, a kind of intellectual midwifery;[1] a delivering of the mind of the notions, with which it was pregnant, and which it was labouring to bring forth. Thus, the Dialectic of Plato, being entirely directed to observation on the mind, and not to external nature, or anything sensible, takes the state of knowledge, as it exists in the mind of the person interrogated, for the ground of its proceeding. It deals, that is, with things, as they exist in the forms of thought; going, as Plato says, from species to species, and ending in species; and so arriving at the principle; following throughout the steps, by which the mind advances, in obtaining an exact view of any object of its contemplation. It is, in fact, the true thought spoken out. The process of thinking by which it is attained, is the dialectical process of interrogation. The decision of the mind when its conviction is settled is the dialectical conclusion.

The chief logical instrument employed in this method is Division. The being able to divide according to genera, and not to consider the same species as different, nor a different one as the same, is stated to belong especially to dialectical science.[2]

[1] *Theæt.* p. 194. Τὴν δὲ μαιείαν τάυτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν· ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν· ἐγὼ δὲ, τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων, καὶ ὅσοι καλοί.

[2] *Soph.* p. 274. Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε ταυτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταυτὸν, μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι; Ναὶ φήσομεν. Also *Theæt.* p. 151. *Polit.* p. 66. *Rep.* vii. p. 167: *et alib.*

In searching out the true definition of the being of a thing, this portion of the internal process of the mind would naturally strike the attention. General ideas being founded on general resemblances of objects, the first step towards a more distinct idea of an object is to see that the generalization is complete; that it neither excludes nor includes any objects which it ought not to exclude or include. The true idea would be that which characterized every object belonging to the idea, and none other. The analysis accordingly pursued by Plato is conversant about Division, using the induction of particulars in subordination to this. We find, indeed, a constant use of Induction by Plato, after the manner of Socrates. But it is always in reference to the main purpose of determining, not a general fact, but the dominant Idea in every object of thought.

At the same time, we may observe, the Dialectic of Plato is truly a method of Investigation, though it does not penetrate to the depth of the modern analysis. It employed deductive reasonings; but these were not essential parts of its method; since the whole was a process of ascent to the theory of the Ideas.

Afterwards, indeed, Dialectic approximated to what is now commonly understood by Logic. The transition was first to the consideration of it as a method of drawing out the probable conclusions deducible from given premises. This was natural. For in Plato's method every opinion was admitted as an hypothesis to be examined, in order to rejecting the falsehood and eliciting the truth that might be contained in it; and so far his Dialectic might be regarded as a speculation on probabilities. This transition prepared the way for a further one, when Dialectic became strictly the science of Deduction. Attention would be drawn more and more to the use of words as instruments of reasoning, when Dialectic was once exalted into the rank of a science.

The progress seems to be this. The science being cultivated primarily with a view to discussion, the importance of language in order to reasoning could not fail, from the first direction of the mind in this channel, to strike the philosophical observer.

The phenomena of sophistical argument would suggest the necessity of inquiry into words as they are employed in reasoning. Philosophers, accordingly, would be led to examine into the nature of words considered as signs and representatives of thought. Thus they would proceed to arrange words into classes, according to their import in this respect. Hence would be obtained that great division of words into those that denote an individual alone, and those that stand both for many and for one, or into singular and common ;—the fundamental principle of logic properly so called, or of logic as the science is now considered. The use of Division and Definition would soon appear. These processes, indeed, would be naturally discovered in the very prosecution of discussions addressed to the refutation of false opinions and popular fallacies. The early dialectics, accordingly, abounded in the use of them.[1] Afterwards, as the analytical power of language came to be more particularly observed, the connections of words in propositions and arguments would attract speculation. The possibility of exhibiting any given proposition or argument under abstract formulæ, in which unmeaning symbols were substituted for the terms themselves of the proposition or argument, would at length be discovered. Thus in the result would be erected a formal science of Logic, in which language would be considered as an artificial system of signs, and the validity of arguments would be explored in their abstract forms, independently of the subject-matter about which they happen to be conversant.

When Plato, however, drew his Theory of Ideas from the logical speculations in which his mind was engaged, there was no such system as that now found in treatises of Logic. There are the materials in the writings of Plato for constructing a method of Dialectic, such as the science presented itself to his

[1] *Phædr.* p. 362. Τούτων δὴ ἐγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστὴς, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκότα ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω "κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο·" καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν, εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε· καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς. Plato is said to have been the author of a work "On Divisions," not now extant.

view; but that method remains, even to this day, to be fully explored and stated. It is clear that he had such a system, and that his writings proceed on regular method; though he has nowhere accurately sketched it, and perhaps never even proposed it to himself in the form of a system. His thoughts were engaged in this, as in other subjects, in giving the great outlines of his philosophy. It was enough for him to have seized the bearings of logical Truth on all truth; and to this general view of the science he has made everything secondary and subservient.

II. The next aspect under which the Theory of Ideas should be considered, is that in which it sums up and measures the infinites of the sensible world. In this point of view, it more immediately represented its Pythagorean prototype, than under its logical aspect. It is in reference to this intention of the theory that Aristotle objects, that, whilst it professes to give the account of things, it introduces an additional number of objects in the Ideas themselves; an absurdity, he observes, like that of attempting to facilitate a calculation by adding to the numbers to be calculated.[1] It was, accordingly, an endeavour to reckon up the individuals of the universe, and exhibit their sum in one statement. As Plato's logical speculations gave their colour to his whole philosophy, so the devotion of the Pythagoreans to mathematics led them to form a mathematical theory of the Universe. The universal nature of Number gave them the ground for this application of their peculiar studies. For all things are in number; and there is nothing from which the notion of number may not be abstracted. That number, then, which alone measures all other numbers,—Unity,—would be regarded as the common measure of all things. And thus the philosophy of the Universe would be reduced to a system of calculation; and the infinity of existing things, and their relations, summed up in numbers and the proportions of numbers. The greek word *logos*, whilst it combined in it the notions of "word" and "reason," also further combined that of "ratio," and

[1] Ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος, ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων, οἷοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη. (Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 9.

reasoning and calculating were expressed by the one term λογίζεσθαι.[1]

It appears to have struck the mind of Plato that the theory of the Pythagoreans was not sufficiently comprehensive, or even ultimate, as an account of the Being of things. The simplicity of Number did not adequately explain the great variety of natures found in the Universe; and though the science of Arithmetic held almost the highest place in his scale of knowledge, on account of its abstract nature, and its leading to the consideration of Being, apart from the changeable objects of sense; he still viewed it as practically implicated with the physical sciences, and, as such, therefore, not strictly and exclusively conversant about Being. In like manner, the science of Geometry, though purer than the physical sciences, as being conversant only about abstract magnitudes, is excluded by him from the highest place. Geometry, no less than Arithmetic, might seem to be simply an intellectual contemplation; since, though it employs visible figures in its demonstrations, the demonstrations do not properly refer to these, but to the abstract notions which the diagrams represent. Yet Geometry, as it assumes its principles, and its truths consequently depend on assumptions, which in themselves demand evidence, cannot, he observes, rank as a science of perfect intelligence.

Perfect intelligence, νόησις, implies an absolute stay to the thought; something beyond which no further inquiry can be made,—which may be seen, as it were, by the mind's eye immediately in itself. And such an object only is furnished by the Idea. Though, accordingly, Plato thus carried his theory beyond that of the Pythagoreans, we find him still cherishing the Pythagorean doctrine of Number, by assigning to it the second place in his scale of knowledge, and only barely distinguishing it, in regard to scientific value, from his own theory of Ideas.[2]

When we come indeed to look more closely into his theory the mathematical approximation will distinctly appear. The Ideas are the finite, applied to the infinite of the sensible world, and

[1] Aristotle, *Effic. Phil.*, supra. [2] *Rep.* vi. *ad. fin.*

thus producing measure and proportion in the Universe.[1] The physical sciences, as, for example, Astronomy and Music, are not truly scientific; because, addressing themselves to what is passing before the senses in the world, they do not consider the immovable beings themselves, which are only imperfectly represented in the observed physical movements. The astronomer computes the actual velocities of the heavenly bodies; the musician counts the intervals of sounds. But neither of these is intent on the real beings, the Ideas themselves of velocity and of harmony. We can discern in such language as this, a mathematical basis of thought. Perpetual variations, as contemplated in their inconstancy, admit of no calculation. To estimate them, we must find the limit to which they continually approximate; and we thus, as it were, reduce to fixed order the apparent disorder and irregularity; and see the variable in its ultimate form of invariableness. This notion is not fully developed by Plato. But it is conveyed in his doctrine of a twofold class of sciences, under the same names; a popular astronomy, for example, and a higher astronomy; a popular music, and a higher music; a popular morality, and a higher morality; the latter of which are sciences of the invariable and the finite, and run up into his Theory of Ideas.[2]

III. The third phasis of the Theory is that in which it is a philosophy of Being, in opposition to the mere knowledge of sensible phenomena. According to the school of Heraclitus, the sensible world was ever flowing, ever in a state of "becoming" or incipiency; a mere development of successive phenomena, displacing each other without cessation. As duration is no positive existence as a whole, but is made up of an infinite number of moments, each of which is gone as the succeeding moment appears; so was it asserted generally in the doctrine of that school, that every object in the Universe was a mere collection of successive phenomena. Of nothing could it be affirmed

[1] *Phileb.* pp. 234-240.

[2] *Phileb.* p. 303. Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαί, καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι δύο τοιαῦται ξυνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος ἑνὸς κεκοινωνημέναι. Also *Rep.* vi.

that it IS. The very sensations, no less than the objects of them, were in constant production; being the momentary, ever-varying results of the concourse of agent and patient. Colour, for example, as the object, and sight of the colour in the eye, as the sensation, are momentary relations, simultaneously produced by something that acts in the coloured object, at the moment, on something that receives the impression in the eye. This doctrine resolved all knowledge into sensation, and (which was equivalent to this) made "man the measure of all things," according to the celebrated enunciation of Protagoras.

Plato saw that, if these views were admitted as an account of the Universe, his whole Dialectic must fall to the ground.[1] It would be nothing but miserable trifling, to try to call forth those reasons of things which he conceived to be in the mind, if knowledge were of this fluctuating character. There could not, in fact, be then any such reasons. There was nothing stable,—nothing that remained in the mind,—to serve as the standing criterion of true and false opinions. There would be no distinguishing whether all that passed in life were not a dream, or whether the seeming occurrences in dreams were not rather the realities. Some sure criterion was therefore wanted, to which the phenomena of sensation might be referred. The theory of Ideas, as a theory of Being, furnished this.

Plato admitted, accordingly, the perpetual flux of sensations and their objects, as taught by Heraclitus, whilst he refuted the sophistical extravagances into which the doctrine had been carried. Granting, therefore, that there was no test of truth or falsehood in the sensations themselves, he points out, that the ground of fallaciousness is in the judgments formed by the mind concerning the impressions of the senses. The soul is endued with a common power of perception, to which the reports of the different senses are referred, and by means of which the mind is enabled to compare past and present sensations of the same kind, as also different sensations with one another. It is in the con-

[1] *Theætet.* p. 90. τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀρλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία.

clusions then formed on these comparisons that we are to seek for knowledge ; or in the purely mental processes ; abandoning altogether the mere informations of sense.[1]

He was led, accordingly, to examine these processes of the mind, in order to discover the grounds of truth and knowledge. He observed that when the mind compares two sensations, and decides on their similarity or difference, there is always some ground on which that judgment is made. When, for instance, it decides on the equality of two things, there is a standard to which they are referred, the general notion of equality itself, which serves as a middle term for testing the equality of the two things compared. In like manner, there is always, whenever a comparison is made by the mind, some general principle, which is the medium of the comparison. And this is a principle not in any way produced by the sensations ; for it is evidently prior to them, and independent of them ; being appealed to by the mind as a criterion of them. This general principle, then, is in every instance the Idea ; and not being formed by the sensations, it is not subject to their variableness. It remains unmoved, and the same, amidst the flow of the sensations, or of the objects of the sensations ;—the standing criterion of all the judgments of the mind to which it applies.[2]

Hence we may see the peculiar meaning of the term " Idea " in Plato's philosophy. It consists in its contrast with the objects of sensation. The latter never attain to any definite perfect form—to any clear outline, as it were, to the eye. They flow and have vanished before they could attain to such form ; since, in the very succeeding one another, they not only pass away, but undergo alteration. But the standard to which they are referred in the mind, is a positive defined shape, or form, or species, simple and uniform, analogous to an object of sight of which we can clearly trace the whole outline by the eye.[3] For

[1] *Theætet.* pp. 139-144.

[2] *Phædo*, pp. 170, 230-236 ; *Rep.* vii. pp. 145-147 ; *Theætet.*

[3] Hanc illi ideam appellabant, jam a Platone ita nominatam ; nos recte speciem possumus dicere. (Cicer. *Acad. Qu.* i. 8.) Formæ sunt, quas Græci *ἰδέας* vocant, etc. Cicer. *Topic.* 7.

the like reason, the term, *exemplar*, παράδειγμα, is also applied to denote the Idea. As the one perfect standard to which all the reports of the senses are referred, it appears in the light of a pattern, to which they would be conformed, but for that incessant mutability which necessarily belongs to them. This, however, was rather the Pythagorean view of general principles than the Platonic; though Plato himself not unfrequently recurs to it.

Plato, at the same time, in thus constituting Ideas the sole absolute criteria of real existence, did not intend to deny all reality whatever to conclusions drawn from our sensible experience, such as those of the physical sciences. But he means, in the first place, to shew the delusive character of all informations of sense which are not corrected by the internal reason of the mind. In the next place, his design is to point out the inferior knowledge, which every other kind of evidence conveys, but that which is drawn from the intuitive perceptions of the mind. The informations of sense, he teaches, are only a knowledge of semblances or idols, εἰκασία, conjecture founded on mere images of the truth. He describes this kind of knowledge by an admirable illustration from a supposed case of men placed in a long cavern, with their bodies so chained from infancy, that they can only look before them, whilst the light of a fire from behind casts on the side opposite to them, the shadows of vessels, and of statues of stone and wood, carried along a track leading upwards from the cavern, by persons who are themselves concealed by a wall, like the exhibitors of puppets. As men so circumstanced would see nothing of themselves, and of each other, or of the things thus carried along, but the shadows, they would mistake the shadows for the realities; they would speak of the shadows as if these were the things; and if any voice was heard from the persons carrying along the figures, they would think the sounds proceeded from the passing shadow.[1] Just like this, he declares, is the influence of education in the lower world of sense on the minds of men. They must be carried up from this cavern, in which they see everything only by an artificial light, to the light

[1] *Rep.* vii. *ad. init.*

of the sun itself, to the region of Ideas, where alone objects are seen as they are in themselves.

As to the knowledge conveyed by the physical sciences, neither is this properly knowledge. It amounts only, as he states it, to belief or opinion. These are less intellectual than the mathematical sciences, because they are conversant about human opinions and desires, or about the production and composition of things, or about the means of sustaining things produced and compounded.[1] They are therefore as unstable as the things about which they are. But they are still not devoid of evidence, so far as they collect actual informations of the senses, and do not learn from mere shadows. This is implied in his calling such knowledge belief, and distinguishing it from conjecture; though he is rigid in preserving the exclusive prerogative of Truth to the knowledge of the Ideas.

The evidence of Experience was necessarily slighted in such a philosophy, and condemned as insufficient for the discovery of Truth. For what is Experience but the memory of several similar previous informations of sense, combined into one general conclusion? And though Aristotle allows that such a general conclusion, in which the mind acquiesces, might be regarded as scientific,[2] in respect of things generated, such as are the principles of Art, this could not be admitted by a philosopher who placed the objects of sensation out of the pale of Being. It was not enough for Plato's system to answer in favour of the scientific value of Experience, that, though this and that particular instance of an information of sense had no immovable truth in it, yet, from the observation of a number of similar instances, a general uniformity might be inferred, and an immovable *general* principle established. He would grant that generalization was a corrective of experience. For this he did when he granted some importance to the arts in education, and for the purposes of life.

[1] *Rep.* vii. p. 165.

[2] Ἐκ δ' ἐμπείριας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης· ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης· ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. (Aristot. *Analyt. Post.* ii. 15, *ult.*)

But Truth with him must, in all cases, be *universal*, not simply general: it must be that which is always the same, not simply that which is only for the most part. And the highest degree of the evidence of Experience, even that which amounts to what is called moral certainty, falls short of this absolute universality. It might be urged, for example, that, though what was sweet to one person and at one time, might be bitter to another person and at another time; and though what seemed the same sensation of sweet, was not in fact the same at two successive moments, but a reproduction; still it was possible, by combining recollections of many similar instances, to form a general notion which should adequately characterize that sensation. Still Plato would say, this was only belief or opinion, and not science. The object of science must be such as cannot be otherwise: it must be absolutely one and the same permanent being; you must altogether quit the stream of the world of sense, and land on the rock of unchangeable eternal Being.

Thus Rhetoric is strongly reprobated by Plato, on the very ground on which it is systematically taught by Aristotle, of its being nothing more than an instrument of persuasion, or an art of speculating on the means of persuasion. Much of his invective indeed derives its point from its application to the servile rhetoricians of his day. Still we find him condemning Rhetoric on the abstract ground of its having no higher view than persuasion. In the modern view of the subject, as in Aristotle's, Rhetoric is a real science, so far as it is framed on just conclusions respecting those modes of speaking, or writing, which excite interest and produce conviction. With Plato it is mere quackery; and for this reason, that it is founded on experience of what persuades; being only an ἐμπειρία or τριβή, a knack acquired by experience and converse with the world; an accomplishment, learned by practice, without any real knowledge, in flattering the passions of men. He in fact regarded Experience as corresponding with what we call empiricism; contrasting it with the conclusions of abstract reason, as we contrast an illiterate and unscientific use of Experience with that of the philosopher.[1]

[1] *Gorgias*, p. 117, *et seq.*; *Phædr.* p. 363.

Looking to that sort of Experience on which the popular teaching of the Sophists was founded, Plato, we should say, was fully justified in his condemnation of the experimental method of his day. It was in truth mere quackery. It was content with shadows and images of the truth, and entirely directed to *producing* a desired effect, without caring for the absolute truth ;— a shallow philosophy of sensation, not founded in the nature of things. He had thus to contend against a system, which distorted that criterion of truth, which man has, in himself, by the right use of his reason conjointly with his experience, to the undermining of all truth and reality. This empirical system was the crying evil of those times. It had infected politics, and education, and private intercourse, as well as philosophy. In opposition to it, he had to take up an antithetical position ; to call in question the existing acceptation and use of the human criterion of truth ; to limit it within its proper bounds, and guard against its perversion. Accordingly the whole stress of his philosophy is on this point. It is a perpetual polemic against the sophistical principle, that " man is the measure of all things." This amply accounts for his disparaging so much as he does, the scientific value of Experience, and insisting on the necessity of the existence of higher principles than those of Experience, in order that the mind may duly receive and appreciate the information of sense. He taught men, at any rate, to perceive that the popular notion of that Evidence of truth which man has in his own nature, was false and deceptive, and that in all judgments and reasonings there is also something more than is merely of man.

IV. The fourth leading point of view under which the Theory of Ideas remains to be considered, is its aspect as it is a theory of the Cause of the Universe. Under this aspect it is identified with the speculation into the Chief Good. Here it is an account, at once, of the First Principle of Motion, and of the End to which all things tend as their perfection and ultimate good. According to Plato, there was no other cause worthy of the name, or which really accounted for the phenomena of the

Universe, but "The Good," or, as it is technically called, the Final Cause. The early speculations of philosophers had been chiefly directed to the material phenomena of the Universe, and had attempted to account for them in a rude manner, by referring them to some one or more of the material elements. Some, indeed, had introduced also moral influences into their theory. The Pythagoreans combined with their speculation of the mysterious unity, the notion of Love as the one-making principle. The Ionic school, however, appears to have led the opinion of philosophers in regard to the cause of the Universe at the time of Plato. And though Anaxagoras of that School asserted the ascendency of Mind, he had lost sight of his great theory in the explanations from material causes, to which he descended in the completion of his system. Socrates began a strenuous opposition to the physical philosophers. Plato carried on that opposition, and, blending the familiar ethics of Socrates with the moral and theological mysticism of the Pythagoreans, established the Final Cause or theory of "the Good," as supreme over the domain of science.

Anaxagoras had certainly prepared the way for the theory. Plato took up his doctrine of a Divine Intelligence, and gave it that development which, as taught by Anaxagoras himself, it yet waited to receive. It was but a vain theory of a Supreme Mind (sublime and important as the simple enunciation of the great truth was), which did not also exhibit the Supreme Mind as operating by design, and diffusing the energy of its intelligence and goodness, as well as of its power, throughout its operations.

The Supreme Mind, therefore, according to Plato, must be conceived, as exemplifying the attributes of its own nature in the works which have proceeded from it. If it be granted that there is a Supreme Mind; that must be the true measure of all things in the Universe. All things must have been framed according to the scheme which such a mind would contemplate in their production. As Intelligence, it cannot be regarded but as working for some object, ἕνεκά του; for by this is intelligence

distinguished from unintelligent force; and the only object to the Supreme Intelligence is the most perfect nature, which is itself. The pattern of its own perfections, therefore, must have been present to it, and in its design, in the construction of the Universe. In other words, the Deity himself is not only the Author of all things, but he has designed to exemplify in them his own attributes. The principle, accordingly, by which all true philosophy must hold, and which it must carry out into its speculations, is, that not man, but God, is "the Measure of all things." And hence, whenever the proper being of anything is to be explored, it must be studied in that light in which it is seen as a work of the Supreme Mind, designed after the pattern of the Divine perfections. In such a contemplation, the theory of the Best is the view by which Philosophy must be guided; for, in Ancient Philosophy, an object of intelligent aim, and good, are equivalent terms. The object at which the most perfect Intelligence aims, must be, therefore, that which is best; and in tracing out, accordingly, the workings of the Divine Mind in the world, we must look for "the best" in everything. That notion of everything by which it is "best," is both its real nature, and the cause of its being produced.

But why is not everything, as it is actually seen, a work of "the best?" why is not good visibly impressed on everything as it stands forth to the view? why must we, in short, resort to the Idea of good, in order to ascertain its nature, instead of taking it simply as it appears?

The antagonist force of Unreason in the nature of that which has Body, and is apprehended by the senses, occasions all the imperfection and evil in the world, as the world actually exists. It subsisted already in the mass of disorder and confusion which the Divine Intelligence, by its operation, had brought into order and regularity of motion; and it still subsists, though reduced into subordination to intelligence. It is overruled so as to minister to the designs of Mind, but still impedes by its contrariety of nature the development of good in the world. And thus Plato says, that it is impossible for evils

to perish out of the world, for that there must ever exist a contrariety to good.[1] Evil pre-existed; and evil accordingly must be displaced by the presence of good; as contraries are displaced by contraries; and as all generation or production is carried on by a process from contrary to contrary. Thus, though evil retires before good in the world of generated things, evil still manifests itself in the very act of its retiring before good; and a perpetual opposition of good and evil remains. What we see, accordingly, in the world, is not the perfect accomplishment of good, but effort and tendency after good in all things. The effects of a struggle between reason and unreason are manifested, on the one hand, in the evanescent imperfect nature of all sensible things; and, on the other hand, in their constant renewing, or in that undying vigour with which they flow on, and are reproduced, and aim at a perfection beyond themselves.

Though, therefore, the Divine Artificer has designed everything in the world for the best, they are not actually the best as they are presented to our senses. They are the best that such things can be; but they do not attain to the Idea of Good, according to which they have been made. Time, for example, only imperfectly represents the Divine Eternity, which is its true Idea. In Eternity, there is no distinction of past, present, and future. But the bodily nature of things will not admit of this co-instantaneous development of the Divine Idea. Existence is here broken up into successive moments; and these successive moments, marked by the periodic motions of the heavenly bodies, introduce the distinctions of number into the simple idea of duration. Again, the velocities of the heavenly bodies, which are observed by the astronomer, must be conceived as very inadequate representatives of the "real velocities performed in the true number and true figures,"[2] which are the "Ideas" after which they have been established. Or, again, it is clear that the ideas of the good, and the just, and the honourable, and

[1] *Leg.* iv. Ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ ἀδύνατον· ὑπεναντίον γάρ, κ. τ. λ.

[2] *Repub.* vii. p. 158; also *Philebus*, p. 303.

the beautiful, as they are seen in the world around us, are only imperfectly developed. Our thoughts are distracted in the contemplation of them in the world, by the multiplicity of forms under which they are apprehended by men ; and it seems to the superficial glance as if there were no one perfect standard of each. At the same time, we are able to trace evident signs of such a standard, when we look thoughtfully at the course of things. We cannot doubt, on such examination, that these principles exist, and are working their way, and that the Universe has been constructed after the pattern of them. But all that the most attentive study will disclose to us as actually observed, is *tendency* towards these principles—a *becoming* or incipiency of being.[1] We do not see their full effect, or what would be their effect, if the world were such as to give them free scope and exercise, and if the impressions of sense did not diversify and obscure the presentations of them to our minds. Must we not say, then, that if we formed our notions of these principles from the visible world, and the impressions of sense, that we must estimate them improperly? And must we not rather elevate our minds to the Ideas themselves, after which the Universe has been constituted in its present order, and take our measures of them from the Divine Being, whose goodness, and truth, and beauty, they represent?

Thus did the Theory of Ideas serve as a moral explanation of the course of Nature, and meet the demand of Philosophy, by removing the perplexity of the mind on the contemplation of the apparent disorder of the world, and giving a firm stay to the thought in this direction. This apparent disorder has been the constant appeal of the atheist and the sceptic in all ages. And in Plato's time there was need, we find from several passages in his writings, of an answer on the part of Philosophy to speculative objections on this ground. The Theory of Ideas

[1] *Phæd.* 170. Πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦθ' ὅ ἐστιν ἴσον καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν. *Ibid.* 171. προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. He goes on to say this applies to all subjects as well.

supplied this answer. By the theory of a perfect model of good, imperfectly wrought out in the visible Universe, the existence of evil was accounted for in some degree; and the eye of thought was enabled to see a chain of goodness, and beauty, and order, binding together the most untoward appearances of the moral world. As the Pythagoreans enchained these disjointed portions of the moral fabric, by supposing a fundamental Unity pervading the whole, and reducing the multiple and the unlimited to definite proportion, or imagining a sort of key-note modulating the apparent discords of nature[1]—so Plato made the one moral good the all-pervading moderator of the system of the Universe. The abstract notions, the genera, and the species, and the definitions, which dialectical science brought out by the aid of language, presented the materials for extending the moral view to other notions besides those strictly moral; and thus a theological and moral complexion was spread over the whole region of Philosophy.

Ideas of evil were evidently excluded. "The good" could not be the cause of all things, but only of those that were well constituted; of evils it was causeless.[2] Evil, as we have seen, had no exemplar or pattern in the nature of the Author of the Universe. It was a condition of that bodily nature on which the good was actively displayed. Evil arose from the nature of the "diverse"[3] inherent in body; that nature in body by which it was contradistinguished from the "sameness" belonging to the Ideas.

In considering the Theory of Ideas under the different aspects which it presents, we have, in fact, taken a summary view of the whole of Plato's philosophy. This theory is the cardinal principle of the whole. The speculations on particular

[1] *Timæus*, p. 307. Δεσμῶν δ' ὁ κάλλιστος, ὃς ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ξυνδούμενα ὁτιμάλιστα ἓν ποιῇ, τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστα ἀπο τελεῖν· ὁπόταν γὰρ ἀριθμῶν τριῶν, κ. τ. λ. The Pythagoreans were fond of describing moral ideas by terms drawn from mathematics and music. The good man, for example, is τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου; and the words πλημμελῶς, ἐμμελῶς, and the like, borrowed from their philosophy, are familiarly used in a moral sense.

[2] *Rep.* ii. p. 251. Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον.

[3] *Tim.* p. 315. Θατέρου φύσις.

branches of philosophy are all included in this one theory, which binds them together and explains them. For when the mind had once risen to the contemplation of the Ideas, it needed no further helps from observation or study of Nature to understand all knowledge. The mind was then in possession of the only true principles of knowledge; and to enter into the consideration of material and sensible phenomena, was only to return to the darkness and the dreams from which the eye of the intellect had been purified—to quit the light of the sun for the cavern of shadows.

Accordingly, all his writings are devoted to the establishment of this theory. Proceeding on that notion of the importance of the theory which he inculcates, he bends every thought to this one point. No one science is set forth by him in detail; no one subject obtains with him a full and explicit consideration. All is resolved into its most abstract and general view, that the mind may be led to see the common principles of all Truth; so intent is he throughout on his theory of Ideas, whatever may be his immediate subject of discussion. He assumes hypotheses, and examines them, and refutes them in the way of argument, without pronouncing on either side of a particular question, as if indifferent about the establishment of any mere opinion, and desirous only of clearing his way for the perception of his theory.

But to place that theory in its full light, we should advert to the theories of Knowledge and of the Soul, which are intimately connected with it. These theories contain his account of the origin of the Ideas.

Knowledge, according to Plato, is Reminiscence, Ἀνάμνησις, a recovery of forgotten truth, which had been possessed by the soul in a former state of existence. His Dialectic professed to do nothing more than to lead the mind, by apt interrogation, to perceive the Truth for itself. It abandoned the attempt to communicate the Truth by didactic propositions. It only removed falsehood, and left the truth to its own course, to suggest itself to the mind, now disabused of its error and prejudice. It

appealed to principles as certain criteria of truth, and yet confessed its inability to state those principles, and place them distinctly before the mind of the learner. They were simply referred to as existing in every mind, whatever might be the peculiar opinions of the individual to whom the questions of the dialectician were addressed. How, then, could those principles have been acquired? No time in the present life could be pointed out when they first appeared in the mind. They are prior to the sensations; for the sensations are referred to them; and the sensations we have had from our birth. These standard principles, then, must have been acquired in a previous state of existence, and what is commonly called learning is, in fact, Reminiscence; and to know is, properly speaking, to remember.[1]

In proof of this account of the origin of the Ideas, Plato introduces Socrates making an experiment on the mind of an uneducated person. Socrates is represented putting a series of questions to a slave of Meno, one of his disciples, and at length eliciting from the youth, after repeated correction of his errors, a right enunciation of a geometrical truth. Socrates then points triumphantly to the instance, and bids Meno observe how he had *taught* the youth nothing, but simply *interrogated* him as to his opinions, whilst the youth had himself recalled for himself the knowledge thus evidently existing in his mind.[2]

Again, in illustration of the same, Plato refers to instances of association and suggestion. Often, on the sensation of a particular object, we are reminded of something else not present to us. On seeing a lyre, or a dress, which one whom we love has used, a thought occurs of the person to whom it belonged. So also, on seeing pictures of objects, persons and objects will be suggested to the mind, unlike as well as like to the objects in the picture. Or one of two friends being presented to our view, we are reminded of the other who is absent.[3]

Now, the instances here referred to, both those of association or suggestion, and those of the self-teaching of the mind by the

[1] *Phædo*, pp. 166-174. [2] *Meno*, pp. 352-361. [3] *Phædo*.

excitement of its reflection, are highly interesting and important in the history of the origin of ideas. But they do not prove the point for which Plato adduces them. The case of the slave interrogated by Socrates certainly shews that there are principles in the understanding which are not derived from external information, but which only wait to be developed by occasions apt to call them forth. And as to the instances of association or suggestion, we can only say, it is an ultimate fact of our mental constitution, that particular objects serve to bring others before our thoughts. All such instances are illustrations of the fact, that the mind is not passive in its admission of truth, receiving knowledge simply as something infused in it from without; but that its knowledge is, in great measure owing to its exertion of its faculties, and its bringing to bear on the instruction given its own intuitive convictions;—that consequently the excellence of all teaching consists, not so much in the positive mass of instruction conveyed, as in stirring up the mind to exercise the powers with which it is gifted, and to learn from itself.

The stress of Plato's argument in favour of the theory of Reminiscence, and of the previous existence of the Soul as a consequence of it, is laid, we find, on the ground of the priority of the Ideas compared with the several particular sensations which are referred to them as criteria. But the priority which he here claims for the Ideas, is not, in fact, a precedence in the order of time, but of logic. In the process of reasoning, general principles are prior to, and more known than, the particulars which fall under them; because, in possessing them we possess the particulars, and the particulars, as yet unknown, are known by deduction from them as already known. Thus we familiarly speak of a conclusion as *following* from the premises. Now, Plato appears to have transferred a priority of this kind to the Ideas, and then to have concluded their priority ABSOLUTELY, as principles existing in the mind independently of the occasions on which they are called forth. But to establish a theory of Reminiscence, it was further required to be shewn,

that the ideas are prior in the order of *time*,—that we possess them antecedently to, and independently of, all experience. The instance which he has given of the way in which a mathematical conclusion is reached by the simple leading of the mind in the right track, is an instance of what has in modern philosophy been more properly called "Suggestion,"—not of Reminiscence. So far from being an instance of Reminiscence, it shews, on the contrary, that the general principles of the mind are developed *subsequently* to the particular occasions which suggest them. It shews, further, that these principles are in some way dependent on such occasions for their development, though not dependent on them for their truth and reality; for the mind accepts them as true, and as the criteria of all other truth, at the moment when they are presented to it. This, then, is what is really illustrated in Plato's instance in the *Meno*. Geometrical science is the best illustration of it, though it is seen also in all our judgments and reasonings; because the remote conclusions to which we are brought by the chain of exact demonstration in that science from a few very simple definitions, present the fact most strikingly. Those conclusions are clearly far beyond the apparent compass of the definitions themselves. They are strictly deduced from them, however, and with an irresistible cogency of argument. The wonder is accounted for by the fact to which Plato has called our attention. The demonstration of the problem appeals in every successive step to the intuitive convictions of the mind. Ideas are suggested by which the statements at each point of the proof are tested; and we sanction the conclusion ultimately, because the process by which we arrive at it has been approved throughout by clear principles of our own minds; and the definitions alone would not suffice for the fabric of truth developed from them, unless with the light and co-operation of these secret intuitions of the mind itself.

But though the theory of Reminiscence has not been satisfactorily made out by Plato, he has the merit of having distinctly noticed and marked, in speculating on the origin of the Ideas, a class of notions of which no previous account, as it seems, had

been given. The philosophy of sensation had before his time chiefly engaged the attention of thinking men, whether of those of the Eleatic school, who made everything "stationary," or of the Ionic, who made everything "flow."[1] It had been carried into the extreme of refinement by the Sophists, its devotees, when Plato commenced his antagonistic system. He found that this philosophy was too narrow a basis for the structure of science, and that it could not stand alone. He saw that it left altogether unexplored the perceptions of the mind itself, such, for example, as the notions of equality, identity, time, causation, right, etc.; and that these notions were, in truth, more important for the establishment of science, than those which had previously chiefly attracted the attention of philosophers. He applied himself accordingly to examine and characterize these principles. The main thing to be accomplished in such an inquiry, was to distinguish them accurately from the informations of sense; to shew that they were not included in, or in any way derived out of, the informations of sense, but developed by the workings of mind. This fact he has recorded in his theory of Reminiscence,—a term, expressing the point of contrast in his method, to that of the empirical philosophers before him exclusively founded on Sensation.

The truth and importance, accordingly, of Plato's Theory of Ideas, appear in this; that by that theory he laid a stable foundation of science, in the principles themselves of the human mind. His error is, that he carried that theory too far; that he included in it notions which are not part of the fundamental principles of the mind, and thus involved his theory in vagueness and paradox. The war of Nominalism and Realism is well known to every one who has looked into the History of Philosophy, or of Theological opinion. This found its occasion in the wide generalization of the Ideal Theory. Had Plato restricted his theory to such notions as really exist in the mind; and had he not extended it, without discrimination, to those which belong to general

[1] Plato characterizes them; the one as the τοῦ ὄντος στασιῶται; the others, as οἱ ῥεόντες. *Theæt.*

terms, and which are purely notional, and are only real in that sense as acts or states of the thinking mind ; there would not have been that ground for controversy on the subject. As the case has been,—one class of disputants, looking to the generalizations of language, the genera and species of logic, took the nominalist view of the subject,—imputing to the whole of the ideas the attribute of one portion of them ;—the other class of disputants, justly observing the reality of certain general principles, as objects of thought, became the advocates of realism throughout. What has been already said on the dialectical origin of the theory, will sufficiently account for the confusion of two such dissimilar classes of principles in Plato's system.

How shall we wonder, therefore, that the great logical philosopher who followed him should find it necessary to combat the theory of Ideas in the undefined form in which it had been left by its author. As thus left, it stood in the way of those exact arrangements of the objects of thought which the rigorous method of Aristotle required, and introduced a class of existences for which he could find no place in his system.

Nor, further, will it be matter of wonder that controversies should have arisen in the schools respecting the nature of the Ideas ; such as, whether they subsisted by themselves, or were bodies, or were actually separable from sensible things, or only separable from them in thought ; or whether they were locally situated anywhere in the Universe, or only in the Divine Mind. The establishing of the theory in its general form was the great business of Plato : it was enough for him to have projected it above the horizon of philosophy. Others would elaborate it after him with more or less skill. Various speculations would be raised concerning it ; and controversy would at length reduce it to more definite form, and a precision beyond the contemplation of its author.

But, however just and important the Ideal Theory is in its connection with metaphysical science, it is but too clear that it retarded the advancement of sound physical philosophy, by its substitution of final causes for physical, and consequently with-

drawing attention entirely from the latter. It would follow, indeed, from the suspicion thrown over the informations of sense, and the undervaluing of experience, that physical science would be slighted under such a system of philosophy. But the dominion of the theory of Ideas would necessarily exclude any other consideration in order to the Truth, but that of tendencies or final causes. No other view of Nature, but that supplied by this theory, would be conceived to possess the stability which science demanded. Accordingly, hypotheses would occupy the place of investigation here. The philosopher would be speculating on what ought to be, instead of observing accurately what IS; and assuming *a priori* notions of "the best," in order to determine the law of physical facts. The principle, "that all things are constituted for the best," no doubt holds good in physics as well as in other studies of the Divine workmanship; but it is here the termination of inquiry, not the commencement. It may even be employed instrumentally in the process of inquiry, to lead the mind to a point to which investigation should be directed. And this it may effect in two ways: either, from considering the good intended in the structure of some object, we may be led to see the parts of that structure in a way which discloses their real organization, and which we should otherwise not have observed; or, from taking our view of an object, not as it is actually exhibited in inferior specimens, or in those states of it in which it is seen only in progress, or under distortion, but from the most perfect specimens,—those most answerable to a divine intention or tendency to the best,—we may judge what it *is*, by considering what it *would* or *should be*. And this especially holds good in morals. But to lay down Final causes as principles from which the truths of physics may be deduced, is, as Bacon says, to corrupt Natural philosophy with Theology, and to render it barren of all fruits.

Such, then, is the state of Plato's Natural Philosophy. In fact, though he asserts the importance of Physics in his own sense of the term, the science has no place in his philosophy. He goes so far indeed as to say that no art can flourish apart

from a knowledge of physical truth; and he attributes the imperfect Rhetoric of his day to its want of such a foundation. But even whilst he imputes the superiority of Pericles as an orator to his studies under Anaxagoras, he strongly objects to the system of that philosopher, as we have already seen, on account of his leaving out all consideration of Final causes.

Accordingly, in the dialogue which fills up this department of his system, he speaks in the person of the Pythagorean, Timæus, and strictly follows the Pythagorean notions. The detail of this dialogue consists of a history of the order of the formation of the Universe in all its parts; commencing with an account of the Universe at large, and the hierarchy of the heavens, and ending with a minute explanation of the structure of man, in regard to his moral and intellectual, as well as his physical powers. And here mathematical figures and proportions are the principles into which the composition and motions of all bodies are resolved. But the theory on which the whole speculation turns, and which gives the explanation of the phenomena, is the theory of "the BEST." It is an account of Good operating throughout the Universe, conforming everything to itself, and constraining the untoward nature of Body to yield to its sovereign power. A perfectly intelligent and good Author of all things is assumed; and his order of proceeding is inferred from that which presents itself to our view as "the best." Thus the Father of the Universe constructs it after the eternal unchanging pattern; "for that is the noblest of generated things, and the best of causes." He formed by his immediate operation whatever is of eternal unchanging nature. Nothing, indeed, but Himself, is immortal and indissoluble by its own nature; but, good as he is, he can never be disposed to destroy what is good. And therefore the fabric of the Universe and the celestial beings, the generated and visible divinities included in it, (with the highest order of whom Plato's description identifies the luminaries of the heavens), subsist eternally, not of themselves, but by virtue of their participation of Good.[1] Whatever is subject to death,—as

[1] *Timæus*, pp. 303, 325.

the bodily nature of man and brutes,—being imperfect, is the work of the generated divinities, imitating the power of the Supreme. It is with these secondary Gods that he connects the popular mythology ; deriving from them the parentage of Saturn, and Jove, and the other objects of heathen worship ; and leaving the further account of their origin to be given by the current tradition. Thus the supreme God is described as the Author of all good throughout the Universe ; and where anything of evil or imperfection is, the agency of the subordinate powers, and the irrational nature of body, are interposed to guard him from imputation of evil.

Derived as his history of the Universe evidently is from the early theogonies, it is very remarkable that it keeps clear altogether of the oriental dualism. There is but One Active Principle in his system of the Universe, the Principle of Good ; and nothing forms, or moves, but that only. "Let us not," indeed, he expressly says in another place, "conceive that there are any two gods, of contrary sentiments, causing the revolution of the Universe.[1] He seems indeed to personify the irrational force of body, where he describes it under the name of Ἀνάγκη, Necessity. But he is evidently only speaking in metaphorical language here ; (that language probably derived from personifications found in the early cosmogonies) ; intending to represent that inert power by which Nature, as we speak, acts according to its laws.

It must have been observed all along how important a place the nature of Body occupies in Plato's philosophy. He has nowhere, however, attempted to give any positive description of the nature of Body. It is in truth, rather a condition in order to the development of the Ideal theory in connection with the phenomena of sensation, than any positive nature, according to his conception of it. He has left it in the most mysterious form: nor does he seem to distinguish it from Space, when he shadows it out by negatives of the attributes of all actual existence. In giving an analysis of production or "becoming," γένεσις, he enumerates three principles as concerned in the process:

[1] *Polit.* p. 30. Μήτ' αὖ δύο τινὲ θεὼ φρονοῦντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν.

1. The thing produced ; 2. That in which it is produced; 3. That from which the thing produced takes the pattern of its production ; depicting them under the analogy of "the father, the mother, and the offspring."[1] The notion of body is here represented by the intermediate term of the three, namely, that in which the production takes place. "The nurse," "the general receptacle," and "the laboratory," or "mould" in which a figure is cast,—ἐκμαγεῖον, are also expressions by which he endeavours to characterize it; as being in its own nature incapable of being presented to the senses or the intellect. "As a person," he says, "observing a perpetual succession of figures moulded of gold, if asked during the process what was moulded, could only safely answer, that it was gold ;"[2] so we must be content to speak of this nature, calling it only a receptacle of forms or species, and not attributing it to any particular species whatever. The tendency of this theory of Body is obviously to remove all material phenomena from the class of real existences. And it seems to point to the origin of Plato's Ideal theory in some older philosophy avowedly idealistic. At any rate, the speculation concerning body, as it stands in his system, leaves a hiatus in the transition from the world of Ideas to that of material existence.

The doctrine of Soul, as delivered by Plato, is properly the connecting link between the worlds of "Being" and Sensation. Hence is derived the importance of the theory of the Immortality of the soul in his philosophy. For it is in the soul that the eternal and immutable is found in the presence of the incipient and evanescent,—the intellectual idea in contact, so to say, with the phenomena of sense. The soul partakes of change, as it is connected with the bodily nature : it is eternal and unchangeable, as it is the seat of intelligence.

Soul, then, according to Plato, is the necessary condition for the development of intelligence in the Universe, as Body is for the existence of sensation. Soul, therefore, was necessarily prior to Body, as the first condition in order to the constitution of the

[1] *Timœus*, pp. 342-344. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 344.

Universe. It was the animating principle by means of which the Deity, when he brought the world out of the disorder and confusion of unreason, communicated intelligence to it, fashioning it after the pattern of the eternal Ideas. And not only is the whole Universe thus ensouled by the immediate agency of the Deity; but every particular system in it, in which any degree of intelligence is found united with body, has, in the very gift of that intelligence, a soul originally imparted to it by the Father of the Universe himself.

This is the ultimate account of that Immortality which Plato attributes to the soul of man. It is not as a *human* soul that it is immortal; but it derives an eternal existence from its being among the original intelligent units of the animated Universe. We see indeed a constant production of living things in the world; but it is not, as they have "Being," that they are thus *produced* or *generated* or *become*. This is the result of that "diverse" nature which was blended in their original composition with their higher principles,—with the principles, forsooth, of "sameness" and "being."

For these are the three principles into which Plato analyzes Soul,—the principles of the SAME and the DIVERSE, and BEING;[1] and by these he explains the phenomena of its actual existence. No time can be assigned, then, to the origin of that which by its nature IS, and is the SAME essentially. No one soul, therefore, can now *begin* to exist. And again, whatever once exists can never cease to exist, unless there is anything capable of destroying its principles of Sameness and Being. But Death, as he shews, has no such power. It may disengage the soul from its present body by dissolving the body; but it cannot affect the essential vitality which is in the soul. This essential vitality is the direct contrary to death. It therefore recedes when death comes, according to that law of Contraries, which holds throughout the world of Generation and Corruption, and which is the agent in all changes. But it still lives as vigorously as ever, and returns to animate another body in the course of Genera-

[1] *Timæus*, p. 344.

tion.[1] Nor, for the same reason, can it maintain an unvaried perpetuity of existence. It remains ever undestroyed; but from that "diverse" principle which enters into its composition, it both alters in its internal character, and only imperfectly imitates the Eternal Nature by a successive re-appearance in the forms of new bodies.[2] Thus, whilst it returns to the sensible world, it migrates from the male to the female sex, or to forms of the lower animals, according to that condition of purity in which it departed from its last body, or its previous degree of intellectual cultivation. For, as we may observe, there is no original distinction, according to the theory, between the soul of one man and another, and the soul of man and brute. All are equal in intelligence and goodness, as the immediate work of the Divine Author. The varieties in the characters of souls arise from the operation of the inferior deities who framed the bodies of men and brutes, and the use which individuals may make of their circumstances in the world. Whilst the number of souls, then, remains the same, they are continually changing their habitations, and passing by death from one body to another in the different forms of animal life; undergoing degradation with the forms of inferior animals, or elevation with those of superior nature, according to their state of improvement, or deterioration, in a former existence.[3]

The theory of the Immortality of the soul thus rests entirely on the Theory of Ideas. It is the universality, and being, and truth, and perfection of the Ideas which prove the soul to be eternal.[4] Ideas are found existing in the mind; but their acquisition cannot be traced to any particular period of a man's present life. They have been there from time immemorial; for no one can say when they first appeared in his own mind. They were therefore born with us; and if so, they must have had existence before our birth: and who can limit that existence?

[1] *Leg.* x. p. 106. Ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον.

[2] *Phædo; Meno.*

[3] *Timæus*, p. 433; *Phædo, ad fin.*

[4] *Meno*, p. 361 Οὐκοῦν, εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη.

They have existed, for ought we know to the contrary, from all eternity: and who, then, shall limit their existence by any future period? why may they not be born with us in a life subsequent to the present, as they were born with us in the present life, and so on to all eternity in endless generations? This is in substance the train of reasoning by which Plato seeks to establish the immortality of the soul. A similar argument has been reproduced in modern metaphysical treatises, variously modified and stated, but the same in substance. How little calculated it is to produce practical conviction, whilst we admire its ingenuity, is evidenced by Cicero's confession, that whilst he wept over the *Phædo*, his mind retained no deep impressions from the argument.[1]

This brings us to the consideration of Plato's ethical system, in its vital connection with his physical and metaphysical doctrines.

The two great principles on which his ethical system reposes, are; 1*st*, that no one is willingly evil;[2] 2*d*, that every one has in his own will a power of inducing changes in his character.[3]

These principles are only the counterpart ethical expressions of his theories of immutable Being, on the one hand, and of the world of phenomena, or mere Becoming, on the other.

For the soul of man, so far as it has any good or truth in it, is framed after the pattern of the eternal Ideas of the Good and True. These Ideas, under the various moral aspects which they present, constitute its moral nature. All its desires, therefore, naturally tend to the Good and True. These qualities are what the soul would be. They are the mysterious realities to which it is striving to attain, in all those various efforts after Pleasure which it makes in the present life;—unconscious it may be, as it is in fact in the depraved, of the true nature of the objects to which its affections ultimately point. Still, if it be conceded

[1] Cicero, *Tusc. Qu.* i. 11.
[2] *Timæus*, 218; *Leg.* ix.
[3] *Leg.*, x.; *Ibid.* v. p. 212; *Ibid.* ix. p. 17; *Phileb.* p. 231.

that Ideas are the only proper Beings, and that everything else is phenomenal, or the product and offspring of the generating power of the eternal Ideas, it must also be admitted, that nothing else can be the real source of moral phenomena but the Good and True. In the moral, no less than in the physical world, a constant succession of passing events is found to take place. We perceive a variety of affections in the nature of man as he is in the world, directed to a variety of objects, each aiming at some particular gratification; one desire and its gratification passing away, and others succeeding it in endless flow. All this restless course, then, of moral events exhibited in the life of man is phenomenal; not in the sense of its having no reality whatever, but of its having no *permanent* reality—of its being no more in the result than effort towards being—restless, endless effort towards that which may give rest and full satisfaction, and stable being.

This ultimate object, then, however indistinctly sought, is the aim of every individual soul of man. Some, indeed, avowedly make mere sensual gratification the end of their desires. They endeavour to satisfy themselves with the limited and the evanescent. But the true cause of all that perverted activity which they display, is the Good itself. They know not what the Good is; but they love it in spite of themselves, and bear evidence, by their life of unceasing pursuit, that they are secretly actuated by the desire of it,—and that they can find no rest in anything short of it. Their soul, originally formed in the likeness of the Deity, can never willingly be separated from its Divine image. In the midst of its wildest aberrations, it feels the attraction of like to like, impelling, and, at the same time, reclaiming it to right.

This accordingly is Plato's meaning in the principle, which he so emphatically lays down, that "no one is willingly evil." It is very different, we may observe, from saying that no one commits evil willingly. And Plato himself takes care to guard his theory from this misconstruction. He readily grants, that acts of wrong are distinguished by being voluntary and involun-

tary, without which there could be neither merit nor demerit; but he strenuously maintains that this distinction does not apply to evil itself. It is in all cases involuntary. No one can choose it in itself. It is necessarily the object of aversion, as the good is invariably the object of choice and pursuit.

How is it, then, it will be inquired, that men do become evil;—that whilst they are really seeking to be conformed to a divine pattern, they practically do what is evil, and, losing more and more of their likeness to the Eternal Being, conform themselves rather to the fleeting character of the world of sensation?

The explanation is found in the other great principle of Plato's philosophy, the theory of Becoming, to which we have referred. Change is the characteristic of all that belongs to this subject; as immutability is the characteristic of Being. The cause itself of successive phenomena may be varied by impressions from circumstances. In the soul there is a principle of change in the power of regulating the desires,—in indulging them to excess, or moderating them, according to the will. And the circumstances in which the soul is placed, as connected with the sensible world by means of the body, present the occasion for such change. The humours and distempers of the body produce discomposure in the soul. It becomes diseased analogously to the body. This state of disease is what is commonly called folly, *ἀνοία*; and it takes the form either of madness, *μανία*, or of mere ignorance, *ἀμαθία*. Where even ignorance only is the result, the internal harmony of the soul is disturbed. Pleasures and pains are unduly magnified; the democracy of the passions prevails; and the ascendency of reason is cast down. In addition to these disturbances or ailments through the body, come the influences of evil governments, evil public lessons, evil education. Hence the soul is changed from what it was when it first came from the hands of its Divine Author. The eternal Ideas after which it was framed are not effaced from it. This cannot be; for then it would cease to have being; but it loses distinct apprehension of them,—mistakes appearances of

good for good itself,—and under that delusion willingly does evil, and presumes on obtaining happiness by a course of evil conduct.

But the same principle of change in the soul gives an opening also for its moral restoration. As the soul is deteriorated by the contagion of the body, so it may also be restored to a sound state by remedial treatment. The yielding to every passing desire, and suffering the desires to grow out of proportion, and destroy the harmony of the soul, is the cause of men's falling into that blindness which hides the good from their mental eye. By restraining then, and moderating the desires, the internal disorder is gradually corrected; reason resumes its ascendency; the soul once more "sees and hears aright," and thus returns to that good to which its desires naturally tend. It is a long process, indeed, by which the restoration is effected; a process of gradual purification, κάθαιρσις, of the soul, by chastisement and suffering. Nor is it accordingly completed in a single life; many courses of existence must be passed through. Not only is the present life of the soul a consequence of its conduct in a former one; but it is destined to many successive stages of existence, each adapted to the character acquired at the stage next preceding, until its defilements are purged away.

These ethical doctrines of the philosopher, when divested of the extravagance of his theory, so far accord with the truth both of inspiration and experience, as they indicate, that the utmost man can do in the present life is insufficient to restore in him the lost image of God. Whilst they lay down this truth under the disguise of the remedial process of the transmigration of the soul, they further agree with the inspired authority, and with experience, in imposing on man the duty of *commencing* the process of restoration, and in holding him strictly responsible for the state of his mind and affections, through that power of self-direction and capacity of improvement by discipline, with which he has been endued. Thus does he also bear evidence both to the fact of the perfection of man at his creation, and that of his existing

corruption. But he differs from the Scripture-account of that corruption, in making it originally a physical rather than a moral debasement, and representing it as taking place by a gradual process, and not by a sudden and entire fall, the effect of a first transgression of a positive divine command.

The Sophists, indeed, boasted of their power of transforming the characters of men, and accordingly made great profession of "teaching virtue."[1] But they coupled with this pretension, the admission, that all opinions on moral, no less than on other subjects, are equally true. All opinions in morals, they said, are true; "but all are not good. What we would effect, therefore, is to lead men to such opinions as we know also to be both good and wise."[2] But this was a mere evasion; for if all opinions are equally true, then must also each man's view of good be true, as well as that which his instructor would inculcate on him; and there is no fixed standard to which he may be conformed. Plato's theory of good, as the sole object of desire,—or the invariable tendency of the will to good, and its invariable aversion from evil,—was a strong ground of opposition to the sophistical doctrine. It pointed out that there was a principle in man superior to instruction, and independent of the accidents of worldly circumstances, the Θέος μέτρον, the "God-measure," the fixed Divine standard, to which all moral teaching should be directed, and from a reference to which all moral discipline obtained its value.

From this mode of enunciating the fundamental principles of morals, it followed, that the practical morality which Plato teaches, should be directed to the means of removing the false appearances of good by which the mind is deluded to evil. He shews, accordingly, that there are false pleasures as well as false opinions—that men's ignorance extends, not only to mistakes in regard to their wealth or bodily accomplishments, but as to their moral characters; for that most men think themselves better

[1] Gorgias, however, appears to have been an exception in this respect. He laughed at the other Sophists for pretending to teach virtue. He professed only the art of words.

[2] *Protag.*

than they really are.[1] Thus does he apply to morals more particularly, the general confession which his philosophy exacts of its disciple on all subjects, that he knows not what he presumed he knew, and sends every one to learn himself, in order that he may be truly a moral man.[2]

This, therefore, according to Plato, is the great purpose for which Philosophy must be cultivated. Philosophy alone can open the eyes to see the true value of things, and alone elevate the mind from the evanescent region of the phenomenal world to the seat of true and eternal Being.

For the same reason Dialectic, as *immediately* conversant about the Ideas of the Good and the True, is the ultimate study of him that would seek to educate and improve the powers of his soul to the utmost.

Philosophy, and religion, and morality, in fact, in his system, perfectly coincide. The love of Truth is also the love of Good, and the love of Good is the love of Truth,[3] and the Chief Good and the Truth itself are the Deity. The process by which the good man is effected, philosophically viewed, is the exercise of a power of analysing pleasure and pains; an art of mensuration, as it were,—enabling the mind to discriminate between Truth and Good on the one hand, and their semblances on the other, and distinctly to apprehend them, under whatever disguise they may be presented and obscured by the senses; just as we learn, by measuring, the real magnitude of objects, which, estimated by the sight, appear to us larger or smaller according to their distance from the eye.[4] Morally viewed, the dominant notion of his system is, the one motive of the love of Truth and Good prevailing over, and purifying, and absorbing into itself, every desire of Human nature.[5] In the first view, it is Wisdom or

[1] *Philebus*, p. 285. Πολὺ δὲ πλεῖστοί γε, οἶμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τούτων διημαρτήκασιν ἀρετῆς, δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἑαυτοὺς, οὐκ ὄντες.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 284. Τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 305. Μήτ' εἴς τινας ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες, μήτέ τινας εὐδοκιμίας, αλλ' εἴτις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾷν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν.

[4] *Polit.*; *Protag.*

[5] *Sympos.* p. 247, *et seq.*

Philosophy; in the latter, it is Purification,—and perfect Virtue,—a discipline of Immortality,—resemblance and participation of the Deity.[1] We find in him, what appears the most received and ancient division of Virtue into the four Cardinal Virtues, as they are termed, of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance, but no particular discussion, as in Aristotle, of the characteristics of each. In his view in fact, Temperance, or more correctly to render the Greek expression, Σωφροσύνη, "sober-mindedness," or that state of mind in which reason maintains its supremacy over the passions, is the dominant principle of all moral conduct. The restraining and subduing of the appetites and desires, become the one great moral aim in a system of morals, which has the purification of the soul from all bodily contagion as its end of pursuit.

These views of moral truth are in themselves certainly grand and ennobling. As guides, however, to duty, they are deficient in that particularity and homeliness of application which are required for the real business of morality. The tendency of Plato's ethical disquisitions to contemplative mysticism is obvious, left as they are by Plato in undefined outline, and adorned with the graces and charms of his imaginative eloquence. Nor shall we wonder that they have easily combined with the feeling of asceticism, so congenial to the human heart. The contempt which they throw over everything belonging to the bodily nature of man,—the delusiveness imputed to the senses, without any limitation of it, or guard against abuse of the theory,—and the abstractedness from the world which they propose,—admit of being construed into a theory of absolute suicidal mortification of the body, and of the purifying efficacy of self-inflicted punishments. These tendencies, indeed, of Plato's ethical doctrines, were, not long after his time, exemplified in the apathy and austerity of the Stoic morality. And it is well known to what extent they have been deve-

[1] *Theætet.* p. 121. Διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὀτιτάχιστα· φυγὴ δὲ, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ, δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι, κ. τ. λ.

loped in the teaching and practice of religionists of all creeds. It cannot be denied, also, that where they take hold of a morbid and susceptible temperament of mind, they tend to substitute, in such a case, the morality of imagination and sentiment for that of common sense and household feeling, and to fritter away the convictions of duty into mere proprieties of taste; so that, even whilst they elevate the character above sordid and vulgar seductions of pleasure, they emasculate and corrupt it, through the very excess of its theoretical refinement.

As bad education was regarded by Plato as the other great cause of human corruption, in addition to the evil influence of Body on the soul, he directs a large portion of his philosophical disquisitions to correct the evil arising from this second source. His ethical discussions go to the limiting of the desires, and curing the diseases produced by them in the soul: his political discussions have for their proper object, the laying down right principles of education, and enforcing them by the constitution, laws, and power of the state.[1] His two great works, the most elaborate of his writings, the Dialogues of the *Republic*, and the *Laws*, are, accordingly, rather theories of Education, than, of Government and Laws, as their titles would import.[2] Both have in view the practical improvement of Human nature by social institutions expressly framed for that purpose.

We must not, however, suppose that Plato contemplated as a result, the actual foundation of a state, according to the principles of polity and legislation laid down in these two famous dialogues. His object was to give an example of the most perfect life, free from those impediments which all existing governments and laws threw across the path of the virtuous man. As Philosophy is the guide of private life, elevating it to the knowledge of the Good and the True, so he would have Philosophy also seated on the throne of Government, and exhibit the eternal Ideas of Good and Truth, modifying society

[1] *Leg.*, vii. p. 354.

[2] *Ibid.* i. p. 41. Πρῶτον δὴ οὖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὁρισώμεθα παιδείαν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης φαμὲν ἰτέον εἶναι τὸν προκεχειρισμένον ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, μέχρι περ ἂν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀφίκηται.

after their pattern, whether it were in the frame of the Government, or in the particular institutions and enactments of the state. All is made to tend, both in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*, to the one great object of Plato's mind, the sketching of the Idea of the Good as a social principle, apart from the evil influences of existing society.

We may imagine him then, in the composition of these two works, especially in that of the *Republic* as the leading one, addressing himself to the task of expressing the Ideas of the perfect polity. Observe him, according to his own illustration,[1] like the painter with his tablet before him, abstracted in thought from everything around him, musing on the high subject,—one while, looking off to the Divine Ideas which he would represent, then again, to his tablet, as he proceeds in the work,—painting in this, obliterating that,—touching and retouching,—pleased, as anything in the execution responds to his effort,—distressed as any effect disappoints his eager expectation; and so throughout, anxiously labouring to delineate, with such faithfulness as may be attained by means of the forms and colours of this lower world, objects, whose seat is in the region of ethereal light, and visible only to the gifted eye, which has had its vision purified and strengthened by Philosophy!

How shall he effectually accomplish the arduous task? Is it to be wondered at, that, dazzled by the splendour of the objects, he should have failed to realize them in his picture, or should have even erred in some way in his conception of them, and incurred censure by extravagances and conceits? We are forced to admit, that there are such blemishes in his execution of his great work; that he aims at an impossible unity in his scheme; that, lost in admiration of the beauty and perfection of the Divine Ideas themselves, he seeks to impress them at his will on the forms of things in the world; and thus, altogether overlooks distinctions deeply founded in the nature of man, and tramples on some of the tenderest and most sacred feelings of

[1] *Rep.* vi. p. 104. Ἀαβόντες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα. κ. τ. λ. Also *Leg.* vi. p. 285. ὅισθ' ὅτι καθάπερ ζωγράφων οὐδὲν πέρας ἔχειν ἡ πραγματεία δοκεῖ. κ. τ. λ.

the human heart? Such is the great fault of his supposed community of wives and children; his disregard of the characteristic proprieties of the sexes, imposing on women the exercises of the gymnasium, not caring to extinguish in them the feeling of modesty; denying them the nursing and training of their children; prohibiting throughout the possession of private property, and carrying that notion so far, as to insist, that "the very notion of what is called one's own, should by all means, from every quarter, be wholly exterminated out of human life,—that it is best, where it is contrived, as far as possible, that even things that are by nature one's own, should, somehow, become common; eyes, and ears, and hands, should seem to see, and hear, and act, in common—all persons to praise and blame in one way—all rejoicing and grieving at the same things."[1]

Most justly indeed, has Aristotle censured these aberrations of the speculative judgment of his great Master, and pointed out the vanity of supposing to remove the evils felt from the inequality of the members of society, and from the absence of a common interest and unity of feeling, by such external arrangements; when the cause of the crimes committed in society lies much deeper,—not in any outward circumstances of life,—but in the depravity of men.[2]

Strongly as we must condemn these extravagances, we may still admire the originality and boldness of the artist, who has not been deterred by the objections against them,—for there can be no doubt, that he was fully aware that there were such grave objections;—this we clearly see, in his own hesitation in adverting to the most offensive particulars. An inferior hand would have held itself back from such representations. It is as in a picture of a great master, in which some things appear to the eye of an ordinary critic out of place, or in themselves ridiculous and absurd; but which are seen by those conversant

[1] *Leg.* v. Op. 8, p. 229. Πρώτη μὲν τοίνυν πόλις τε ἐστι καὶ πολιτεία, καὶ νόμοι ἄριστοι, ὅπου τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον ἂν γίγνηται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα, λέγεται δε, ὡς ὄντως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· τοῦτ' οὖν εἴτε που νῦν ἔστι, εἴτ' ἔσται ποτὲ, κ. τ. λ.

[2] Aristot. Polit. ii. cc. 1–4.

with the art and the style, as perfectly consistent with the design, and, if faulty, only such faults as a man of genius would commit. Thus, to Plato, describing as he does, a polity, not having its existence or possibility of existence on the earth, but only where the Divine archetypes of all that is good and true in the Universe have their Being—that is in the presence of the Deity Himself, "the King," as he styles Him, in the Heavens; the concerns of this world might well seem of little importance. Human nature sinks into insignificance in his view. Man is regarded, to use his own expression, as "a sort of plaything of the Deity,"—θεοῦ τι παίγνιον,—having but little of truth, or reality in his nature, and scarcely worth any serious attention. "You disparage altogether the race of men," says a speaker in the Dialogue of *The Laws:* "wonder not at it," replies the Athenian; but make allowance for me; for it was from looking off to the Deity, and under emotion, that I expressed what I have now said. However, let it be granted, that our race is not insignificant, if you please, but worth some serious consideration."[1] Such is the spirit in which he deals throughout this work with human nature, as if human beings were only so many chessmen to be moved in a game on the board, so as to display the admirable design of the all-disposing mind, and illustrate the working of the eternal Ideas. The error is in his philosophy itself. As in his physical speculations, so here, he commences from the final cause, or the notion of the Best, and constitutes the world of social life after that; instead of rising from the study of its actual formation, to the notion of the Best, he supposes that he can arrive at a just view of the Divine pattern of the Good, by presenting a theory of it after his own conceptions of the Best. Having once formed his theory, he was not to be checked by any repulsive consequences from pushing it to the utmost.

The true vindication of his Theory of the perfect Polity, is, after all, to be found in the fact, that he is shadowing out a Divine Life, rather than describing the outline of a State. It is

[1] *Leg.* vii. op. p. 353.

perhaps only doing justice to his design, to say, that he was unconsciously feeling in the dark, while the sun of Gospel-Truth was as yet far below the horizon, after that "Kingdom of God which is within us,"—the citizenship of the Saints of God,—the πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς, of which an Apostle speaks,—[1] dimly and confusedly as in a dream, anticipating, amidst the surrounding thick darkness, that period, when the things of this world shall have passed away; and when there will be "neither marrying nor being given in marriage," but all will be "as the angels of God in Heaven."

It is not then so much to remedy the evils of any existing condition of society, by the substitution of a better, as to educate men for a higher and better condition of being, that he is speculating. As the form of a state, his theoretic Republic may be most imperfect; as such, it may be said to be utterly defective in neglecting the great mass of the people comprized in a state, and providing only for those by nature best constituted to profit by the institution, and to be fit examples of it; the whole being directed to the forming of the minds, and character of the highest class, those designated the "Guards" of the city. Still his proceeding might be fully justified by the explanation, that he was not constructing a polity of this world,—he was not making laws for any one form of government known among men, but building up, and regulating, an invisible internal polity in the souls of men, and training them for immortality.[2]

[1] Philipp. iii. 20. The notion of "a polity" is not unfrequently adopted and applied by the Fathers of the Church to Christianity. St. Augustine's great work is *De Civitate Dei*. St. Paul also (Phil. i. 27) uses the verb; Μόνον ἀξίως τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χριστοῦ πολιτεύεσθε. It would seem that the ethical application of the term was become familiar at the outset of the Gospel, from the spread of the knowledge of Plato's philosophy through the school of Alexandria.

This notion of the similarity of the internal condition of man to that of a state, runs through Plato's system; as in his illustration of the character of individuals from the account of the different forms of government, in the 3d and 9th Books of the *Republic*, Ἴθι δή μοι ἔφην, ὦδε σκόπει· τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἀναμιμνησκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν, τὰ παθήματα ἑκατέρου λέγε. P. 250. Οἶσθ' οὖν ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπον τινὰ εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν, 186.

[2] Rep. ix., 281, Μανθάνω· ἔφη, ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ· ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ

Thus, referring to the imperfect attempts previously made by written laws, he observes, that it might be objected to his work as compared with these, very much as an empiric in the art of healing might object to the treatment of a case by the scientific physician, who should explain to the patient the nature of his disease, and trace it to its cause; "that he was educating the sick man; as if he wanted to become a physician, and not to be made well."[1] The objection, he admits, would be so far just, that he is in fact seeking to educate, in making laws for a people; speculating at leisure on what might be best for them; not like a tyrant or despot, sternly ordaining laws with their penalties, and then going his way, and caring no more about the matter; but after the manner of a father or mother, sensibly dealing with them, and making it evident that, out of affection for them, he was devising only what was most honourable, and best for them.[2]

Comparing the two Dialogues, we may say, that whilst both purpose to educate man according to the principle of immortality which is in him; and both employ the machinery of a state in elaborating their respective schemes; the *Republic* contemplates the improvement of man, as he is an *individual* in the world; the *Laws*, his improvement as a *member* of a state, or of some particular community in society. The *Republic*, accordingly, might reasonably not concern itself about the great mass and variety of whom a state must in fact consist: whilst the *Laws*, respecting man in society, undertake to regulate the whole body of the citizens in their public and private life, in their civil as well as religious duties throughout. The *Laws* presuppose, and have reference to, the Divine Life instituted in the *Republic;* inasmuch as that is the great end to be kept in view, whatever may

οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. Ἀλλ' ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. Διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἐστὶν, εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἀλλῆς δε οὐδεμιᾶς.

[1] Leg. ix. op. 9, p. 11.

[2] Leg. ix., pp. 13, 14, οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν γραφῆς γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς σχήμασι φιλούντων τε καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων φαίνεσθαι τὰ γεγραμμένα· ἢ κατὰ τύραννον καὶ δεσπότην, τάξαντα καὶ ἀπειλήσαντα, γράψαντα ἐν τοίχοις, ἀπηλλάχθαι.

be the actual form of government in the state. That, it is conceded, cannot be actually represented in any human society: it can only exist, if anywhere, he says, where "Gods or sons of Gods administer it, subsisting in a life of enjoyment." Still it is the one pattern, the παράδειγμα, to be kept ever in view: all that can be attempted in the world, is, to effect one like it to the utmost, or approximate to it as nearly as may be. And such is the scheme of legislation which the dialogue of the *Laws* seeks to embody in its several institutions and enactments.[1]

This dialogue is very remarkable among the works of Plato, as that in which Socrates altogether disappears from the scene, and the chief speaker and instructor throughout, is simply an Athenian; whilst the others engaged in the conversation, are Clinias a Cretan, and Megillus a Lacedæmonian, persons apparently of no particular note, perhaps only fictitious names, standing as representatives of the systems of legislation to which they respectively belong, for the purpose of introducing the prominent points of each system into the discussion, and the observations on them by the philosopher, as he proceeds in his subject. It exhibits more of the character of a regular treatise on the matter proposed, than of the gradual, and sometimes desultory, proceeding from step to step in the argument, which characterizes the dialogues in general. The Cretan and the Lacedæmonian, in fact, take but little part in the conversation. They rather serve to give the usual form of a dialogue, than contribute at all materially to the discussion.

It would seem that Plato in this particular work, touching immediately on the politics and history of the leading states of Greece, felt called upon in a manner by the nature of the discussion to speak more in his own person, and express his opinion not only as a philosopher, but as a citizen of Athens. The

[1] Leg. v. op. 8, p. 230. Ἡ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις εἴτε που Θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες Θεῶν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι πλείονες ἑνός, οὕτω διαζῶντες εὐφραινόμενοι κατοικοῦσι. Διὸ δὴ παράδειγμά γε πολιτείας οὐκ ἄλλῃ χρὴ σκοπεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐχομένους ταύτης, τὴν ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαύτην ζητεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν. Ἣν δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, εἴη τε ἂν γενομένη πως, ἀθανασίας ἐγγύτατα· καὶ ἡ μὲν δευτέρως· τρίτην δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐὰν Θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, διαπερανούμεθα.

theory of the *Republic* fell strictly under the general scope of his Philosophy. It was an exemplification of what a state ought to be on the principles of his Philosophy. It was therefore only consistent, that it should still obtain utterance under the mask which it had all along assumed. And Socrates, accordingly, is presented before us in the *Republic* in the usual way, as leading the conversation, interesting the young men with whom he is talking, by his questions and his lively manner, to enter more and more with him into the subject, and so enticing them on, until he unfolds to them the whole argument of the work.

That Socrates should disappear altogether from this Dialogue on *Laws*, may be attributed partly to the scene of it. The conversation is supposed to take place in Crete on the occasion of a public sacrifice to be performed at the Temple of Jupiter near the city of Cnossus. Though Plato does not feel bound to observe in his Dialogues the congruities of time and place, the inconsistency might have seemed too palpable, had Socrates, who was known as a constant resident at Athens, and never to have left it but on one or two remarkable occasions of military service, been introduced into the Dialogue as a visitor of Crete. Nor indeed would the subject of that Dialogue have been so appropriate in the mouth of Socrates, differing as it does from that of the *Republic*, in not being a speculation concerning the true polity, or a general question of Philosophy, but one relating to the internal life of a particular state, or its own government of itself. For in matters of this kind, Socrates does not appear to have actively interested himself. Whilst he laboured for the improvement of his fellow-citizens in their private life, and for their discipline of themselves, it was his practice to keep aloof from all interference in public affairs; and it would have been therefore scarcely consistent with the domestic character of his teaching, to have presented him, as this Dialogue required, undertaking the ostensible function of the legislator.

But though Plato no longer wears the mask of his master in the conduct of the Dialogue *on Laws*, it is still no other than his

master's voice that we hear, in the person of the "Athenian," delivering his lessons of wisdom to his two friends, the Cretan and the Lacedæmonian; as the three walk together on their way to the Temple, or rest themselves awhile under the shade of the "tall and beautiful cypresses" of the grove through which they pass, on a long summer's day. We miss indeed, in their conversation, the quaint humour of Socrates, such as occasionally sparkles out in his encounters with some sophist of the day, whom he foils by his adroitness in the argument, or in his rebuke of some conceited youth whom he has subjected to the test of his searching examination. The "Athenian" discourses with all gravity, little interrupted by any objections on the part of his companions, who receive his instructions with a respectful deference, as coming from the citizen of a state holding the acknowledged pre-eminence in learning and philosophy which Athens did. But it is still essentially the same teaching in this Dialogue, as in the other in which Socrates himself is before us.

But though the two Dialogues of the *Republic* and the *Laws* are in themselves distinct, we may justly regard them as parts of one great design in the mind of the author; the former shadowing out a theory of the education of the soul in the outline of an imaginary polity, in which Reason is educated to its high function as the guarding and directing power of the soul; the latter setting forth a scheme of discipline, by which the inferior principles of the soul may be trained to a due subordination and obedience to the master-principle of Reason.

The great antagonist with which Philosophy had to contend in the education of the people in Greece was the Theatre. When we read those wonderful compositions of the Greek dramatic muse, which have remained to our times, with so much delight, notwithstanding our imperfect appreciation of the force and beauty of the language, and in the absence of the choral melody and rhythm, which charmed the ear in the exhibition of them,—we may, in some measure conceive with what enthusiasm they must have inspired the imaginations of the people themselves

who beheld and heard them. It was by them in fact that the poets became masters of the thought and feeling throughout Greece, and the successors to that influence which Homer alone originally possessed.

It would have been well if that powerful influence had been simply exerted for the instruction of the people in truth and right, instead of being itself perverted and rendered instrumental for evil, by following the leading of those passions and humours among the people which it should have guided. In the time of Plato the dramatic muse had descended from its high ground to become the mere echo of the voice of a lawless theatre. There was no longer, as he says, an "aristocracy—a rule of the best—in its music;" but a mischievous "theatrocracy" had succeeded. Once the theatres had been mute; but now all was clamour and uproar,—every one was presuming to judge what was right or wrong in the choral song and dance of the drama; and from the popular conceit in this particular, a general presumption of wisdom had arisen, and license had followed along with it.[1]

Such is the ground of his indignation against the poets, and against the tragedians in particular. The writers of comedy he does not seem to consider so dangerous to the morals of a state: with respect to them he chiefly cautions against the effect of indulgence of pleasure in the ludicrous, lest one should unawares acquire a habit of comic humour in the intercourse of life,[2] and so turn the private citizen into the comedian.

It is not that he objects to poetry, as it is the work of genius. No one is more alive to its impressions than himself. None but one, into whose soul the spirit of poetry had deeply penetrated, could have composed such writings as his. Towards Homer, in particular, so strong are his aspirations of love and respect from childhood, that it costs him a struggle with his feelings to enforce the stern verdict of his philosophy against one so cherished in his affections.[3] But he fears the corruption of the principles

[1] *Leg.* iii. p. 155. [2] *Rep.* x. p. 306. [3] *Rep.* x. p. 283. Καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι. Ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ.

of the young from the false teaching which may be insinuated into their minds by the charm of the poetic imitation. He instances, particularly in Homer, his attributing vicious and weak conduct to the gods and the heroes,—his describing the Deity as the author of evil no less than of good,—his exaggeration of the terrors of the unseen world, tending to excite undue fear of death. Whilst he fully owns then the charm of Homer's poems, and would honour him as the sacred minister of the muses, "pouring the ointment on his head and crowning him with the fillet," it is only as the parting tribute of admiration and homage due to a poet so admirable and delightful.[1] Again, in his *Laws* we find the like judgment expressed against the poets of Tragedy in particular. He there warns the citizens of his new state, that they must regard these poets in the light of competitors with them in a dramatic contest for the prize; for that "they also were poets themselves; inasmuch as their whole polity consisted of a representation of the noblest and best life, which was the truest tragedy."[2] Should such visitors then come to their city, and ask permission to exhibit their dramas there, they must be required to submit their compositions to the magistrates, and only in the event of the decision being, that the same things which were proper to be said were better expressed by these than by themselves, should the chorus be granted to them; thus imposing a condition on the strangers, their supposed competitors, which would virtually be a prohibition and exclusion of them.[3]

But these censures of Plato do not exhaust the burthen of his objection to the poets. The real question at issue with him is one between the truth and the semblance of the truth. As in his view the Divine Eternal Ideas are the only real existences in the Universe, and every thing else possesses being and truth, secondarily, or only as it participates of these, it must follow, that all the productions of imitative art, such as those of

[1] *Rep.* iii. 285. Ἀποπέμποιμεν τε ἂν εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν, μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέοντες, καὶ ἐρίῳ στέψαντες.

[2] *Leg.* vii. 817. Πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην.

[3] *Ibid.*

Poetry, Painting, Music, as representing only the impressions received in the mind from the objects of its contemplation, cannot be regarded as having any substantial truth in them. Thus, according to Plato, there are three gradations in the order of truth. The first is from the Divine Ideas to the works of Nature, the immediate operations of the Divine Artificer constituting the various species of all existing things. Such are, then, the first and nearest approximation to the truth of the Divine Ideas themselves. The next is to the works of the Human Artificer executing some production of art according to the idea manifested in a given object, and thus producing another object of the same species; as when the carpenter makes couches or tables after the general idea of either of those objects. The carpenter does not make the species, but an individual of the species; and therefore approximates to the truth only in the second degree. Thirdly and lastly are the productions of the imitator; not, in fact, real productions of any thing, such as are those of the carpenter who makes a couch or table; but only appearances, idols, or phantasms, as Plato describes them. Consequently all such productions are far removed from the truth.[1] These have no more of truth in them, as he observes, than the images in a mirror have, as it is turned in every direction and reflects each object in succession.[2] This is the ultimate ground of Plato's contempt for the poetic imitations, and rejection of the poet from his imaginary republic, and from the state for which he legislates. He would not have "pleasure and pain reign," as he says, in his city, instead of law and reason. He would not have the sympathies of his people excited by the mimic occasions presented in the scenes and the music of the drama; and their power of self-command—the polity within them, in their own

[1] *Rep.* x. p. 597. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφην, ἐπ αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν τὸν μιμητὴν τούτου, τίς ἐστίν; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τρισσαί τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίγνονται; μία μὲν, ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἣν φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι, ἢ τίνα ἄλλον; Οὐδένα, οἶμαι. Μία δέ γε, ἦν ὁ τέκτων. Ναὶ, ἔφη· Μία δὲ ἦν ὁ ζωγράφος· ἢ γάρ; Ἔστω. Ζωγράφος δὴ, κλινοποιὸς, Θεὸς, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 596. τάχιστα δέ που, εἰ θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ, ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν τε καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα, κ. τ. λ.

souls—impaired, or perhaps destroyed, by such indulgence. "For great is the contest," he says, in summing up his observations on this head,—"great beyond what it appears,—for one to become good or evil; so that it is not worth one's while, by inducements of honour, or wealth, or power, nor even by poetry, to neglect justice and the rest of virtue."[1]

That government only which most resembles a Theocracy is, in Plato's view, a true polity. All others, popularly termed governments, as democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, are merely settlements of cities, and not *Polities*;[2] being called after that power which has the ascendancy in each over the other parts of the state. So far as a state is truly such, it ought to be named, he says, after the true God, the Lord over all intelligent beings. Governments, as they exist, are only the results of the struggles of contending factions: whence we find, as he observes, one party in the ascendancy excluding and depressing another, in order to its own maintenance, and no concern taken for the welfare of the whole community. To remedy this general evil of existing governments, he would have the simple and straightforward course of the divine procedure brought before the minds of men, and a conformity with that procedure inculcated on them as the only rule of life and happiness. "God," he teaches, in an animated and noble passage,[3] "as the ancient story also is, holding the beginning, and end, and middle of all things existing, describes a straight line, according to Nature, walking about.[4] In his train ever follows Justice, the avenger of those that are left behind by the Divine law; to which, he that would be happy, keeping close, follows in the train, humble and orderly; but whoever is puffed up with high boasting, or elated with wealth, or honours, or grace of person, together with youthfulness and folly,—his soul burning with insolence, as presuming, that he requires neither ruler nor any guide, but is competent even to

[1] *Rep.* x. p. 310. [2] *Leg.* iv. 178.

[3] Χρῆν δ' εἴπερ τοῦ τοιούτου τὴν πόλιν ἔδει ἐπονομάζεσθαι, τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τοῦ τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων δεσπόζοντος θεοῦ ὄνομα λέγεσθαι. (*Ibid.* p. 713.)

[4] *Leg.* iv. p. 185. Ὁ μὲν δὴ Θεὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθεῖαν περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος.

be a guide to others,—is left, forsaken by God. And being left, and taking to himself others besides, such as he is, he frolics, throwing everything into promiscuous confusion. And to many he seems to be some one; but, after no long time, undergoing a retribution, of which he cannot complain, to Justice, he utterly subverts himself, and his house, and his city."[1]

Here we have emphatically recognized the great truth, that the foundations of all Government and Law are laid in the unchanging nature of the Divine Being. The law of right, as exemplified in the dominion of party, is the law of the strongest, fluctuating with the accidents of power, and never attaining to any permanent being. Such was the law of right, as taught from city to city, by the Sophists, and which was fully established in public opinion throughout Greece,—not only as manifested in the factious character of the particular governments, but avowedly declared and acted on as a principle of conduct. In "the matter of good-will, as concerns the Deity," say Athenian ambassadors, in reply to an expression of confidence on the part of those whom they were assailing, in the Divine support of the justice of their cause,—"neither do we conceive that we shall fail of that support; for it is nothing out of the course of the established opinion of men concerning the Divine Being, or their sentiments concerning themselves, that we are expecting or doing. For we hold that the Divine nature, so far as we can judge of it, and Human nature, as we see clearly, by an instinctive necessity, ever exercise power where they can obtain the mastery. Nor are we the first, either to propose the law, or to use it when laid down: it was in being when we took it up; and it will subsist for ever, for us to transmit to others after us; and we merely act upon it; convinced, that yourselves, no less than others, were you placed in the same power in which we are, would do so."[2] Here, then, is the law which belongs to the region of instability,—to that nature which is ever *becoming*, and

[1] *Leg.* vii. p. 353.

[2] Thucyd. v. 105. Τῆς μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐμενείας οὐδ' ἡμεῖς οἱ ὁμεθα λελείψεσθαι. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῆς ἀνθρωπείας, τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως, τῶν δ' ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως, δικαιοῦμεν ἢ πράσσομεν. κ. τ. λ.

never *is*. Contrast with this Plato's principle, which deduces the origin of law from the eternal IDEA of GOOD, and it will then be more distinctly seen what the spirit of Plato's legislation really is.

It follows, indeed, from his principle, that all instituted law is imperfect.[1] And he admits, accordingly, that if a perfectly virtuous ruler could be established on earth, it would be best that the business of government should be carried on by his sole will; which would in such a case be only the copy of the Divine exemplar of right. But as this is past hope in the present condition of human things, the substitute for the more perfect system is the institution of laws framed after the eternal Idea of Good; not laws adapted merely to the preservation of a particular form of polity, but embodying in them the immutable principles of right. And even such laws, as being matters of institution, are inferior in dignity to unwritten laws—the principles of right—which, themselves resting on no external sanction, are yet the conserving principles of all positive laws.

Having his eye fixed on the eternal pattern of the Good and the True, Plato looked with a feeling of disappointment and disgust at the several forms of polity which the States of Greece exhibited. He is generally thought to have inclined to a preference of aristocracy, and to have regarded with aversion all popular government. But though it is probable, that, from what he saw of the tyranny of an unrestrained democracy, he sighed in secret for a better order of things, we cannot conclude from his political speculations that he regarded any single existing polity as the best. He, in fact, condemns all particular forms;[2] and when he asserts a preference, it is for a polity such as was nowhere seen in his times, combining in it monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.[3] But in his view, as governments then existed, they were all one-sided; the dominion of one part of a community over the rest, and not the dominion of Good over the whole.

[1] Ὅτι νόμος οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότατον, κ. τ. λ. (*Polit.* p. 82.)

[2] *Rep.* vi. p. 96. Ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολιτειῶν; οὐ δ' ἡντιναοῦν, εἶπον, κ. τ. λ.

[3] *Leg.* iii. pp. 137, 138.

This dominion, as we have observed, was only to be found in the government of God over the world, and to it, therefore, he would have all human government conformed. His sole preference, then, is for a theocracy, if such could be realized on earth. His slighting manner of speaking of the lower orders of society, and of all indeed but those who are gifted with superior talents and other natural endowments, is to be ascribed to his general low estimate of Human nature, considered apart from that cultivation which the highest and most intellectual studies impart to it.

Respect for antiquity and prescriptive authority is strongly inculcated by Plato. In nothing was the changeableness of all generated things more evident than in the ever-varying forms of the states of Greece, and especially of Athens itself. The democracy of Athens had been an universal market, παντοπώλιον, as Plato terms an extreme democracy, of all sorts of polities.[1] And laws had so far lost their force there in the most corrupt times, that everything was transacted by the decrees of the day; the variable determinations of popular assemblies being substituted practically in the place of standing Laws, the records of former experience and wisdom. Early legislators had devised expedients for counteracting this love of change on the part of their countrymen, as Solon, for instance, and Lycurgus had done. And in some instances, we find a temporary and partial expedient adopted, by the popular assembly itself fixing the penalty of death to the proposal of rescinding a measure before a certain period.[2] Plato's expedient was supplied by the principle itself of his philosophy. If the Idea of Good was eternal and unchangeable, the constant pursuit of change must lead men astray from their happiness and the truth. They must be called back, therefore, from that which is present and passing, to the recollection of the past. They must not look on wisdom as a thing which is different to-day from what it was yesterday, or in former times, but hold it as what by its very nature is unalterable. To regard it as susceptible of improvement in the lapse of time, would be to deny its proper Being, to reduce it to the con-

[1] *Rep.* viii. 10. [2] Thucyd. ii. 24.

dition of mere Becoming. A distrust in the wisdom of any existing generation of men, and a sacred reverence for that of former generations, and especially for the earliest traditions of knowledge, would naturally be inculcated in such a philosophy. Thus he highly commends the Lacedemonian and Cretan polities for the provision, that no young man should inquire whether the laws were good or bad, but that "all should with one voice and with one mouth agree in declaring that everything in them is well appointed, as being by the appointment of gods;" and that no other sentiment should be allowed to be expressed. Further, not even does he permit a young person to be present when such matters are considered by the old.[1] In the same spirit, the Egyptian immutability in the arts for thousands of years, is admired as a proof of admirable legislative and political wisdom.[2] Even in regard to the fine arts, and to sports and amusements, he reprobates the tendency to innovation, as dangerous to the serious institutions of a state, on the ground, that changes in these lighter matters "imperceptibly change the manners of the young, and bring what is primitive into disrepute, and what is modern into repute;" and that there cannot be a greater mischief to states than such a habit of "blaming antiquity."[3]

All this, which under certain limitations may be true, appears, when thus broadly laid down by Plato, a misapplication of the proper sanction of religious truth to truth in general. In Religion, the only question being what is really taught by its Divine Author, there can be no addition made in the course of time to the truths revealed except by another Divine Revelation; though there may be advancement in the exposition and teaching of it. What is primitive and ancient, accordingly, in this subject, once fully ascertained to be so, is the truth, and the whole truth. Only we must not mistake antiquity of exposition and comment, for primitiveness of the truth itself; for these admit of improved knowledge by human study, when the original truth itself does not. The contest between the advocates of the respective claims of the past and of the present, in the matter of knowledge, is,

[1] *Leg.*, i. 24, 25. [2] *Ibid*, ii. p. 67. [3] *Ibid*, vii. pp. 338, 339.

doubtless, much older than the time of Plato. But his authority and eloquence have probably been mainly instrumental in starting and sustaining the controversy in modern times, through the early reception of his philosophy into the literature of the Christian church.

But we may further see a reason for the stress which Plato lays on the wisdom of prescription and authority, in that state of public opinion to which he is addressing himself. It was not, as might be supposed, a state of things corresponding exactly to a demand for religious or civil changes, in our days, under established governments and institutions. The question of change is now gravely discussed, and deliberately carried or rejected, not with the view of unsettling everything, but in order that some particular institution or law may be *established* for the future. Except in violent outbreaks of human passions long pent up within artificial restraints, exasperated by resistance, and at length forcing their way out, and levelling all barriers before them, as in the instance of the great French Revolution, it cannot be said with truth, of the struggles for particular changes in modern institutions, that they have been actuated by the mere desire of change, and the hatred of everything established. The religion and the civilization of modern times have in some measure presented a check to this. But at the centre of movement in Greece, change was the order of the day. Athens would neither rest itself, nor suffer other states to rest. When its very demagogues are forced on some occasions to endeavour to repress this incessant changeableness; as Cleon was, when he told the Athenians it was better "to have worse laws unmoved, than good laws perpetually changed;"[1]—it is evident that the spirit of change was then developed in its most fearful form. For we find the magician himself who had evoked it, starting in terror at the apparition, and finding it too strong for his direction and control. Δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν ἀεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων, "Slaves of every new extravagance, but despisers of what is accustomed,"[2] are the words with which he attempts to exorcise it, and which

[1] Thucyd. iii. 37. [2] *Ibid*, c. 38.

the historian of the times puts into the mouth of one who, as the creature of the system, could most pointedly characterise it. Such was that spirit against which Plato had to contend. It was an enemy not only to the existing government, but to all government, and all law, and all religion and morality. It demanded, therefore, the most forcible counteraction. It was to be met by inculcation of the opposite. According to his own universal principle, contrary was to be expelled by contrary. Everything that was ancient was to be upheld, accordingly, as worthy of veneration and acceptance, simply because it was ancient. The voice itself of antiquity, though speaking without evidence, was to be received with implicit acquiescence and submission. Thus it is that Plato is found strenuously appealing to the instinctive feeling of his Athenian countrymen, which they still retained in spite of the prevailing folly,—the feeling with which they so fondly reverted to their early glories, and delighted to view themselves in the past;—and labouring to correct their vacillations of present opinion by recalling them to the fixed lessons of their *memory*.

Political philosophy, then, according to Plato, is the history of those changes which the will of man produces in the matter of Government and Laws, and an endeavour to limit those changes by restoring in the social world the primitive order and rule.

Education is the means by which those changes are counteracted. It avails itself of that principle of contrariety by which all changes are carried on; and endeavours to expel the evil by inducing the good. The process by which it carries on this effect is, a discipline of the intellect, prescribed by the state, and promoted by all its institutions and customs, framed, as these are supposed to be, after the idea of the Sovereign Good. That discipline lays down a course of exercise for the body as well as for the intellect, that the body may be brought into the best condition, in order to the exercise of the intellect. The intellect itself it conducts through the steps of the several sciences, from the bodily and sensible to the unembodied and intellectual,—

from the phenomenal and changeable to that which has real being, and is unchangeable. And thus in Plato's system it is classed under the two comprehensive heads of Gymnastics and Music; the latter term being understood, according to its derivation, to denote whatever might be ascribed to the inspiration or dictation of the muses, as history and philosophy, no less than poetry and music; or literature in general. Philosophy itself was the ultimate attainment of education,—the result of the whole intellectual training of the accomplished man. Ostensibly, under this system, there was no peculiar discipline of the heart. Indirectly there was; so far as it inculcated purification and self-denial. But the strengthening and elevating of the intellect was its direct object. Its tendency was thus to exalt the virtues of the intellect above those of the heart; and, in opposition to the evidence of facts, to assert the power of knowledge over the determinations of the will. Not that Plato denies the existence of what we call self-command, or that controlling of the passions which is the result of a previous struggle with them. But he did not admit (as Aristotle does, and urges against him) that reason could ever be overpowered by the passions, or that if there were a distinct knowledge of the truth in the mind, it could give way to passion.

In the matter of Religion, Plato's theory of Ideas led him to see that there were truths above the evidence belonging to Experience, and which must be received solely on the ground of the Divine Authority. For whilst he taught that the mind of man must work its way up to the Ideas by a course of argument and discussion and examination of evidence, yet, having reached the Ideas themselves, it had attained the ultimatum of truth; no further evidence of these was to be sought; they carried their own light in themselves. So, when any truth was presented to the mind, which related immediately to the Divine Being, it was not to be supposed capable of being examined in

[1] Aristot. *Ethic. Nic.* vii. 2. Aristotle, though controverting the extreme view of the doctrine of Plato on this point, in the result nearly coincides with him. *Ibid*, c. 3.

itself, and established on any higher ground of internal evidence, but must at once be admitted, if there were sufficient external authority for it. The only proper question respecting such truths is, are they *historically* true? Is it certain, or at least highly probable, that they have descended to us from the Father of Lights himself? Have we reason to think that they were originally real divine communications,—and are they vouched to us as such by a competent evidence?[1] Now, in regard to the primary principles of the mind, such as we have before spoken of, though they are not evidenced by any higher principles, or by any conclusions from Experience, they carry their own evidence, by their invariable presence in the mind on certain occasions, being naturally suggested by such occasions to every rational understanding. But the truths of Religion are of a different nature. They cannot be authenticated by the mind itself to itself, as being out of its range of thought. They must therefore be authenticated from without. And in regard to these, accordingly, we must appeal to the Reason and Word of God, as the simple, and proper, and unanswerable vouchers of them.

And such is the notion expressly inculcated by Plato; when he introduces Socrates exhorting Alcibiades to beware of judging for himself, what he should ask in prayer from the Gods; and to wait for One that should appear,—One that cared for him,—to take the mist from his eyes, and enable him to know both good and evil.[2]

This is the account of Plato's disclaimer of all evidence, either of demonstration or probability, on matters strictly Divine, and his frequent appeal to mythic traditions when his discussion touches a mystery of the Divine Being or the Divine conduct. He resolves the whole authority of such matters into the evidence of "ancient story," παλαιὸς λόγος,—and "primitive hearing," ἀρχαία

[1] *Timæus*, p. 304. Ἐὰν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, μὴ δυνατοὶ γιγνώμεθα πάντη πάντως ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους λόγους ἀποδοῦναι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μηδενὸς ἧττον παρεχώμεθα εἰκότας, ἀγαπᾶν χρή· μεμνημένον, ὡς ὁ λέγων, ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταί, φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν· ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους, μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ἀποδεκτέον.

[2] Alcibiad. ii., p. 100.

ἀκοή,—and "learning hoary with time," μάθημα χρόνῳ πολιόν.[1] In speaking of the generation of the subordinate divinities, in the *Timæus*, he makes an observation applicable to the whole subject of divine things as treated by him. Instead of entering into explicit accounts of them, he observes that the subject is "too great for us, and that we must believe those who have spoken before,—being the offspring of gods,—in the way in which they said it; and because they must be conceived to have known their own ancestors;" adding, that we cannot refuse credit to the "sons of gods, although they speak without probabilities and necessary demonstrations, but must follow the rule of believing them on their word, as declaring what belongs to them."[2] He commends, too, the primitive generation of men for their docility in following rules of life founded on oral tradition,—their "holding as true the things said concerning both gods and men."[3] Again, speaking of the state of the dead, and their interest in the concerns of men on earth, he appeals to the same kind of evidence. "We must believe," he says, "the voices of others in such matters, so current as they are, and so extremely ancient; and it is enough for our belief that legislators, unless they be proved absolutely unwise, have asserted them."[4] So justly does he insist on the reasonableness of being content with the voice of a declaratory authority in matters incapable, by their nature, of a direct evidence from our reason.

By the heathen philosopher, in the absence of an authentic revelation, the authority for such truths was naturally sought in ancient traditions,—traditions mounting up beyond all memory of their origin, and therefore referable to times when the world was yet fresh from the hand of God. The voice of remote and undefined antiquity, indeed, by a natural delusion, represents itself to the mind as but little different from the sanction of eternal truth. For it is but a slight and imperceptible transition from the indefinite to the infinite. Many such traditions were found in the heathen mythology, connecting themselves with another order of things, when gods conversed with men on earth.

[1] *Timæus*, p. 291. [2] *Ibid*, p. 324. [3] *De Leg.* iii. p. 111. [4] *Ibid*, xi. 150.

Some of them, certainly, were full of absurdity and profaneness; and all were disfigured with the colouring of fable; but still there were some, beautiful in the conception, and sublime and impressive in the doctrine. Of this latter character, for the most part, are those exquisite mythical legends, with which Plato has diversified his discussions, throwing the solemnity of religion over truths of high importance which he would specially enforce.

Thus, though he has elaborately argued the Immortality of the soul, he is not content to leave the question on those abstract grounds of conviction. He feels that the conviction which may practically influence the conduct, must be drawn from another source,—that of a simple belief in some authority declaring it,—when he closes the discussion, as in the *Phædo*, and in other places, with a scenic representation, from the legends of ancient tradition, of the doctrines which he has been enforcing. The whole of the *Timæus*, in fact, is a legend rather than a philosophical inquiry. It appeals, for the reception of its truths, to the shadows with which it veils them, and the mystic echoes of sounds heard by the listening ear from afar. In that legend, indeed, we have very considerable evidence of the pure source, from which the heathen world drew much of the sacred truth that was wrapped up and disfigured in their fables. We perceive in such a document of Ancient Philosophy, at once the sure and wide-spread knowledge resulting from a scriptural Revelation, and the obscurity and fallibility of the information of Tradition. To this effect are the description in the *Timæus*, of the Universe as the "one" work of the "One Supreme Being,"—as the "visible likeness of one, Himself the object only of intellectual apprehension,"—as the "only-generated," μονογένης, of the Father of all things; and the strong assertion of the goodness, and beauty, and perfection of the Universe; and particularly, in reference to this, that striking passage, "When the Father who generated it, perceived, both living and moving, the generated glory of the Everlasting Divinities, he was filled with admiration, and, being delighted, he further contemplated the working

it still more to a resemblance of the pattern."[1] Add to these instances the simple and magnificent words which the Father of the Universe is supposed to address the generated gods, respecting the formation of the bodies of men and other living creatures;[2] bringing before us the gladness of that day, "when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy." The attributing to Him a speech at the first formation of man, is alone sufficiently remarkable; and the plural address with which it opens, makes the correspondence still closer to the sacred words, "*And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.*" The order of the generation of things, it may be further observed, agrees with the order of the Creation. First, the heavens and the earth are produced, and then the living creatures; and among these Man, designated as "the most religious of living things."[3] But at the same time there is much confusion and degradation of the high subject. We look in vain for those sublime features of the inspired account, that the Creation arose out of nothing, by the word of God. This is darkly intimated in the shadowy nature which the narrative assigns to Body; but, though it be but a shadow, Body still subsists in his system, as the co-eternal contrary of the Divine Intelligence. Traces of the descent of holy truth, in the like disguise, appear in the references found in Plato to early deluges and genealogies;[4] to the notion of God as the Shepherd of his people;[5] and to accounts of variations in the course of the rising and setting of the sun.[6]

Such, then, is the character of Plato's philosophy, both in its general method, and in its results, as a theory of the Universe, and an information respecting the leading branches of human knowledge.

[1] *Timæus*, 37 (36). Ὡς δὲ κινηθέν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνενόησε τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατὴρ, ἠγάσθη τε, καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς, ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον πρὸς πὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι.

[2] Θεοὶ θεῶν ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς, πατήρ τε ἔργων, κ. τ. λ. (*Ibid*, p. 325.)

[3] Ζώων τὸ θεοσεβέστατον. (*Ibid*, p. 326.)

[4] *Polit.* p. 290; *Leg.* i.

[5] Θεὸς ἔνεμεν αὐτοὺς, αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν· καθάπερ νῦν ἄνθρωποι, ζῷον ὂν ἕτερον θειότερον, ἄλλα γένη φαυλότερα αὐτῶν νομεύουσι. (*Polit.* p. 35.)

[6] *Polit.* p. 28. The same referred to by Herodotus ii., 142.

It was concerned, we find, more in investigating and establishing first principles, than in drawing out results; in exciting the love of wisdom, rather than in aiding in the research after it. With him, indeed, Philosophy and its method of inquiry, as we have seen, are one; and, in like manner, Philosophy and its several branches coalesce in his system into one. We have spoken of his logical, and physical, and ethical doctrines, as if they were distinct subjects; but in his mind the one theory of Ideas held these several doctrines in its embrace, and made them indissolubly one with itself. For his design throughout is, to establish universal principles, common to every subject, and on these to build a structure of Philosophy,—a counterpart in the human mind to the Universe itself, and comprehending therefore all that relates to the Deity, to Man, and to the Universe. He would place the mind of the philosopher far above the scenes in which man lives, and endue him with a keenness and range of vision extending over the whole region of speculation, and leaving no part, either from its largeness or from its minuteness, unexplored. The problem which he undertakes to solve is, how all things are both one and many; how, amidst the multiplicity of phenomena with which we are surrounded, a real unity still subsists and pervades the whole. He proceeds on the conviction, that to attain to this unity, so far at least as our faculties will enable us to attain to it (for in itself it is incomprehensible and ineffable), is to find the clue to that maze of sensible things which bewilders human observation. He was not intent, therefore, on distinguishing and arranging the several branches of knowledge, but on bringing all into subjection to his commanding theory of the perfect unity. He has not, in fact, elaborated, or even sketched, any one particular science. He has shewn how the sciences may be distributed, or rather furnished hints for such a distribution. But he has left the task of doing so to others after him, as subordinate agents, filling up the details and supplying the omissions of his system. His was characteristically a one-making mind. It analysed—not, however, for the purpose of finding and arranging the com-

ponent elements of a subject, but in search of the one vivifying principle, which gives form, and truth, and goodness and beauty, to everything. He omits, accordingly, to examine with minuteness into secondary agencies, which are the proper study of the particular sciences, in order that he may direct attention to the master-principle, by which all subordinate principles are held together, and by which they work, as concurring causes in the infinite variety of actual phenomena, with such energy and constancy of operation.[1]

It was left for his pupil Aristotle to take up the business of Philosophy where he had designedly left it unfinished, and, by a more rigorous method, to introduce order into the field of science, by assigning to each particular science its distinct objects and office.

It required, indeed, some philosopher worthy of such a master to take up the subject where Plato had left it, and to carry it out to the fulness of an instructive method, and a systematic exposition of truth; and such a successor was found in Aristotle. Aristotle, as controverting the Theory of Ideas, may perhaps be regarded by some as an antagonist, rather than a successor, to Plato. But every succeeding system of philosophy is partly a polemic against its predecessor, by whose labours it nevertheless has profited. So it was with the great movement of mind commenced by Plato. It languished under Speusippus and Xenocrates, and the still more remote successors in the Academia. But in the Lyceum, the rival school in name, but the rival only as the vigorous offspring of the declining parent, a crowd of hearers such as that whom the great magician of the Academia had called around him, was once more assembled, and Athens again assumed the form of an university. In Aristotle's system, accordingly, we see the productiveness of those germs of philosophy which the genius of Plato had planted and reared. Others cultivated the germs themselves; and some fostered them into a wild luxuriance. It was by being engrafted on the sturdy

[1] *Tim.* p. 336. Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἔστι τῶν ξυναιτίων, οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρῆται, τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν.

stock of Aristotle's mind, that they received fresh vigour, and produced fruits, though not strictly their own, yet partaking of their life and richness. And thus has Aristotle been justly described by an ancient critic, as the most genuine disciple of Plato.[1]

If we take Plato's philosophy as a whole in its complex form, not simply as a system of Philosophy, but a system in which Philosophy, and Eloquence, and Poetry, and deep religious and moral feeling, are harmoniously combined, it stands alone in the history of literature. There is nothing which approaches to it under this point of view,—nothing which may be properly regarded as a continuation of it. It is a splendid work of rare genius, like the Homeric poems or the Athena of Phidias, which no other artist has ever equalled. Philosophical dialogues have been written in imitation of those of Plato; but how unlike to them, how altogether inferior to them in conception and execution! There is learning, and eloquence, and grace, in whatever the accomplished mind of Cicero has touched. But compare his most finished specimens in this way with the Dialogues of Plato; and what a deficiency appears! Dignity and refinement of mind and an acquaintance with the stores of philosophy, shine forth in the Dialogues of Cicero. But we miss altogether the depth and the exquisiteness of thought, the range and the minuteness of vision, the exactness of reasoning, the lively sketches of character and manners, which interest and astonish us by their combination in the Dialogues of Plato. Xenophon had great knowledge of human nature, and has thrown an air of great naturalness over his simple descriptions, whether it is conversations and moral lessons that he relates, or stirring scenes of history. But his Socratic dialogues do not admit of comparison with the elaborate efforts of Plato. They were clearly intended only as simple accounts of what Socrates had taught, and did not aim at any artist-like effect, as compositions. Or, if we turn to the *Symposium* of Plutarch, there, again, much as the author admired and studied Plato, we observe an entire want of that tact in the management of the dialogue, which so engages our attention

[1] Dionysius of Halicarnassus. *Ep. ad Cn. Pomp.*

amidst the subtilties of Plato's discussions. If we compare, again, the philosophical Dialogues of Shaftesbury and Berkeley, with any in Plato, we find the like contrast as in those of Cicero. Superior as these may be in composition to other efforts of the kind in our language, they still give no proper representation of the spirit or the form of the Platonic Dialogue. There is no life in the interlocutors of these Dialogues; and the author himself is scarcely concealed behind their masks. Nor are there any touches of natural feeling or incident to connect the argument with the personality of the speakers; such as those in the *Phædo;* where the discussion opens with the loosing of the chains from the limbs of Socrates, his bending and rubbing his leg, and expressing the pleasure arising from the contrast of his pain before; circumstances, not merely thrown in by way of dramatic interest, but leading, in immediate application, to the argument in hand. As we have said, then, the philosophy of Plato, taken in connection with the admirable compositions in which it is contained, stands alone in the history of literature. It is due to the charm of the composition, that the interest of the reader is sustained amidst much of dry abstract speculation, requiring the closest attention, and considerable acquaintance with the subjects of philosophical discussion, in order to follow it. It was this charm in great measure, doubtless, which rendered the writings of Plato, in spite of their abstruseness and subtilty in many parts, so acceptable to Grecian taste. He had his critics also and censors; but all seem to have concurred in placing him at the head of the philosophical writers of Greece. Objection was taken by some to the severity of his sarcasm against the leading Sophists and other great names. Complaint, too, was made of his putting sentiments and words into the mouth of Socrates which Socrates had never used; and of his anachronisms, in bringing together in conversation, persons, who, from the period at which they flourished, or other circumstances, could never have met. But these were merely minute criticisms. It was seen by those who entered into the spirit of his writings, that he was still the great master throughout,—that he was not giving, in his Dialogues, a

history of individuals or of the times, but a general character of classes of men, and the prevailing tone, both of philosophical discussion and of popular opinion. The enlightened critic saw that Socrates, for example, is not portrayed by him simply as Socrates, but as the characteristic spokesman of the system on which he is engaged;—and in like manner, that if he brings together persons of different periods, he disregards the anachronism, that he may enunciate the doctrines inquired into, in their proper person.

The perfection to which he wrought the style of his most elaborate Dialogues, will be apparent to those who study them accurately under this point of view. So fastidious, indeed, is the taste with which they have been wrought into their present form, that it cannot be duly appreciated without an accurate and even delicate observation. Every word seems chosen with care, and every clause of his periods made to flow with its proper rhythm; and this effect at the same time is produced out of the ordinary materials of the language. The words and idioms are those of conversation, and the way in which they are put together seems, at the first view, to be as unstudied as mere conversation. But the result is an exquisite composition, in regard to which we are at a loss to pronounce whether the depth and the elegance of the thought, or the grace and propriety of expression, most prevail.[1] It is evident that he was not the first to compose Dialogues; were we to look simply to the finished form in which his Dialogues have been executed. They are, doubtless, not the first efforts in that way. But the school of Elea had preceded him in this style. More particularly, however, we are told that Alcamenus of Teos was the first to write Dialogues; or at least his is the earliest name to which, on the testimony of Aristotle, in a work now lost, the honour of originating the Dialogue has been assigned. But we need look no further than to the Greek drama for the first thought of the

[1] The fastidiousness of taste with which he touched his compositions, is illustrated by the account of the opening of the *Republic* having been found with the clauses variously transposed. Dionys. Hal. *De Comp. Pub.* 25.

Platonic Dialogue. The Mimes of Sophron, and the Comedies of Epicharmus, probably furnished materials from which he was enabled, if not to mould, at least to enrich his Dialogues. The Mimes of Sophron, indeed, it is said, found a place under his pillow.[1] And what are the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, and the *Symposium*, it may be asked—the particular Dialogues in which he has most displayed his dramatic power—but philosophical comedies in prose, analogous to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, and only differing from that play, as addressed to a higher class of hearers, and as intended, not to call forth the applause of spectators, but to elicit thought from a reader.

Nor, in touching on the peculiar excellences of Plato's Dialogues, ought we to omit to notice especially, under this point of view, the delightful mythic narratives with which he has adorned and relieved his abstract discussions. The art with which he has introduced them is most admirable. They are openings of rich scenery suddenly presented to the view when least expected;—tales of an Arabian night succeeding to a morning's pastime of disputation in some school of Greece;—solemn shadows from an unseen world casting their majestic forms over some ordinary incident of daily life. But they are not to be regarded only as embellishments and reliefs to the argument. They bear an important part in the teaching itself of his philosophy. They soften down the outline of his reasonings,—taking from them that positive didactic form in which they might appear amidst the strife of debate, and as wrought out by discussion. The knowledge which his theory aims at imparting is that of Reminiscence, as we have shewn; and he would not, accordingly, have the results of his inquiry present themselves as anything else but Reminiscence. We are, indeed, to search out the reason of things. We are not to rest in mere opinion, but to battle our way against error and falsehood, until we rise to the eternal Ideas, the causes of all knowledge, as they are the causes of all Being. Still, we are not to suppose that we can distinctly comprehend the eternal Ideas in themselves. Though they are at

[1] Diog. Laert. in *Vit.*

last intellectually discerned; it is only "at the last," and that "scarcely."[1] For they carry up the eye of the soul to the fountain of all knowledge,—the Divine Being himself, who cannot be conceived, much less defined in words.[2] The mythic legends admirably combine with the refutative form of the discussions to leave this impression of indefiniteness on the mind. Whilst the mind's eye is directed steadily to the objects which can alone give stability and certainty to its knowledge, we are thus throughout reminded by Plato, that we live amidst shadows and darkness; and that our eye must be purified, and endued with heavenly light, before it can look undazzled on the TRUTH itself.

[1] *Rep.* vii., p. 133. Ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία, ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι.
[2] *Tim.*, p. 303.

SOCRATES.

THE name of Socrates is familiar to every one among his earliest classical recollections. Who has not heard of the Athenian sage, the great moralist of heathenism, and his persecution and constancy even to death? There is no name indeed which stands forth more conspicuously in the history of the Philosophy, or of the Religion, or of the general Civilization of the ancient world. It marks a distinct era in the progress of the human race. The character of a great period in the history of man is concentrated, in fact, in the life and teaching of this extraordinary individual; and his name accordingly has descended to us with all the importance of the crisis itself at which he flourished; recommended as it is to our affection and admiration, not so much by the characteristics of his personality, as by the tradition of his influence and authority.

For when we come to consider his particular biography, we find our attention arrested by little that belongs to the individual. We read of a long life passed for the most part in uniform tenour within the walls of his native Athens; and until we come to its tragical close, scarcely distinguished in point of incident from that of the mass of his contemporaries. When, again, we ask for writings from which, as from the proper mirror of the philosopher's mind, we may collect some express lineaments of his character and teaching, we find nothing even on this ground on which our curiosity can fasten; so little have we derived that interest, which the mention of Socrates now awakens, from himself immediately; and so much, on the other hand, are we indebted for our acquaintance with this philosopher to a popular feeling preserving, and handing down to us the name which represents the thought and character of an age.

The conjuncture of events at the time of Socrates was peculiarly favourable to the development of such a character. Socrates, born at Athens in the year 469 or 470 B.C., grew up to manhood during those years when Athens, standing on the proud eminence of her victories of Marathon and Salamis, was consolidating her power as a sovereign state and seat of empire. In the course of the fifty years which intervened between her triumphant resistance to the Persian invasion and the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, Athens, like Rome in her struggle with her Italian neighbours, had gradually converted her allies in the islands and on the coasts of Asia Minor and Thrace into dependent subjects and tributaries. But Athens had not, like Rome, the prudence to combine these scattered members of her empire, elements of discord and trouble as much as of strength to the sovereign state, by the free communication of the rights of citizenship. Nor indeed could this wise expedient have availed in the case of Athens as in that of Rome. For the states over which the empire of Athens extended, were either independent governments reluctantly submitting to her yoke, or the weak dependencies of a rival power, and indisposed to acknowledge the sovereignty of Athens but so long as that power wanted the vigour and the enterprize to head a coalition against the common oppressor. There were thus in the very constitution of the Athenian empire, materials of jealousy and disunion, which no line of conduct but the impolitic one of surrendering an arbitrary rule into the hands of the people who had groaned under it, could long have kept from explosion. And, in fact, it was not the policy of Athens (masterly as that policy was under the hands of her great leaders) which sustained her empire for more than fifty years, so much as the inertness of her great rival, Lacedæmon, and the difficulty of bringing the several grievances of the subject-states to bear on some decisive point, capable of influencing the movement of the whole in a strenuous concerted effort of resistance. At length we see this effort in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, in the year 431 B.C., as well as the difficulty of it, in the complicated diplomacy by which

that great movement was preceded, and in the reluctance of Lacedæmon to bring home to herself the necessity of exertion.

But, whilst Athens was thus aggrandizing herself against a day of retribution from the insulted states of Greece, she enjoyed the sunshine of her day of empire, in the brilliant assemblage, which she then witnessed within her walls, of the great, and the learned, and the eloquent, from all parts of Greece.[1] While her arms and her enterprize were setting foot on every sea and land, her attractiveness as a home of genius and civilization, was evidenced in the number of strangers frequenting her porticoes, and groves, and theatres, and temples, and the houses of her nobles. During thirty years of this period of glory, the philosopher Anaxagoras was employed in propagating there the doctrines of the Ionic school, honoured by the patronage of her great men, and the revered master of her choicest spirits in the newly-acquired taste for philosophical inquiry. Nor was philosophy, in the strict sense of the term, as a science of Nature and the Universe, alone pursued, but rather in its application to the social and political requirements of the day. The importance of oratory in order to political power and influence, was now more and more recognized; especially as it was evidenced in the conspicuous example of Pericles. Rhetoric, therefore, became the favourite study of every aspirant to the honours of office in the state. Athens, accordingly, formed a great centre of attraction to those who professed to teach the art of Rhetoric in its understood acceptation, as the key to political wisdom and importance. The demand for such instruction was chiefly supplied, as has been before pointed out,[2] by the Sophists within her walls, surrounded by crowds of admiring pupils from the highest rank of her citizens. There also were now collected, as in a school of all arts, the great masters of the drama, of sculpture, and painting, and music, and the gymnastic exercises. To these means and opportunities for the cultivation of talent of

[1] Isocrat. *Panegyr.* Καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀφικνουμένων ὡς ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτον ἐστιν, κ. τ. λ. p. 59.

[2] Plato, supra.

every order, whether of mind or body, must be added also the acquaintance imparted with the works of the poetic genius of the early period of the literature of the Greeks, such as the poems of Homer, and Hesiod, and others, and of Homer in particular, by the Rhapsodists, so called, who recited and interpreted them in public. This in itself, when books were scarcely accessible to many, must have served as one great instrument of general education. So that Athens, at this time, contained within her own bosom abundant resources for the enlargement of the mind, whether in the eminent men who formed her society, in the lectures and conversation of the professors of science, or in noble works, the specimens and examples of what genius could effect. Athens contained, also, doubtless, much to enervate and corrupt the moral judgment, whilst she presented every thing to exalt the imagination and refine the taste. Her political institutions, well-balanced as they had been left by Solon, were now violently disturbed. In the course of these years of imperial greatness and prosperity, they received a large infusion of that licentious spirit, which the naval successes of the Athenians had engendered in the lower order of the citizens,[1] and the flattery of successive demagogues had fostered and diffused through the whole of the state. Now, also, faction divided the ties of family and kindred, and formed associations of the people for every lawless purpose of private ambition and cupidity. Their highest and purest court,—one principal anchor of the state, according to the intention of their great legislator,[2] —the Areopagus, was mutilated in its powers. And whilst numerous courts of law, thronged by their hundreds of judges, chosen by lot from the whole body of citizens, were constantly open,[3] and an idle populace were encouraged, by pay from the public treasury, to attend on the business of these courts, the functions of the legislative and deliberative bodies were virtually

[1] Aristot. *Polit.* ii. 9, τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος, ἐφρονηματίσθη, κ. τ. λ.

[2] Plutarch. *Solon*, 19, οἰόμενος ἐπὶ δυσὶ βουλαῖς ὥσπερ ἀγκύραις ὁρμοῦσαν, ἧττον ἐν σάλῳ τὴν πόλιν ἔσεσθαι, κ. τ. λ.

[3] Aristoph. *Nub.* 208.

αἵδε μὲν Ἀθῆναι. Στ. τί σὺ λέγεις; οὐ πείθομαι.

ἐπεὶ δικαστὰς οὐχ ὁρῶ καθημένους.

suspended. The peremptory power of these judicial committees, in which the people at large felt and exercised a despotic authority, became the real executive of the state. Then came into intense activity the vile system of sycophancy,—a system, under which the life and property of the wealthy were at the mercy of every needy adventurer who could speak to the passions of the people, and earn a livelihood for himself by a career of successful prosecutions.

Nor was public corruption unattended by its usual evils of private luxury and debauchery. At this time too, there might be observed in the heart of a city which prided itself on its pious feeling,[1] and amidst the frequency and splendour of festivals and external rituals of religion,[2] a profane scepticism with regard to the fundamental principles of religion and morality. A spirit of self-conceit and of presumption of knowledge, already natural to the Athenians, had now widely spread among the people; and every one was by turns dogmatist or sceptic,—according as it was his own opinion that he asserted,—or as he might display his ingenuity in questioning some received principle, or disputing some opinion proposed by another.

Add to these circumstances, the effect of a large slave population, the degraded ministers to the wants and the wealth of an insolent body of citizens, and of a number of resident foreigners engaged in carrying on the manufactures and trade of the city, paying a tax for their protection, and contributing to the military strength of the state, though excluded from its franchise. The slave, indeed, and the foreigner, lived more happily at Athens than at Lacedæmon, or perhaps any other city of Greece, especially during a time of war, when their services were needful to the state.[3] Slavery, therefore, acted probably less injuriously on the character of the

[1] Soph. Œd. Col. 1006,
εἴ τις γῆ θεοὺς ἐπίσταται
τιμαῖς σεβίζειν, ἥδε τοῦθ' ὑπερφέρει.

[2] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, i. c. 4, gives an instance in Aristodemus of one, who, not only had a contempt for all religion, but even derided those who concerned themselves with it.

[3] Aristoph. *Nub.* 6.
ἀπόλοιο δῆτ', ὦ πόλεμε, πολλῶν οὕνεκα,
ὅτ' οὐδὲ κολάσ' ἔξεστί μοι τοὺς οἰκέτας.
Also Xen. *Rep. Ath.*, c. i.

Athenian master, than it did elsewhere in Greece. It was tempered by the social humour of the people. But the facility thus afforded to the citizens of living in indolence and ease, and abandoning all domestic employment for the excitement of the public assemblies, and the courts, and the spectacles, naturally induced a neglect of the private and domestic duties. There is reason to believe, that whilst the Athenians appeared in the face of the world the most light-hearted of men, they were secretly unhappy in their homes; living in listlessness from day to day on the alms of their public pay; many of them reduced from affluence to poverty through the loss of lands and property by the ravages and pressure of war, and yet unable or unwilling to use the necessary exertions to relieve themselves from their distress.

It is evidently no singular instance which Xenophon has given of this state of things at Athens, when he tells us of Aristarchus complaining to Socrates of the number of poor female relatives who, from losses in the course of the Peloponnesian war, were thrown on him for support. The difficulty which Aristarchus felt, was, that he could not expect persons who were free-born and his own kindred, to undertake any manual labour, so as to assist in maintaining themselves. Happily, however, he adopts the friendly suggestion of Socrates, and makes the experiment of setting them actively to work. The money necessary for procuring the materials is borrowed; the wool for the work is purchased; and the females were then busied in the profitable exercise of the art, which, in their prosperous days, they had learned only as the proper employment of their sex, and the amusement of their leisure. Such was the effect indeed, of this happy counsel of Socrates on the inmates of the house, that now the complaint was retorted on the master, that he was the only one in it that eat in idleness; to which Socrates, in his characteristic manner, bade him reply by the fable of the dog; how, when the sheep complained to their owner, "that he gave nothing to them who supplied him with wool, and lambs, and cheese, but what they took from the earth; whilst to the dog he gave some of his own food;" the dog, on hearing

it, said; "true, for I am the one that keeps you from being either stolen by men or seized by wolves; since, for your part, unless I guarded you, you could not even feed, through fear of being destroyed." As the sheep then conceded to the dog the privilege of honour, so Aristarchus might say to his relatives, that he acted the part of the dog, as their guard and superintendent, enabling them to live securely and agreeably at their work.[1] The experiment, however, fully succeeded; and contentment and cheerfulness were introduced to a home, where before, from the distress of the case, all was gloom and mutual suspicion.

In the meantime, a great number of mechanics and tradesmen had risen to wealth and importance, in consequence of the demand for every species of labour and trade, resulting from the multiplied population of the city and its numerous foreign dependencies and connections, and, in particular, from the magnificent public works carried on during the administration of Pericles. All this while, Athens was becoming more and more a mercantile community, in the midst of strong aristocratic prejudices still surviving, and rendered, indeed, more intense by the opposition growing up around them. In many instances, the older families would be declining in wealth, exhausted by the burthens of the state or the extravagance of individual expenditure; whilst new families, the creations of successful trade and enterprize, would be obtaining influence by the force of their wealth, and encroaching on the privileged ground hitherto occupied only by right of birth. It may be easily conceived, therefore, that the mass of the society of the city would be now all fermentation and restlessness; the one class pushing their interests and their claims to equality founded on their personal title, whilst the other obstinately clung to the exclusiveness and the pride of hereditary right.

But we shall best judge of the distempered state of the social atmosphere of Athens, by adverting to the character of female society as it existed there. It has often been remarked, as the glory of modern and Christian civilization, that it has restored

[1] Xen. *Mem.*, ii. 7.

woman to her due place in the scale of social importance, and thus most effectually chastened and elevated the general intercourse of human life. In a country so essentially social as Greece, and especially at Athens, it was practically impossible to impose on the women the absolute seclusion of eastern despotism. Still it was even at Athens the rule, that the wives and daughters of citizens should live in the strictest privacy of their homes: the only occasion on which they appeared in public being at the public sacrifices when they took part in the sacred ceremonial.

In an interesting sketch which Xenophon has given of what appears an excellent specimen of married life at Athens, he describes the wife as coming to her new home, ignorant of everything beyond the work of the distaff and the web. She had been married when not yet fifteen years old, and had spent her previous life in seclusion under the strict superintendence of her parents, "so that she might see as few things as possible, hear as few things as possible, ask about as few things as possible." "Her mother had simply told her," she says, "her business was to be modest."[1]

But whilst the virtuous matron and her daughters were excluded from the social circles, the place which they should have held in Athenian society was, as before noticed,[2] filled by other females, strangers to family ties, and attracted to Athens by the licentiousness and wealth of an imperial city. The union of high intellectual acquirements, and a masculine dignity of understanding, in some distinguished individuals of this class, with the graces of female loveliness, appealed with a powerful interest to the sensual elegance of Grecian taste. We find, accordingly, at Athens, at this time, forming, as it were, the female court of the sovereign people, the Milesian Aspasia, and others of less name, living in the profession of a dissolute course of life, not only without shame or scandal, but even in the enjoyment of

[1] Xen. *Œconom.*, c. 7, s. 15. Τὸν δ' ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον ἔζη ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας, ὅπως ὡς ἐλάχιστα μὲν ὄψοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δ' ἀκούσοιτο, ἐλάχιστα δ' ἔροιτο . . . ἐμὸν δ' ἔφησεν ἡ μήτηρ ἔργον εἶναι σωφρονεῖν.

[2] Plato, supra, p. 186.

public respect. We may judge how deeply corrupted must have been the standard of public opinion in Greece, when female profligacy could thus avert the eye of moral observation and censure from itself. So thoroughly had refinement of intellectual taste and of manners, together with the grossest impurity of morals, pervaded the whole society of Athens, that even those who were elevated above the world around them in talents, and strength of character, and kindliness of disposition, as Socrates was, imbibed in some measure the poison of the infected atmosphere which they breathed.

Such, then, was that state of things in which Socrates was trained, and which will greatly account to us for the peculiar form which the character of his philosophical teaching exhibits. For he was ever an Athenian instructing Athenians. He spoke as one fully conversant with the habits of thought and action of his countrymen; as knowing what kind of instruction they most needed, and by what mode of address he might win their attention. We might expect, therefore, to see in him some leading traits of the Athenian civilization of his time; a teaching, admirable indeed in its main features, but bearing, at the same time, some marks of that corrupt state of society which called it forth, and to which it was immediately addressed.

The son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and Phænarete a midwife, and himself brought up in his father's art, he yet enjoyed those advantages of mental culture and social refinement which were common to every citizen of the democratic Athens. The meanness of his birth and his poverty, much as high birth and wealth were esteemed there, would not exclude him from familiar intercourse with persons of the highest rank and consideration in the state. Nor, indeed, could the advantages of education be restricted to a privileged few, where every one lived in public, and where knowledge was for the most part acquired and communicated by conversation and oral discussion.

If, in the general relaxation of discipline at Athens, the citizen was no longer obliged to submit himself to a prescribed

course of education under the eye of the state, and it was left to each person to avail himself, or not, of the sources of instruction presented in the intellectual society of the city, Socrates was not a person to neglect the advantages placed in his way. Money he had not to pay to the Sophists, the great masters of his day. But he had from childhood an inquisitive mind. He felt that he was thrown on his own resources of thought, and that he must be his own master in the art of education. And to this great object he appears to have bent from the earliest time, all the powers of his energetic mind; making it his constant employment to inquire from every one,[1] and collect on every occasion, some hint towards the right prosecution of it. We may picture to ourselves the young Socrates, resembling the Socrates of mature life, freely entering into conversation with all to whom he had access; feeling and acknowledging his own ignorance; listening attentively to all that he heard; weighing and discussing it in his own mind with patience and acuteness; and not resting until he had traced it out in all its bearings to the utmost of his power. Thus would he gradually form and strengthen that faculty of observation, and that analytical acumen for which he was afterwards so eminently distinguished.

Nor has Plato improbably put a prophecy of his future eminence in the mouth of one of the great masters of the day, when he makes Protagoras say of him, with the self-complacency of the man of established reputation: "For my part, Socrates, I commend your spirit, and the method of your reasoning; for whilst in other points I am no bad sort of person, as I think, I am the farthest from being an envious one. For concerning you in particular, I have already observed to many, that of all I meet, I admire you by far the most; of those of your own age, even to the extreme; and I say too, I should not be astonished if you were to turn out a man of celebrity for philosophy."[2] To the same effect is the story, that his father being at a loss how

[1] Plato, *Laches*, p. 186, c., ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, κ. τ. λ. p. 176.
[2] Plato, *Protag.* p. 193.

to educate him, consulted the Delphic oracle, and was advised to leave him entirely to his own bent, inasmuch as he had a director in himself superior to a thousand teachers.[1] The simple interpretation of what is here thrown into the form of marvel probably is, that he gave, even when a child, striking indications of a devotedness to those studies which became the business of his manhood.

The notice of a wealthy individual of Athens, the excellent Crito, appears to have been early attracted to Socrates. Crito was of about the same age as Socrates;[2] and an attachment to the pursuit of philosophy, and an admiration of the character of Socrates, naturally led to that intimacy which he now commenced with the young philosopher, and steadily maintained through his subsequent life. Through him Socrates was relieved from the necessity of earning his livelihood by the profession of a sculptor; or, as Laertius expresses it, "was raised from the workshop."[3] Sculpture, indeed, was in high honour at Athens, especially at this time. For Phidias, enjoying the protection of Pericles, was now adorning the city with the immortal productions of his own chisel, as well as other noble works of art executed under his taste and direction. But to follow up the profession with success, required a devotion of mind and hand that must preclude the opportunities indispensable for the moral student. And though, for a time, Socrates worked at the art,—and with success, if a statue of the Graces in the citadel of Athens, attributed to him, were really his workmanship;—we may imagine how distasteful the occupation, however intellectual in itself, must have been to a mind, so eager for observation on living man, so intent on mental and moral phenomena, as that of Socrates; and how gladly he would exchange the labour of his paternal art for that philosophic leisure which the friendship of Crito held out to him.

The world of that day reproached the philosophers with servility, taunting them with being ever seen at the "gates of the

[1] Plutarch. *De Gen. Socr.* [2] Plato, *Apol.* p. 78, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης.
[3] Diog. Laert. *in vit.*

rich." In some instances the reproach may have been just. But in general, the fact was the reverse. Their society rather was courted by the great and wealthy, who were proud of the reputation of being patrons of philosophy. To Socrates, indeed, the patronage of a man of wealth would be peculiarly acceptable, not so much for the means of subsistence, about which he was absolutely thoughtless and indifferent, as for the society itself to which he would thus be introduced, and the opportunity of carrying on his researches into philosophy, both by books and by the oral instructions of its living professors. To him it would be the very means by which he would enlarge his field of moral observation. The social evenings of Athens were the natural sequences of the mornings of the agora, and the courts, and the council, and the assembly. They prolonged in festive conversation that strife of words and competition of argument, which had been begun in the busy and serious discussions of the morning, and of which the last murmurs had scarcely died away on the ear of the assembled guests. For Athenian life was a life of constant excitement. What Demosthenes observed an hundred years afterwards, and an Apostle four hundred years later still,—that the Athenians did nothing but go about and ask the latest news of the day,—was a characteristic of the people already strongly developed at this period of their history. Socrates, who, in his own person, gave a philosophical cast to this inquisitive spirit, would be peculiarly interested by such opportunities of exercising it as were presented in the animated encounters of the symposium. There he would see human nature displayed in some of its most striking forms. There he would meet the citizen full of years and honours, experienced in the arts of government and diplomacy, and in the service of the state by land and sea; the poet flushed with his victories in the dramatic contest; the sophist armed at all points for the display; the philosopher expounding his theories; the orator, the idol of the people in his day; the courtly patron of literature; and a circle of young men, the flower of the highest rank in the state; each bearing his part in the free and lively interchange of thought,

emulously provoking one another to discussion, and contending for the mastery in the conflict of debate.

By such society Socrates would be effectually prepared for that active enterprize of philosophy, which formed the whole engagement of his life. In the meagre information handed down to us respecting the details of his history, we are not able to ascertain at what precise period of life he began his career of public teaching, or at least attracted notice as the philosopher of Athens. The transition would probably be gradual, from the youthful inquirer, to the mature and expert teacher of others. This transition would be the less perceptible in the case of Socrates, from the circumstance, that he never professed to *teach*, even when he was most actively employed in teaching; but still, at the last, as he had done from the first, merely to *inquire*.[1] For his part, he disdained the *profession* of philosophy. He was disgusted with the vain pretension advanced by the Sophists, of being masters of every science, and capable of imparting instruction on any given subject. He accordingly set out with the antagonist position, that he *knew nothing:* that his only wisdom, if he possessed any beyond other men, consisted in his being *aware* of his real ignorance ; whilst others ignorantly presumed on the possession of a knowledge which they had not. His teaching, therefore, was only a continuation of the process of education of his own mind, by extending it to the minds of others. He was fond of describing it as an *examination* or *scrutiny* of the mind ; a method of finding out the real condition of each mind, and so of preparing it for the due exercise of its powers in the practical emergencies of human life. He saw that the evils of life arose, in great part, from the wrong judgments of men,—from their mistaking their own powers, presuming on their knowledge, and ability, and the truth of opinions adopted without inquiry. He endeavoured then to effect the cure of human error and unhappiness by a reformation of the intellect. The first step towards this would be taken, if men could be only divested of this vain self-confidence ; if they could be brought

[1] Diog. Laert. Pausanias, i. 22 ; ix. 35.

to *suspect* that they might be mistaken in their judgments, and so to *question* themselves. This preliminary labour was employment enough for any one man's life, especially in a society such as that of Athens, so entirely infected with the sophistical leaven. Socrates wisely confined his exertions to this simple object. He is content to excite inquiry,—to provoke discussion,—and thus to suggest the necessity of self-discipline in order to right judgment. He does not, like other philosophers, quit the seclusion of a study, or the field of foreign travel, to come forth to the world the accomplished teacher of the accumulated wisdom of years of solitary thought and reflection. Whilst philosophizing in the agora and the streets of Athens, in the workshops of the artizan, or at the banquets of the rich, he is still employed in the work of *disciplining* the mind. Thus he passes on insensibly from the education of himself to the education of others, and it is difficult consequently, or rather impossible, to say in his case, where the character of the learner ends, or where that of the philosopher and teacher begins.

Yet, entirely as Socrates disregarded all positive knowledge, and threw himself on the resources of a shrewd and extensive observation of human nature, we must not suppose that he neglected to inform himself in the existing systems of philosophy, and the particular sciences as they were then understood and taught. There is reason to believe that he had accurately studied the systems of the early physical philosophers of the Ionic school, as well as the moral and mathematical theories of the Pythagoreans, and the dialectics of the school of Elea. Without supposing him so deeply versed in the doctrines of the several schools as might be inferred from his exact discussions in the dialogues of Plato, there is still ample evidence, from the more direct account of Xenophon, that he was by no means ignorant of them. He had doubtless read much,[1] as well as observed much, when he commenced his philosophic mission. Xenophon indeed tells us that Socrates considered the physical and dialectical theories of his predecessors as unprofitable. But he takes

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 6.

care to add, that Socrates was not unacquainted with these theories. And in particular, as to the sciences of Astronomy and Geometry, he thought the attention of the student wasted in investigating their more abstruse theorems. But he was able (as Xenophon further observes) to speak on the subjects of these sciences also from his own knowledge of them.[1]

Nor are we to suppose that, whilst he had properly no master in that line of philosophical study which he had marked out for himself, he had no aid in the cultivation of his mind, from the living masters of philosophy in his day. The long residence of Anaxagoras at Athens, probably coincides in time with part of the early life of Socrates.[2] To him, therefore, Socrates would naturally have access, as well as to Archelaus,[3] his disciple, and the inheritor of his doctrines. If he had no personal intercourse with Anaxagoras, it appears from the testimony of Plato, that he was acquainted with the famous treatise of Anaxagoras, which contained his theory of the Universe.[4] And perhaps we may distinctly trace the early and abiding influence of the lessons of this great philosopher throughout the teaching of Socrates, in his uniform maintenance of the principle of an all-disposing mind, the glory of the system of Anaxagoras.

To the writings of Heraclitus, his attention appears to have been drawn by the poet Euripides; if the anecdote be true, as related by Laertius, that on being asked by Euripides, who had put them into his hand, what he thought of them, he replied, alluding to the studied obscurity of that philosopher; "What I understand is excellent; so also, I suppose, is what I do not understand; only there is need of some Delian diver to reach the sense."[5] He had also opportunities of conversing with Zeno

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 7.

[2] The chronology of the life of Anaxagoras is very doubtful.

[3] Archelaus is called both a Milesian and an Athenian. The probability is that he was a Milesian; since philosophy had scarcely yet found a home at Athens.

[4] Plato, *Phædo*, p. 97. The writings of Anaxagoras appear to have been extensively circulated. Socrates is made, in Plato's *Apology*, 26 D, to say to his chief accuser, Meletus, *οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων;*

[5] Diog. Laert. *in vit.*

the Eleatic, and Theodorus of Cyrene; the former eminent for his dialectical skill, the latter the most distinguished geometrician of the time. And though his scanty means precluded his attendance on the lectures of the sophist Prodicus, he would on several occasions have been among the company assembled at the house of some wealthy citizen, and there heard from the lips of that master of language some of those rhetorical displays for which he was famed. With the poet Euripides, indeed, the disciple also of Anaxagoras and Prodicus, and who was his senior only by a few years, he appears to have lived in habits of intimacy. With Euripides he would probably often have discussed those ethical topics which the poet so greatly delighted to transfuse into his tragic scenes, and associate with the interest of dramatic incident. They were, in fact, brother-labourers in the same cause, though in different ways. For whilst Euripides endeavoured to work a reformation of his countrymen, by didactic addresses insinuated through their feelings, amidst the interest of tragic story, Socrates appealed, at once, to their understandings, and amidst the business or pastime of real life. The envy of contemporaries was prone to attribute the excellence of the poet in some of his dramatic efforts, to the aid of his philosopher-friend. The truth probably is, that the benefit of their intercourse was mutual; that, whilst the poet's imagination was informed and chastened by the shrewd and severe wisdom of the philosopher, the philosopher also, ever intent on his calling, would enlarge his mind with riches drawn from the genius, and taste, and learning of the poet.

The Sophists had their counterparts in the female sex, in those persons, known as Ἑταίραι, "female associates or companions," under the flimsy veil of a name which popular favour threw over their vice,—strangers visiting Athens from all parts of the Grecian world,—themselves the natural offspring, like the fabled harvest of the serpent's teeth, of those evil seeds, which the unprincipled and immoral teachings of the Sophists had scattered on the soil. Allusion has been made to individuals of that class as attendants on the teaching of Plato. Their

appearance, however, at Athens is of much earlier date. We have an account from the pen of Xenophon of the visit of Socrates to the house of one of these, by name Theodota; who is described as so beautiful, that painters resorted to her, to study as in a model of beauty, those graces of form by which she was distinguished, and represent them in their pictures. Socrates, on visiting her at her house, found her standing before a painter for that purpose, sumptuously adorned, with a number of female attendants around her, also richly attired, and everything about her in a corresponding style of elegance. He enters into familiar conversation with her; fully recognizing her position as one subsisting on the revenues accruing from a life of profligacy. He gives her friendly counsel as to the way of making friends; and, in reply to her invitation to repeat his visit, excuses himself on the plea of want of leisure; adding, that he has a charm which draws persons around him,—mentioning some of his known disciples,—and, in his eagerness to influence all classes and all sorts of persons, offering to receive her too, if she would come; and when she readily engages to do so, suddenly taking leave of her, saying, in his jesting way, "that he would admit her, provided there should be no other dearer one visiting him at the time." With the celebrated Aspasia, the heroine of her class, as she may be called, when we look to her public station as the intimate of Pericles, and her commanding influence over him, and her celebrity for beauty and talent, the name of Socrates is still more familiarly associated. Though Aspasia must have been rather a learner from him, than he from her; we find him acknowledging himself as indebted to her for instruction in Rhetoric in particular. In conversing with Menexenus, an aspirant to the honour of being elected a member of the Athenian Council, he tells him, that it was no wonder that he should be himself able to speak; as he had had no indifferent teacher in the art, namely, Aspasia,—"she who had made many good orators, and among them one especially, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus."[1] He

[1] Plato, *Menex.* p. 277.

goes on, indeed, to say that Aspasia had even composed that celebrated funeral oration which was pronounced by Pericles over the slain, at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian war. We must evidently, however, regard this assertion rather as a testimony to the great celebrity enjoyed by Aspasia,—perhaps only the repetition of a popular rumour, invidiously attributing to her even the eloquence of the great man himself, as if he did nothing apart from her, and could not even speak but by her dictation. In estimating, too, the weight of this assertion, we must make allowance for the habitual irony of Socrates; in the indulgence of which, he sometimes makes a statement having the appearance of a matter of fact, when it is only thrown out humorously, and must be interpreted with reference to the person addressed and the purpose in view.[1]

Great indeed must have been the curiosity excited by Aspasia in the character of a teacher at Athens; when, not only philosophers, and young men, studying to fit themselves for taking part in the affairs of the state, attended on her, but even women,—though it does not appear that these were of the families of Athenian citizens,—might be observed, under the escort of their friends, in the throng of admiring listeners gathered around her.[2]

Instruction in Music formed an important part of Athenian education. Socrates, it seems, did not neglect the opportunities which the presence of the great masters of the art in Athens

[1] The conclusion of the dialogue shews, that the statement here is not to be taken as literal truth; when Socrates, replying to the surprize of Menexenus that Aspasia, a woman, could compose such orations, says, "then, if you do not believe me, follow along with me, and you shall yourself hear her;" to which Menexenus again observes, "that he had often conversed with Aspasia, and knew what she was;" "why then, do you not admire her," subjoins Socrates, "and be thankful to her now for the oration?" "I am very thankful for this oration, Socrates," replies Menexenus, "to her, or to him, whoever it was, that told it to you, and I am very thankful to him before others who has told it to me." "Well," says Socrates, "but do not tell upon me; that I may hereafter report to you many and fine political orations from her."

A comparison of the two orations, that in Plato and that in Thucydides, will be a sufficient disproof of the assertion.

[2] Plutarch, in *Vit. Pericl.*

afforded him of learning its principles. Damon, a celebrated musician, though not more eminent in the science which he professed, than as a politician and sophist, was resident at Athens during part of the administration of Pericles, an intimate and counsellor of that great statesman, as well as his instructor in Music.[1] From him, we are told, Socrates received instruction in the art. He is also described as having learned to play on the harp, even in his advanced age, from Connus, a person well-known[2] for his skill on that instrument. By these accounts, however, we may understand, not that he became a proficient in the musical art, but that he had attended on the most skilled professors of it, and studied under them, so far as Music entered into the general pursuit of Philosophy; and formed a part of the general education of the accomplished Athenian at that time.

It should be observed, indeed, that though Socrates strongly discouraged the *presumption* of knowledge in all with whom he conversed, he did not disapprove of the acquisition of particular kinds of knowledge. He communicated whatever he knew to every one that came in his way; and where he was himself unacquainted with any subject, he referred his hearers to those who possessed the information. He was not in fact opposed to knowledge in itself. He was glad to embrace it wherever it could be found. But he was an enemy to the substitution of mere intellectual acquisitions,—and those often superficial and unreal,—for *education* of the mind and character. He felt, and justly felt, that knowledge by itself was vanity. The tendency of the age was to ascribe value exclusively to mental acuteness and dexterity. Ingenuity and cleverness obtained the merit and the prize of wisdom. His labour was to draw his countrymen from thinking too highly of their boasted knowledge. He wished them to see how greatly they overrated intellectual accomplishments,—how much they had yet to learn if they would be real proficients in wisdom.

Socrates indeed appears to have regarded Philosophy in the

[1] Plutarch in *Pericl.* [2] Xenophon, *Mem.* ii. 6. Plato, *Menex.* p. 235.

light of a sacred mission, τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, to which he was specially called, rather than of a study and exercise of the mind. This notion of philosophy had already been exemplified by Pythagoras and his followers. But they had realized it by forming themselves into distinct communities or colleges; separating themselves from the world around, by a solemn initiation, and the practice of an ascetic discipline. Socrates, however, had no thought of changing the outward form of society. He did not propose, like Pythagoras, to institute a refuge from the pollutions and misery of the world, or to educate a peculiar brotherhood, who should afterwards act on the social mass. He did not address himself to the few. His school was all Athens, or rather indeed all Greece. Leaving society as it was, he sought to infuse a new spirit into it, by carrying his philosophy into every department of it. He therefore went about among all classes of people, preferring none, despising none, but adapting his instructions to every variety of condition and character. Thus did he in truth, according to the observation commonly applied to him from the time of Cicero, bring down philosophy from heaven to earth; but not so much by being the first to give a moral tone to philosophy, as by the universality and philanthropy of his teaching. His distinguishing merit is, that by his freedom from all pretentiousness, and by his simplicity, he humanized philosophy.[1] Philosophy in his hands was no longer an exclusive and privileged profession. It no longer spoke as from an oracular shrine, and in the language of mystery. It now conversed with every man at his own home,—submitted to be familiarly approached and viewed without reserve,—and, instead of waiting to be formally consulted by its votaries only, volunteered to mingle in the business, and interests, and pleasures of every-day life.

His manner of life and of teaching is thus described by Xenophon.[2]

[1] Plutarch, *De Socrat. Genio*, p. 582 B, Ἀνδρὸς ἀτυφίᾳ καὶ ἀφελείᾳ μάλιστα δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἐξανθρωπίσαντος.

[2] *Mem.* i. 1; also Plutarch, *Utrum seni gerend. Resp.*

"He was constantly in public. For early in the morning he would go to the walks and the gymnasia; and when the agora was full, he was to be seen there; and constantly during the remainder of the day, he would be wherever he was likely to meet with the most persons; and for the most part he would talk, and all that would might hear him."

The nature of his conversations is thus further reported by the same faithful authority:

"No one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, any thing impious or profane. For not only did he not discourse about the nature of all things, as most others, inquiring how, what by the Sophists is called the Universe, consists, and by what laws each heavenly thing is produced; but he would point out the folly of those who studied such matters. And the first inquiry he would make of them was, whether they proceeded to such studies from thinking themselves already sufficiently acquainted with human things; or whether they thought they were acting becomingly in passing by human things, and giving their attention to the divine. He would wonder, too, it was not evident to them, that it was not possible for men to find out these matters; since even those who most prided themselves on discoursing of them, did not agree in opinion with each other, but were affected like madmen in relation to one another. For of madmen, whilst some did not fear even what were objects of fear, others were afraid of things that were not to be feared; whilst some were not ashamed to say or do any thing even before the multitude, others objected even to going out into the world; whilst some paid no honour to sacred things, or altars, or any other religious object, others worshipped even stones, and common stocks, and brutes. So of those who speculated on the nature of all things, whilst some thought that Being was one only, others thought it was infinite in number; whilst some thought that all things were in perpetual motion, others thought it impossible for any thing to be moved; whilst some thought that all things were in a course of generation and destruction, others thought that nothing could possibly be generated or

destroyed. He would further consider respecting them thus: whether, as the learners of human things think they shall be able to make practical use of their knowledge for themselves and any one else at pleasure, so also the searchers into the divine things hold, that having ascertained by what laws each thing is generated, they shall be able to produce at pleasure, winds, and waters, and seasons, and whatever else of the kind they may want; or whether they have no such expectation, but it suffices them only to know how every thing of this kind is generated. Such, then, was his manner of speaking about those who busied themselves with these matters.—But, for his part, he was ever discoursing about human things; inquiring what was pious, what impious, what honourable, what base, what just, what unjust, what sobriety, what madness, what courage, what cowardice, what a state, what a statesman, what a government of men, what the character of a governor; and about other subjects, which, by being known, he thought, would make men honourable and virtuous, whilst those ignorant of them would justly be called slavish."

Xenophon has thus fully touched the character of the teaching of Socrates in its leading points, and the nature of his constant occupation at Athens. The intermissions of military service appear to have been the only occasions of any variation in this uniform course of life. No other country had any charms for him, as no other afforded such rich opportunities of conversing with men, and studying human nature.[1] His activity was essentially different from that either of his predecessors or successors in the path of philosophy. They travelled from place to place searching for knowledge, storing their minds with various observations, and making philosophy their formal business. Socrates, as he had no stated school or place of audience, so he had no design of framing any system of philo-

[1] Plato, *Laches*, 187. *Οὔ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ᾖ λόγῳ, ὥσπερ γένει, καὶ πλησιάζῃ διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ . . . . μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὑτοῦ λόγον, ὄντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ, καὶ ὄντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβιώκει, κ. τ. λ.*

sophy, or of enlarging the researches and discoveries of former philosophers, or of pursuing knowledge as an ultimate object. He regarded himself simply, as called by the voice of Deity to undertake the reformation of men, and especially of his fellow-citizens, as his proper sphere of duty, from their corruptions of sentiment and conduct. He stood, therefore, by the great stream of human life which was ever flowing at Athens, and watched its course. He is said once to have visited Samos in company with Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, and also to have gone to the Pythian and the Isthmian games. With these exceptions, and those of the occasions of military service abroad, he appears to have constantly remained at home, unattracted from the town, the seat of his philosophic mission, by invitations even to the courts of princes. In vain did Scopas of Cranon, and Eurylochus of Larissa, offer him money, and invite him to visit them.[1] He could refuse also the hospitality of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, the same with whom the poet Euripides found a kind and honourable refuge in his old age, from the envy of his countrymen, and domestic grievance. His refusal of the invitation of Archelaus is said indeed to have been accompanied with the declaration of his feeling, that he could not brook the acceptance of a favour which it was entirely out of his power to return.[2] Nay, so entirely engrossed was he in the work to which he had devoted himself, that he was a stranger, as Plato represents him, even to the immediate neighbourhood of the city. The banks of the Ilyssus, even then classic ground, rich with legendary associations, could not seduce him from the agora and the crowd; so that he seemed scarcely at home anywhere beyond the walls of Athens.[3]

No Athenian, however, could decline the military service of the state. And this service, at the time of Socrates, often

[1] Diog. Laert. *in vit.*

[2] Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 23.

[3] Plato, *Phædr.* 230. Σὺ δέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀποπώτατός τις φαίνει· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ, ὃ λέγεις, ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τοπαράπαν ἐξιέναι. ΣΩ. Συγγίγνωσκε δή μοι, ὦ ἄριστε, φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μὲ θέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι. P. 287; also *Crito*, p. 120. *Meno.* p. 348.

engaged the citizen in hazardous enterprizes and long absences far from his home. The first occasion on which Socrates is related to have served, was in the Chersonese at Potidæa, just before the opening of the Peloponnesian war. The service in which the Athenian soldiers were engaged here was one of great hardship. It was in the winter season, and the climate in those parts was most severe. Amongst those who distinguished themselves by their resoluteness and gallantry, none was so conspicuous as the philosopher. Whilst others were clothing themselves with additional garments, and wrapping their feet in wool, he was observed in his usual dress, and walking barefoot on the ice, with more ease, than others with their shoes. Nor even amidst these circumstances, did he merge the character of the philosopher in that of the soldier. He was seen one morning at sun-rise fixed in contemplation. At noon he was in the same position, and still in the evening, and so continued through the night, until the sun-rise of the following day. Such, too, was his bravery in the engagement at Potidæa, that he earned for himself the prize of distinction, but readily sacrificed his claim to the wishes of the generals, in favour of a more illustrious candidate in the person of Alcibiades. Alcibiades himself would have refused the honour as due rather to Socrates; for to the unwillingness of Socrates to leave him wounded on the field, he had been even indebted for his own life, and the preservation of his arms, after the battle. But the philosopher, with a true magnanimity, insisted on the award of the generals.[1]

The next occasion of military service, in which he was scarcely less distinguished than at Potidæa, was in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, at the battle of Delium in Bœotia. The battle was an unsuccessful one to the Athenians, and they were forced to retreat in disorder. Alcibiades was also present on this occasion, and overtook, on the way, Socrates, in company with Laches, one of the generals. He was on horseback, and comparatively therefore out of danger, whilst they were on foot.[2] He had opportunity, therefore, of admiring the presence

[1] Plato, *Sympos.* 269.

[2] Ibid. *Laches*, 165.

of mind which Socrates displayed on the occasion, even beyond Laches, and the steadiness and vigilance with which he kept the enemy from pressing upon them, and so secured their retreat.[1]

These incidents seem to rest on indisputable evidence. The form in which they are introduced, related as they are by a professed eye-witness, and that witness Alcibiades, the person, next to Socrates himself, most interested in them, may justly be regarded as giving a sanction to their history, independently of any fictitious circumstances added in the way of embellishment to the Dialogue.

The third occasion on which Socrates served as a soldier was again in Thrace, at Amphipolis,[2] in the same year as that of the unfortunate expedition to Delium. No particulars are mentioned of this adventure. But the fact itself is sufficiently attested. Nor, though it follows immediately on the affair of Delium, is it improbable on that account. For at this busy period of the war, when the Athenians were making demonstrations of their power, by the presence of their forces in different places at once; and when Brasidas was pushing his successes against them in Thrace; no individual of the military age (and Socrates was not more than about forty-five years of age at this time), would enjoy any long interval of relaxation from foreign service.

With these exceptions, Socrates appears to have constantly resided at his home at Athens. All this time, throughout his whole life indeed, he lived in great poverty, content with the

[1] Plato, *Sympos.* p. 270. The story is again alluded to by Plato, in the dialogue *Laches.* Laches there says, that he had experience of the *actions* of Socrates, and reminds him of the day of their common danger, ἢ μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιεκινδύνευσας, κ. τ. λ. p. 182. Laertius says (*in. vit. Soc.* ii. 5-7), that Socrates rescued Xenophon, who had fallen from his horse in the battle of Delium, by carrying him off the field. In the *Deipnosophists* of Athenæus (v. 55), doubt is thrown on these accounts of the military service of Socrates; and instances are given of the historical inaccuracy of Plato. The objections, however, as there given, are evidently thrown out in the way of discussion, and not with perfect seriousness, as if the speaker really thought them of weight.

[2] Plato, *Apolog.* 28. c. p. 67. Diog. Laert. *in vit.* Ælian, *Var. Hist.* iii. 17.

least that might suffice for mere sustenance and clothing from day to day.

Yet it was no artificial, and melancholy, and fanatical life that he led. He accustomed himself to strict moderation, not with any view to the mortification of the body, or as thinking that abstinence was in itself a virtue, but in order to self-command; by rendering himself as independent as possible of the circumstances of the body, to disencumber the soul of every burthen and obstruction to its free operation. There was nothing, indeed, of austerity in his life or manner. He might be seen walking barefoot, but it was not for the pain that it might inflict. It was only that he might bear cold and privations of every kind the better, and suffer less inconvenience when exposed to necessary hardships, and require less for his ordinary subsistence. So far was he from studying a discipline of bodily severity for its own sake, that he was observed at times mingling in the social festivities of his fellow-citizens with the full freedom of Athenian conviviality, and shewing that he could bear excesses which mastered others, without losing his self-command.[1]

Both Plato and Xenophon have presented to us a picture of him, under this especial point of view. Each has sketched a symposium, or drinking party, at Athens, in which Socrates appears as the principal figure, bearing his part in the festal mirth of the occasion, and, at the same time, giving an instructive turn to the conversation. In the symposium of Xenophon, the party are assembled at the house of Callias in the Piræus, the well-known resort of the Sophists, in honour of the victory of the youth Autolycus in the contest of the pancratium, at the great Panathenæa: in that of Plato, the occasion is of a similar character, at the house of the youthful poet, Agatho, in celebration of his Tragic victory of the previous day, at the Lenæa.

In the former, the entertainment of the evening is described as enlivened by a professional jester, who appears among the guests without invitation, and by the performances of a paid

[1] Ælian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 11.

exhibitor accompanied by a girl playing the flute, another a dancer, and a boy playing the harp; who, at intervals, amuse the company by singing, and by feats of skill and agility, and sleight-of-hand tricks; and, at the end, delight them by a stage-representation of a love-scene between Bacchus and Ariadne.

In the latter, a minstrel-girl is introduced; but it is only to be immediately dismissed; Agatho and his guests determining, that, as the previous day had been one of profuse drinking, this should be one of liberty to each to drink only as he pleased, and that on the present occasion they should engage in some intellectual pastime among themselves. A subject of discussion, accordingly, is proposed—the encomium of Love—on which each is to display in turn his power of description. It comes last to the turn of Socrates to speak; and it is to him that Plato reserves the expression of the judgment of his philosophy on the subject. All that is said by the previous speakers, (though the masterly hand of Plato is evident in their speeches, in working them up for effect, and marking out any peculiarities in the individuals, with strong touches of his own satirical humour, (especially in those of Agatho and Aristophanes), is but the clearing of the ground, and the prelude to the exposition which Socrates proceeds to deliver, of the nature of Love. Avoiding, as was his constant practice, all didactic statement, Socrates professes only to repeat a conversation which he had held on some occasion with "the Mantinean stranger," Diotime, one, evidently, of the notorious class of female visitors of Athens. As the account which he is about to give of the affection of Love, would doubtless sound somewhat mystical and strange in their ears, he prefaces it with the mention of her fame for skill in the art of divination.[1] He tells them, how, by a series of questions, she had brought him to a sense of his ignorance on the subject, and taught him, that Love had not for its true object, the

[1] Such was her skill in this respect, he says (*Sympos.* p. 227), that in consequence of a sacrifice performed by the Athenians at her suggestion, she had occasioned a delay of the visitation of the plague for ten years before the war.

gratification of this or that particular desire, but only "the good," with the possession of that good for ever; how he had further learned from her, that all that effort of Love which was observed in the world, was a seeking, to the utmost, an immortality of being and of happiness; that which in itself is mortal, thus preserving its identity, and realizing its immortal existence by successive renovations of self; just as personal identity remains, whilst changes are constantly proceeding in the mind and body of the individual. Whilst (as she explained to him further, he said) this effort manifested itself in various ways in the world,—in some, in sensual indulgence; in some, in the love and care of their offspring; in some, in the pursuit of fame; in some again, in works of intellect, or in labours for the benefit of men, by implanting in other minds the principles of knowledge and virtue,—it could never obtain its full gratification in the present condition of being; but must go on, striving still, from lower to higher ground,—step by step,—becoming larger and more general in its aim,—until at length it realizes to itself the bright vision of the intrinsically beautiful and divine.

The setting forth, however, of this mystical and sublime theory of Love, connecting it with his philosophy of the Divine Ideas, was not all that Plato contemplated in bringing Socrates before us in his symposium. He evidently designed further to vindicate the character of Socrates from the imputation of corrupting the young, by introducing both Aristophanes, by whom the charge had obtained a public expression in his play of the *Clouds*, and Alcibiades, to whom that charge especially pointed, in friendly intercourse with him on this occasion. Aristophanes, as one of the company, had, in his turn, spoken in the praise of Love. And he was about to reply to some observation of Socrates alluding to him, when suddenly a loud knocking is heard at the door of the court; and Alcibiades makes his appearance in a drunken frolic, followed by a party of noisy revellers, such as appear very commonly to have infested the streets of Athens at night. Being invited to take his part in celebrating the praise of Love, he affects to be jealous of the

attention of Socrates to Agatho, and peremptorily refuses to praise any one but Socrates himself. He sets out, accordingly, with a humorous strain of encomium, imitating the ironical manner of Socrates, holding up to ridicule the peculiarities of the person of Socrates; even quoting some words from the *Clouds*, expressive of his manner of solemnly moving his body and glaring with the eyes; then making a sudden transition from this topic, going on to declare his admiration of the great virtues of Socrates, of the influence which he had with all whom he addressed; how Socrates had saved him in the war from the hands of the enemy; how he had not only shewn himself brave in the hour of danger, but also no less firm and invincible under temptations to licentious and criminal indulgence; how, in all their intercourse, his conduct towards him had ever been no other than that of a father towards a son.[1]

One account, but not a very credible one, as it rests on the authority of Aristoxenus, an invidious writer, states that Socrates was supported by the alms of friends, contributed from time to time for his relief. With his very limited wants, and his ready access to the house of Crito and other liberal patrons of philosophy at Athens, he would not have to depend on this precarious charity. The pittance which sufficed for the humblest citizen would suffice for him. He is said to have inherited a patrimony of seventy or eighty minæ.[2] But this sum, it is

[1] The Tragic victory of Agatho, occurring at the festival of the Lenæa, in B.C. 416, and the first exhibition of the *Clouds* being in B.C. 423; there would be sufficient time in the interval between the exhibition, and the occasion of the symposium in Plato, for passages in the *Clouds* to have become current in the mouths of people.

Allusion is also made in Xenophon's symposium, to the frivolous questions which Socrates is made to ask in the *Clouds*.

Notwithstanding the entire difference of style in the two dialogues, they resemble each other in so many points, that one is apt to suppose, that one of the two authors had previously seen the work of the other.

[2] About £400 of our money. Plutarch (in his life of Aristides) finds fault with Demetrius Phalereus for having endeavoured to remove the imputation of poverty from Socrates, by stating that Socrates had land of his own and seventy minæ put out to interest by Crito. The idea of his extreme indigence originated probably with the caricatures of his profession of poverty by the comic poets; and, true as it was substantially, was afterwards, it seems, maintained by his friends and admirers, as the evidence of the consistency of his life with his avowed contempt for worldly possessions.

added, he lost (though the time is not stated when the loss occurred) by the failure of the person with whom it had been placed at interest. He possessed also a house in Athens; and he was able, however scantily, to support a family. So that we cannot suppose he was absolutely destitute of all resources of subsistence. He appears then rather to have voluntarily renounced every kind of worldly possession, so far as his own personal comfort was concerned, than to have been absolutely reduced to want by the pressure of circumstances. Poverty, in fact, was his profession, and not the mere necessity of his case. If he prided himself in any thing, it was in his avowal of his contempt for riches, and disregard of domestic interests and comforts, in contrast with the general habits of an age of selfish activity and profusion. The means of enriching himself, at least of extricating himself from want, were often placed in his power, and he as often rejected them. Alcibiades offered him land on which he might build a house, but he refused it pointedly, observing, "Had I wanted shoes, would you have offered me leather to make shoes for myself?—and ridiculous should I have been in taking it." Charmides would have given him slaves, as a source of revenue by their labour. This offer also he refused.[1] In the same spirit, he would often cast a look at the number of things that were sold, and say to himself, "Of how many things I have no need!"[2] Thus was his whole plan of life studiously opposed to the acceptance of any provision for his comfort or ease. It was a service of the Deity in which he felt himself engaged, and, in the prosecution of that, solemnly devoted to a course of hardy poverty.[3]

In the domestic relations of life, he lived an Athenian among Athenians. He differed from other heads of families at Athens in this respect, that in his dedication of himself to his philosophic mission, he took no thought about the management of his private affairs. His home was abroad; his household the people of Athens. Still he discharged the duties of a husband, and the

[1] Diog. Laert. *in vit.*

[2] Ibid.

[3] Plato, *Apolog.* p. 5. Ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

father of a family; and that under trying circumstances, unless the proverbial severity of temper of his wife Xanthippe be esteemed an idle scandal of the day. No Athenian, indeed, was truly domestic, in the sense of making his home the scene of his highest interest and enjoyment. Nor was Socrates domestic in this sense. Still less was he so than other Athenians; inasmuch as his very profession of life was a call from the bosom of his family. But in the midst of these avocations from his immediate home, and the vexations to which he was subjected there, he was not estranged from the ties of domestic affection. Xenophon has recorded a simple and touching trait of the character of Socrates under this particular point of view—a trait the more interesting, as almost everything else that we know of the philosopher is drawn from his life in public. It occurs in the course of a conversation between Socrates and his son Lamprocles, who had complained of the insufferable temper of his mother Xanthippe. "What," said he to the youth, "do you think it more annoying to you to hear what she says, than it is to the actors, when in the tragedies they say every thing bad of one another?" "But they, I conceive," replied the son, "bear it easily, because they do not suppose that the speaker, in contradicting them, intends to hurt them, or that in threatening, he intends to do them any ill." "Then are you," resumed Socrates, "vexed, when you well know that what your mother says to you, she says, not only intending no evil, but even wishing more good to you than to any one else; or do you regard your mother as unkindly affected towards you?" Lamprocles, disclaiming this latter supposition; "Do you then," he added, "say of her, who is both kind to you, and takes every possible care of you when you are sick, that you may recover, and want nothing proper for you, and who, moreover, prays to the gods in your behalf for many a good, and pays vows,—that she is vexatious? For my part, I think, if you cannot bear such a mother, you cannot bear what is good for you"[1]

From the description given by Plato of the family of Socrates

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* ii. 2.

in the prison-scene, it would appear that Socrates had two other children then living besides Lamprocles—the eldest;[1] one of them quite a child, at the time of their father's death.[2] We learn from other authorities,[3] that the two younger children were named Sophroniscus and Menexenus; but these are said to have been the children, not of Xanthippe, but of another wife, Myrto, the grand-daughter of Aristides, surnamed the Just.[4] To account for this, it has been stated, that after their disasters in Sicily, the Athenians made a decree authorizing double marriages, with the view of recruiting their exhausted population. But this statement does not appear to be borne out by the earlier authorities on the subject of Athenian legislation. Nor is it probable that a law should have been enacted, directly sanctioning a form of polygamy. It appears, that during the pressure and confusion of the Peloponnesian war, persons obtained the freedom of the city of Athens whose title was objectionable on the constitutional ground of their not being born of citizen-parents on both sides. Thus had Pericles, after the death of his two legitimate sons, obtained the admission of his son, Pericles, by Aspasia, to the privilege of citizenship;[5] though he had himself carried, some time before, a law of strict limitation, under which nearly four thousand were deprived of the franchise.[6] Such extension of the privilege to the offspring of illegal unions, possibly gave a pretext to the supposition, that a decree passed at Athens sanctioning bigamy.

Some difficulty, however, arises on the subject of the marriage of Socrates, from the conflict of authorities. Whilst it is asserted, on the one hand, that he was married to Myrto and Xanthippe at the same time; on the other hand, others assign them both as his wives, but in succession, and also differ as to the order of succession. But the silence of Plato and Xeno-

[1] Xenophon, *Mem.* ii., 2, in the anecdote referred to above, speaks of Lamprocles as the eldest son, and of Xanthippe as his mother.

[2] Plato, *Phædo*, pp. 135, 262.

[3] Aristotle, cited by Laertius *in vit. Socr.*

[4] Diog. Laert. *in vit.*

[5] The same who was among the generals at the battle of Arginusæ, who were cruelly and iniquitously sacrificed to party spirit after their great victory.

[6] Plutarch *in Pericl.*

phon respecting any other wife of Socrates but Xanthippe, and their coincidence in speaking of her only as the mother of his children, may be regarded as sufficiently decisive of the point against every subsequent authority. Indeed, the reference to Aristotle, given by Laertius, which is the chief ground for supposing that Socrates was married also to Myrto, is very questionable; it is even doubtful whether the treatise to which Laertius appeals for the fact, is the genuine work of Aristotle. From the manner, too, in which the name of Myrto appears to have been introduced in the account, nothing more may have been intended, than that Socrates found her in a state of widowhood and distress from poverty, and took care of her at his own home.[1] Aristides belonged to the same tribe, and the same demus or borough, as Socrates; and a reverence for the virtues of the grandfather, may have combined with these almost domestic ties, to call forth such an act of friendliness to the disconsolate Myrto.[2] And if this be the case, as is probable, it would only add an interesting instance of that liberal benevolence which characterized the whole conduct of Socrates.[3]

It is a confirmation of this conclusion, that all anecdotes of the private life of Socrates which appear at all credible, bring Xanthippe on the scene. On his inviting some wealthy persons to supper, it is Xanthippe who is distressed by their deficient means of hospitality, and to whom he replies, "Take courage; if they are worthy people, they will be satisfied; if they are worthless we shall care nothing about them."[4] It is Xanthippe whom he reproves for her particularity about her dress on the occasion of some public spectacle, as more desirous of "being seen than to see."[5] It is of her again that Alcibiades expressed his wonder how he could bear with her, when he simply but pointedly referred him to her just claims on his affection as the

[1] The poverty of the family of Aristides appears from Ælian, *Var. Hist.*, x. 15.

[2] Plato, *Laches*.

[3] Plutarch in *Aristides*. He adds, that Panætius had sufficiently refuted the story of the double marriage in his observations on Socrates. The story is also questioned by Athenæus, *Deipnosoph.*, xiii. 2.

[4] Diog. Laert. *in vit.*

[5] Ælian, *Var. Hist.*, vii. 10.

mother of his children.[1] On another occasion his disciple, Antisthenes, is said to have asked him, with reference to Xanthippe, why he did not study to improve the disposition of his wife, whose violence of temper (he observed) was unexampled in the history of domestic life. Instead of confirming the censorious remark, he turned it, according to his usual method, to a practical illustration of his philosophy. "If Xanthippe was hard to be controlled," was the tenor of his answer, "it was only a proper discipline to him for the management of men; as those who would be masters in horsemanship, began with managing the most spirited horse, after which every other would be tractable."[2] These stories, and the like, handed down or invented by the humour of the times, may be merely exaggerations of the fact of the inconvenience and dissatisfaction occasionally felt at the philosopher's home, by his habitual neglect of his domestic concerns, and the duty of exertion consequently imposed on Xanthippe beyond Athenian women in general. She appears indeed to have tenderly loved her husband, if Plato has faithfully traced the picture of her visit to his prison, and her extreme anguish at that trying hour. And he also knew her value, if his affection may be judged of, as surely it may, by the kind and gentle considerateness of his manner in committing her to the care of his friends at parting, and his absolute reserve of his feelings on that occasion.[3] The picture, indeed, is drawn by the hand of a consummate master; and Plato, it is true, was not present on the occasion. But we must believe, that in painting a scene that must have been impressed on the mind of the disciples of the philosopher, above every other incident of his life, and of which persons then living must have retained a lively recollection, he took his outlines at least of these interesting particulars from the real state of the case.

But the allusion to these circumstances brings us prematurely to the solemn tragedy which closed his intrepid and energetic career. We have yet to contemplate him pursuing for many a year his unwearied labour of awakening his countrymen

[1] Diog. Laert. *in Vit.* [2] Xenoph. *Sympos.*, ii. [3] Plato, *Phædo*, p. 135.

from their dreams of knowledge and happiness to the realities of their condition in the world. Great indeed must have been the address, which could recommend the severe and wholesome truths inculcated by him, to the hearing of the vain and volatile Athenians. To none is the practical application of a principle, so condemnatory of human folly and impertinence, as the maxim, "Know Thyself," truly welcome. And yet this was the burthen of the teaching of Socrates for a series of years, among a people, whom it was far easier to please by praising to excess, than not to displease by censuring ever so slightly. They would listen, indeed, patiently, to general invectives on their public conduct, conveyed in the impassioned eloquence of their orators; as persons will readily sympathize with general descriptions of the depravity of Human nature, or of whole classes of men. But all are apt to recoil from the pain of direct self-application of the truth; and Athenians, especially, regarded with invidiousness every attempt to impart to them moral instruction. Every Athenian, they thought, was capable of communicating this kind of knowledge, at least every educated Athenian, every individual of the higher order of citizens.[1] They wanted no one to teach them Virtue. Hence the allusion made on so many occasions by Socrates to the question, whether virtue could be taught or not. When the Sophists made this a part of their profession, it was as an external accomplishment or art, and not as a *discipline of life*, that it entered into their system of education.[2] Socrates uprooted this vain notion. He laboured to impress on the Athenians, that so far from these popular teachers being able to impart instruction in Virtue, there were none who really knew what Virtue was. They had yet to learn *themselves*,—to become acquainted with their own minds, their own character intellectually and morally, in order to that pur-

[1] Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2. 24. Κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ που γεγραμμένον τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν, ἢ προσέσχες τε καὶ ἐπεχείρησας σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν ὅστις εἶ; Μὰ Δί', οὐ δῆτα ἔφη. καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάνυ τοῦτό γε ᾤμην εἰδέναι· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ἤδειν, εἴγε μηδ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐγίγνωσκον, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Isocrates speaks of them as σύμπασαν ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν πωλοῦντες, and again, as τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παραδιδόντας. *Contra Soph.* 3, 4.

pose. This, then, was his great difficulty. It was not the difficulty of communicating *new* knowledge, but that of leading men to *unlearn* their presumptions and conceits, and to *feel the necessity* of real moral instruction. That he should have succeeded then in any degree in such an attempt,—that he should have been able to carry on the effort for so many years, in the very centre of Greek civilization,—that, proceeding on so broad and fundamental a principle of reformation, presenting no definite system on which a sect might fasten, no specific lure to the zeal of party, he should have drawn around him so many followers and admirers—this is the extraordinary effect in the case of Socrates, which shews the powerful charm of his address. To persons offering any particular instruction, or professing to qualify them for the office of ststesmen and orators, the Athenians were most ready to attend ; and many doubtless did attend to the conversations of Socrates with this view. They could not but admire the skill which he displayed in arguing with every one that came in his way ; not with the vulgar only, but with those who had the highest reputation for talent in reasoning, and for the extent of their knowledge. They saw his superiority to the Sophists, on the very ground on which the Sophists set up their pretensions. Many, accordingly, flocked to him as the best master in political science and dialectical skill, particularly as he was always accessible, and his instructions were perfectly gratuitous. Some, too, of a better nature than the rest, were won by the honest and manly purpose which shone through his teaching and manner on all occasions, whatever disguise of irony, or humour, or sophistry, he might assume. There were even some of the young men, whose habits of life were reproved, and principles condemned, by his searching interrogatories, but who yet were won to attention by the charm of his instruction, and patiently heard from him truths which they would not have listened to from any other lips. For who else could stay, even for a moment, the wild impetuosity of Alcibiades, or the ferocious arrogance of Critias ? Their motives in resorting to Socrates were chiefly selfish and political. It was in pursuit of their

schemes of ambition that they sought his society. Still he was able to retain them for a time at least, though they found his instructions very different from what they calculated on receiving; and so long as they continued to associate with him, they exercised a degree of self-restraint which strikingly contrasted with the habitual profligacy of their lives.[1]

Much as we must allow for the humour and the extravagance of what is said in the person of Alcibiades in Plato's symposium, where he is represented as speaking under the excitement of wine and revelry, and for the amusement of the company amongst whom he has suddenly presented himself, rather than for any serious purpose, we may yet believe the substantial truth of what he attributes to the influence of Socrates over him, when he tells them how the words of Socrates affected him; how his heart had beaten, and the tears had gushed from his eyes, at the reproofs of Socrates; how he, whom no one would believe ever to have felt shame before any one, was yet ashamed before him, and constrained to own his fault in neglecting himself, amidst all his officious concern about the affairs of the state. Whilst he excites a laugh around him by pointing out the peculiarities of the person of Socrates, comparing him to the sculptured figures of the Sileni and the Mercuries in the streets of Athens, he yet owns the power of the spell by which he was held in the presence of Socrates, as persons were said to be by the flute of the satyr Marsyas. Nor was he the only person who felt this charm: he adds, For that there was no one, woman, or man, or boy, that might hear him, or even his words repeated by a very indifferent speaker, but was taken by surprise and rivetted in attention.[2]

This comparison of him to the Sileni, and, in particular, to the satyr Marsyas, was also true in more respects than that of the enchantment of his conversation. His countenance, strongly marked by that arch intelligence, which half-concealed, half-betrayed, the earnest deep thought, under the guise of irony and humour, presented an outline resembling those grotesque forms

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.*, i. 2. [2] Plato, *Sympos.*, p. 257.

with which the imagination of the Greeks delighted to people the woods and wilds of their land. There were the prominent dilated eyes, scarcely parted by the low ridge of the nose, the broad expanded nostrils, the wide mouth with its thick lips, such as were represented in the images of the Sileni. Then his manner of looking about him—his head fixed, whilst his eyes traversed the space around, glancing from side to side—excited the smile of wonder in the spectator, as to what this strange solemnity of aspect might portend. Add to this, the clumsy protuberance of his figure, so repugnant to Grecian notions of the symmetry of form, and the awkwardness of his movement before the eyes of a people who had a lively perception of elegance in every gesture and motion. These were circumstances which, to the fastidious taste of the Greeks, would appear more important than we can well conceive.[1] Thus, in regard to Socrates, the physiognomist Zopyrus pronounced that he was stupid and dull, because the outline of his throat was not concave, but full and obtuse.[2] Prejudices accordingly drawn from the personal appearance of Socrates may reasonably be believed to have tended to render his teaching unwelcome in its first impressions. But soon this fastidiousness would give way as he proceeded; and those who began to listen with a smile at the uncouthness of his form, and the quaintness of his manner, would be attracted to admiration of the intelligent and kindly expression which lighted up those rude features, and would find themselves lingering in his presence in spite of themselves.

The story of Euthydemus "the handsome," as he was called, may be taken as a specimen of such an effect. Euthydemus, proud of his personal accomplishments, and not wishing to be thought indebted to any one for his learning and eloquence, had studiously avoided the society of Socrates. Socrates, however, with his usual dexterity, contrives to excite his attention, and gradually interests him in conversation. Euthydemus shrinks

[1] Aristotle, in treating of arguing from Signs in general, notices, under the head τὸ φυσιογνωμονεῖν (*Anal.* Pr. c. *ult.*), conclusions drawn from natural signs, such as indications of temper or disposition in the form of any class of animals, peculiar to that class.

[2] Cicero, *De Fato*, c. 5.

back at first on his self-conceit, but at length is so won upon by the persuasive reason of the philosopher, as freely to acknowledge his own ignorance and need of instruction; and, ever afterwards, he is found by the side of Socrates, his devoted admirer and follower.[1]

Some, indeed, took offence at the plain truths which Socrates brought home to them, and no longer frequented his society.[2] But these were the inferior sluggish minds, which no arts of address could rouse to a sense of their intellectual poverty. Generous, susceptible minds overcame their first reluctance, and yielded themselves fully to his guidance. The faithful attachment of many was evidenced to the last moment of the philosopher's life. He might have commanded the use of Crito's wealth, had he desired it. Such, indeed, was the confidence which Crito reposed in his sincerity of purpose, and so highly did he value his instructions, that to no other would he commit the education of his sons, but made them fellow disciples with himself of his own revered master and friend. And this friendship was warmly requited by Socrates. For it was by his counsel that Crito was saved from the malicious arts of the sycophants. These pests of Athenian society were not to be encountered by the simple testimony of a life contradicting their mercenary calumnies; and Crito was one of those who would rather pay their money, and compromise the attack, than take the trouble of defending themselves. They were only to be foiled by turning their own weapons against themselves. By the suggestion of Socrates, accordingly, Crito enlisted in his service a clever individual of this class, Archedemus, who effectually checked the iniquities of which his patron was the object, by counter-prosecutions of the sycophants, and exposure of their conduct; acting as a watch-dog, according to Xenophon's description, against those rapacious wolves.[3]

The devotedness of Plato and Xenophon to their master, speaks from every line of their writings. These writings are, in fact, as much monuments of the influence of Socrates over their

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 2. [2] *Ibid.* 40. [3] *Ibid.* ii. 9.

minds, as of their own genius. And what human teacher has ever had such glorious trophies erected, of the conquests of his philosophy as the extant works of these master minds? Entirely different as they are in character,—the one flowing with the full stream of impassioned feeling, and lively elegant imagination, and the abundant treasures of literary and traditionary wisdom, —the other sensible and acute and practical, forcible by his very simplicity and the terseness of his unaffected eloquence,—they bear distinct yet conspiring evidence of the ascendancy of that mind which could impart its own tone and character to such disciples. Both of them, indeed, lead us to think that they felt his society as a kind of spell on them. For, when Plato speaks of the charm of the discourses of the Sophists, he seems to speak in irony of them what he thought in truth of Socrates himself. So, too, when Xenophon introduces Socrates describing himself as skilled in "philters and incantations," he is evidently presenting that idea which the conversations of Socrates impressed on his own mind. He seems almost to confess this of himself when he informs us how Socrates triumphantly appealed to the marked devotedness of his followers, in saying, "Why think you that this Apollodorus and Antisthenes never quit me? Why, too, that Cebes and Simmias come here from Thebes? Be assured, that this is not without many philters, and incantations, and spells."[1]

To the same honourable band of attached disciples might be added many other names afterwards renowned in the annals of Grecian history and literature. Isocrates, Aristippus, Antisthenes, each of whom became afterwards masters themselves, were content to follow in his train. Antisthenes especially, who, by perverting the Socratic simplicity of life into a profession of austerity, became the founder of the Cynic school, was never from his side. He would walk from the Piræus to Athens, a distance of about four miles, every day, in order to be with Socrates. And whilst Cebes and Simmias came from Thebes, Euclides, the founder of the Megaric sect, was not deterred by the

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iii. 2.

bitter hostility between Athens and his own city of Megara, from seeking the society of Socrates at the hazard of his life. Even during the war, when the Megareans were excluded by a rigid decree, he continued his visits to Athens, adopting, it is said, the disguise of female attire, and so passing unobserved into the city at nightfall, and returning at daybreak.[1] The same individual gave still more conclusive evidence of his zealous attachment to Socrates afterwards; when he opened his house and his heart to receive, at Megara, his brother disciples, in their panic on the death of their master. So strong was the tie of reverence and affection which subsisted between the philosopher and those whom he drew around him. They formed, indeed, a sort of select family, each of whom was engaged in the pursuit of his own peculiar employments and tastes in the world, whilst all looked up to Socrates as their father and head, and ever recurred to his society as to their common home.

This domestic intercourse subsisted in the midst of a city harassed with jealousies and dissensions, and with severe afflictions of war and pestilence. Socrates remained unmoved through all these convulsions of the city, preserving a constant evenness of temper, so that Xanthippe could testify of him, that she never saw him returning at evening with a countenance changed from that which he left home in the morning.[2] Nor could even the merriment of which he was sometimes the object, discompose his settled gravity and good humour. On one occasion, returning from supper late in the evening, he was assaulted by a riotous party of young men, personating the Furies, in masks, and with lighted torches.[3] The philosopher, however, without being irritated by the interruption, suffered them to indulge their mirth; only he required them to pay that tribute which he exacted from every one that came in his way, to stop and answer his questions, as if he had met them in the Lyceum, or any other accustomed place of his daily conversations. Himself sound in mind and body, (for his habitual temperance saved him from the infection of the plague which so obstinately

[1] Aul. Gell. vi. 10. [2] Ælian, *Var. Hist.* ix. 7. [3] Ibid. c. 29.

ravaged Athens), he was enabled to give advice and assistance to all of his country in the midst of that physical and moral desolation, in which every one else seems, more or less, to have participated.

Thus were the years of a long life quietly and usefully spent; and he had nearly reached that limit at which nature herself would have gently closed the scene of his philanthropic exertions, when the hand of human violence interposed to hasten the approaching end.

The annals of party spirit at Athens had already recorded many a deed of dark and wanton cruelty. But they were yet to be stained with the iniquity of a persecution, even to death, of him who had been the greatest benefactor and ornament, not only of Athens, but of the whole community of the Grecian name.

The banishment by ostracism had this redeeming merit, that it was an avowal in the face of Greece, of the envious and factious spirit, which drove from the state the individual whose talents or virtues too greatly distinguished him from among his fellow-citizens. The enmity to which Socrates fell a sacrifice, exhibits a deeper character of malignity; inasmuch as it masked itself under hypocritical zeal for religion and virtue, and thus courted public sympathy for proceedings, against which every voice in Athens and in all Greece should have indignantly protested. Ostracism, again, was content to remove the obnoxious great man from the eyes of his fellow-citizens. The attack on Socrates was satisfied with nothing short of the destruction of its victim.

It was in the midst of the tranquil, but busy course of his daily engagement, that Socrates was suddenly arrested, and without, it seems, any previous intimation of the intended attack, summoned to the portico of the king-Archon, to answer a charge of impiety.[1]

[1] Plato, *Theætet. ad fin. Euthyphro.* et alib. The king-Archon was a sort of minister of state for the department of Religion—the representative, under the democracy, of the priestly office of the King during the monarchy at Athens. See Demosthenes, *cont. Neær.*

The accusation was in this form: "Socrates is guilty of the crime of not acknowledging the gods whom the state acknowledges, but introducing other new divinities: he is guilty also of the crime of corrupting the young." The penalty proposed was death. It has been commonly supposed that the charge was laid before the court of Areopagus. But it would appear rather, from the course of the trial, to have been before one of the popular courts, and probably, from the great number of dicasts or jurors who voted on the cause, before the principal court, the Heliæa.

The circumstances connected with the accusation remain, after the utmost inquiry now possible, involved in considerable mystery. We are told that Meletus was the accuser, and that he was supported in the prosecution by Anytus and Lycon. These three individuals are also said to have represented distinct classes of persons interested in the proceedings; Meletus, who was himself a poet, appearing in behalf of the offended poets; Anytus, a wealthy tradesman and demagogue, resenting the affronts of his brother-tradesmen; Lycon, an orator, or politician by profession, standing up as the assertor of the pretensions of his factious order. But these particulars, though they may account to us in a great measure for the success of the prosecution, do not exhibit the secret agency by which it was effected. The accusers themselves were men of no note or importance in the state. Meletus was a young man; a vain and weak person, it seems, of whom nothing more is known than that the accusation was made in his name. Nor of Anytus and Lycon have we anything to mark the importance, beyond the fact, that the former was included, together with Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, among the persons exiled by the Thirty, and the notice taken of him by Plato, where he represents him the inexorable foe of every thing in the shape of a philosopher, and as parting from a conversation with Socrates in anger.[1] Merely personal offence, however, could not have given sufficient pretext or weight to so grave an accusation. Nor can we suppose that it was even the combined in-

[1] Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 42, 44.—Plato, *Meno.*

terest of the three classes represented by the three accusers—the poets, the tradesmen, and the orators—which carried the condemnation of so respected a person. The ground of the attack must lie deeper; and the men whose names appear so prominently in this fatal conspiracy against the life of the venerable old philosopher, could only have been the puppets moved by some secret and more commanding force. The trial would seem to have been only a solemn pageant, exhibited before the public, as a prelude and justification of a deed of murder already resolved on by its real though invisible perpetrators. Whilst the charges themselves, as set forth by the nominal accusers, were but feebly sustained, it is evident that no defence, however just and able, could have availed to avert the sentence of condemnation. The body of jurors before whom the cause was heard, appear to have been disposed to acquit the accused, if we may judge from the number of votes which were given in his favour; and yet the majority were overruled. This in itself would lead us to think that some secret influence had been exercised, to obviate the chance of failure of the ordinary ostensible means of judicial assault. And so Socrates himself appears to have felt; if Plato and Xenophon have faithfully reported the substance of his reply to the accusation in their Apologies. His defence, as there represented, is that of one who retires, on his own consciousness of right, from a bootless conflict with adversaries who are not to be appeased by argument and persuasion. It does not set forth the strength of his cause as against an opponent, but simply asserts the truth and merit of the course of life which he had been pursuing.[1] The sentence accordingly excites no surprize in him. He yields himself up as to the sweeping of a tempest, with which it is vain to parley. Would we then explore the circumstances of the trial and condemnation of Socrates, we must obtain a deeper insight into the moving power of Grecian politics—the spirit of the Heathen Religion, and the mode of its

[1] See the same exemplified in what Socrates is made to reply to Callicles in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 162, *τοσοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον, κ.τ.λ.*

action on the conduct of states and individuals. This appears to be the proper solution of the case of Socrates. The circumstances of the case evidently point to this. And though, from the want of information, we cannot very distinctly trace the working of the religion of the times in the particular instance before us, we may, from a closer consideration of the facts, not unreasonably suspect its active operation and instrumentality.

Speculators have sometimes spoken of the mild and tolerant spirit of paganism. The observation, however, is superficial and untrue. The facility with which the polytheistic worshipper transferred his offerings and prayers to every new idol, has been mistaken for a readiness to admit any variation from the established worship, or any freedom of opinion respecting divine things, without offence. The contrary is the fact. The heathen, resting his religion on ancient tradition[1] and the authority of the priests, and not on any intrinsic evidences of its truth, could not but feel a jealousy of any departure from what he had thus received, or any attempt to bring the subject into discussion. It was not only the primitive Christians that were stigmatised by heathens as atheists, because they renounced the divinities of the heathen creed, but the same reproach was long before cast upon those among the heathens themselves, who, with however pious disposition, ventured to speculate on religion. A mere traditionary religion will tolerate any laxity of thought or conduct which professedly admits its authority, whilst it peremptorily puts down everything which impugns the principle of absolute deference to its authority. Thus we shall find that, where that principle is carried to the utmost, there co-exists with it a scarcely-concealed infidelity, and an unrestrained licentiousness of conduct; and, at the same time, also an extreme sensitiveness in regard to deviation from the received profession and language on the subject. We have unhappily seen this in

[1] Demosthenes (*Orat. against Neæra*) speaks of a column erected in the Temple at Limnæ, *ἐν τῷ ἀρχαιοτάτῳ ἱερῷ τοῦ Διονύσου καὶ ἁγιωτάτῳ*, standing in his time, which stated, among other things, *ἵνα κατὰ τὰ πάτρια θύηται τὰ ἄῤῥητα ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα γίγνηται τοῖς θεοῖς εὐσεβῶς, καὶ μηδὲν καταλύηται, μηδὲ καινοτομῆται.*

those Christian countries, where the true faith, the principle of devout submission to the word of God, has been transformed and perverted into one of resigned submission to the authority of the living ministers of that word. There—as, for example, in Spain and Italy—where the authority of the Church is bowed to most submissively, practical infidelity and immorality shew their front with impunity, whilst the expression of opinion or argument on questions of theology is discouraged and silenced, if no longer now, as once, crushed at its outbreak by the dark terrors of an Inquisition. The same fact was intensely exemplified in heathen Athens. At no place was piety, as piety was understood by heathens, more in honour. No state boasted such a tradition of sacred associations as Athens. In none were there so many festivals and solemnities of religious observance as in Athens.[1] In none did the priests of religion hold such sway. Witness their power over Alcibiades at the moment of his political triumph, and amidst the caresses and admiration of his fellow-citizens, when he felt himself obliged to relinquish his command in Sicily, and desert his country, rather than encounter at home the threatened prosecution for his profanation of sacred things. Witness their power again in the instance of the same Alcibiades, at his restoration to the command of the army, when, to conciliate their favour, he delays the urgent expedition, and keeps the soldiers under arms along the road by which the sacred procession passed from Athens to Eleusis. Witness further, the frequent prosecutions at Athens on charges of impiety of which we read, and of which we have monuments in extant orations. But, amidst this strictness of external profession, in no place was there a more entire license as to practical irreligion. Their festivals abounded with rude and obscene mirth. Their drama, whilst it inculcated in direct precept the belief and worship of the gods, indulged in the most profane

[1] Aristoph. *Nub.* 298.

οὐ σέβας ἀῤῥήτων ἱερῶν, ἵνα
μυστοδόκος δόμος
ἐν τελεταῖς ἁγίαις ἀναδείκνυται,
οὐρανίοις τε θεοῖς δωρήματα,
ναοί θ' ὑψερεφεῖς καὶ ἀγάλματα,
εὐστέφανοί τε θεῶν θυσίαι θαλίαι τε
παντοδαπαῖς ἐν ὥραις, κ. τ. λ.

Also Thucyd. ii. 38; and *De Repub. Athen.* attributed to Xenophon.

ribaldry and ludicrous representation of sacred things. Yet were these follies and excesses tolerated, because under them a regard was still maintained to the authority which upheld the Religion, as in the "mysteries" and "moralities" enacted with the connivance of the papal power in modern times; and the people at large were satisfied with a religious system which was exhibited to them as so good-humoured and humane. They were tolerated, indeed, but not without the like injury to the religious feelings, as in the parallel cases, where a corrupted secular Christianity has ventured on the like palliations of its despotism. For all the while the people were losing their hold of the popular religion. Those who thought at all on the subject, either rejected it altogether, or accounted it a mere matter of opinion and external ordinance; whilst those, on the other hand, who were content to receive everything traditionary as divine on the mere principle of deference to the priests, readily engrafted every new superstition on the received religion. Thus, whilst infidelity and superstition grew up at Athens, and flourished together, and often perhaps in the same mind, the connection between religion and morality was altogether lost sight of and dissolved. Men began to regard themselves as devout, and friends of the gods, whilst they were committing deeds of violence and lust, and blindly and wickedly endeavoured to support the cause of religion by forcible suppression of the truth, and persecution of those who subjected their tenets or their rites to the test of inquiry. Thus, whilst Aristophanes was amusing the people, not of Athens only, but from all parts of Greece, at the public festivals, with ludicrous representations of the popular theology, and loosening more and more any existing associations of reverence towards the objects of their worship, severe prosecutions were carried on from time to time against all who in any way made Religion a matter of debate, or seriously brought it into question with the people. The same persons can take part in the vulgar low jest, and shew their real contempt of religion by their carelessness about oaths and the practical duties of religion, and yet join zealously in the prosecution of offenders

against established notions on the subject. It is the same habit of mind in both cases; a habit of looking at Religion as a general rule of external profession—as a rule belonging to a community—rather than as a personal concern, and an internal discipline and trial of the spirit of a man. "He has brought Gentiles into the temple; he has abolished circumcision; he has profaned our law and our temple;" was the outcry against St. Paul: and yet these same persons, thus clamorous against the Apostle, were minding earthly things all the while, jealous of any innovation on existing forms, and customs, and privileges, as these are parts of an instituted system,—in their personal religion, unstable and variable, drifted about by every passing breath of passion or of interest.

At Athens, accordingly, though there was no freedom of religious opinion, as such, the Religion might be employed to excite festive mirth, and gratify the levity and licentiousness of a dissolute yet intellectual populace, amidst the charms of poetry and music and the solemn graceful dance. For then the associations of deference to the mysterious agency which held together the traditions of the popular creed were not violently broken asunder. There still remained in the minds of the people an awe at the indefinite mystic truth, hidden under, or dimly seen through, the embroidered veil held before their eyes. They knew that the splendid drama of Religion, which at once gratified their refined intellectual taste and their sensibility, was not the whole of their Religion. They had, at the same time, the Eleusinian Mysteries; rites performed in secrecy, and fenced round with the terror of death to him that should divulge them; delegated to a few, the initiated only, and incommunicable to the vulgar; of which the popular rites were but the rude symbols.[1] There were also the wild orgies of the worship of Bacchus, celebrated in the darkness of night, consecrating the vilest abominations of lust and violence,

[1] Isocrat. *Panegyr.* p. 54. "Ας οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἄλλοις ἢ τοῖς μεμνημένοις ἀκούειν . . . καὶ τὴν τελετὴν, ἧς οἱ μετασχόντες περί τε τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος, ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν.

as acts of a pious frenzy, the inspiration of the God in his votaries. The popular worship might wear the form of caricature, the grotesque, the farcical, and even the profane, as being merely the pantomime in which some recondite interior religion was dimly and wildly shadowed. The people laughed at what they saw and heard at their festivals. The ludicrous might seem at times to be carried too far, and to be endangering the hold of the religious belief on the mind of the people. Thus, we find Euripides in the play of the Bacchæ, counteracting that impression which the extreme ludicrousness of the Dionysus represented by Aristophanes might produce on the spectators, by holding up to them a counterpart picture of the same Dionysus, as the son of Jove, and a conqueror of his enemies; and declaiming against all subtle refinements on the faith of the people as "a wisdom that was no wisdom;"[1] whilst he labours also to remove the imputations of immodesty from the celebration of the Bacchic rites.[2] But amidst their laugh there was evidently a feeling of awe, which subdued the luxury of their mirth; a consciousness that, whilst they sportively shook the chain of their superstition, its iron entered into their soul. We see, on the other hand, Aspasia, the favourite of Pericles, at the time of the greatest popularity of that most popular leader, summoned before the courts, to answer a charge of impiety, and scarcely defended by the eloquence and the tears of Pericles himself, from the inexorable power whose vengeance she had provoked by her speculations. Protagoras, admired as he was and courted at Athens for his talent in his profession of a Sophist, was, at last, expelled from the city and borders of Attica by the Athenians; and his books were collected by proclamation and burnt in their agora, for his avowed scepticism as to the

[1] Eurip. *Bacch.* 424.
σοφὰν δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε,
περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν·
τὸ πλῆθος ὅ τι τὸ φαυλότερον
ἐνόμισε χρῆταί τε, τόδε τοι λέγοιμ' ἄν.

[2] Ibid. 312.
οὐχ ὁ Διόνυσος σωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάσει
γυναῖκας εἰς τὴν Κύπριν· ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει
τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἔνεστιν εἰς τὰ πάντ' ἀεί·
τοῦτο σκοπεῖν χρή· καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν
οὖσ', ἥ γε σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.

existence of the gods.[1] Æschylus, whose very poetry is instinctive with religion, was accused before the Areopagus of divulging the mysteries in one of his tragedies.[2] The philosopher Anaxagoras, like Galileo under his papal inquisitors, suffered imprisonment at the hands of Athenian persecutors, for having asserted the material nature of the heavenly bodies, and only escaped condemnation by the intervention of Pericles, and by exile from his adopted home. Pericles himself, as a disciple of Anaxagoras, was threatened with the like charge. And when he had to defend Aspasia, it was not his eloquence, but his tears and entreaties in her behalf, that prevailed for her acquittal. The extent again, to which prosecutions for offences against the popular religion could be carried at Athens, is shewn in the number of persons who were imprisoned on suspicion of being implicated in the impieties charged on Alcibiades, and the execution of so many, on that occasion of panic, on the unsupported evidence of secret informers. Lastly, not many years before the accusation of Socrates, Diagoras the Melian, and Theodorus of Cyrene, were branded with the epithet of atheists; and the former was forced to fly from Athens on a charge of profanation of the rites, with the price of a talent set on his head for any one who should kill him. The like jealousy with regard to the sacred rites, is illustrated in the story of the daughter of Neæra, as told by Demosthenes, in his Oration against Neæra. This person had been married, under the pretence of being an Athenian citizen, to an Athenian who served the office of the King-Archon. As the wife of this officer of the state, she was admitted to the rites, and solemnly inducted into the mystic temple of Bacchus at Limnæ. But it was unlawful for any but a true-born citizen to enter into the temple, or to witness the rites: and her husband consequently was tried before the court of Areopagus for the "impiety," and only escaped on the plea of his ignorance of the fact or "profanation" as concerning her, and on the condition of dismissing her from his house. And long after the time of Socrates, the same

[1] Diog. Laer. ix. c. 8. Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* i. 23. [2] Ælian, *Var. Hist.* v. 19.

spirit subsisted to drive Aristotle from the Lyceum, and later still, to intimidate the speculations of Epicurus. So strictly was the *authority* of the established worship guarded by a jealous and watchful inquisitorial power, in a state which boasted of its perfect liberty of speech, its παῤῥησία, above all others.

In fact, there was no liberty of speech on this subject in Greece. Every thing relating to religion was to be received as handed down from former ages; as the wisdom of an immemorial antiquity, borne along on the lips of the priest and the prophet, or impressed on mystic rituals, the hereditary trust of sacred families, or symbolized in the pomp and pageant of festivals and games, in the graceful majesty of temples, and the solemn shadows of sacred groves. The inward devotion of such a Religion naturally took the form of silence, and reserve, and awe. It was concentrated in the simple dread of profanation. The more superstitious indeed a people is, the more necessary is it that the rites of their religion should be strictly shut up from all inquiry, and a feeling of reserve should be inculcated as essential to the religious character. It is the indefiniteness of superstition that holds together the system. Let any one part of the vaguely-floating system be touched too palpably; and the whole crumbles. Thus it has been found, that superstition and infidelity have always gone hand in hand. Diagoras was made an atheist from being at first superstitious. The Athenian people, in like manner, from their superstitious character, were peculiarly exposed to a reaction of impiety. And it was but a wise policy, therefore, that the Religion of Athens should be jealously guarded with an awe forbidding all inquiry into its truth.

The colloquial and lively spirit of the Athenians mitigated the intensity of this feeling in the minds of the people at large; and the managers of the system were fain to relieve it, by blending recreation, and mirth, and interesting spectacles, with its public celebration. Grecian superstition accordingly, whilst it bore the essential marks of its oriental origin, in the submissiveness exacted of his votaries, and its mystic reserve, assumed

also the mask of cheerful expression characteristic of the genius of the people. Still we see that submissiveness and that reserve strongly marked in the stern denial of the right, not only of private judgment on questions of Religion, but even of bringing such questions at all into discussion.

Now, though, as we have already observed, we cannot distinctly trace the steps by which this spiritual despotism was brought to bear on Socrates, we cannot doubt that his was a case which must have attracted its notice. During more than forty years, Socrates had been seen at Athens, going about among all classes of the people, exciting among them a spirit of moral inquiry, urging on them the importance and the duty of self-knowledge, of taking no opinion on mere hearsay, or indolent and self-satisfied trust, but of bringing every thing to the test of discussion and learning, of acquainting themselves, as their first step to knowledge, with the depth and extent of their ignorance. Observers saw in this extraordinary teacher, one of their own citizens, educated in their own institutions, familiar with the habits of Athenian life, ever at home among themselves, recommending himself alike to the young and the old, by the honest though quaint dignity of his manner, and the interest and charm of his conversation. He was not, like Anaxagoras, or Protagoras, or Prodicus, a stranger sojourning among them; a philosopher or rhetorician by profession, or one pursuing philosophy as a trade and a source of subsistence, waiting to be resorted to and courted by the affluent and noble, and reserving himself for occasions of display or profit; but he was found an Athenian among Athenians, in the market-place, in the streets, in the workshops, at the tables of the wealthy, himself seeking out persons to instruct, asking questions of all around him, and engaging them, even in spite of themselves, in conversation with him.[1] In other teachers, Philosophy had spoken, according to

[1] Plato, *Euthyphro.* 3 d., p. 6. Ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅ, τί περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον, ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως, εἴτίς μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν.

Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2. Ἀλλὰ τῶνδέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων, καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι (Critias is speaking) αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατατετρῖφθαι διαθρυλουμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ. P. 21.

the observation already made, as from an oracular shrine, to those only who came to inquire of it as votaries and disciples. With Socrates, Philosophy walked abroad, insinuating itself into the scenes and business of daily life, and drawing forth the secret treasures of men's minds with its own hands. According to that homely but apt illustration of his mode of teaching, which he was so fond of employing, from midwifery, his method freely offered its services in assisting at the birth of the thought with which the pregnant mind was labouring. He busied himself, he used to say, with the officiousness of his maternal art, in exploring the genuineness of the fruit of the intellectual womb, which his dexterous questions had brought to light.[1] Such a person, then, could not but fix on himself the eyes of every attentive observer of the state of society in Athens. Such teaching evidently could not but have a very considerable influence on public opinion. Particularly, when he was seen to be acceptable to men of all parties in the state, to the leaders of the aristocratic faction as well as the humblest citizen, it could not but be inferred, that his influence was not a transitory one, dependent on the predominance of any party, but that it would reach to the fundamental constitution of the society at large of the city, and be a leaven of fermentation to the whole mass. What then, it would naturally be asked, must be the effect of such a teacher on existing opinions in Religion? He taught, indeed, that men should acquiesce in what was established in Religion; that they should inquire no further here than what simply was the law of the state. He treated, too, the popular imagery of Religion with respect. For he would often clothe his instructions in the language of the legends and traditions of their mythology. Nor did he attempt to explain them away, though he waved all discussion of them. He was seen, too, on all stated occasions, sacrificing at the altars of the gods, and joining in the rites.[2] But, it would be asked, if the citizens were taught to examine into received opinions generally, would

[1] See especially Plato's *Theætetus* in illustration of this.
[2] Plato, *Euthyphr.* and *Phædrus.*

they abstain from carrying this principle into the subject of Religion? Would they continue still blindly and submissively to follow the voice of authority? Would they not rather, so far as they were disciples of Socrates, begin to speculate on divine things, abandoning that reverence which they had hitherto maintained for the objects of public worship, disputing and discussing without reserve, and exposing to the vulgar gaze what had been all along venerated in mystic silence, and under the veil of symbol? The mercurial temperament of the Athenian was just the soil in which the seeds now scattered by the hand of Socrates might be expected to vegetate. The excessive prosperity, too, of Athens, during the fifty years immediately following the Persian war, and then its condition of struggle against internal faction and the confederate arms of Peloponnesus, were circumstances calculated to foster the profane irreligious spirit in a light-hearted people. Then, instances were not wanting of young men, the intimates of Socrates, and whose minds had been especially cultivated by conversation with him, who proved in the end traitors to the Religion as well as to the civil liberties of their country. Critias, afterwards one of the "Thirty Tyrants," and Alcibiades, at once the pride and the pest of his fellow-citizens, whom they loved and hated, and banished and longed for by turns, were striking evidences, to the superficial observation, of the evil apprehended from the teaching of Socrates. For here were young men of ability, susceptible by nature of the fullest influence of the lessons of the philosopher; and yet these had failed under his hands. What, therefore, might not be expected of minds of inferior order? How would not the Religion and the institutions of the city fall into profane neglect and contempt, should the Socratic spirit of inquiry be imbibed by the next generation of citizens? The observation, indeed, was only a very superficial one, which would infer from such instances the evil of the teaching which these individuals misapplied. Still, it is plain, that such cases were pointed at with invidious reference to Socrates and Philosophy in general. We find the orator Æschines attributing the death of Socrates to the circumstance

of his having educated Critias;[1] not that he must be supposed to have believed this to have been the whole account of the trial and condemnation of Socrates; but, as an orator, he states, for the purposes of his argument, what he conceives would be readily believed as part of the account of that event. Plato also, as has been before observed, studiously addresses himself to the defence of Philosophy from objection on this ground, with evident allusion to Alcibiades and the like cases; arguing that the same individuals who were most susceptible of the good of Philosophy, were also such as would be the most apt to abuse it. And probably he had the same design, when he refers to the degenerate sons of Pericles himself, as an instance in point to those who cherished the memory of that great man, and of the times in which he flourished, to shew that the philosopher was not to be held responsible for the extravagances and vices of the disciple.[2]

The exhibition of the comedy of "The Clouds," appears to have been designed to bring before the people the supposed evil tendency of the teaching of Socrates, as exemplified in such distinguished instances. It was produced in the year B. C. 423, when the philosopher had attained his forty-seventh year, and was at the height of his reputation throughout Greece, and about twenty-three years before his death. There we have Socrates introduced by name under broad caricature, as the representative of the class of Sophists, and a consummate master of the arrogant pretension, and sordid cunning, and impiety, of the worst individuals of the class. The clouds are his only divinities. A profligate spendthrift youth, and a dotard father, are his dupes. The inquisitive method which Socrates practised is also held up to ridicule and contempt, by identifying it with the frivolous questionings of the grammarians, and dialecticians, and rhetoricians of the day, and with the perverse sophistry which held

[1] Æschin. con *Timarch.*

[2] Plato. See the *Protag.* and *Rep.* vi. —Xenophon adverts, in like manner, to the charge of corruption as supported by the instances of Critias and Alcibiades, *Mem.*, i. 2. See also the conversation which Xenophon reports between Socrates and Hippias. Isocrates, in *Busiris*, with the like feeling, denies that Alcibiades was *educated* by Socrates; meaning, it seems, that Alcibiades was too short a time with Socrates to be really improved by the instruction which he received.

truth a matter of indifference, or, which amounted to the same thing, called every man's opinion truth, and boasted of its skill to make the worse appear the better cause. It was but too evident, to Athenian spectators at least, that the Socrates of Aristophanes was not the Socrates whom they had been accustomed to see and converse with in real life, and the play, accordingly, failed at the first exhibition. Not all its charms of poetry, and humour, and skilful composition, could obtain for it a favourable reception. Though Aristophanes was aware that the portrait which he had drawn was not a portrait of the individual but of the class, there can be little doubt that he calculated on the sympathy of the people in giving the name of Socrates to his personification of the sophistical spirit, and that he felt it necessary to depreciate the influence of Socrates as the commanding influence of the day, by attributing to his method all the vices of the schools of the Sophists. Socrates is honoured and complimented in the very attempt to weaken the respect for his instructions, and to awaken a clamour against him. The failure of *The Clouds* at the first representation, and one account adds, even at the second (for the play is said to have been retouched for the third time), has been attributed to the influence of Alcibiades. Alcibiades, indeed, has been supposed by some commentators to have been no less the object of attack in the play than Socrates himself, and to have been designated under the name of Phidippides, the youthful and accomplished victim of the Sophist. There are certainly some traits in the character of Phidippides which would seem to point at Alcibiades, whom perhaps the poet, bold as he was, could hardly venture to bring on the stage by name, or closer description, at this particular time. And we may perhaps justly allow some weight to party influence in neutralizing the effect of *The Clouds* at its first exhibition. Still, when we observe in other instances the great power which the comic muse could wield against a political opponent, as in the attack on Cleon in *The Knights*, we cannot but think that there was some strong countervailing feeling in the public estimation of Socrates himself. If the account of Ælian be true, Socrates could

join in the laugh raised against him, for he was present in the theatre during the acting of the play, and finding that he was the object of attraction, placed himself where all could command a view of him.[1] He knew, and every one in Athens knew, that he was a very different person from the Sophists with whom the play identified him. They indeed were corruptors of the young: for they unsettled every principle in the minds of the young, and gave no substitute for what they profligately swept away. They left the young to be drifted away by the tide of their passions, with no criterion of truth or of right beyond the present opinion or the present interest. But Socrates, whilst he taught the young to inquire into the truth of their opinions, lessened their presumption and self-confidence, by shewing them how apt they were to mistake mere assumptions for knowledge, and to be conceited of their ignorance. His object was truth and accurate knowledge. He stated difficulties and objections, not in the spirit of a sceptic, but in order to awaken curiosity, to clear away confusion of thought, and inculcate sound principles of judgment and conduct. He could well, then, laugh at the jest which glanced from him to its proper objects, the Sophists themselves, the very persons against whom his whole teaching was directed. He felt doubtless that he had a hold on the people at large, which the Sophists had not. They were for the most part known only to the great and wealthy; those who could receive them into their houses, as they went from city to city through Greece; who sought their society as patrons of literature, or aspirants after political distinction, and who could pay for their instructions. He, on the contrary, was accessible to all. He would receive no money from any one. He was the frequent guest of the rich; but he was no less the associate of the artizan and the poor; and many must have been present in the theatre, when the Socrates of *The Clouds* was amusing the audience by his sleight-of-hand philosophy, who would remember the real Socrates as a man of honesty, and truth, and disinterested benevolence, from whom they had received much useful

[1] Ælian, *Var. Hist.*

counsel from time to time, and whom they had ever found affable, and at leisure to enter into their feelings and views with patience and kindness. If we compare the Socrates of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon with the Socrates of *The Clouds*, we may judge how great was the contrast to those who could compare the well-known philosopher of the agora with his portrait as drawn by Aristophanes. If we can smile at the caricature of *The Clouds*, and yet love the excellent moralist of the *Memorabilia*, we may also conceive how harmless the satire of Aristophanes would really be against the object of it; whilst the jokes of the poet, true as to the personal peculiarities of the philosopher, amused a volatile and clever people. For them to have confounded Socrates with the class of Sophists, would have been in them the like palpable mistake, as it would be to confound the philosopher Bacon, on account of some points of resemblance, with the alchemist and empiric of the preceding ages.

It might seem matter of reproach against Aristophanes, that, in selecting the name of Socrates to represent the sophistical spirit which had then so largely corrupted the education and the government of Athens, he pointed the shafts of the comic muse aginst the very person who was in truth its most successful antagonist. In such a view of the case, however, sufficient justice would not be done to the discernment of the poet. He shrewdly observed in Socrates the master-genius which would ultimately cast into the shade all those busy professors of the art of education, who, under the name of Sophists, or professors of all knowledge, were then attracting the notice of the world to themselves and their teaching. Socrates, in himself, Aristophanes could not but admire, and recommend to the imitation of his country. He doubtless knew Socrates to be a true patriot no less than himself—to be steadily aiming to bring back the Athenians to the purity of their institutions, from which they had so sadly degenerated, by his instructive conversations; as he was by the satirical strokes of the drama. Socrates, too, appears to have been his personal friend; for Plato introduces them as meeting on terms of intimacy, not many years after the

first exhibition of *The Clouds.* But with that freedom which the state of manners, under an absolute democracy, sanctioned and encouraged, Aristophanes did not scruple to bring even the revered name of Socrates on the stage, to give the due point to his satire. He overlooked the individual, the Socrates with whom he familiarly conversed, and presented before the spectators what he saw in Socrates, the living speaking impersonation of the influence of education on the character of a people, for good or for evil. Anaxagoras, or Protagoras, or Prodicus, or any other of the well-known philosophers or sophists of the day, might have occupied the foreground in the comedy of *The Clouds;* had the poet sought to give merely a fugitive sketch of the sophistical spirit of his times, or to single out for ridicule some of its external superficial features. This is what Plato has done on many occasions, and especially in that most animated picture in the dialogue entitled *Protagoras,* where he groups together the figures of the leading Sophists in such admirable relief with each other, and such happy contrast with the unpretending form of his own revered master and friend.* Such a view, however, could not have answered the design of Aristophanes in his play of *The Clouds.* His object was to seize the deep, influential characters of the system of education which was then extending itself throughout Greece, and especially as it was manifested at Athens, the great school of all Greece. Naturally, therefore, and wisely, he fixed his eye on an Athenian—and that Athenian, Socrates—not only as the first Athenian who had appeared in the office of a philosophical instructor, but who, as an Athenian, gave to his lessons the character of Athenian civilization, and fitly exemplified the influenc of philosophical education in the hands of an Athenian, and as operating on Athenians.

The poet, indeed, as addressing the eye and the ear of the

* Aristophanes himself is made by Plato the object of satire, in the picture which he presents of him in the *Symposium.* He is there exhibited as unable, from an attack of hiccough, to proceed in the regular course when it comes to his turn to speak; and when he does speak, his comic vein is caricatured in the ludicrous myth ascribed to him as his part in the discussion.

ordinary observer, and not Athenians only, but strangers of the Grecian name from all parts, mingles with his colouring some playful lights borrowed from the forms of the well-known professional Sophists of the day. But neither are these representations, nor the allusions which he makes to the real eccentricities of manner and uncouthness of person in Socrates, the points on which he desires to fix the attention of the theatre. It is the important modification of the Athenian character, under a system of education which had now reached its maturity. Under the administration of Pericles, that system had already infected the policy of the state, and perverted its courts of justice into sinks of corruption and oppression. Now, at length, it was found domesticated at Athens in the sanctuary of private life. An Athenian had appeared in the character of a teacher of Philosophy; and around him were gathered citizens of all ranks, from the noble youth who aspired to the helm of the state, and the wealthy patron of literature, to the mean artizan who worked at the forge, and the drudge of the market. What was further to be observed now, was, that the system came recommended by the eloquence of lively and exciting conversation. And how powerful must have been such conversation, as it came forth from the lips of the speaker in the elegant and terse Attic idiom! It was no wonder, therefore, that the comic poet should have seized this moment for portraying the danger which he anticipated to his country from the fashionable education of the day, and thrown all the force of his ridicule on the most attractive form in which it then presented itself, as displayed in the personal teaching and example of Socrates.

The testimony of Plato is to the same effect. Plato has not given us an exact portrait of Socrates any more than Aristophanes has; for he has evidently transferred to the Socrates of his Dialogues, not less of his own cast of mind and manner, than Aristophanes did to the Socrates of his comedy, of the general tone of the Sophists. And this is to be accounted for, as in the case of Aristophanes, from the fact, that Plato regarded Socrates as the impersonation of the Philosophy of the times.

He felt that, to give his own doctrines a proper authority and weight, he could not employ a more effectual organ than the tongue of him who had first given to Philosophy an Attic expression, and from whom it would henceforth derive its proper Grecian character.

But though the drama of *The Clouds* was unsuccessful as an attack on Socrates, if it were intended as such, or as an attack on the Sophists under the name of Socrates, which is the more probable view of its design, it must not be supposed that the play produced no effect unfavourable to Socrates. The tradition, that Aristophanes was employed by Anytus and Meletus to write down Socrates, does not seem altogether without reason; though it can hardly be literally true, when we look to the distance of time which intervened between the production of the play and the accusation. In the *Apology* of Plato there is an allusion to the prejudice excited in the young men by the representation given of the philosopher in this play. Nor had *The Clouds* been the only attack on Socrates by Aristophanes; not to mention other comic writers who had made him the object of their humour. In the year 405, B.C., not more than five years before the prosecution, the play of *The Frogs* had been exhibited; in which a pointed allusion is made to the influence of Socrates in terms of reprobation.[1] In the mean time, also, the same note had been struck; for the play of *The Birds* was produced in the middle of this interval between *The Clouds* and *The Frogs*, in the year 414, B.C.; and in that again the Athenians are warned against the corruptions and enchantments of the philosopher.[2] And it is very possible that many who lived to witness the formal accusation of Socrates, might have received their earliest prejudices against the philosopher by what they heard in the theatre then—prejudices, too, which the course of events, the miseries of the Peloponnesian war, and the anarchy consequent upon it, may have ripened into exasperation.[3] For they saw their country fallen from its proud station in Greece, to the condition of a

[1] Aristoph. *Ranæ*, 1487.

[2] Aristoph. *Aves*, 1282, 1554.

[3] See Thucyd. iii. 82, Ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν, κ. τ. λ.

dependent state; and they were led to ascribe their misfortunes to a change of habits since the days of Marathon and Salamis—to their having deserted the palæstra and the field, and become, from a body of devoted patriots and soldiers, students of rhetoric and masters in debate.[1] During all this time, Socrates continued the unrivalled teacher of the youth of Athens; increasing, indeed, in renown and popularity; and surrounded by a number of students of philosophy and political science, from all parts of Greece. He had, in fact, converted Athens into a university of Greece. For though he had no professed school—no φροντιστήριον, no "workshop of thought," as Aristophanes jocosely represents the scene of Socrates amongst his disciples—no regular place of meeting, such as Plato had in the Academia, and Aristotle in the Lyceum;—there might be seen around him in familiar conversation, in every part of the city, day after day, the statesmen, and orators, and generals of the Republic—philosophers of established repute from other cities—the sons of the noblest families of Athens as well as of the humblest citizens—and the resident foreigners and occasional visitors of the city; some seeking instruction in the art of government, some investigating by his guidance the chief good of man, some studying the theory of eloquence and criticism, some exploring, by the light of his searching questions, the depth of metaphysics, and the subtle speculations of the earlier philosophers; all according to their different pursuits, and in their different degrees, receiving information and general mental culture from the great Athenian sage. Those who clung to the thought of Athens in its days of military glory and empire, would painfully observe how great a change had taken place in the internal habits of the city. Formerly it was enough for the intellectual improvement of the

[1] In Xenoph. *Mem.* iii. 5, the younger Pericles asks Socrates how the Athenians are to be brought again to become enamoured of their ancient virtue, glory, and happiness; and afterwards he expresses his wonder how the state ever began to decline. Socrates imputes their degeneracy to their neglect of the institutions of their ancestors. The particulars mentioned are, want of respect to elders, neglect of bodily exercises, even to the ridicule of them, insubordination to authorities, mutual irritation, envy, quarrelsomeness, litigation, covetousness, incompetence of their generals.

youth, that in childhood he had the grammarian for his instructor, and, as he grew up to manhood, was consigned to the poets ;[1]

τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν
ἔστι διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖσ δ' ἡβῶσιν δὲ ποιηταί[2]

Now even the slaves were becoming literary. The distresses of war had occasioned the addition to the roll of citizens, of many even from that class. And these might be seen, as the comic poet represents them, "each with his book, learning the clever things ;"

βιβλίον τ' ἔχων ἕκαστος μανθάνει τὰ δεξιά.[3]

Formerly, their wise men were obliged to leave the ignorance and rudeness of their own city, and learn Philosophy by foreign travel. Solon had brought back with him from his travels the wisdom of Crete and of Asia to enrich their code of laws, but had not given Philosophy a domicile at Athens; had not affected domestic life there with its refinements. From that time, however, a change, introduced by the literary taste of Pisistratus, had gradually prepared the way for establishing a school of Philosophy at Athens.[4] Pericles, too, had given a great stimulus to the literary spirit by his own fondness for intellectual pursuits, and the society of intellectual men. In the midst of his active political life, he could find time and thought for the elaborate disquisitions of the ingenious persons whom he invited to him. He could spend a whole day in disputing with Protagoras on so subtle a question as the theory of causation ;[5] such was the intense interest which he displayed in every thing tending to the development of mental energy, and such the

[1] If we except the profession of the Sophists, when at its height of public favour, skill in the composition of Tragedy was the most highly rewarded of all talents at Athens. Plato, *Laches*, 183, b. p. 169. The poets of Athens, therefore, were naturally jealous of the popularity of philosophers and sophists. Plato, *Rep.* x. 8, apologizing for his severity in dealing with the poets, observes, that it is a quarrel of long standing between Philosophy and Poetry; προσείπομεν δὲ αὐτῇ μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ.

[2] Aristophan. *Ran.* 1020.

[3] Aristophan. *Ran.* 1079.

[4] Aul. Gell. vi. 17. Libros Athenis disciplinarum liberalium publice ad legendum præbendos, primus posuisse dicitur Pisistratus Tyrannus, etc.

[5] Plutarch in *Pericl.*

encouragement he gave to the change of taste then in progress, by his own example. In the person of Socrates was found the genius formed to preside over the growing taste for literary and philosophical refinement, and to give it the form of an established institution. What, therefore, were merely indefinite fears at the time of the exhibition of "The Clouds," assumed a more distinct character of alarm to ancient prejudices within a quarter of a century afterwards. The rapidity and violence of several successive revolutions of the government during the latter part of that interval, further prepared the minds of the people for any sudden outbreaks of party spirit, and made every man an object of suspicion to his neighbour. A democracy of an hundred years' existence[1] had been overthrown; and first an oligarchy of Four-hundred, then a tyranny of Thirty, established by foreign arms, in its place. Nor, as it had not been without fraud and bloodshed that the people had been spoiled of their "ancient liberty,"[2] were they disposed to surrender it in quiet; or were those who seized on the government able to retain it long on the same footing. A struggle ensued; in which the individuals of contending parties only sought to provide, each for his own aggrandizement and interest, or at least his own safety, under the constant expectation of some counter-revolution.[3] The people had found that some of those very persons who would never have been suspected of oligarchical views, had in the late changes taken part against the popular government; so that they knew not, at last, whom to trust even of themselves.[4] We are not to wonder that an accusation of Socrates should have succeeded before an Athenian jury at this period of morbid sensitiveness of the public mind.

An accusation of impiety was, we must remember, too, an accusation of a political offence. A change of the popular religion was a change of the fundamental constitution of a Greek state. And as in the absolute rule of a single despot, so in the tyranny of a multitude, the reputation of zeal for religion is

[1] Thucyd. viii. 68.
[2] Thucyd. viii. 71, 72.
[3] Thucyd. iii. 82. *πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον, κ. τ. λ.*
[4] Thucyd. viii. 66.

studiously maintained from policy, if from no higher motive, to throw around its arbitrary acts the reverence and fear due to the religious character. The teaching of Socrates was indeed eminently religious; but it differed from what the state regarded as such. He proved the existence of an invisible divine power, wisely designing and governing all things; and inculcated the duties of piety and morality as flowing from the belief of such an agency. Such clearly was not the state-religion.[1] This was no system of truth or morality. It was tradition and legend, and immemorial usage, and ritual observance.[2] And it was enough for a charge of impiety that Socrates rested Religion on other grounds. A pious Athenian, and yet not pious after the manner of the Athenians, was, in their view, an introducer of new gods. He might well be believed to be a worshipper of the clouds and the air, when he pointed out to them, that the gods would not receive the sacrifice offered by wicked men,[3] that even their silent counsels were not concealed from the divine cognizance, and that justice was an indispensable duty of the worshipper of the gods.[4]

That the accusation further should be credible, as brought in this form, is not strange, when it is known that, during the Peloponnesian war, the worship of new gods had been introduced into the city; as at Rome during the depression of its fortunes in the first years of the second Punic war. So greatly had the vicissitudes of fortune influenced the minds of men, observes Livy, describing this effect at Rome,—so great was the influx of religion, and that chiefly foreign, he says, into the state—that either the men or the gods appeared to have suddenly become different.[5] So at Athens, it appears, the forms of superstition had been multiplied, under the pressure of civil and domestic calamity acting on the fears and credulity of the people. The strong re-

[1] Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 9.
[2] Cic. de *Legib.* ii. 16.
[3] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 3.
[4] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 6.
[5] Liv. xxv. 1. Quo diutius trahebatur bellum et variabant secundæ adversæq. res non fortunam magis quam animos hominum; tanta religio, et ea magna ex parte externa, civitatem incessit, ut aut homines aut Dii repente alii viderentur facti, etc.

proof which Euripides puts into the mouth of Theseus, of the austere life of Hippolytus, would seem to point at some ascetic devotees among the Athenians themselves, practising a more refined and scrupulous religion, distinct from that of the vulgar ;

> Ἤδη νυν αὔχει, καὶ δι' ἀψύχου βορᾶς
> Σίτοις καπήλευ', Ὀρφέα τ' ἄνακτ' ἔχων,
> Βάκχευε, πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνούς.[1]

In Aristophanes[2] we find still more evident allusion to the introduction of new objects of worship, new fanatical rites, in which the women chiefly officiated, and in which a gross licentiousness mingled with the gloom and solemnities of barbaric superstition.

Again, Education was intimately connected with politics in a Grecian state. The state took in hand its youthful citizens, and trained them according to its peculiar institutions, and in its own spirit. At least, in all the early constitutions, great attention was paid to education. Lycurgus made Sparta a constant school of war to his citizens. So too Solon, though he had, with greater knowledge of human nature than Lycurgus, adapted his institutions to the people for whom he legislated, provided that the people should be trained to the system of laws prescribed to them. But this care of the early legislators had begun to be lost sight of in practice.[3] In Aristotle's day it had disappeared everywhere.[4] In Sparta it was still nominally reverenced. In Athens, an entire relaxation of the educational discipline had taken place already in the time of Socrates. Pericles, flattering the democratic spirit of the Athenians of his day, could boast of their ease from labours and the obligation of bodily exercises, and congratulate them on the courage which they could display at the time of action, without being inured beforehand by a course of hardy discipline.[5] But now, whilst the state was

[1] Euripid. *Hippolyt.* 952.

[2] See *Pax.* 410, 428. *Lysist.* 389.

[3] Lysimachus, in Plato's *Laches*, complains of their fathers having neglected their education, ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἴων τρυφᾶν, p. 162. See this dialogue of Plato throughout, on the subject of Athenian education.

[4] Aristot. *Pol.* v. 7, ὀλιγωροῦσι πάντες.

[5] Thucyd. ii. 39.

remiss in not enforcing education according to its ancient regimen, a new system had grown up, the offspring of the luxury and refinement of its days of imperial greatness. This new and unauthorized education was diffused throughout the mass of the inhabitants beyond the pale of the citizens. Solon's law imposed the duties of the exercises on the citizens, but excluded the slaves from the gymnasium. Now all classes were hearers of the philosopher ; the smith, the carpenter, the fuller, the dresser of leather, were engaged in discussing problems of ethics and politics, no less than the high-born and wealthy citizen, and the orator, and the statesman, and the general. This was an evident indication of a corresponding change in the government itself ; a change which really came to maturity not long after the time of Socrates, when the machinery of the government passed from the hands of the generals and the men of practical ability, into those of the orators of the republic, and when rhetoric, or oratory, became the master science, and only another name for politics.[1]

Those, then, whose attention had been drawn to the person of Socrates many years before, and had then only laughed at the exaggerations of the comic muse, might naturally begin to suspect, in the progress of events at Athens, that there was a real danger to the institutions of the country couched under the humorous mien and conversation of the real Socrates. They would now, as they watched his increasing influence and reputation, recal their early associations of the ludicrous with the name of Socrates, not with the good humour with which they were originally received, but with the undefined fears since acquired, in the course of their daily observation, of one in whose hands the destinies of their country seemed to be placed. They would probably then think that they had judged his case too leniently before as spectators, and that they were now called upon to pronounce authoritatively as judges, not so much from

[1] Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* x., 10, 18, 20. Τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, κ. τ. λ. Τῶν δε σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι . . . οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν. c. ult.

the representations and arguments of the accusers, as from their own experience of the great change which their country had evidently undergone, and was still undergoing. Even indeed at the time of trial, nearly half of the great body of jurors were in favour of his acquittal; and Meletus would have failed altogether, but for the speeches of Anytus and Lycon, men of popular and rhetorical powers, who addressed the court in support of the charge; so strongly did the weight of his personal character, and the interest which he had excited by his friendly and instructive intercourse with every class of citizens, prevail in his favour.

We should take into account, further, the general neutrality of Socrates on questions of politics, and his decisive energy on particular political occasions, in which he was called upon by the circumstances of his position to take part. Both lines of conduct would create enemies. Neutrality in a state distracted with parties is the most unpopular course which can be adopted; however candid and reasonable the principle of such conduct may be, all parties look with jealousy at one who will not be associated with them in the guilt and the danger of party-struggles. They envy him his exemption from their violence, his reputation of candour, his chance of safety under every vicissitude of party-ascendency. Corcyra, as a state, was obnoxious to the other states of Greece for its neutral policy. So was the individual at Athens who kept aloof from public business, amidst that restless pragmatical spirit which actuated the state and its citizens. Athenians could not understand and appreciate the motives of one who abstained from the public assemblies, and the courts, and the theatres; who shrank from all public offices, was a member of no faction or club, engaged in no trade, disregarded even his own domestic concerns, and lived a private man, where every one else was the servant of the public, busy with the affairs of the state, and incessantly pushing his own interests by his political activity.[1] The laws of Solon, indeed, inculcated the

[1] Thucyd. ii. 40. *ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι· μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα ἀλλ' ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν.*

principle, that every one should take his side in the contention of parties.[1] Solon wished to interest the people in the maintenance of the constitution which he had given them, and accordingly obliged them by penalties to attend to public affairs. This was evidently his reason for compelling their attendance in the assemblies and courts, as also for this singular provision. The increased action of the democratic spirit in the time of Socrates must have greatly fostered the opinion thus declared in their ancient laws; and hence we find philosophers in general held in disrepute in Athens, on account of their inactivity and unconcern in public affairs. The busy Sophist, the orator, and the man of the world, censured them as pusillanimous, and indolent, and incapable of the duties of a citizen. Some of the early philosophers, indeed, had been distinguished as statesmen, and legislators, and generals. The Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia appear still to have sustained this character in some measure. But now philosophers were observed, for the most part, to lead a contemplative life of leisure, and to present a striking contrast to the general society of Grecian states. Plato takes every opportunity in his writings of defending Philosophy from this calumny directed against the persons of its votaries, evidently treating it as a grievance which he had felt in his own case. Aristotle also indicates the prevalence of the same objection against philosophers at his day, when he studiously maintains, that exertions of the mind in speculation may be regarded as even more really practical than those which are merely directed to external results.[2] Socrates, accordingly, was a puzzle to many of his contemporaries. They wondered that he should freely dispense the treasures of his wisdom, and not convert it into a marketable commodity. Whilst they gave him credit for integrity, they regarded such a proceeding as mere folly.[3] They asked how he

[1] Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 20.

[2] Aristot. *Pol.* vi. 3. Ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, κ.τ.λ. Also *Ethic. Nic.* x. 7. The oration of Isocrates against the Sophists is addressed to the same popular calumny against Philosophy.

[3] Xenoph., *Mem.* i. 6, 11, 15. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ τοί σε μὲν δίκαιον νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, κ.τ.λ . . . Καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ἐρομένου, κ. τ. λ. Ibid.

could think to qualify others for public life without taking part in it himself, if he really knew what it was to be a statesman. But he was content, in reply, to point to the number whom he had laboured to render capable of public duties, as a more effectual service on his part to the state than a personal activity in himself.

But though the general conduct of Socrates was to avoid all interference in affairs of state, he had shewn on one or two very important occasions his patriotic feeling, and the energy with which he could carry it into effect. He had served with distinguished courage at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium, as we have seen; and proved himself on those hard-fought days, one who, as Pericles characterizes the Athenians, could philosophize without effeminacy, and, without being inured to the dangers of the field, could brave them at the moment of trial with no diminished spirit. But still greater occasions of trial were those of civil exertion at home, to which he was called not long before the accusation of impiety. Perhaps one of the most memorable instances of resolute firmness which History presents, is to be observed in the fact, that when the uproar of faction was demanding the iniquitous condemnation of the generals who commanded at Arginusæ, Socrates stood alone among his colleagues in office, and refused to put the question to the vote, as the epistates, or superintendent of the day, in the form proposed.[1] Each of the ten Athenian tribes had its turn of presidency in the Council of Five Hundred for thirty-six days of the year; fifty out of the whole tribe being chosen by lot as its representatives during this period. These fifty were further subdivided into tens; and each of these tens, under the name of proëdri, served a week in succession, as it was allotted, until the official term of the tribe was completed. Again, of these ten presidents, seven were appointed by lot to occupy the chair in succession during their week of office; each one of the seven becoming in his turn epistates, or superintendent for a day. The tribe Antiochis, to which Socrates

[1] Xenophon, whose own reputation for courage gives a strong sanction to his opinion, says of this act of Socrates, ἦν οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα ἄνθρωπον ὑπομεῖναι, *Mem.* iv. 4, 2. He alludes in the same place to the story of Leon.

belonged, happened to be the presiding tribe on the occasion of the impeachment of the generals; and it came to the lot of Socrates to be in the chair of office on the day when the question of their condemnation was so passionately debated. The generals had nobly done their duty to their country, and gained the most brilliant victory which had been achieved at sea in the course of the war by the Athenian arms. But the crisis was an unfortunate one for them. Athens was then on the verge of ruin. The jealousy of parties was at its height. The hopelessness of recovering the lost ground by military strength at this time, gave an opening and encouragement to personal intrigue and the arts of an unscrupulous diplomacy; and a victory, however honourable to their arms, and hopeful as to the future, seems only to have been hailed with very doubtful congratulations by the struggling factions of the city; each looking at it rather as it might act for, or against, his party—as it might tend to the strength of his rivals or their depression—than as a great public triumph. However this may be—for the event remains a matter of perplexity to the historian—the successful generals were brought to trial through the treachery of their own officers, on the specious charge of having neglected the collecting of the dead bodies of their men after the action.[1] The charge was specious, because it was partly true, and was attested indeed by the very officers who were sent by them on that service, and who were now brought as witnesses against their commanders. It was true, so far as the endeavour to collect the dead bodies had been frustrated by a violent storm which followed the engagement. Still the endeavour had been made. The charge was further specious, because it appealed to religious prejudices as well as to the democratic spirit. The generals seemed to have been regardless of the solemn rites due to the dead, and of the persons and feelings of the lower orders of the people. The occasion, therefore, furnished abundant topic of invective to the demagogues; and their addresses too fatally succeeded in obtaining an ungrateful and factious vote of death against the generals.

[1] Thucyd. ii. Plat. *Apol.* 28.

Socrates was threatened with criminal information by the orators of the people; and the people themselves were urging on his assailants, and clamouring against him. Still he remained unmoved, and would not put the unjust question to the vote; preferring the hazard of bonds and death to himself, on the side of the law and right, to a compliance with the popular will in an illegal act.[1] The iniquity was perpetrated ultimately in spite of his resistance; but he at least did his utmost to prevent it.

Such was his conduct under the ascendency of the democratic power. Afterwards, when the oligarchy was established, and the Thirty were exercising their acts of cruelty and extortion without restraint, he was the first to give a check to their tyranny. In their career of confiscation and blood, they marked out Leon of Salamis for destruction. They conceived that the terror of their power would compel even Socrates to be a ready instrument to their rapacity; and they were desirous also, doubtless, to implicate him in the criminality of the act. Accordingly, they appointed him with four others to go to Salamis, and bring Leon to Athens, that he might be put to death. They were disappointed, however, in their expectation, so far as they depended on Socrates as an instrument in the dark deed. The order was executed, and the unhappy Leon was sacrificed to their cruel avarice and fears. But Socrates had no hand in it, and resisted it as far as he could. Unawed by their stern command, he said nothing; but as soon as he had left the Tholus, the place where the Thirty were assembled, he left his four colleagues to proceed on their bloody errand, and went home. He would not, indeed, have dared thus to disobey the order with impunity; he would surely have felt their vengeance—for there is nothing that tyrants resent more than a clemency volunteered by the ministers of their cruelties[2]—but that happily that reign of terror was soon after put down.

[1] Plato, *Gorgias*.

[2] Herodot. 3. 6. Cambyses was glad that his order, given in a moment of passion, to kill Crœsus, was not obeyed; but he could not forgive those who had ventured to reckon upon his return to better feelings; and he accordingly commands, that they should be executed for their disobedience.

By these intrepid acts, Socrates had shewn that the philosopher, in declining the contentions of political life, did not incapacitate himself for its duties when the exigencies of his situation should require him to perform them.[1] As Thales had proved that the philosopher could, if he pleased, make money, by applying to that purpose his observations on the seasons, and his prognostics of an abundant crop of olives;[2] so did Socrates defend Philosophy in his own person and by his conduct on these great occasions, against the imputation of inactivity and selfish ease. It is quite evident, too, that such a spirit as that displayed in these remarkable instances, had he entered into political life, would have subjected him to violent collisions with the successive leaders of party at Athens. "You well know, Athenians," are the words which Plato's *Apology* puts into his mouth, "that had I long ago attempted to take part in political affairs, I should long ago have perished, and I should neither have done you any service nor myself. And be not aggrieved with me for saying the truth; for there is no one of men that can be safe, in giving a spirited opposition either to you, or to any other popular government, and in preventing the occurrence of many unjust and iniquitous things in the state; but he that would in reality fight for the right, must, if he would be safe but a little while, lead a private life and not engage in public business."[3] "Think you, indeed," he further asks, "that I should have lived for so many years, had I engaged in public business; and had I, engaging in it in a manner becoming a good man, succoured the cause of right, and, as behoved me, made that the thing of greatest consequence? Far from it; for neither could any one individual of men."[4]

The time, then, appears to have arrived, when the accusation was brought by Meletus, for his exemplification of the truth of this observation in his own person. He had hitherto avoided the impending storm by the quiet tenor of his private life. But he had done enough to offend the partizans of either extreme in

[1] Plato, *Apol.*, 32.
[2] Cicero, *De Divin.*, i. 49.
[3] Plato, *Apol.*, 31. 32.
[4] Ibid.

the state. Both extremes would be united against him in their enmity to all moderation; for the ascendency of such counsels as his would have been a death-blow to their own reckless lust of power. Hence, they were readily disposed to concur in sacrificing him to their mutual resentments. And we thus behold the sad spectacle of one who had been the friend of every poor man at Athens, no less than of the rich and noble, requited with prosecution and death by those very hands conjoined in the unnatural act, which should each have warded off the blow, if inflicted by the other. The genius of Intolerance was indeed behind the scene, mixing the poisoned cup for its destined victim; an evil jealousy was exerted against him, which nothing short of the extinction of its object could appease. But the actors on the public stage of the trial were, at the same time, wreaking their own vengeance on a political opponent; and the more exasperated against him, in proportion as, by his imperturbable demeanour and real inoffensiveness, he seemed to defy their assaults, and to throw them back on the consciousness of their injustice and ingratitude towards him.

Nor can there be any doubt, that there were many individuals, whose pride he had hurt, whose ignorance he had exposed, whose ill-humour he had irritated, and who, such is the infirmity of human nature, would rejoice in the opportunity of revenge by the verdict of a public condemnation of his doctrine. In affronting the Sophists by his free discussions of their pretensions, he had excited, doubtless, the hostility of many of the higher order of citizens, their patrons and disciples. Many fathers of families too must then have been suffering from that corruption of public morals, which, under the teaching of the Sophists, had clothed itself with plausibilities of argument, and impudently arrogated, for its vain pretensions, the importance of Philosophy. Disobedient, profligate sons, lifting their hands against their fathers, and adding bitterness to their unnatural rebellion, by the hollow false-hearted principles on which they had learned to justify it,—forward, petulant youths, insulting the dignity of age by their pretensions to superior wisdom, and their turbulence,—

these were the fruits of sophistical education, which came home to every family at Athens. Few that felt the evil in their own homes, would stop to inquire whether Socrates was the teacher whom they had to blame for their suffering. Most would hastily conclude, that all such instruction of the young was pernicious; and their offence at the mischievous doctrine of the Sophists would become a disgust against philosophy and philosophers.

Some, indeed, would distinctly trace to Socrates the annoyance which they had experienced from particular individuals. There were many who had frequented the society of Socrates, with no sincere intention of profiting by his lessons—who observed his inquisitive manner, and its effect in convicting and refuting the errors of those with whom he conversed, and who endeavoured, for their own wanton gratification, to imitate him in their intercourse with others. These would take delight in confounding and perplexing others, and exposing and ridiculing their pretensions to wisdom. It is easy to conceive, that the superficial resemblance to the manner of Socrates in these persons, and the vexation produced by it, would excite angry objection against the real method of Socrates.[1] These persons would be pointed at as his disciples. These would be referred to as instances of the evil tendency of the teaching of the philosopher himself; the discredit of the spurious disciples being reflected on the master, to whom it belonged not in any degree.

It appears, further, as might have been expected, that the doctrines of Socrates were studiously misrepresented at the time. Allusions or illustrations employed by him in his reasonings were construed into positive opinions on the subjects to which he thus referred. For example, when, inculcating honest industry, he quoted Hesiod,[2] saying, "Work there is none that

[1] Xenophon speaks of persons who were pointedly corrected by Socrates, *μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν.* *Mem.* i. 4, 1. Such persons would bear a grudge against him, as Anytus in particular appears to have done, and would not be very scrupulous, with this angry feeling dwelling in their minds, as to the mode of resenting the affront.

[2] *Ἀεργείη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.*

is a scandal, inaction is the scandal," the captious absurdly but maliciously interpreted him, as applying the words of the poet to sanction the doing every thing, whether right or wrong, for the sake of gain. When he quoted from Homer the account of Ulysses silencing the uproar of the people, against the practice of employing worthless persons in the public service, it was represented, that he approved the coercing the common people and the poor by harshness and violence.[1] Again, in urging the necessity of looking to the qualification of those who should be appointed to office, and illustrating this by the fact, that no one would choose, by lot, a pilot, or carpenter, or flute-player, or any one, indeed, in matters where error was far less mischievous than in politics,—he was charged with encouraging contempt of the established laws, and exciting the young to acts of violence.[2] And (which is the most invidious form of misrepresentation) a general charge of corrupting the young was thrown out against him, unsupported by any specific statements of the means of corruption which he employed. As in the polemics of later days, so in the controversy between Socrates and his assailants, the obloquy of general hackneyed terms of reproach was resorted to as the substitute for definite grounds of imputation. Thus were the off-hand allegations against all philosophers,—"that they searched into the things in the air, and the things under the earth, and rejected all belief in the gods, and made the worse appear the better reason,"[3]—used as a cover, on this occasion, to the envy and malignity which shrank from the light and the evidence of facts.

The accusation of Meletus, it will be observed, was distributed into three heads: 1. Contempt of the established religion. 2. The introduction of new divinities.[4] 3. The cor-

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2.

[2] Plato, *Euthyphro*, 3, 6. *ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα, γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν· καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς.* P. 6.—Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2, 9.

[3] Plat. *Apol.* 23, p. 54.

[4] Athenians preserved the same character at the time of St. Paul in this respect, also, as well in their eagerness after news; as is seen (Acts xvii. 18, *ξένων δαιμονίων δοκεῖ καταγγελεὺς εἶναι*) in their accusing him of setting forth "strange gods."

ruption of the young. The second of these charges requires to be more particularly noticed, because it has reference to a peculiarity in the conduct of Socrates which gave it a colour of truth.

The mind of Socrates appears to have been deeply imbued with religious feeling. The observation of final causes particularly excited his interest; so much so, as to lead him to think that no other account should be attempted to be given of the phenomena of the world, but as they are the results of a wise and benevolent design. He delighted thus in contemplating every thing in a moral and religious point of view. He thought that the introduction of physical and mechanical causes into the study of nature, only perplexed and misled the mind. He had at first been greatly attracted by the speculations of Anaxagoras. What won his attention in the system of this philosopher, was its distinguished merit beyond all previous systems, in assigning Mind as the master principle of the Universe. But when he came to study the writings of Anaxagoras more closely, he was grievously disappointed, and threw up the system in disgust. For he found that it lost sight of the grand and true principle with which it set out, and, after all, constructed the Universe out of mere material and mechanical elements.[1] He saw, indeed, how futile, as to any real knowledge of the Universe, had been the inquiries of the early philosophers. As an Athenian, he participated, in some measure, in that general prejudice against physical science, which Athenians had ignorantly imbibed against all Philosophy, when they characterized it as idle talk and drivelling dotage. But as a genuine philosopher, in spite of his Athenian prejudices he saw and felt that there was a real moral agency pervading the world; and he judged that, by observation of this, principles of real use for the right direction of human life might be discovered. Tinctured too, as an Athenian, with the superstition of his countrymen, and at the same time correcting it by his superior judgment and feeling, he was disposed to draw every phenomenon into his moral and religious theory of the Universe.

[1] Plato, *Phædo—Apolog.*

To stop to inquire into any thing whether it might be explained on simple natural causes, or to doubt its moral design, would appear to his mind sceptical and profane. Hence, we see at once displayed in him the common character of the Athenian, in his dislike of physical science, and his susceptibility of superstitious influences from the most trivial things; and, on the other hand, the wisdom and religiousness of the true philosopher, in his constant devout disposition to refer all things to a providential design and moral agency.

It is well known how anxiously the heathens watched the most minute circumstances, not only in their religious rites, but in the actions of daily life, as intimations of the will of the gods. Not only dreams and visions, but flights of birds, the meeting any particular object, sneezing, a voice, a sound, and the like trivial things, were regarded with seriousness and awe. Socrates felt the mystic influence of such incidents; only he thought more deeply on them than the generality, and that,—not with the vulgar emotions of fear or of hope, according as the omen might be interpreted,—but with calm and pious reference to the benevolent design which he attributed to them as divine intimations. Further, not only did he apply this sentiment to the outward circumstances of daily life; but he also took into his view the state of his own mind. He conceived that he received at times mysterious signs distinctly perceptible to himself, not indeed of any positive good to be expected from a particular course of conduct, but of precaution—warnings against evil concerning others as well as himself. These presages he interpreted,—or others perhaps, taking his account of his impressions in too literal a manner, have so represented it,—as a voice addressed to him on each occasion. Instances too, are alleged in which this divine voice was the means of saving him and those who obeyed its direction, from danger. In the retreat of the Athenians after their failure at Delium, it is said to have prevented his taking a particular road, and thus saved him, together with Alcibiades and Laches, from being pursued and overtaken by the enemy; whilst others taking another way were

overtaken and slain.[1] This circumstance, according to Plutarch, was a great occasion of the fame at Athens of the "demonion" —or "genius," as it was called by Latin writers,—of Socrates.[2] To this voice is attributed his active devotion of his life to the moral reform of his countrymen by private and personal addresses to them, and his refraining, at the same time, from all political exertion.

The name of a particular dæmonion, or genius, was evidently not assigned by Socrates himself to these extraordinary presages, while he confidently declared their reality. It was rather the misconstruction of the vulgar, and of his assailants, interpreting what he affirmed generally of divine intimations, as assertions of the presence of some particular divinity ascertained by his own convictions, and distinct from the gods worshipped at Athens. Heathens, in general, were incapable of forming a notion of the Deity, but as a local and tutelary god. They could not rise to the sublime conception of the One universal Being, Τὸ Δαιμόνιον, the God in all the world, than whom there is none else. In the view of Socrates, this belief in a presaging voice addressed to his private ear, was nothing more than an extension of the prophetic science, or divination of the heathen world, to practical purposes, and to the cultivation of religious feelings.

It must be remembered, that the Athenians had their augurs or prophets among the regular officers of the republic, without whose presence no matter of public counsel or of war was ever transacted. These were the recognized interpreters of the Divine will. But Socrates claimed a special authority for the presages with which he was peculiarly favoured, and thus seemed to innovate on the science, and encroach on the established forms, of divination. He enjoined, indeed, a devout reference to the Delphic oracle, in all questions of hazardous conduct; teaching that, whilst human reason was the guide in all matters of human power, in those, on the contrary, which were out of human power, as the future event of actions, resort

[1] Plutarch. *de Socr. Gen.* 298. Cicer. *De Divin.* i. 54. [2] Ibid. p. 299.

should be had to every means offered for exploring the will of the gods. He professed to have adopted his own course of life on the evidence of such communications. He advised Xenophon to consult the Delphic oracle, as to whether he should do well in accepting the invitation of Proxenus to join the expedition of Cyrus.[1] But with this reverence for the recognized sources of divine information, he combined a suspicion of the pretenders to Prophecy, who were countenanced by the popular superstition, —the *θεομάντεις* and *χρησμῳδοί*,—who abounded at Athens.[2] He relied rather on the sagacious auguries of his own mind, drawn from observation of some passing incident, or some rapid conclusion respecting the consequences of actions—a kind of intuitive judgment and forecaste, mingling and confounding itself with his religious impressions,—a second hearing, as it were,—a perception of a voice unperceived by the common ear, mysteriously telling of danger to come from some particular course of conduct. Thus was a pretext given to his enemies to say, that he introduced "new divinities;" whilst public opinion tolerated the grossest pretensions to divine revelations, and a system of mercenary imposture founded on them. Public opinion upheld the system of divination as it existed, with its external array of augurs, and prophets, and ceremonial. Socrates, on the contrary, led every man to consult the will of the Deity, not without devout preparation in the inward recesses of his own mind, nor without reference to his own obedience and moral improvement.[3] Superstition, doubtless, strongly tinctured his notions of religious duty. This made him construe many things into divine intimations, which were frivolous and irrelevant. Still he rose above the superstition of the popular divination, in the personal piety which laid hold of each occasion for its exercise and cultivation, and taught men to regard the Divinity as interested in the protection of the good, and ever present

[1] Xenoph. *Anab.* iii. 1, 4.

[2] Plato, *Apol.* 22. c. p. 51.

[3] Plato, *Alcib.* ii. 150, p. 99. *Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡμῶν οἱ θεοὶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν, ἂν τις ὅσιος καὶ δίκαιος, κ. τ. λ.*

to the words, and actions, and even the silent thoughts of men.[1]

Xenophon appears to have faithfully stated the difference between the popular divination and that professed by Socrates, in the following account: "He introduced nothing new beyond others who, acknowledging the reality of divination, make use of omens, and voices, and objects presented on the way, and sacrifices. For these do not conceive, that the birds, and the persons that meet them, know what is expedient to those who divine by them, but that the gods, by means of them, signify this. And so he held. But the generality say, that they are dissuaded and persuaded by the birds, and the objects that meet them; whereas Socrates spoke of it as he thought. For he said that it was the Divinity, Τὸ Δαιμόνιον, that gave signs to him. And to many of his intimates he prescribed to do some things,[2] to forbear other things, on the ground, that the Divinity had presignified it to him; and it was to the advantage of those who took his advice, whilst those who rejected his advice had to repent it."[3]

But how great was the change from the practical devotion of the mind here taught by Socrates, from that popularly entertained at Athens! The history of divination, as it was regarded, not at Athens only, but throughout Greece, is but a picture of the hopes and fears, and conscious guiltiness, if not of the envy and malignity, of the weak and corrupt heart of man, exalted into attributes of the Divine Being, and interpretations of the Divine Will. Let us only hear Solon, as described by Herodotus, speaking of the Deity as invidious and turbulent, and as guided by no fixed course in the disposition of human affairs; and we may judge what a task he had enterprized, who entered into conflict with this inward and subtile idolatry of human passions, established by the heathen system of divination. It was indeed teaching divinities new to Athenian ears, when Socrates incul-

[1] Xen. *Mem.* i. 1, 19. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, κ. τ. λ.

[2] Xenophon here differs from Plato's *Apology*, in saying, that Socrates received intimations of *what was to be done;* whereas Plato expressly says the directions were only *negative.*

[3] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 1, 3, p. 3. Xenoph. *Apol.* 13, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο δαιμόνιον καλῶ.

cated an inward reformation of the character of those who would look for the favour of the gods, or expect a special interposition and direction from the benevolent Principle which guides the course of the moral world.

Whereas, too, the popular divination was employed on the most trivial occasions, and made the substitute for the proper exertion of men's faculties on matters cognizable by them, Socrates differed from this prevalent notion of the subject. He contended that, where the line of conduct was plain, men should use the best of their judgment in acting,—that they should use their experience and reason in learning what the gods had given them to learn by such means, and only have resort to consultation of the Divine will by the extraordinary means of divination, where the results of conduct were uncertain. Thus might he be construed as dissuading men from the use of divination, when he only dissuaded from an improper use of it, and exhorted to a rational activity.

We may see from the story of Aristodicus of Cyme, how the practice existed among the Greeks, of endeavouring to obtain from the oracles sanctions even to iniquities and impieties. Aristodicus consults the oracle whether he may surrender an unhappy fugitive; and the oracle permits him, dexterously reproving, by the very permission, the attempt to cast the burthen of personal responsibility on the oracle itself, and to cover an immoral act with the veil of religious duty.[1] Divination, in fact, was indolently resorted to in the heathen world, to relieve the mind of the labour and anxiety of thought, and the searchings of conscience. And Socrates addressed himself to the correction of this practice, by recommending, as we have seen, exertion of the judgment, and the acquisition of information on all matters within the sphere of human reason. He would thus provoke the hostility of many a professed diviner, who made a trade of his art, and would find individuals of this class ready

[1] Herodot., i. 158, 159. The same is illustrated in the story of Glaucus in Herod. vi. c. 86. The oracles were consulted, also, on frivolous matters, such as the petty thefts of Amasis. Herodot. ii. c. 174.

to join in the outcry raised against him, of innovation on the popular Theology.

The jealousy of the Sophists in particular, the very class with whom the accusation of Meletus identified him, would also swell the popular prejudice against him on this head. For these claimed, among their pretensions, to be regarded as endued with a predictive sagacity, rendering them expert practical guides respecting the future.[1] Socrates would offend them in this point in two ways; both as counselling persons to have recourse to their own judgment, and the ordinary means of information, on questions to which human reason was competent; and as bidding them seek Divine direction by the rites of Religion on all matters beyond the compass of man's understanding. For in both respects would the Sophists find their course interfered with. The use of men's own judgment, or the appeal to the signs of the Divine will, would equally lessen the value for those counsels which they pretended to impart.

What added still further to this invidious feeling was, that the reputation of Socrates now eclipsed theirs throughout Greece. And Socrates appears himself confidently to have appealed to this public estimation of his character against the partial censures of his countrymen at the time of his trial. He vindicated his assertion of Divine intimations specially granted to him, by referring to the oracle of Delphi as having honoured him with its distinct approbation. Chærephon, in the devoutness of his admiration of his master, had, on some occasion, consulted the oracle respecting him, and obtained an answer that Socrates was the wisest of men. The authenticity of the anecdote has been questioned. But the introduction of it in the two *Apologies*[2] may be taken as a voucher of its substantial truth. It, at any rate, shews the favourable opinion which had been conceived of him out of Athens itself; that, as Lycurgus had been complimented by the verdict of an oracle, so the same tribute of public applause might, with equal probability, be assigned to Socrates.

[1] Isocr. c. Soph. 2, 4, *περὶ τῶν μελλόντων μὲν εἰδέναι προσποιουμένους.*

[2] Xenoph. *Apol.* p. 249. Plato, *Apol.* p. 48.

According to Laertius, the sentence of condemnation was carried by a majority consisting of 281 votes. The number was little more than sufficient to decide the question on that side; for it only exceeded the number of votes of acquittal by three. "Had but three votes only fallen differently," says Socrates himself, in the *Apology* of Plato, "I should have been acquitted." Nor, indeed, would Meletus alone, without the aid of Anytus and Lycon, (he is made there confidently to declare) have obtained even a fifth part of the votes to save him the penalty of a thousand drachmas, affixed by the law to an unsustained prosecution. But when the penalty of death was further put to the vote, and he was found unwilling to propose the substitution of any other penalty, such as a fine or exile, but evinced his indignant contempt of their unjust sentence, by asking rather, in his ironical way, instead of even a slight punishment, the highest honour of the state,—that of a public maintenance in the Prytaneum,—the multitude of the jurors were so exasperated by the unbending spirit thus displayed, that eighty additional votes were given on the hostile side, determining the sentence of death. So evidently was the whole case ruled by passion, and the arts of demagogues exciting the people to treat it as a slight on their majesty, rather than as a cause in a court of justice. Otherwise, it could not have happened, that when the previous question of guilt had been carried with nearly an equal number of dissentients, the severest penalty should have obtained such an accession of voices in its favour.

The little solicitude shewn by Socrates in regard to his defence from the accusation has been already remarked. As he strongly disapproved the affected artificial Rhetoric of his times, and the practice of appealing to the passions against the judgment of the hearer, so neither would he study beforehand what he should say on the occasion of his trial. Twice had he essayed (he observes to Hermogenes) to consider what he should say in his defence; and as often had he been prevented by those secret divine intimations to which he habitually re-

ferred his conduct.[1] Nor again would he receive the proffered services of friends in pleading his cause. The celebrated orator Lysias composed an oration for this purpose. On reading it, he expressed his admiration of it, but declined it as unsuitable to him. When Lysias wondered that he could admire it, and yet say it was unsuitable, he observed, in his usual manner of illustration, by an apposite case; "Would not also fine coats and shoes be unsuitable to me?" Plato, however, it is said, could not be restrained from appearing in his behalf, and made an effort to address the court. But the uproar was so great, that on his uttering the words, "ascend the bema," he was met with the cry, "descend," and forced to abandon the attempt.[2]

So neither, again, would he resort to those appliances to the feelings which were usual in the Athenian courts. The Athenian juryman expected that the defendant should come before him in the character of a suppliant, and entreat his clemency rather than claim his justice. He was to be assailed with prayers and tears, no less than with arguments addressed to his understanding. But Socrates would not condescend to these methods of persuasion. He would not produce his wife and children in the court, to excite compassion, or bring forward his connexions and friends to intercede in his behalf. He felt it unbecoming in him at his age, and with his reputation as a philosopher, to supplicate for his life. It would have given to his whole previous demeanour the appearance of insincerity and hypocrisy. It would have shewn that dread of death, against which all his teaching had been directed.[3] It would have been an evidence that he disregarded the sanctity of Religion, in trying to influence his jurors to decide by favour against their oaths, and so far would have substantiated the charge of Meletus against him.[4] For the same reason, he had refused to offer to submit to a mitigated penalty, when challenged, according to the practice in the Athenian courts, to propose his own estimate of the offence. Afterwards,

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 8. Ἔφη γὰρ ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον ἤ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου λέγειν αὐτῷ, ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται, κ. τ. λ.—and *Apol.* 2, *et sqq.*

[2] Diog. Laert. *in vit.*

[3] Plato, *Apol.* i. p. 79. [4] Ibid. p. 82.

indeed, he softened this bold vindication of his merits, by adding in the same ironical manner, that he could perhaps pay the fine of a mina of silver, and would therefore fix that amount of damages; or that as Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, suggested the sum of thirty minæ, and would be good sureties for the payment, he would fix the latter amount.[1] To have seriously proposed any such estimate, would, in his opinion, have been an admission of his guilt.[2]

He displayed throughout the trial the same calm and cheerful temper which characterized his ordinary behaviour. There were in his manner, even at that solemn crisis, touches of the same ironical humour, the same half-earnest, half-playful strokes of argumentative attack, which had given so much interest and point to his daily familiar conversations; and when the trial was over, he evinced no further emotion than the indignation of a sincere and honest man, at the malicious and mischievous arts by which the result had been accomplished. He was sustained by the consciousness, that no crime had been proved against him; whilst his assailants must feel the reproaches of conscience for the real impiety and iniquity of which they had been guilty; some for having instigated others to bear false witness against him; some for having themselves borne this false witness. The disgrace of the condemnation fell not on him, he asserted, but on those who had passed such a sentence. He consoled himself with the thought, that it was the will of the Deity, and it was best for him now to die; that, though condemned by his present judges, like another Palamedes, he should receive from posterity that verdict of approbation which was withheld from Ulysses, to whose successful plot the life of that chief was sacrificed.[3] Availing himself also of the prophetic power which the popular belief attributed to the words of a dying man, he warned his countrymen, as he left the court, that they were embarked in a course which must involve them in bitter repentance.[4] He concluded his

[1] Plato, *Apol.* 38 b. i., p. 88.
[2] Xenoph. *Apol.* p. 23, κελευόμενος ὑποτιμᾶσθαι.
[3] Xenoph. *Apol.* 24.
[4] Plato, *Apol.*

address with the following striking admonition: "I have only this request to make. As for my sons, when they shall have grown up, punish them, I pray you, by troubling them in the same manner in which I have been in the habit of troubling you, if they appear to you to concern themselves either with money or any thing else in preference to Virtue. And if they would seem to be something when they are nothing, reproach them, as I do you, that they take no concern about what they ought, and think themselves to be something when they are nothing. And if you do this, I shall have suffered justice at your hands, both myself and my sons. But it is now time to depart; —for me to die—for you to live—but which of us is going to a better thing, is uncertain to every one except only to the Deity."[1]

In his way from the court to the prison to which he was now consigned, he was observed with eye and mien and step composed, in perfect unison with his previous address. On perceiving some of those who accompanied him weeping, "Why is this," he said; "is it now that you weep? did you not long ago know, that, from the moment of my birth, the sentence of death had been decreed against me by Nature? If, indeed, I were perishing beforehand in the midst of blessings flowing in upon me, it would be plain that I and my kind friends would have to grieve; but if I terminate my life at a time when troubles are expected, for my part, I think you ought all to be in good heart, as feeling that I am happy."[2] Apollodorus, whose admiration of his master amounted to an amiable weakness, complained to him of the great hardship of his suffering by an unjust sentence. Acknowledging the affectionate feeling thus shewn to him in a familiar manner, by passing his hand over the head of his attached disciple, he, at the same time, gently reproved him, saying, "Would you then, my dear Apollodorus, rather see me dying justly than unjustly?" and smiled at the question. On seeing Anytus pass by, he could not forbear, it is said, the expression of a strong censure on the conduct of that individual towards his own son. He foretold, what the unhappy result

[1] Plato, *Apol. ad fin.* [2] Xenoph. *Apol.* 27.

proved too true, that the heart of Anytus would one day be embittered by the evil fruits of that low and unworthy education to which, with mercenary views, he had subjected his son, a young man with whom the philosopher had formerly conversed, and who had seemed destined for better things.

The execution of Socrates, by the poisoned cup, would have followed immediately on his condemnation, but for the peculiar circumstances under which the trial had taken place. It was after the commencement of the Delian festival; an annual commemoration, of the safe return of Theseus and his devoted companions to Athens, from the fatal labyrinth of Crete, and the release thenceforth from the bloody tribute exacted by Minos, by the mission of a vessel to Delos with sacrifices to Apollo, and other religious rites. When the Priest of Apollo had once crowned the stern of the sacred vessel with the festive garland, it was not lawful to pollute the city by a public execution, until the solemn pomp had been performed, and the vessel had returned. This ceremony had been performed only the day before the trial of Socrates. Thus he obtained the respite of thirty days between his trial and execution.

These were days of high interest and importance not only to his sorrowing friends, but to the cause of that admirable practical philosophy which all his previous life had inculcated. This compulsory leisure he devoted to studies which had never hitherto engaged his attention, in composing a hymn in praise of Apollo, and in rendering into verse some fables of Æsop; under the influence of a religious scruple, as he said, lest he should depart without having fully complied with a divine command, often presented to him in dreams, Ὦ Σώκρατες, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου, by simply interpreting it, as he had all along done, as a call and incitement to philosophy, the highest work so designated; whereas its intention might be, that he must further exercise himself in the work of the Muse in its ordinary popular sense of poetic composition.

Now indeed, in his prison, with the immediate prospect of a violent death before his eyes, he could discourse with an irresis-

tible cogency of argument, of the vanity of human things, and the real happiness of man, as consisting in the cultivation of the spiritual and immortal principles of his nature. He had professed his whole life to be a "meditation" of death. He now had the opportunity—which, as a philosopher (could the voice of natural instinct have been silenced), he would most have desired—of realizing, by his own example, that view of death, according to which his thoughts and teaching had been studiously framed and directed. Unlike his successors in the schools of the Stoics, he did not advocate a doctrine of suicide, much as he depreciated the importance of the present life of man in the world. With that good sense which restrained his religion and his philosophy from running into fanaticism, he held it to be impious in any one to release himself, by his own hand, from that post of duty in which the Deity had placed him.[1] Though, however, he had not courted death, he felt that, in his circumstances, he was called, consistently and resolutely, to go through this last act of his public profession. He seems, indeed, to have rejoiced in being thus enabled to sum up his philosophy in one great result, enforcing every observation and argument of his previous teaching, by demonstrating, so far as human reason and example could avail for the purpose, the absolute supremacy and power of the great principles of Moral truth. The occasion was one which the genius of Plato would not fail to seize, as most felicitous for the development of its own enthusiastic and transcendental interpretation of the lessons of Socrates. Accordingly, in that most exquisite of his Dialogues, the *Phædo*, he has invited us to the couch of Socrates, on the last sad morning of his imprisonment, to listen to the philosopher, with the chill of death almost upon him, discoursing on the Immortality of the soul. The affectionate disciple doubtless shed natural tears over his dying master. But he sought also to elevate his own philosophy to the dignity of being the dying confession of the great sage of Athens. And he wished, further, that it should speak, as it were, the funeral oration over him to whom it was indebted

[1] Plato, *Phædo*, p. 61, c. Οὐ μὲν ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι.

for its earliest inspirations, and pour its own libation on his tomb. Thus he has especially elaborated the last scene of his master's life, and made us contemplate with the deepest interest the death of Socrates, not only as an act of heroic self-devotion and patient martyrdom to the truth taught by the great sage himself, but as a splendid episode in the dramatic development of his own philosophy.[1]

During his imprisonment, Socrates was not denied the solace of receiving his friends, and conversing with them day after day. Early each morning might be seen a company of devoted friends, whom nothing could separate from him, assembled at the hall of justice, where the trial had taken place, and which was close to the prison, watching for the jailor to open the gate and admit them. Being admitted, they would commonly remain with him in the prison until evening, engaged in earnest and instructive conversation. His wife and children, too, appear to have been constantly with him.[2] He was importuned by these affectionate followers to suffer them to effect his escape. Crito earnestly entreated him to be allowed to execute a plan which he had concerted for rescuing him. Simmias, the Theban, also brought a sum of money with him to Athens for that purpose. Cebes and others were equally ready with their resources. They argued, that, so far from being at a loss what to do with himself out of Athens, as he had said on his trial, they could ensure him

[1] Yet we may well believe that this Dialogue contains the substance of what Socrates really discoursed on the solemn occasion itself. For there can be little doubt, that much of what he had said was noted down at the time by one or more of those present, and subsequently drawn out at length, with the omissions supplied, and corrections made, after fresh communication with those persons.

It is expressly stated with respect to another Dialogue, the *Theætetus*, that the person who received the account of it from the mouth of Socrates, made notes of it immediately on his going home, and afterwards wrote it out at his leisure; questioning Socrates again, on his return to Athens, about anything that he might not have recollected, and so correcting it. Such may be presumed to have been the way in which the substance of the *Phædo* was also preserved and transmitted, and we may assume, accordingly, that we have in it a faithful record, on the whole, of the scene itself and the argument; though perhaps often retouched by the hand of Plato, and gradually wrought up to the finished state in which we have received it.

[2] Plato, *Phædo*, p. 60, a.

friends in Thessaly, and many other places, who would most gladly welcome him, and protect him. But to none of these importunities would he yield. He answered that, while he highly estimated their kindness, he was pledged to obey reason only, and the Laws, and that he saw no ground in his present circumstances for taking a different view of his case. As for the duty of providing for his children, by preserving his own life—a consideration which Crito appears to have strongly pressed on him—this was not now a matter for him to consider; it was for those to consider, who, as his Athenian judges, treated life and death as such light concerns; for his part, he must look simply to what was right or wrong to be done.[1] Thus steadily and calmly did he persevere in his resolution of awaiting the utmost extremity.

At length it was announced that the Theoric galley had been seen off Sunium, and might very shortly be expected to arrive at Athens. Crito proceeded in anxious haste to the prison; and being well known to the jailor from his frequent visits there, obtained admission at a very early hour. He found Socrates asleep; and sat by him in silence, wondering to see him sleep so soundly in so much trouble; until he at length awoke to receive the fatal intelligence. This he received with the same composure as if it had been some ordinary communication. His only answer to Crito was, that he was quite resigned to the will of the gods, if it were so; but that he had been persuaded by a dream that the vessel would not come that day, but the following one. His reliance on dreams as divine intimations has been already mentioned. He told Crito it was well that he had not waked him up; for he was dreaming that a woman of noble form, clothed in white, came to him and called him, and said to him in a line from Homer, slightly altered in its ending;

> On the third day to deep-soiled Pthia thou mayst come.[2]

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[1] Plato, *Crito*, p. 48, c.

[2] *Iliad*, ix. 363. Ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐριβῶλον ἱκοίμην.

The event, at any rate, accorded with his expectation. It was not on that day, but on the following one, that the sacred vessel reached the harbour of Piræus; and the day after that was appointed for the execution.

By the dawn of that day, the sorrowing party again met at the accustomed place, and were informed by the jailor that the Eleven—the officers who superintended the public executions—had given orders that the chains should be taken off, and that Socrates should die on that day.

It is interesting to know who the individuals were of that party, thus assembled at this last solemn interview with their loved master and friend; some of whom indeed are not without note in the subsequent history of Philosophy.

There was Phædo, with whose name the Dialogue is inscribed; and who gives the account of the interview to a friend; a youth of a noble family of Elis, who having been carried a captive to Athens, and there sold as a slave, had been attracted by the teaching of Socrates, and, by means of the friends of Socrates, had been ransomed from that state of extreme degradation. Of the Athenians present, were Crito, with his son, Critobulus, the youthful Apollodorus, remarkable for his childlike affection to Socrates, Antisthenes, Æschines, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Ctesippus, Menexenus; of the Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, who are the chief interlocutors in the Argument, and Phædondas; of the Megareans, Euclides and Terpsion. Such are the names expressly mentioned, as forming the company actually present. The absence of two important persons, Aristippus and Cleombrotus, is explained, by their being said to have been in Ægina at the time. And why, it would naturally be asked, were not Plato and Xenophon there? Nothing indeed is said of Xenophon; and the omission of his name has been imputed to a feeling of ill-will towards him on the part of Plato. But this is asserted without reason; for Xenophon was then in Asia; having gone in the previous year,[1] as a volunteer, to join the expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks, whom Cyrus

[1] Diog. Laert. in *vit. Xen.*

the Younger had enlisted, in his attempt on the throne of his brother Artaxerxes. As for Plato himself, the reason of his absence is given in those few touching words, Πλάτων δὲ, οἶμαι, ἠσθένει. He was at Athens; but "he was sick." The scene was in truth too trying for his feelings; yet he would not have it supposed by any who should inquire, who were the friends present, that he, on whom the loss would press most sorely, was wanting in an act of duteous affection and respect to their common father and friend. His grief, it would seem, was too deep to be expressed, and his hand shrinks from the attempt.

After being kept waiting some little time, they were admitted. They found the philosopher already loosed from his chains, with Xanthippe and his youngest child with her, by his side. By his desire they conduct her home; the good Crito entrusting her to the care of his attendants, amidst cries of passionate grief which had broken forth afresh from her, at the sight of them now come to bid their last farewell.

What the emotions were of that company of devoted disciples and friends, chiefly young men, enthusiasts in their admiration of their master, now gathered around him in such a place for the last time, to listen to a voice, which, for many a long day past had interested and delighted them, we can only faintly imagine. They were all bewilderment; at one moment, weeping, at another, laughing; in a strange state of pain and pleasure commingled; as they looked at him, their beloved teacher and guide, now about to be withdrawn from their society for ever.

The occasion naturally leads to the conversation which ensues, on the condition of the soul after death, and the theory of its immortality; Socrates interrogating and arguing with all his wonted energy and vivacity; and they, on the other hand, eagerly awaiting his exposition of each point in the discussion; hanging with earnest attention on every word as it proceeds from his lips, as if dreading that, when he should be gone, no one would remain, able to sustain an argument of such deep

interest to them, or answer objections with which it might be assailed.[1]

He had not yet left the couch on which he had been lying, when they came in, but was sitting up rubbing his leg now relieved of its chain. He opened the conversation, by expressing the pleasurable sensation which he experienced at that moment in the transition from the previous pain; remarking to them the strangeness of the close connection subsisting between pleasure and pain; how invariably one was found to precede the other; so that, had Æsop thought of it, he might have represented the fact in a fable, relating that the god, finding he could not reconcile them from their state of war, had linked them together by their heads; whence it was now impossible for one to appear anywhere without being immediately followed by the other. Thus mentioning Æsop, he is led to explain to them why he had employed himself during his imprisonment, in poetry, a matter so unusual to him; and in particular, had directed his attention to versifying fables of Æsop. He then put down his feet, and took his seat, prepared to enter on the discussion belonging to the occasion, and on which the thoughts of all were anxiously intent.

He had scarcely begun, when Crito interposed to tell him, that the man who was to administer the poison, had been urging him to say, that he must not converse much; as the exertion would render the poison more lingering in its effect, from the warmth thus produced in the body; for that, in consequence of this, he had been obliged sometimes, in his experience, to administer it twice over. "Let him then," replied Socrates, "only be ready to perform his duty, and to administer it twice, or even thrice, if it should be necessary."

Resuming thus the conversation, he endeavours, at the outset, to impart to them the comfort of that assurance with which his own spirit was supported and cheered, that, when he should depart hence, he should go to a happier world, and a condition,

[1] *Phædo*, p. 173. Ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ᾖ ποιῆσαι.

more favourable for perfecting that discipline, which as a philosopher, having the attainment of wisdom for his great end, he had been ever pursuing through life, but under great difficulties and hindrances from the body. There were the necessities of the body demanding attention to them; there were the vulgar pleasures of sensual indulgence; there were the delusions of the senses: all these things, obstructions to the philosopher arising from communication with the body. He might have good hope therefore, that, when freed from the bonds and the pollutions of the body, his soul would be enabled to realize to itself the purification and the perfection which it had before sought in vain; and death therefore might be gladly welcomed by him as the introduction to it.

But what if Death be not, as the argument has assumed, a mere separation of soul and body, but an extinction of the soul—what if, on its departure from the body, it should be dispersed, and vanish like breath or smoke; and this should be the end of its existence? Such is the objection now raised by Cebes.

In answering it, Socrates first states, as an opinion traditionally received from of old, the point which he is about to prove, that the souls born into this world proceed hence to Hades, the region of the departed, and come forth again from Hades here; and thus are born from out of the number of the dead. Then, that such is the fact, he argues on two grounds: first, on the principle of contrarieties as the origin and cause of all generation; and in the next place, as consequent on the theory of Knowledge as consisting in Reminiscence.

With regard to the principle of contrarieties; if it were not evidenced, he observed, in a continued generation of the living and the dead, in alternate sequence of one from the other; in like manner as cold and heat, greater and less, sleep and waking, just and unjust, etc., follow, as contraries, one from the other, in each pair of instances; if, instead of this, all went on in one direction to the opposite, and there were no return; that is, if all died, and there were no return from the dead to the living; all

life would thus, at length, be at an end; and there would be but one uniform spectacle of death throughout nature.

Again, if all Knowledge, so far as it has for its object the real and the true, must be regarded as Reminiscence, men must have lived in another state before their appearance in this world. Unless this should be granted, it would be impossible to account for their possession of such knowledge. For their experience in the present life does no more than reveal to them its existence in their minds; and no time in the present life can be pointed out in which they acquired it.

The pre-existence of the soul, however, being conceded; it still remains to be proved that it exists *after* Death. This indeed follows, as Socrates alleges, from the admission of its pre-existence; for, how could it, according to the last argument, be generated again from the dead, unless it were still living after death? But, as the objection recurs, that the soul in going forth from the body may evaporate and be dispersed, he shews more distinctly the futility of such a supposition. This might be the case, he argues, if the soul were of a compound nature; but must be impossible, if the soul appears to be altogether simple and uncompounded. And that it is such, he concludes, from its power of apprehending those simple essences entirely abstracted from everything sensual and bodily, which are discernible by the intellect alone, apart from, and beyond, the perceptions of the senses; such as the notions of equality, honour, right, etc., the uniform, permanent and invariable standards and tests to which it refers in each instance the reports of the senses, and thus forms its judgments of the truth of things. The soul then truly lives, according to its proper nature, when it devotes itself to the contemplation of these immortal and divine essences, detaching itself from the bonds of the body, and from all sensual contagion, to the utmost, even whilst it is, as now in this world, connected with the body. Hence he draws the confident hope for himself and for all who have, like him, truly philosophized, that their souls will depart from this world to the invisible region, as to its congenial place; and there be happy, in

the enjoyment of that freedom for which it has been longing, from the error, and folly, and fears, and wild desires, and other evils of humanity.

There was then silence for some time; Socrates himself musing in thought. But observing Cebes and Simmias speaking to each other, he asked them if there were anything in what had been said that did not satisfy them; the subject, he admitted, was still open to many difficulties and objections, and he was ready to go along with them in the further discussion of it. On learning that they were only reluctant to trouble him, in consideration of the occasion, he remarked with a quiet laugh and some expression of surprise, that he could hardly hope to convince others, if they were not convinced, that he did not regard the occasion as a calamity, or one to irritate him; they must therefore think nothing of that; but go on questioning him, as long, at least, as the Eleven would permit it. They then stated the objections which had occurred to them.

That of Simmias was drawn from the theory of the older physical philosophers, which described the nature of the soul under the notion of "Harmony;" signifying by this term, that the soul was nothing in itself; but simply a result of the composition and adjustment of the several parts of the body, and tempering of the various elements of which it consists. An illustration of it under this point of view was derived from the structure of a musical instrument. As the harmony or musical tone of the lyre resulted from the composition of its parts, and the due tension of its strings; so was the soul, they asserted, the effect of a certain arrangement of the component parts of the body, and mixture of the elements of moisture and dryness, heat and cold, and such like opposites, combined in it. And as when the lyre was broken up, the harmony must perish along with it, so must the soul be supposed to perish with the destruction of the body; notwithstanding the fact, that Harmony itself is of a higher and more divine nature, in comparison with the lyre, or the organization from which it results.

The objection of Cebes amounted to this; that the argument

of Socrates, as yet, had only proved that the soul was more lasting than the body, and would survive the destruction of the body: it did not prove that it would last for ever. He illustrated his point from the supposition of a person having worn out, in his lifetime, many garments in succession, which he had woven for himself. And it might as well be asserted, he maintained, when the man died, that he was still in existence, by producing, as evidence of the fact, the last garment which he had made, and contending that, because the less durable then remains, therefore the man himself has not perished. For, in like manner, the soul might have worn out and survived many renewals of the body, and yet not necessarily survive the body at last. It may have often died, and have been as often generated again, and yet perish at last in the course of these alternations; so that no one could feel sure at any time, as to his death at that time not being his end, unless the soul could be shewn to be altogether immortal and indestructible.

These difficulties in the question thus put forward by the two disputants, produced at the moment a sort of consternation among the party, as if the argument had now been quite overthrown. They waited anxiously for the reply of Socrates. Noticing the effect on them, but himself undisturbed by the objections, he stroked with his hand the head of Phædo, who was sitting on a low seat near him, and pressing together the locks on his neck, he said, "To-morrow, Phædo, you will cut off these fair locks." "So it seems," said Phædo. "Not so," he replied, "if you would obey me; to-day, I must cut off mine, and you, these, if our argument should come to an end, and we cannot revive it; and if I were you, and the argument should escape me, I would bind myself by an oath, like the Argives, not to suffer my hair to grow long again before I should fight the battle over, and vanquish the argument of Simmias and Cebes."[1] Then making some observations cautioning against the weakness

[1] In allusion to Herodot. i. 82, where the Argives are described as making such a determination in regard to the recovery of Thyrea, after their defeat by the Lacedæmonians in their defence of that disputed territory.

of giving way to a feeling of general scepticism, because an argument to which one has trusted has been proved unsound; and bidding them look more to the truth than to him as its advocate, and contend against him, if he seemed to them to say what was not the truth, lest, deceiving them as well as himself, he should depart, like the bee, leaving the sting behind; he proceeds to the refutation in order of each of the objections just urged.

The notion which represents the soul as Harmony, implying, he argues, that the soul is of a compound nature, implies also, that it has not existed before it appeared in human form, and is contradicted, therefore, by the former conclusion asserting its pre-existence; whereas, in the instance adduced of the lyre, the lyre itself, and the strings, and the notes, are produced first, and the harmony, which is the last in the production, is, on the other hand, the first to be destroyed. Again, Harmony admits of degrees, and of more or less in quantity; but one soul is not more a soul in degree or quantity than another. Nor, on the theory which asserts the soul to be Harmony, could there be any such thing as vice; all souls must be equally good, all equally virtuous, according to that theory; since Harmony must follow that of which it is composed, and cannot be at variance with itself; it cannot become otherwise than Harmony. But in the soul we find a conflict and opposition between its various principles; reason, as the governing power, dictating to the passions; and the passions struggling against reason for the mastery; so that the notion of Harmony is utterly inconsistent with that of the soul.

The objection raised by Cebes required Socrates to shew, that the soul is not only immortal but indestructible. The proof of this involves, he says, nothing less than an inquiry into the subject of Generation and Corruption, or into the causes of all that is effected throughout the Universe. Sketching the history of his own searchings into the subject, he states, how he came at last to the conviction, that there was no adequate cause to be assigned for any thing, but the one essential notion

or abstract nature; the presence of which constitutes a thing that which it is; as, for example, whatever is honourable, is so, from the presence in it of the essential notion, the honourable itself; whatever is great, from the presence of the essential notion of greatness itself; and so in every thing. If this be granted, it must follow, that nothing can admit the presence of any essential nature; or (in the language of Plato, idea) contrary to that essential nature, or idea, which constitutes it; and remain the same. In *things* themselves (as before shewn, in referring to the argument from the principle of contraries), contraries proceed from contraries; but it is not so with essential contrary *natures*. These cannot but recede from the presence of their contraries, and depart undestroyed. Snow, for instance, as he observes, recedes before the presence of heat; it cannot remain what it was, and become both snow and heat; but must either recede or be destroyed before the presence of heat. Or fire, on the accession to it of cold, must be displaced or destroyed, but cannot remain as both fire and cold. Or even when two *things* are not contrary themselves, but import in them contrary *ideas*, they must, in like manner, exclude those ideas wherever they are present. Such, then, is the case with regard to the soul and the body. Though not contraries in *themselves*, they import essentially contrary *natures*, the soul bringing along with it the idea of life wherever it is present, and thus excluding the idea of death; so that, besides being immortal, the soul must, as such, be also indestructible. Accordingly, when Death comes upon the man, that which is *mortal* of him dies; but the *immortal* goes away sound and uncorrupted, receding before the presence of death.

"If then," says Socrates, in concluding the argument, "the soul is immortal, it needs care, indeed, not for that time only which we call living, but for all time; and the danger would even now seem to be dreadful, if one should neglect it. For if Death were a riddance from every thing, it would be a gain to the evil to be rid at once, both of the body and their own evil, with the soul; but now, since it appears to be immortal, there

can be no other refuge from evils, and no safety, except in becoming as good and as wise as possible. For the soul goes to Hades, possessing nothing but its education and nurture; which indeed are also said most to avail the dead, either for their benefit or their hurt, on their journeying thither."

But, as if, after all, he still felt impressed, that something more than philosophy, and the subtilty of argument, is required for a full conviction on the great subject which he has been discussing, that the truth must, in fact, descend to us from above, and cannot be found in the depths of the mind of man; he sets before them, as the sum of the whole, a parting admonition to prepare themselves for that moral retribution which awaits the soul when it passes hence into another state of being, in the form of a mythical description of the unseen world; declaring the judgment to be hereafter pronounced on each soul, according to its former life; the punishment of the evil on the one hand; and, on the other, the perfect felicity of those who have lived piously, and purified themselves to the utmost by philosophy, and the pursuit of all virtue.

He then rose to proceed to the bath, as an immediate preparation for his death; when Crito detained him for a while, to ask his last commands about his children, or any other matter in which their services might gratify him. He replied, "that he had nothing new to say beyond what he had ever been saying—that, by attending to themselves, they would most gratify him and his, as well as themselves, in all they might do, though they might even make no promise now; but that, if they neglected themselves, and were unwilling to follow in the track pointed out in all that he had said to them up to this last occasion, all that they could do would be of no avail, however much, and however earnestly, they might promise at the present moment."[1] Crito assented to this advice, but in his eagerness still to do some act of kindness to his revered friend, subjoined, "But in what way are we to bury you?" This mode of speaking of his burial, gives occasion to a very characteristic reproof from him,

[1] Plato, *Phædo*, p. 115, a, *et sqq.*

of this solicitude on the part of Crito. "As you please," was his answer, "if at least you can take me, and I do not escape from you." Then gently smiling, and looking off to the surrounding company, he added, "I cannot, my friends, persuade Crito, that I am the Socrates that is now conversing, and ordering every thing that has been said; but he thinks that I am that man whom he will shortly see a corpse, and asks how you should bury me. But what I have all along been talking so much about—that when I shall have drunk the poison, I shall no longer stay with you, but shall, forsooth, go away to certain felicities of the blest—this I seem to myself to have been saying in vain, whilst comforting, at the same time, you and myself. Bail me therefore to Crito the opposite bail to that which he bailed me to the judges; for he was bail for my staying; but do you be bail for my *not* staying when dead, but going away; that Crito may bear it more easily, and may not feel aggrieved for me, as if I were suffering something dreadful, when he sees my body either burning or being interred; nor may say at the burial, that he lays out, or carries out, or inters *Socrates*. For," he continued, turning himself again to Crito, "be assured, excellent Crito, that the speaking improperly is not only wrong in itself, but also produces some evil in the soul. However, take courage, and say that you are burying *my body;* and bury it as may be agreeable to you, and in the manner you may hold most lawful."[1]

He then went into another apartment to bathe, Crito following him, whilst the rest of the party awaited his return. After bathing, he received his children—and the females of his family. Having conversed some time with these in the presence of Crito, and given them his final commands, he dismissed them, and came out again to the assembled friends. This affecting interview had occupied a considerable time, and when he returned, it was near sunset. He had not long sat down, when the officer of the Eleven presented himself, and respectfully intimated to him that the fatal moment was at hand. The noble and gentle demeanour of the philosopher during his imprisonment had won

[1] Plato, *Phædo*, p. 115, a, *et sqq.*

upon this man; and used as he had been to scenes of execution and horror within those walls, he was struck by the contrast in the case of Socrates, and bursting into tears as he gave his message, turned himself away, and retired. Socrates himself was touched by this demonstration of considerate feeling. "Farewell, you too," he said, "we will do as you bid;" then addressing his friends, "How courteous the man is! through all the time he would come to me, and would converse with me sometimes, and was the best of men; and now how generously does he weep for me!" He then called for the poisoned cup. Crito's affection would still have delayed it, for he urged that the sun was not yet gone down, and that others on the like occasions had not used such despatch, but had supped and drunk beforehand as they pleased. Socrates answered that this might be reasonable for others; for him it was reasonable not to do so; and persisted in requiring the cup to be brought. The process of bruising the hemlock took some time; but at length the man who was to administer the poison came with it now ready for the draught. He calmly inquired what he was to do; and, being told that he was only to walk about after drinking it, until he found a heaviness in the legs, and then to lie down, he took the cup into his hand without the slightest change of colour or of countenance. But before he put it to his lips, partly, it seems, from religious feeling, and partly in humour, he further asked whether he might make a libation to any one from the cup. Nor did even his usual quaint manner of putting a question, which he knew would somewhat surprize the hearer, forsake him on this occasion; for he looked at the man, at the same time, with that peculiar glance usual to him, which his contemporaries designated by the word ταυρηδόν, denoting its resemblance to the manner in which the bull looks around him with the head downward. Learning that the whole draught was not more than sufficient for the fatal purpose, he said, "At any rate one may, and ought to pray to the gods, that the migration hence to those regions may be prosperous; which indeed I do pray, and so may it be!" With these words, he

drank off the poison with the most perfect composure and readiness.

At the sight of this, the bystanders could no longer command their emotions. Their tears flowed profusely. Some rose up from their seats — Crito set the example — and covered their faces, to give vent to their sorrow. The youth, Apollodorus, who had never ceased weeping, now sobbed aloud. Every heart felt broken, only Socrates himself remained unmoved. He gently expostulated with them for this outburst of grief, saying, "What are you doing, my dear friends, so strangely? I indeed sent away the women not least on this account, that they might not offend in such a way; for I have heard that one ought to die amidst auspicious sounds: I pray you, therefore, be tranquil, and bear up." This rebuke had the effect of repressing their tears. The heaviness which he had been led to expect from the working of the poison now began to come on; and he left off walking, and reclined, with his face upward, and covered over. The torpor gradually spread towards the upper regions of the body—the lower parts becoming, one after the other, congealed, and insensible—until it reached the heart. In this interval, he uncovered himself, and said, "Crito, we owe a cock to Esculapius; pay it, I pray you, and neglect it not;" intimating probably, by this allusion, that now all the diseases and disquietudes of life were at an end, and that he was about to be restored to real and pure existence by the death of the body. These were his last words. Crito asked whether he had any thing more to say, but received no answer. There was no further indication of life, but a motion of the body. The executioner uncovered him, and they observed his eyes fixed; upon which Crito, faithful in the last respectful attentions to his beloved friend, the now departed philosopher, closed the mouth and the eyes.

Thus died Socrates, when he had now completed his seventieth year, B.C. 400, or 399, in the full vigour of a healthy old age; happy in his own estimation, and in that of his admiring disciples, in having terminated his life in so glorious a manner, with unimpaired faculties of mind and body, and after

a defence sustained with so much truth, and justice, and fortitude.[1]

His death spread dismay at the moment among those who had been most conspicuous in their attachment to the philosopher, as they naturally dreaded the overflowings of that malignant spirit which had swept down their master. The chief of these appear to have fled to Megara, where they could reckon on finding a refuge from Athenian hostility, and a home with their fellow-disciple, the friendly Euclides. It is remarkable, however, that Isocrates, timid as he was by nature, should not have scrupled to remain at Athens, and to testify his affectionate regret for his master, by appearing the next day in public, clothed in mourning.[2] But with the fall of its great victim, the spirit of persecution was sated for a time. An act had been perpetrated, to which the eyes of all Greece would be intently turned; and the greatness of the sacrifice seems at the moment to have absorbed the attention of its agents and instruments, in the contemplation of it and its possible effects. If we may believe the representation of subsequent writers, shame and repentance soon followed the cruel act; and those who were most ostensibly involved in its guilt, were either banished or sentenced to death, or laid violent hands on themselves. Of the banishment of Anytus, and the death of Meletus, we are told by Laertius that Antisthenes was the immediate cause. In what way he was instrumental to the death of Meletus, is not stated. But with regard to Anytus, Antisthenes is said to have occasioned his banishment, apparently without the intention of doing so, by a stroke of practical humour. For meeting with some young men from Pontus inquiring for Socrates, whose fame had induced them to visit Athens, he conducted them to Anytus, who, as he observed to them, was "wiser than Socrates;" upon which, the indignation of the bystanders was excited, and they drove Anytus forth from the city.[3] He fled to Heraclea; but there found no peace, being forced by public proclamation to

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 8—*Apol.* 32. Plato, *Phædo, ad fin.*
[2] Pseudo-Plutarch. *X. Orat. Vit.* [3] Diog. Laert. in *Vit. Antisth.* v. 140.

leave the city forthwith.[1] Though, however, these individuals soon after received the retribution due to their offence, it would not follow that they suffered from their countrymen on account of the part they had taken against Socrates. The ascendency of another political faction (and Athens was ever fluctuating between contending parties) would be quite sufficient to account for their overthrow and desperation. On the other hand, the testimony of Plutarch is explicit to the point, though he mentions no individuals by name, that the sycophants who had assailed Socrates, became the objects of popular hatred to such a degree, that none would associate with them in any way, not even to return them an answer when addressed by them, and that at last they hanged themselves, being no longer able to endure the public execration.[2] His friends, indeed, performed the last obsequies to his remains; but his fellow-citizens afterwards concurred in honouring him, by erecting a brazen statue of him, the work of Lysippus, in the Pompeium, and expressing their sorrow, by closing the public gymnasia for a while.

This, at any rate, is certain, that persecution, as it ever does, overwrought its part in the case of Socrates. It oppressed, indeed, the individual, but it gave the seal of martyrdom to the cause in which he had been engaged. It produced a temporary intimidation, under which men would hear less of the name and teaching of Socrates openly avowed, but throughout which the admiration and love of the heroic philosopher would be cherished in secret, and his doctrine would be fostered in the shade, to appear in the sunshine of a future day. If the Athenians had desired to plant the root of philosophy in their city, they could not more effectually have done so, than by their violence against Socrates. Such, in fact, was the result. Philosophy henceforth obtained an Athenian naturalization and name; and the schools of Athens may date their period of nearly a thousand years from this memorable act, which, in its intent and spirit, fiercely but

[1] Diog. Laert. in *vit. Socr.* ii. 5, 43.

[2] Plutarch. *de Invid. et. Od.* Op. viii. p, 128.—Diodorus Siculus says, ὁ δῆμος μετεμελήθη . . . . καὶ τέλος ἀκρίτους ἀπέκτεινε. xiv. 38; also Augustin. *de Civ. Dei*, viii. 3.

blindly endeavoured to extinguish there the very profession of philosophy.[1]

The cause, however, in which Socrates had been engaged, was too true, for any opposition to it, though conducted with the greatest prudence, to have been long successful. It had also already advanced too far, and interested too many persons in the maintenance of it, to be put down by a sudden blow. The burning of a book, or a formal condemnation of the opinions of a writer, are but futile means, as experience shews, of suppressing obnoxious doctrines. How much less could opposition avail, where, as in the case of Socrates, the offending doctrines had been scattered over, not the pages of a book, but the strenuous exertions of a long life—already engraved in characters which no obliterating hand could reach, no flame consume—and doubtless so worked into many a mind, as not to be distinguishable from its own proper convictions—doctrines too, so confirmed by the noble example of their teacher, in carrying them out to their full consequences by his death? For the death of Socrates, it should be observed, was not simply a test of his sincerity in his teaching. It was this, and still more. It was the ultimate and decisive opposition to those false principles, against which every action and discourse of his life had been directed. He had been all along exposing the presumptuousness and vanity of the principles on which men ordinarily judged and acted. He was now further to shew, that this opposition on his part was not to be daunted by those principles, when set in formidable array against his own life; and that, professing a low estimate of the present life, he would not disown or shrink from that profession at the moment of greatest trial.

If we inquire, accordingly, what was the substance of the positive teaching of Socrates, we must address ourselves to the contemplation of his active life, and his resigned patient death. He had no design of establishing philosophy as a literary pursuit or intellectual pastime; though he probably foresaw, that that taste for inquiry into truth which he was ever awakening, must

[1] The schools of Athens were closed in the reign of Justinian, A. C. 529.

soon lead to the formation of a philosophical literature at Athens. He already witnessed, indeed, the commencement of such a literature, the result of this excitement, if it be true that he had read the Lysis of Plato, and observed respecting it, "How much the young man makes me say that I never said!"[1] He wished rather to divert men from the vanity of setting themselves up as philosophers, and make them employ their thoughts in learning and investigating, instead of prematurely commencing at once as well-informed persons and teachers of others, with crude and superficial notions and principles.

If we look, then, to the course of his practical teaching—to the general tenor of his conversations and actions, and the example throughout of his life and death—we shall find that his whole labour was directed to the establishment of true moral and religious principles, in opposition to the false and mischievous principles which, he observed, were commonly acted upon and avowed in the world. The excellence and supremacy of self-knowledge was what he was ever inculcating; and of self-knowledge, not as a matter of intellectual curiosity, or for its value as a science, but in order to self-government and to happiness. He found that this was the last kind of knowledge which men ever thought of acquiring; that they had, in fact, no concern about it; or that if they were reminded of its necessity, they presumed on their possession of it already. His first effort, then, was to open the minds of men to a perception of the value of this knowledge, and of their own need of it. The questions which he would put—the refutations which he addressed to the various propositions or conclusions elicited from others in the course of his conversations—the perplexities to which he would reduce them—and the unsatisfied state in which he would commonly leave them, after exciting their doubts—all had a direct tendency to convince men of the insufficiency of their intellectual acquirements, and of their want of some more adequate and availing information.[2] To the same purport was his disparage-

[1] Diog. Laert. in *vit. Plat.* xxiv.

[2] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 2, 36. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι οὐδ' ἔσκεψαι. . . . *Ib.* 39. φροντίζω, μὴ κράτιστον ᾖ μοι σιγᾷν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι.

ment of physical science, and of all merely speculative knowledge, in comparison with that which was useful for human life. For he was far from an utilitarian, in the modern sense of that term. He did not value particular studies, because they ministered to the necessities or conveniences of human life, or undervalue them because they had no such bearing. But he saw that his clever and ingenious countrymen were studious of intellectual refinement—that they delighted in the specious, and the admirable, and the subtle, more than in the solid and the unostentatious qualifications of the good member of a private family and the useful citizen. He was aware, too, from his own acquaintance with the existing physical philosophy, how imperfect that knowledge was, how entirely hypothetical, and incapable of practical application. We must make allowance, therefore, in estimating his objection to speculative science, for the polemical spirit in which he assailed a branch of knowledge then, at once, so barren, and so encroaching in its claims on public attention. We must regard him as preparing the way for the due cultivation of the other, the higher as well as more important knowledge, that of man's own nature, then so little thought of, and so neglected. This seems to be invariably his design on every occasion, whatever may be the immediate purport of his discourse.

When he came to direct the minds of men, once awakened to the importance of moral study, to the subject itself of human nature, he had to encounter on the very threshold the most perverse notions. All their maxims of life were based on the absolute importance of the present life. The body, and its present appetites and desires, were regarded as the whole of man. The tyrant, in the enjoyment of absolute power to gratify every passion without restriction or penalty, was considered as the apt representation of the highest human felicity. All men's plans of life accordingly were directed to the acquisition of power for themselves. They studied to improve their external circumstances, and not themselves. Then their religion was merely the fear of mysterious powers influencing the prosperous or adverse events of the present world, and which were therefore

to be conciliated or appeased by offerings and vows. Socrates set himself strenuously to refute these vain presumptions. He argued the folly of supposing, that men really accomplished their own wishes in gratifying each prevailing inclination. He shewed, that whilst they did what they pleased at the moment, they did not in fact attain that pleasure which they sought; and led them therefore to surmise, that there must be some end of human pursuit beyond the gratification of the passions, and further, some ultimate end to the whole sum of the active energies of the soul, beyond the present life, and distinct from all bodily associations. But he not only suggested such a thought by shewing the reasonings on the opposite view of human life to be inconsequential and absurd; he further practically refuted the prevailing fallacies on the subject, by his own example on the other side. He proved to the world, by divesting himself of all the worldly accessories of happiness, and depending exclusively on the internal resources of his mind and character, and by his perpetual cheerfulness under those privations, that happiness did not result from externals, or from the body, but from the internal nature of man, nor from any thing positive and absolute in that nature, so much as from its state of discipline and command over the appetites of the body. Theories of morals were yet to be formed. It remained for Plato to erect the true and sublime standard of human conduct in the perfections of the Divinity, and for Aristotle afterwards to shew the application of the law of habits to the subject, and construct a system of Ethics. Socrates has the merit of having prepared the way for these developments of the subject, by demonstrating the folly of seeking the ideal of happiness in any enjoyment of the body, or in any thing present.

So also as to Religion, though he could not advance, in his conceptions of the retributive justice of the Divine Being, beyond the circle of darkness which limits the natural observation of man, he proved the absurdity of supposing that mere external punishment was the only suffering undergone for offences committed. Secret faults, as he pointed out, did not

escape with impunity. He appealed to the remorses of conscience, to shew how surely, however invisibly, wrong-doing was visited with its punishment; and whilst in his own mind he concluded that there would be a future state, in which each man would receive the merited consequences of his actions, he must also have excited, in the minds of his hearers, a strong though undefined apprehension of a period of general retribution after death in another world. At least they must have seen that it was not so certain, as they may have once supposed, that, though a present punishment may have been evaded, punishment would not follow at a future day. In well-disposed minds, there would thus be a foundation laid of a doctrine of the Immortality of the soul. Under the teaching of Socrates himself, this truth, perhaps, would scarcely assume the form of a positive doctrine, so distinctly as it is stated by Plato. It would be simply a practical conviction. And thus Socrates himself probably scarcely propounded it in formal terms, nor without those qualifying doubts which both his memorialists describe him as joining with its enunciation. But Plato, following him, took up the doctrine as a formal truth, and worked it up into a perfect theory, with the array of argument and didactic exposition.

There was nothing, indeed, of system in any part of the teaching of Socrates. In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, we have probably a very complete specimen of the substance of what he taught, and, in the desultory manner in which the subjects of the several conversations there given are introduced, of the actual way in which he would throw out his questions and reflections on different points, as they happened to suggest themselves on each occasion. There we find the various duties of the good man and the good citizen summarily sketched, without the formality of statement or systematic connection. He inquires what is just, or pious, or temperate; and he leads his hearers to consider the true definitions of the several virtues;[1] but it is chiefly with the view of laying open their mistakes and confusion of thought on the subject, and to divert

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 8, 11. Ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, κ. τ. λ.

them from sophistical disquisitions on Virtue, to the discharge of Virtue in all its parts, rather than to give any precise idea of it himself.[1]

Certainly there are grave objections to the morality which he taught. It did not enjoin that perfect purity of sentiment and action, which, judging from its general excellence, we might perhaps have expected. It forbade indulgence in the pleasures of the body, as injurious and evil; but it did not also forbid licentiousness, as altogether vicious, or, though it condemned, fix the due stigma of disgust and abomination on that monstrous form of vice which polluted Grecian society. Nor, again, did it give a right tone to the resentful feelings. It enjoined the requiting of ill to enemies—placing retaliation as a duty on a par with the return of kindness to friends.[2] With these exceptions, the morality inculcated by Socrates, founded as it was on the indications in man's nature of a destiny beyond the present world, bears strongly the marks of the law written by the finger of God, and proves that the Creator has not left Himself without witness, even where the light of His revelation has not shone. Supposing even that those great truths, thus taught, were the broken planks from the wreck of a primitive Faith, floated down on the stream of ages, we must yet believe a providential disposition, in the fact of that ready acceptance which they could obtain with one, brought up, as Socrates was, amidst the grossest corruptions of heathenism. His was an instance, how the unsophisticated heart responds to the notices of divine truth, when once they are duly presented to it; and how, wherever there is a sincere pursuit of right, the moral eye will be enabled to pierce the surrounding gloom, and to discern, for the most part, the true outline and form of right.

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 4, 9. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκούσῃ, πρίν γ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφήνῃ, ὅ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷς, ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενὸς, κ. τ. λ.

Plato, *Rep.* i. 10. Ὦ Ηράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ τοτ' ἐγὼ ἥδειν τε καὶ τούτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ, καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ.

[2] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 2. 16; ii. 6. 35. Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 23.

It is observable, however, that, whilst Socrates correctly perceived that the laws of religion and morality possessed a sacred importance, independently of all positive enactments of men, he yet appeals to the laws of the state for the particular rules of religious and moral duty. When instructing Euthydemus on the worship of the gods, he cites the Delphic oracle, which enjoined the law of the state as the rule of acceptable worship.[1] When asked by the sophist Hippias what is just, he answers, that it is what the laws prescribe. Such reference was perfectly natural in a Greek, accustomed as Greeks were to view every thing in subordination to politics, and to regard the duty of the citizen as paramount to every other duty. This feeling had its influence with Socrates, and induced him to regard the authority of the state as possessing in itself a moral force of obligation. The respect which he throughout shewed to the laws of his own state, was that of one who not only obeyed what they commanded, but strictly reverenced their authority.[2] We must not, however, suppose, that he thus intended to place positive and moral laws on the same footing. The reference which he gives to the written law of the state, as the directory on questions of religion and morals, is the substitute in his teaching for a systematic development of the moral and religious duties. The law of the state presented, to one who had no thought of systematizing the subject for himself, the best expression of those great truths which he was drawing forth from the higher source of man's eternal nature. He is content to point out to his hearers, in a general way, the wisest and readiest collection of rules for those cases which came under the great comprehensive duties of piety and justice. Evidently he is not treating the subject with the exactness of the theorist, in assigning this importance to the law of the state; but he is enforcing the use of the law of the state as an authoritative practical guide to right conduct.—His internal view of religion, for example,

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 3, 16. Also, i. 3, 1.

[2] See in the *Crito* of Plato, a beautiful address, put into the mouth of Socrates, from the personified majesty of the laws.

was founded on observation of the signs of benevolent design throughout the material and intellectual world; and he was thus led to the acknowledgment of a pure Theism. But in his conduct, he knew not how to realize the obligations which the perception of this truth imposed on him. With his reverence, accordingly, for the laws of his country, as well as under the influence of that superstition to which his piety habitually verged, he sought a direction to his religious sentiments from the authority of the state, and thus in practice was a polytheist.—His object was further to prevent men from trusting to the conceits of their own judgment in matters of conduct, and to recommend a proper deference to the wisdom and authority of their ancient laws, then so presumptuously slighted by each vain pretender to superior prudence and political sagacity.

In assailing, as Socrates did, the follies of his countrymen by the dexterity of an acute reason, he was ever exposing their ignorance. The impression on his own mind appears to have been, that men erred rather from the want of due information respecting their moral condition, than from the perverseness of their will—from folly, rather than from vice. Himself an accurate observer of human life, and with a disposition to follow the path of duty wherever it might lead him, he had in his own case felt the importance of intellectual cultivation, in order to right conduct. From his own circumstances, accordingly, and a natural predilection for those exercises of the mind which were his habitual pursuit, he overrated this importance; and, instead of simply regarding the information of the mind as a necessary ingredient in moral improvement, he made it all in all. Thus, according to him, wisdom or philosophy was virtue, and ignorance and folly, vice. He carried this view of Morals so far, as to place the knowledge of duty on a footing with the knowledge of arts. Nor was he even startled with the paradox, that if such were the case—if the knowledge of right were the whole of morality—there would be less immorality in

intentional wrong conduct, than in unintentional done through ignorance.[1]

Thus vice was in no case, in the view of Socrates, an act of the will, but of the mistaken judgment. He did not mean by this to assert, that men did not act wrong wilfully in the particular instances of misconduct, so as not to deserve blame for their misconduct; but that the seat of vice was in the perverse understanding—for that the will was invariably towards good. If, accordingly, vice may be regarded as seated in the understanding, and not in the heart, it would follow, that that man is less vicious in *principle*, who knows what is right and acts wrong, than one who acts wrong without knowing what is right. The former alternative, however, was impossible, according to his theory. For knowledge, by its intrinsic excellence, must prevail over every other principle. So far was Socrates led by the working of his method, and his observation of the ignorance and folly of men, to overlook facts, at least, as evident on the other side—the plain instances of men acting wrong in spite of their better knowledge, and of greater blame assigned to wrong thus done in spite of knowledge. His error is further to be traced to a confusion of the ideas of right and happiness, in the term "good." That the will is, by the original constitution of man, invariably towards good, if we take good in the sense of real interest or happiness, is quite true; but it is far from true, if we include the notion of right in that of good. Men, when they take even perverted views of their happiness, may be regarded

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 2, 20. Δοκεῖ δέ σοι μάθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι, ὥσπερ τῶν γραμμάτων, κ. τ. λ. Seneca, arguing also the need of moral information for the performance of duty, refers to the same illustration of morality from the arts, as that given by Xenophon, to shew that there is no real analogy between the two subjects. "Vis scire," he says, *Ep.* 95. 8, "quam dissimilis sit harum artium conditio et hujus? In illis excusatius est, voluntate peccare, quam casu: in hac maxima culpa est, sponte delinquere. Quod dico, tale est. Grammaticus non erubescit solecismum, si sciens facit: erubescit, si nesciens. Medicus, si deficere ægrum non intelligit, quantum ad artem, magis peccat, quam si se intelligere dissimulat. At in hac arte vivendi, turpior volentium culpa est." He seems to have had the argument of Socrates, as given by Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. 2, 20.) in his view. So also Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* vi. 5. Καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος· περὶ δε φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.

as unconsciously desiring the real happiness of their nature. The will, therefore, in this sense, may be said to be always towards good. But in the latter sense of the term "good"—that in which it includes right—the contrary rather is true. Men see the light, but love darkness rather than light; and the seat of vice is, accordingly, not in the understanding, but in the heart. But there is this justification of the language of Socrates on moral subjects, that the ignorance which he attacked, was, in truth, a vicious and blameable ignorance. Men did not take pains to inform themselves on moral subjects. They neglected themselves, pursuing and professing every other kind of knowledge but that which was most at hand for their acquisition, and most concerned them. Seeing, then, the moral errors into which men ran from this neglect, Socrates not unreasonably set his mark of reprobation on ignorance, as the source of immorality. Immediately, indeed, and ostensibly, he attacked the general ignorance of men, holding out Philosophy as the remedy of vice and unhappiness. But the ultimate and real object of his attack all the while was, the immoral disposition, the self-neglect, and the irregular habits of life, from which the incapacity and ignorance of men on moral subjects commonly result. Then, further, it was the ignorance of self, chiefly, that he laboured to remove. He found conceit as to themselves, the prevailing fault of the men of his age and country. And he hoped, by exposing their ignorance on various subjects, to make them question their presumptions relating to their own nature, and character, and duties. Thus would he, in effect, be correcting moral error—the folly of men persuading themselves and others that they knew what they had never cared to examine, much less to know.[1]

As the peculiar aspect under which he presented the subject of Morals arose, in a great measure, from his manner of interrogating in conversation, so the general character of his philosophy is to be sought in its intimate connection with the peculiar

[1] Xenophon speaks of the refutations employed by Socrates, serving as chastisements of presumptuous folly, *κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα*. *Mem.* i. 4. 1.

method which he pursued. His philosophy, being essentially colloquial, laid down no positive principles in any particular science, or even any general principles for the conduct of the understanding in scientific or moral inquiries. But it sought to rouse the understanding to a perception of its condition of weakness, and defects, and ignorance, previous to its interrogation of itself, and its acquisition of knowledge, and its strengthening by exercise and discipline. Like the great reformer of modern science, he found nothing duly ascertained in the field of Philosophy; hypotheses assumed without examination, truth obscured and confounded under the plausible cover of general terms and vague analogies. Yet every one was fully satisfied with the state of knowledge; every one presumed that he was in possession of the truth. So, too, at this period, as at the time when Bacon proposed his new method, there was a dialectical science in use, available only for disputation and victory, and not reaching the truth of things, or imparting any real knowledge. And, in like manner, in the time of Socrates, as in that of Bacon, this imperfect dialectical science was regarded as the key to every kind of knowledge; and he who could discourse fluently on any given subject, was esteemed the accomplished philosopher. "Of nothing," as Bacon himself pointedly observes, "were men so scrupulous as lest they should seem to doubt on any subject."[1]

This state of things formed a strong barrier against any attempt to effect a moral reformation. The way to the heart had to be cleared through a mass of outworks thrown out by the intellect. It only remained, then, for him who would be the moral reformer of his countrymen, to work by means of that very dialectical science which opposed its ramparts and its arms to his progress.

But to have simply used the same method which his contemporaries employed, would have been to revolve in the same perpetual circle. Socrates, indeed, might, by a more skilful use of the same dialectical artifices, have confuted the Sophists and others with whom he reasoned. He might have gained the

[1] Nov. Org. i. 67.

victory in argument, by demonstrating the fallacy of their deductions, or proving the contradictoriness of their conclusions. But no advance would have been made by such a proceeding towards a detection of the source of the popular errors, the wrong principles themselves, on which men argued and acted. To accomplish this object, then—to expose the fallacy of wrong principles—he had to exalt the art of the dialectician to a higher function than that of merely eliciting consequences from given principles.

This attempt accordingly he made. Without instituting any formal method, or teaching any art of discourse—without, it seems, having any such design in his thoughts—he yet so far gave a new direction and impulse to dialectical science, as to render it in some measure at least subservient to the investigation of truth. In his hands, it served, if it did nothing more, to raise *doubts* as to the truth of erroneous principles which before had passed without question, and which the very practice of reasoning from them as axioms, had tended to confirm as fixed and indisputable standards of all other truths.

We must not suppose, that Definition and Induction were unknown as parts of Dialectic before Socrates; or that Socrates was absolutely the first to discover and propound their nature and use. The expressions of Aristotle might suggest this supposition. For he says particularly, that there were two things which one might ascribe to Socrates, General Definition, and Inductive Reasoning.[1] What Aristotle probably intends to say, is, that Socrates was the first to improve the existing dialectical method, by employing Definition and Induction as the principal engines of discussion, and illustrating their nature and use more than ever had been done before him. He gave them, in fact, a body and a vitality, by applying them to the realities with which men had to do in their daily life.[2] Instead of employing

[1] Aristot. *Metaph.* xii. 4. Δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους, καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου. Ibid. i. 6. περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν.

[2] Xenoph. *Mem.* iii. 3. 11. Λέγεις, ἔφη, σὺ τὸν ἵππαρχον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν καὶ τοῦ λέγειν δύνασθαι; κ. τ. λ.

them for the purpose of verbal distinction, or for the expression of some abstract and barren generality, he applied them to limit the vague notions entertained about matters of practical concern, and to bring opinions into harmony with ordinary experience. To the dialecticians before him, Definition and Induction were the commencement of their discussions. They unsuspectingly presumed on the logical processes involved in these instruments of discourse, as already sufficiently accomplished. They attempted, indeed, to define; but they took such definitions as they found at hand—of course the most superficial.[1] General principles they scarcely thought of establishing; but they assumed such as were the current maxims of the day. And the rest of their discourse proceeded from these crude and unscientific elements. But Socrates did not profess to give definitions, or to have arrived at any positive certain principles, from which, as data, other truths might be demonstrated.

He disclaimed, as has been already pointed out, the design or the ability to teach. He was only an inquirer, himself *knowing nothing*. When pressed, as by the sophist Hippias, to give his own account of the particular subject about which he is importunately questioning, he evades the point, and recurs to his established way of proceeding by interrogatories.[2] He is constantly, that is, endeavouring to rise to a correct definition of the subject under discussion. He presents it as the end to be attained by the whole discussion; leading the person questioned from point to point, until he brings him close to the true and exact idea of the subject. So also does he employ Induction. He cites some instance,—commonly some coarse and very familiar one, from the workshop of the smith or the shoemaker, or from the culinary art, and the like,—as apposite to the point under debate; and thus brings the principle itself, on which the dispute turns, to the test of actual experience. This was so

[1] Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 5. Καὶ περὶ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἤρξαντο μὲν λέγειν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι· λίαν δ' ἁπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν· ὡρίζοντό τε γὰρ ἐπιπολαίως, κ. τ. λ.

[2] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 4, 9.

much his manner, that it was made a standing jest by those against whom he so triumphantly employed it. They complained of his ever repeating the same thing; ever talking of "carpenters, and smiths, and fullers, and cooks, and such like nonsense."[1] But he was not deterred by the scoff, which in reality proved the point and force of his reasonings. He replied, that about the same things, he must persist in saying the same things; unless it could be shewn, that a person being asked, whether twice five were ten, should answer differently at different times.[2] Thus, he would continually recur to his well-known illustrations from common life, hackneyed as they were in his own use, and low and trifling as they might seem.

From this his constant practice of bringing men to the test of Definition and familiar instances on every subject discussed, he had been regarded by the Thirty as the teacher of an "Art of Discourse," and as therefore obnoxious to a law which they had made (chiefly with a view to him), forbidding the teaching of such an art.[3] Such a restriction, however, could not apply to Socrates; since, as we have seen, he professed no art; he imparted no method of argument; and, to have silenced him, they must, as he shewed them, have absolutely prevented his asking the most simple and familiar question. Here it was the point of an apt illustration that had provoked this sally of resentment from Critias and Charicles, two of the Thirty. It had been reported to them that he had drawn attention to their acts of violence, by asking, what would be thought of the herdsman under whose care a herd should be diminished. On this occasion, Charicles, after vainly remonstrating with him against the practice of his daily conversations, shewed the point of the illustration, by bidding him beware lest he also should make the number of the herd still less.[4]

So far, indeed, was Socrates from instituting any regular method either of argument or of investigation, that the very definitions

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2, 37. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 491, a. t. iv. p. 96.

[2] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 4, 7. διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

[3] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2, 31, 3. Aristid. t. ii. p. 248.

[4] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2, 37.

and instances which he employed were of a popular character, adapted for refutation of error rather than for conviction of the truth,—such as to place difficulties in the way of a dogmatic opponent, rather than didactic illustrations of any particular subject. He was engaged in repelling dogmatism. And nothing is of more avail for this purpose than analogies; such instances, that is, as test the truth of an assumption in one case, by its application to another of the same kind. Direct instances, shewing experimentally the truth or falsehood of an assumption, may be difficult to be found; and, in their use, they require a particular acquaintance with the subject itself, in order that their application may be seen. For example, if it were desired to expose a false theory of government, some fact of history must be adduced, and its bearing on the theory in question must be distinctly pointed out. But an analogous instance does not require this intimate acquaintance with the subject itself, in illustration of which it is brought. It shews at once that a given hypothesis is either tenable, or not tenable,—that it is verified or not verified in some parallel case, and therefore may be granted or not, in the subject about which the argument is. Only it is necessary, for this purpose, that the analogous instance should be a familiar one,—that the exhibition of the principle in question should be clear and striking in the instances adduced. For example, to set forth the evil of tyranny, it would be quite enough to point out, as Socrates did, the case of a herdsman under whose keeping a herd should be deteriorated; and the inference would be immediate, that a career of confiscation and blood was no evidence of a good government. Again, whether it were wise to choose magistrates by lot, would be a difficult question to be decided by the direct evidence of facts bearing on the point. But when Socrates referred to the absurdity of appointing a steersman by lot, it was at once evident, that there were cases in which this mode of appointing important officers of the state would be mischievous. Such then was the kind of evidence which Socrates was constantly adducing from analogous instances to the point in question; an evi-

dence not conveying any positive instruction in the theories of the subjects to which it was applied; but removing false impressions respecting them, and opening the mind to the reception of the truth. It was an admirable method of unteaching prejudices or vain assumptions, and of silencing the dogmatist,—a method, powerful at once for the refutation of error, and the conviction of ordinary minds incapable of being instructed by a more direct and positive evidence. Such, accordingly, was the method practised by Socrates. In pursuing any argument, "he would proceed," as Xenophon observes, "by the most admitted premises; considering this to be the sound basis of discussion. And therefore," adds Xenophon, "he, far beyond all I ever knew, when he spoke, carried conviction to his hearers;" and he would say, "that Homer had ascribed to Ulysses the merit of being a sound orator, on account of his arguing on grounds that are the most apparent to men."[1]

It was seldom, however, if ever, that Socrates avowedly argued a point. Professing to know nothing himself, he constantly challenged others as to what they professed to know. He put his questions to each person with whom he conversed, very much as the skilful experimenter in these days does to Nature, so as to lead to the affirmative or negative of a particular hypothesis whose truth he would investigate. Having obtained an answer, he proceeds analytically, to found on that another question, studiously directed, in like manner, to elicit the answer which might serve for further inquiry, and so on, until he has reduced the first proposition to some simple elements, clearly shewing the truth or falsehood of the original assumption. As to the persons addressed, it was a leading them on by a series of gradual concessions, each of slight amount in itself, as they answered the questions which he put to them, until at length the collection of the whole in the result disclosed some great error and contradiction to the original assumption; like a game of chess (as one of those subjected to the process describes it), in which the unskilful player is at last shut out, or check-mated,

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 6, 15.

and unable to move. They have nothing to say at the last; and yet they are not satisfied that the truth is so.[1] It was as truly an experimental process on men's minds, as that which the modern investigator performs on the subject which he examines. Those analogical instances in which he so much delighted, served the purpose of this analysis, no less than direct and proper instances, such as belong to him who investigates experimentally the nature of a particular subject. For analogies detect the state of the mind to which they are addressed. They at once call forth and illustrate its principles and habits of thought, and enable the experimenter to avail himself of the existing resources in that mind for effecting the desired conviction. They furnish him with a clue to the course which he should follow in carrying on his analysis. This was that midwifery of the mind which Socrates used sportively to describe as his peculiar occupation.

In his conversation, for example, with Euthydemus,[2] who prided himself in having cultivated his mind by his own independent study of books, of which he had formed a large collection—he first drew attention to the singularity of the young man's conceit, by representing him as coming before the public, with high professions of being self-taught, and putting the parellel case of a candidate for some medical office, who should announce that he had studiously avoided even the appearance of having *learned* the art of medicine, and ask for the office on the promise of endeavouring to learn the art by his future practice. Interest being excited by this illustration of the absurdity, he next led his hearers to see the further absurdity of entering on political affairs without preparation, by referring to the fact of the severe

[1] Repub. vi. 487. *Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔρη, πρὸς μὲν τοιάδε σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷος τ' εἴη ἀντειπεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων, μέγα τὸ σφάλμα, καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι· καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν, οἱ μὴ, τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις, ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν.*

[2] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 2.

application and discipline undergone by persons who seek reputation in such accomplishments as flute-playing and riding. Then, having gained over Euthydemus as a more willing listener, he proceeds to question him as to the use for which he had collected so many books. He throws out the presumption that they have been collected with a view to enrich the mind with virtue. Supposing this to be granted, he goes on to interrogate Euthydemus as to the particular excellence of which he is in quest. He enumerates several particulars; and these being rejected, he comes at last to excellence in the art of government, which the young man concedes to be the object of his desire. This gives an opening to inquire into the qualifications necessary for such excellence. He discovers, by the answers of Euthydemus, that he conceives himself master of those moral virtues which he is induced to admit are indispensable to the good citizen. By a series of questions, however, relating to particular actions, he forces Euthydemus to admit, that what is just in one case, is unjust in another, and to contradict himself in his successive statements as to the comparative criminality of voluntary and involuntary acts of injustice. What, then, triumphantly asks the philosopher, think you of a person who is so inconsistent with himself? The conclusion is inevitable; and Euthydemus is constrained to own, that "he knew not what he thought he knew." But Socrates, not yet satisfied, presses him further to explain his notion of that ignorance which he had thus displayed; and finds that, notwithstanding his confession of his want of right instruction, he yet presumes on his possession of self-knowledge. Another question forces him to abandon this position. The young man then asks to be only put in the way of self-examination. Here at once his false presumptions are exposed to the searching analysis of Socrates. The inquiry turns on a knowledge of the goods and evil of life. Euthydemus enumerates one thing after another as good; and Socrates immediately subjoins some counter evil as attending it; until Euthydemus at last gives up his confidence in his own opinion, and declares that he knows not now what he ought to pray for

to the gods. Again, Socrates presents before him pointedly the evidence he had thus given of having been diverted from consideration of the subject by the strong presumption of his knowledge of it. But that he may leave no room for escape, he calls on him, in conclusion, to state his opinion as to the nature of democracy, which at least, he conceived, Euthydemus, as a candidate for public office in a popular state, must have studied. And in like manner, he extorts from his successive answers a further proof of his ignorance and incompetence to the duties for which he had designed himself.

The effect thus produced is what Plato compares to the numbing touch of the torpedo.[1] The mental powers of the individual thus tried were for the moment paralyzed. He found that he only committed himself further by renewed efforts; and "began to think," as Euthydemus says of himself at the close of the conversation to which we have just referred, "whether it were not best for him to be silent; as he ran the hazard of appearing absolutely to know nothing."

From the instance just given, it will appear that a current of irony pervaded these experimental argumentations of Socrates. There was irony mingled with earnest conviction, in that very disclaimer of all knowledge with which he set out. It was a mask, behind which he could hurl his weapons of assault on the boasted knowledge of others; whilst at the same time he expressed his serious view of the real ignorance of man, and the necessity of coming with a simple unprejudiced mind to the acquisition of truth. In the prosecution, however, of his method of analysis by interrogation, irony was indispensable for the success of his inquiry. For his object was to obtain the truth from the mouth of the person interrogated, not to state it himself; and where he did state it accordingly, it was necessary to put it in such a form as to try whether it was the opinion or not of that person—whether he really thought so, or adopted it on the judgment of his questioner. An ironical statement answers this purpose. It conceals the teacher; and enables him to judge,

[1] Plato, *Meno.*, 80 a. t. iv., p. 348.

according as the hearer applies it, what the state of the hearer's mind is; and to argue the point in question, not on premises laid down by himself, but on the admissions of the other. The hearer, too, is taken by surprise. The air of seriousness which the ironical manner sets out with, and the absurdity involved, on second thought, in carrying out the supposition of a serious intent, in their united effect, provoke the smile of surprize, and win attention. As Socrates was engaged, too, in presenting unacceptable conclusions—bringing home to the self-conceited evidences of their real ignorance—it was necessary for him to disguise, as much as possible, the conclusion to which he was tending. He had to assume, therefore, the principles on which those with whom he conversed were reasoning and acting, and reduce these to an absurdity, by applying them as true to some evident case of ordinary experience. The skilful use made by Socrates of this irony was a powerful enforcement, in itself, of the convictions which he desired to leave on the minds of his hearers. He brought the aid of a delicate ridicule to the support of an argument, and thus exhibited the desired conclusion under a form, which, whilst it pleased the hearers, shamed them into an acknowledgment of its truth.

But this irony, and the analogical instances over which it was thrown, were but approaches to that end which Socrates appears always to have had in view in his conversations—the ascent to accurate general notions of each object of thought. He was always working his way towards an exact definition of the idea on which the discussion turned. Each instance which he adduced was a step in this progress, diminishing by its light some portion of that obscurity and confusion of thought with which he found the subject invested. He did not, indeed, reach the point which he had in view. Dialectical science was in too rude a state at present for the attainment of its perfect end. Socrates rather set an admirable example of the perseverance and energy with which the end should be pursued, than a perfect model of the method of pursuing it. His very method, indeed, confesses its own imperfection, in stopping just at the point

where the way seems to be opened, and leaving the subject negatively, rather than positively defined.

This constant pursuit of exact definition is an indication of the antisceptical bent of the mind of Socrates. The foundations of morals and of all science were shaken by the speculations of his sophistical predecessors. Opinion was exalted to the prerogative of knowledge. Socrates accordingly put opinion to the test. He explored it experimentally, as it existed in different minds ; and he proved it deficient from the standard to which it had been vainly exalted. He found that it vanished before the light of investigation ; and, in fact, that in proportion as the fancies and errors of opinion were cleared away, advances were made towards more stable and certain knowledge. This knowledge, accordingly, he continually sought after. He had probably but an indistinct conception of the realities towards which he directed his pursuit. Still he appears constantly to have assumed and fully believed their existence, by steadily proceeding, as we find him to have done, through the various opinions which he encounters in discussion, until he arrives at some more definite form of thought. What Socrates only indistinctly apprehended, Plato afterwards realized in his philosophical system, and endued with existence in his celebrated theory of Ideas. But in the view of his master that theory was but dimly seen in shadow. Socrates shaped his course towards it, as he more and more limited the extravagancies of popular opinion on the various subjects which he discussed, and excluded whatever was irrelevant and foreign to the real nature of the thing. He threw doubts on what was doubtful, that there might be the less doubt and uncertainty about what remained when the doubtful was removed from a subject.

What appears to have led Socrates into this sound method of proceeding, was, as Aristotle very justly intimates, the firm moral convictions which were the great elements of his mind and character.[1] He felt that there was a reality in the principles of piety, justice, benevolence, and other moral sentiments,

[1] Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 6. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, κ. τ. λ.

which no sophistry could impugn. He not only felt their reality within himself, but he had observed, that however invisible to the outward eye, they produced real effects in the world; that they were not only evidenced in the constitution of Nature, but also recognized in those unwritten laws which were found everywhere the same, independently of positive institution, as well as in the enactments of particular states.[1] He looked for the original of these sentiments to the perfect nature of the Divinity; and he held them accordingly to be invariable and true. Hence he would allow no proper and adequate power of causation but moral design. Material or mechanical causes were in his view but of instrumental efficacy.[2] It was moral sentiment only, the love and pursuit of good, that possessed real power. This alone, he observed, subsisted unchanged and fixed, whilst every thing else was moved by it, and derived its existence from it. It was the neglect of this primary principle in the detail of the physical theory of Anaxagoras, which had offended him in the system of that philosopher. And agreeably to this, Plato, as we have seen, tells us of his accounting for his remaining in his prison, from the simple cause of the moral feeling by which he was actuated.

Fixing his eye accordingly on these stable eternal principles, Socrates pressed forward in every discussion towards their attainment. He would never rest in vague general classifications, which, involving also much that belonged not to the subject in question, left its real nature as undefined as ever. But he proceeded to a further limitation of the generalities on each subject, obliging his hearer to distinguish the subordinate genera included in the more general idea first thrown out, and thus

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 4.

[2] Aristotle gives an instance of the manner in which Anaxagoras lost sight of his theory of mind in working out his system. Anaxagoras, he tells us, said "that man was the most intelligent of animals, because he had hands; whereas he should have stated, that man had hands because he was the most intelligent of animals; for that hands were an instrument for taking hold." Aristot. de *Part. Anim.* iv. 10, p. 1034. *Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν φησὶ, διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων τὸν ἄνθρωπον· εὔλογον δὲ, διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων, χεῖρας ἔχειν· τοῦ λαμβάνειν γὰρ χεῖρες ὄργανόν εἰσιν.*

gradually to circumscribe the subject within its proper boundaries. This was the intimate connection of his logic and ethics. He was engaged throughout in an endeavour to remove the vain presumptions of mere opinion, and to substitute for these a real knowledge, as far as it was attainable, of the subjects themselves. He conceived that if men went astray in their conduct, acting on what they mistakenly thought right, and good, and true, it was only necessary to make them *know* the truth, and they would then act on their *knowledge*, as before they acted on mere *opinion*, and by thus acting attain their happiness. This was but a short-sighted view of the origin of human misconduct and unhappiness; as it did not go beyond the fact of the erroneous judgment of men, to the moral perversion which was the primary cause of their failure in action. As the practical error of men arises from this perversion, it is evidently vain to think to improve their conduct, by merely substituting more correct notions of truth and duty; since this remedy does not reach the source of the malady. Such, however, was the view of Socrates. And hence he laboured, whatever might be the subject of his conversations, to lead men to contemplate the nature of the thing discussed, and to seek to define it to themselves; thus blending the perception of the right and the good in the intellectual apprehension of the truth. Xenophon accordingly remarks the importance attributed by Socrates to the ability of distributing things into genera, on the ground, that by means of this talent "men would become most virtuous, most formed for command, and most able in discourse."[1]

Though Socrates thus endeavoured to render his hearers accomplished in the art of discussion, by directing their attention to Definition, he, as might be expected, in that early state of logical science, did little more than point out the great importance of Definition, and mark the direction in which it should proceed. Were we to take our estimate of what Socrates accomplished in this way from the Dialogues of Plato,

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 5, 12. Ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους (καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.)

we must suppose Socrates to have been much more methodical in his discussions, than we should infer from the specimens given by Xenophon. Something perhaps should be allowed for the practical turn of Xenophon's mind, and his comparative inattention to the more abstract part of the discussions of his master, whilst his fellow-pupil, on the other hand, who had an eagle-eye for theory, however remote and dazzling, would seize every hint that dropped from the lips of Socrates for the indulgence of his speculative imagination. Still Xenophon may be regarded as having presented the most natural, as well as most exact specimens of the method of Socrates. In the simplicity of his honest admiration and grateful recollection of the instructor and guide of his youth, he evidently records what had most impressed his own mind, both as to the substance and the manner of the conversations of Socrates, without any attempt either at dramatic or theoretic effect. From Xenophon we learn how Socrates appeared to the young Athenian, who, without any theories of his own, approached him, simply with the desire of hearing him, and applying what he might learn from the philosopher to his own improvement. Plato, on the other hand, whilst he also has given a faithful portrait of Socrates in the general outline (and the faithfulness is shewn by its close correspondence with that given by Xenophon), studied to give effect, at the same time, to his own philosophic sketches, by placing the figure of Socrates in such a light as to harmonize with his own sublime and beautiful ideal of truth.

Thus we see how Socrates was the founder of the Moral and Logical science of the Schools of Athens. He taught nothing positively in either branch of Philosophy; but he taught men to inquire, and set them on the right track of inquiry. He trained men to think for themselves—to accept no opinion which should be contradicted by the moral and intellectual principles of their own nature—and to rest in no opinion until they had traced it up to these principles.

An exact Logic, and a sound Ethical system, would in time naturally result from such a direction of men's minds.

In giving account to themselves of their opinions, men would be led to examine into the connections and dependencies of their ideas. Observations would be made on the relations of ideas, and of words as their signs and representatives. And such observations methodically stated, would at length constitute a system of Logic, such as that which Aristotle brought to light, about half a century after the death of Socrates. In the mean time, however, the value of ideas in themselves, apart from their expression by words, would engage attention; and a metaphysical logic—a logic having for its object the determination of the true notion or idea of a thing, and for its business the discussion of the probabilities or appearances of truth surrounding the matter in question—would naturally be the first to succeed. Such was the Dialectic of Plato—a science of Discourse or Discussion, as its name imports; not a particular science, like the Logic which grew out of it, but as general in its comprehension, as the method itself of Socrates, of which it was the formal development, and equivalent, therefore, to Philosophy in the highest sense of that term, as being a search after the Nature of things, or, according to him, a Theory of Ideas.

Again, in giving account to themselves of their opinions, men would be led to trace the connection of their moral sentiments and actions with an internal standard of right, independent of the variations of opinion. The examination of this relation would suggest, in process of time, a system of rules for bringing the variable—the sentiments and actions of the individual moral agent—into accordance with the invariable principles of his moral nature. The first Ethics, identical, like the first Logic, with Philosophy in general, would be employed in carrying the views of men to those great principles themselves—discussing and removing obstructions to the pure contemplation of the nature of Virtue. But the more mature study of Ethics, taking up the subject as a separate branch of Philosophy, would develop the application of the doctrine of the fixed standard, by shewing throughout the field of man's Moral nature, how every moral sentiment is strictly limited by

its reference to such a standard. The former is the chief business of Plato's Ethical Philosophy; the latter, that of Aristotle's;—the first tending to a contemplative morality, to a love of the transcendent beauty and excellence of Virtue—the latter, to a theory of Active Virtue—to a regulated state of the affections in all the offices of life;—both natural consequences in their order, of that awakening of the reason of men of which Socrates had been the living instrument.

Socrates, at the same time, by the method which he pursued, taught men the beginning of an art of Criticism. From an examination of existing opinions, the transition was natural to the systems of philosophers, and the records of the opinions of men of former days. And, in this respect, Socrates may be regarded as the father of the History of Philosophy. Even had the criticism of the writings of philosophers formed no part of his conversations, still he must have prompted such an inquiry by his method of interrogating, and exacting from every one an account of his opinions. But he did more than this. Though not properly erudite, in that sense in which Plato and Aristotle were, he had yet acquainted himself with the doctrines of former philosophers. The chief part of his life was spent with his eye, not on books, but on men. Still, as we are informed by Xenophon, he had read, and had selected in the course of his reading, whatever he thought valuable in the writings of those before him.[1] Plato, accordingly, has made great part of the conversation of Socrates consist of criticism of the theories of philosophers. Much of this criticism evidently belongs to the richly-various and elaborate learning of the disciple, rather than to the master from whose lips it proceeds. But that Plato is not gratuitously ascribing this kind of learning to Socrates, we see from the manner in which the less erudite disciple refers to the discussions by Socrates of the doctrines of former philosophers. Not only does Xenophon mention, in common with

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 6. 14. Καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, κ. τ. λ.

Plato, the comments of Socrates on the more recent system of Anaxagoras,[1] but he refers also to his examination of the great antagonist theories of the older schools, of Parmenides, Xenophanes, Melissus, and others, on the one hand; Heraclitus, Empedocles, and their followers, on the other; though without formally introducing their names.[2]

That various and discordant Schools of Philosophy should have arisen out of the excitement produced by the movement thus originated, was in the natural course of things. Powerful minds, shaking off the yoke of sloth and indifference, and now at length roused to self-exertion, would, however generally docile to the guidance of a leader, be tempted to try their own powers, and strike out a path for themselves. We are not to wonder, then, that Aristippus, the advocate of Pleasure, and Antisthenes, the austere cynic, should have been among the hearers of Socrates, or that Plato should have founded a contemplative mysticism on the sober homely philosophy of his master. Socrates, as we have all along shewn, did not propose any precise system of doctrine to his followers. His mission was accomplished in making them exert themselves. He did not desire that they should think alike, but that all should think and judge for themselves. It is no wonder, therefore, that some should have gone into extravagancies, and that, whilst general good resulted from the excitement, partial evil also should have accompanied it. An Aristippus, or an Antisthenes, could not have issued from the school of Pythagoras. But how much evil generally may have resulted from the abject submission to the authoritative opinions of Pythagoras, in the neglect of self-examination and self-knowledge, and disregard of personal responsibility, by those who implicitly received them?

But whilst we ascribe to Socrates the praise of having given at once the impulse and the character to Grecian philosophy, we must yet single out for special commendation, his admirable services in reviving the forgotten theory of Natural Religion

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 7. [2] Ibid. i. 1. 1416.

among his countrymen. Of Religion, indeed, as an external system of positive laws enforced by the state, they had, as we have before observed, more than enough. But religion, as a system of Truth, was scarcely thought of. When Aristophanes[1] brings on the stage Demosthenes asking Nicias, well-known as Nicias was for his superstitious feeling ; ἐτὲον ἡγεῖ γὰᾳ θεούς; really, then, do you think there are gods?"[2] the allusion is evidently to the real irreligion, which the most rigid and scrupulous worship of the heathen but ill concealed. Resting their belief of a Divine agency in the world on Tradition and Authority, men omitted to explore the witness of God in their own nature, and in the world around them. Consequently, they were exposed to every objection which the ingenuity of theory, or the folly and wickedness of the world might suggest to their uninformed credulity, against the positive truth of their religious system. As infidelity in these days finds its refuge in the belief of infallibility in the Church, and is itself in its turn the miserable refuge from the despotism of the very infallibility before which it crouches in silence ; so among the votaries of heathen superstition, the doubts and misgivings of the thoughtful intellect and the troubled heart, were left to prey on themselves, shut up in abject submission to an external authority, and unprepared for their own defence and support. Socrates addressed a great portion of that practical information, which, in spite of his disclaimer of the office of a teacher, he was ever imparting to all around him, to the remedy of this distempered state of the religious feelings. He saw plainly enough that the vulgar theology could not be defended on the ground of rational evidence. This, therefore, in his respect for the ancient laws and customs of his country, he was content to lean on the sanction of positive institution. A great reverence, he justly thought, was due to the wisdom embodied in ancient laws ; and he would not

[1] Aristoph. *Eq.* 32.

[2] Thucyd. v. 105. Ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως,—and ἡγούμεθα τὸ θεῖον δόξῃ, are expressions of Thucydides, which shew the low ground on which religion was rested in Greece.

[3] Plato *Euthyphro*, p. 6. a. Ἀλλά μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγεῖ ταῦτα γεγονέναι οὕτως ; κ. τ. λ.

encourage persons wantonly to abandon the presumptions of truth and right naturally belonging to established institutions. At least, he would not have men rashly set up their own notions against the presumptions in favour of the wisdom of other men and other days, recommended as these were by some experience of their stability and use, whilst each man's private opinions had no such sanction, or no equivalent sanction. But he felt, also, that the internal sense of Religion wanted other support—that presumptions of human vanity and corruption were, and ever would be, brought to bear against this; and that such assaults could only be repelled by a well-informed reason prepared for the encounter. He therefore provided his hearer with a solid and impregnable argument in favour of the Being and Providence and Moral Government of the Deity. The argument was what is now familiarly known as the argument from final causes, or the evidences of Almighty design in the fabric and course of Nature. For this purpose, he gave an induction of instances from the world without, and from the intellectual and moral constitution of man himself, of admirable design in the adaptation of means to ends. He called upon men, with such evidences of Divine Benevolence around them, not to wait for any more palpable proof, such as judging from the analogy of Nature they had no ground to expect, but to believe in the existence of invisible things from their effects, and from the good received, to reverence the Deity, its author. The language, indeed, attributed to him by Xenophon, is in remarkable correspondence with that of St. Paul, declaring that, "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead;"[1] and the tenor of his argument throughout illustrates the inspired observation of the apostle. More particularly we may advert to his striking inculcation of the doctrine of the Moral Government of God. He refers to the sense of responsibility as in itself an evidence of the existence

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 3. 14. Ἃ χρὴ καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον. αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν

of a Divine Power to reward and punish ;[1] and he points to the pleasure and pain, advantage and disadvantage, respectively consequent on virtuous and vicious conduct, in the course of things, as instances of a perfection of government beyond the power of human laws.[2] The stock of instances has been enlarged by the researches of modern science, and strength has been added to them by their arrangement and combination. But Socrates, after all, has the distinguished merit of being the first to give the argument from final causes an explicit statement and due importance in the proof of Natural Religion.

When we think that truths of such high import and interest were so sedulously propagated for so many years in the place of concourse of the civilized world, we naturally turn from the contemplation of the living philosopher, to ask, what was the result—what was the amount of beneficial influence on the people to whom his mission was addressed. We cannot doubt, that on the whole the influence was great—that the serious errors of many in regard to the conduct of life were corrected—their minds opened to consider the great purposes for which they had been born into the world, and to look for happiness, not from transitory sensual enjoyments, but from the sober and vigorous exertion of their powers of thought and action. In some conspicuous instances, indeed, his endeavours strikingly failed. Critias and Alcibiades were known wherever the name of Athens was heard. And their wild and guilty career presented to the public eye a splendid mirror, from which the most unjust censure was reflected on the philosopher himself. But the many instances which must have occurred in humbler life, of his success in the

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 4. 16. Οἶει δ' ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι, ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν.

[2] Ibid. iv. 4. 24. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες ἔφη, θεοῖς ταῦτα πάντα ἔοικε· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὰς τιμωρίας ἔχειν βελτίονος ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον νομοθέτου δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. So Bishop Butler, in his *Analogy*, part i. ch. 2, observes, "For if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them, without a trial, and the formalities of an execution; if they were able to make the laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself; we should be just in the same sense under their government then, as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more perfect manner." P. 51.

work of moral reformation, are passed over in silence. That there were such instances Xenophon has given us to understand, when he observes, in his simple manner, that Socrates used to send forth those who associated with him, improved by the effect of his intercourse with them.[1] To expect, however, any decisive and permanent public improvement from the teaching of the philosopher, would be to overlook the extent and the malignity of heathen corruption. The men of that day, as of the present, had the voice of God distinctly speaking within them; "their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing or excusing them;" according to that just description of them which Scripture has set before us. But if they shut their ears, and hardened their hearts against this divine instruction, how would they listen to one who was ever upbraiding them with their dulness and inattention to its lessons and admonitions? Rather, they would feel towards him, according to that apposite illustration of Plato, as persons dozing towards one that should wake them up, and, after ridding themselves of his disturbance, think quietly to compose themselves to sleep again.[2] For he did not disguise that his mission to them was one of reproof and expostulation—a mission, as he expressly told them, from the Deity; and that his real concern, accordingly, was not for himself, but for the success of his mission, lest they should incur the guilt of rejecting a divine gift.[3]

And truly we may regard that energetic call which he was ever sounding in the ears of his countrymen, as a providential warning to the heathen world around him, against that reprobate mind—that state of alienation from the life of God—when they who have continually resisted all His gracious appeals to their hearts, are left to eat of the fruit of their own ways, and, "being past feeling, give themselves over unto lasci-

[1] Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 2. 61. *βελτίους γὰρ ποιῶν τοὺς συγγιγνομένους ἀπέπεμπεν.* Also ib. 4. 19; iv. 5. 24.

[2] Plato, *Apol. Socr.* 31, a. Op. i. 72.

[3] Ibid. *Πολλοῦ δεώ ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν, ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι.* P. 71.

viousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness." As God sent his Prophets to his chosen people, to tell them of their transgressions, and bid them "remember the law of Moses his servant;" so in his dealings with the nations of the world, He appears to have raised up, from time to time, individuals from among themselves, heathens still, yet gifted with a purity of moral vision beyond their contemporaries, to retrace the Divine outline of their original nature, amidst the ruins and crumbling monuments of its former greatness; and to declare, almost authoritatively, the indelible but forgotten law of Truth and Righteousness. Israel rejected its Prophets, and persecuted and slew them; but through all the perverseness of the people, those Prophets still proclaimed and prepared the way of the Lord. The heathen world, in like manner, refused to listen to the voice of its monitors—its Legislators, and Philosophers, and Moralists; but in spite of their general obduracy and indifference, we cannot but believe that the call was not utterly fruitless. To the original influence of Socrates especially, brought, as this was, to bear on the great centre of heathen civilization, it may have been, in some measure, owing, that the light of religious and moral truth was kept alive, however faintly burning, for successive generations, in many a dark abode of superstition; and that in a later day, the revelation of the Gospel appealed not without effect to the Areopagite of Athens, the jailor of Philippi, and the Roman Proconsul at Paphos. He certainly excited a spirit of eager curiosity on moral subjects; as was evidenced in the rise of the schools of philosophy to meet the demands of that spirit, and in the moral character of the disquisitions pursued in them. But this spirit could not have exhausted itself in mere literary discussion. There were doubtless the waverings of anxious minds beyond the precincts of the schools, to be settled; there were souls, craving after more safe direction of personal conduct than such as the world presented, to be satisfied. Such a state of things would keep men looking for gospel-truth. Some would feel, as Alcibiades is represented by Plato, and Euthydemus by Xenophon,

after a conversation with Socrates, at a loss how to pray. And to such the answer of Socrates, as given by Plato, would very indistinctly perhaps, yet not without earnest hope, suggest the high thought, that they must patiently wait until they could be informed by God himself, as to the proper disposition towards God and men; or until one should come to discipline them—to remove the darkness from their eyes, and enable them to discern both good and evil.[1]

[1] Alcib. ii. p. 150, d. Πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων; ἥδιστα γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἰδεῖν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστιν· Σ. Οὗτός ἐστιν ᾧ μέλει περὶ σοῦ, κ. τ. λ. Op. v. p. 100.

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